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Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies

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An argument can be made that social science has been *too* geographical and not sufficiently historical, in the sense that geographical assumptions have trapped consideration of social and political-economic processes in geographical structures and containers that defy historical change.

*John Agnew*¹

Since the early 1970s, debates have raged throughout the social sciences concerning the process of “globalization” – an essentially contested term whose meaning is as much a source of controversy today as it was over two decades ago, when systematic research first began on the topic. Contemporary globalization research encompasses an immensely broad range of themes, from the new international division of labor, changing forms of industrial organization, and processes of urban-regional restructuring to transformations in the nature of state power, civil society, citizenship, democracy, public spheres, nationalism, politico-cultural identities, localities, and architectural forms, among many others.² Yet despite this proliferation of globalization research, little theoretical consensus has been established in the social sciences concerning the interpretation of even the most rudimentary elements of the globalization process – e.g., its historical periodization, its causal determinants, and its socio-political implications.³

Nevertheless, within this whirlwind of opposing perspectives, a remarkably broad range of studies of globalization have devoted detailed attention to the problematic of space, its social production, and its historical transformation. Major strands of contemporary globalization research have been permeated by geographical concepts – e.g., “space-time compression,” “space of flows,” “space of places,” “de-territorialization,” “glocalization,” the “global-local nexus,” “supra-

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territoriality,” “diasporas,” “translocalities,” and “scapes,” among many other terms. Meanwhile globalization researchers have begun to deploy a barrage of distinctively geographical prefixes – e.g. “sub-,” “supra-,” “trans-,” “meso-,” and “inter-,” – to describe various emergent social processes that appear to operate below, above, beyond, or between entrenched geopolitical boundaries. The recognition that social relations are becoming increasingly interconnected on a global scale necessarily problematizes the spatial parameters of those relations, and therefore, the geographical context in which they occur. Under these circumstances, space no longer appears as a static platform of social relations, but rather as one of their constitutive dimensions, itself historically produced, reconfigured, and transformed.

The key methodological link between these major reorientations in the contemporary social sciences – the explosion of interest in globalization studies; and the recent “reassertion of space in critical social theory”⁴ – has been the pervasive questioning of the territorial nation-state as a preconstituted geographical unit of analysis for social research. As various authors have recently argued, significant strands of the social sciences have long been locked into a state-centric “territorial trap” in which states are viewed as the self-enclosed geographical containers of socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations.⁵ However, to the extent that the current round of globalization has significantly reconfigured, and at least partially undermined, the container-like qualities of states, this inherited model of territorially self-enclosed, state-defined societies, economies, or cultures has become highly problematic. Thus arises the need for new modes of analysis that do not naturalize state territoriality and its associated, Cartesian image of space as a static, bounded block. Particularly since the early 1980s, globalization researchers have constructed a variety of heterodox, interdisciplinary, and even post-disciplinary methodologies that have begun to challenge the “iron grip of the nation-state on the social imagination.”⁶ I view this wide-ranging effort to transcend state-centric epistemologies as the unifying theme of contemporary globalization research.

Against the background of the apparent “spatial turn” in contemporary globalization studies, the present article examines critically the efforts of globalization researchers to achieve their goal of “unthinking” (to borrow Immanuel Wallerstein’s terminology)⁷ state-centric modes of sociological inquiry.⁸ I believe that one of the central intellectual barriers to a more adequate understanding of globalization is that we

currently lack appropriately *historical* conceptualizations of social and political space. Indeed, despite the efforts of critical human geographers in recent decades to critique such assumptions, space is still commonly understood throughout the social sciences as a realm of stasis, as a pre-given, unchanging territorial platform upon which social action occurs.⁹ Even within contemporary globalization studies, I shall argue, major strands of research are grounded upon implicit, relatively un-historical geographical assumptions that are derived from an earlier, now largely superseded state-centric configuration of capitalist development. Meanwhile, those globalization researchers who have moved beyond such state-centric geographical assumptions have generally done so by arguing that state territoriality and even geography itself are shrinking, contracting, or dissolving as a consequence of processes of “deterritorialization.” A break with state-centrism is thus secured through the state’s conceptual negation, a move that sidesteps the analysis of newly emergent, reterritorialized forms of state power and their associated political geographies.

In contrast to these positions, I argue that the current wave of globalization is leading to: 1) the transcendence of the state-centric configuration of capitalist territorial organization that prevailed throughout much of the twentieth century; and 2) the production of new configurations of territoriality on both sub- and supra-national geographical scales. A crucial if apparently paradoxical corollary of this thesis is that state-centric mappings of spatiality severely limit our understanding of the territorial state’s *own* major role at once as a site, medium, and agent of globalization, as well as the ways in which this role is currently triggering a reterritorialization of the state itself. Therefore, the effort to escape the “territorial trap” of state-centrism does not entail a denial of the state’s continued relevance as a major geographical locus of social power, but rather a rethinking of the meaning of both state territoriality and political space in an era of intensified globalization.

My argument proceeds as follows. First, I summarize the conceptualization of globalization that will be deployed in this discussion. On this basis, I analyze the epistemology of state-centrism and its basic geographical assumptions. In the main part of the essay, I indicate various ways in which the contemporary round of globalization has undermined state-centric modes of analysis. Through an immanent critique of two major strands of globalization research – labeled, respectively, “global territorialist” approaches and “deterritorialization” approaches – I elaborate an alternative analysis of the contemporary round of

globalization as a multi-scalar process of reterritorialization in which states play crucial roles. A brief concluding section outlines three central methodological challenges for future research on the geographies of globalization.

Globalization and the production of space

As already noted, “globalization” is a highly contested term. Some researchers privilege shifts in the world economy such as the growing role of transnational corporations, the deregulation of finance capital, the expansion of foreign direct investment, the intensified deployment of information technologies, and the dissolution of the Bretton Woods monetary regime since the early 1970s.¹⁰ Others emphasize various newly emergent forms of collective identity, political consciousness, and diaspora that appear to have unsettled the principle of nationality as a locus of everyday social relations, as well as new forms of technologically mediated sociocultural interaction that seem oblivious to national territorial boundaries.¹¹ Finally, some authors have defined globalization more abstractly, as a process through which interdependencies among geographically distant localities, places, and territories are at once extended, deepened, and intensified.¹² Clearly the relative merits of these and other definitions of globalization hinge upon their usefulness as tools of analysis with reference to particular research questions. In what follows I am concerned to explore the implications of the current round of globalization for the *geographical* organization of world capitalism. Consequently, globalization is theorized here as a reconfiguration of superimposed social spaces that unfolds simultaneously upon multiple geographical scales.

I view the contemporary round of globalization as the most recent historical expression of a *longue durée* dynamic of continual deterritorialization and reterritorialization that has underpinned the production of capitalist spatiality since the first industrial revolution of the early nineteenth century. On the one hand, capitalism is under the impulsion to eliminate all geographical barriers to the accumulation process in search of cheaper raw materials, fresh sources of labor-power, new markets for its products, and new investment opportunities. This expansionary, deterritorializing tendency within capitalism was clearly recognized by Marx, who famously described capital’s globalizing dynamic as a drive to “annihilate space by time” and analyzed the world market at once as its historical product and its geographical expres-

sion.¹³ On the other hand, as David Harvey has argued at length, the resultant processes of “space-time compression” must be viewed as one moment within a contradictory sociospatial dialectic that continually molds, differentiates, deconstructs, and reworks capitalism’s geographical landscape.¹⁴ According to Harvey, it is only through the production of relatively fixed and immobile configurations of territorial organization – including urban built environments, industrial agglomerations, regional production complexes, large-scale transportation infrastructures, long-distance communications networks, and state regulatory institutions – that capital’s circulation process can be continually accelerated temporally and expanded spatially. Each successive round of capitalist industrialization has therefore been premised upon socially produced geographical infrastructures that enable the accelerated circulation of capital through global space. In this sense, as Harvey notes, “spatial organisation is necessary to overcome space.”¹⁵

This theoretical insight enables Harvey to interpret the historical geography of capitalism as a “restless formation and re-formation of geographical landscapes” in which configurations of capitalist territorial organization are incessantly created, destroyed, and reconstituted as provisionally stabilized “spatial fixes” for each successive regime of accumulation.¹⁶ From this perspective, social space operates at once as a presupposition, medium, and outcome of capitalism’s globalizing developmental dynamic. Space is not merely a physical container within which capitalist development unfolds, but one of its constitutive *social* dimensions, continually constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed through an historically specific, multi-scalar dialectic of de- and re-territorialization.

Building upon this theorization, I understand globalization as a double-edged, dialectical process through which: 1) the movement of commodities, capital, money, people, images, and information through geographical space is continually expanded and accelerated; and 2) relatively fixed and immobile socioterritorial infrastructures are produced, reconfigured, redifferentiated, and transformed to enable such expanded, accelerated movement. Globalization therefore entails a dialectical interplay between the endemic drive towards space-time compression under capitalism (the moment of *deterritorialization*) and the continual production of relatively fixed, provisionally stabilized configurations of territorial organization on multiple geographical scales (the moment of *reterritorialization*).

Thus conceived, globalization is an ongoing, conflictual and dialectical process rather than a static situation or a terminal condition. Moreover, globalization is both spatial (based upon the continual extension, reconfiguration, and restructuring of capitalist territorial organization) and temporal (based upon the continual acceleration of capital's socially average turnover time). Finally, globalization unfolds simultaneously upon multiple, intertwined geographical scales – not only within global space, but through the production, differentiation, reconfiguration, and transformation of sub-global spaces such as territorial states, regions, cities, and localities.

Two key implications of this theorization deserve particular emphasis. First, as defined here, globalization does not occur simply through the geographical extension of capitalism to encompass progressively larger zones of the globe. Though a capitalist world economy has existed since the earliest round of capitalist growth during the long sixteenth century, it was not until the shift from mercantile to industrial capitalism during the nineteenth century that capital accumulation became *intrinsically* premised upon large-scale, socially produced territorial infrastructures for production, exchange, distribution, consumption, transportation, communication, and the like. As Henri Lefebvre argues, it is only in the wake of this epochal transformation “from the production of things in space to the production of space” that the geographical foundations for each successive wave of capitalist industrialization have been themselves continually produced, reorganized, and transformed through capital's *own* contradictory developmental dynamic.¹⁷ The resultant, incessantly changing “second nature” of capitalist territorial organization must therefore be viewed at once as a presupposition, medium, and outcome of the globalization process.¹⁸

Second, against conceptions of globalization as a process of state demise or erosion, territorial states are conceived here as essential geographical *components* of the globalization process. Much like urban-regional agglomerations, territorial states have operated as provisionally stabilized forms of territorialization for successive rounds of capital accumulation, particularly since the second industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century. With the consolidation of national-developmental political regimes during this period, states became ever more central to the promotion, regulation, and financing of capitalist industrial development – above all through their role in the construction of large-scale territorial infrastructures for industrial production, collective consumption, transportation, and communica-

tion.¹⁹ According to Lefebvre, the state's increasing role in the territorialization of capital since the late nineteenth century signaled the emergence of a new, globally articulated state form, the "state mode of production" (*le mode de production étatique*), oriented simultaneously toward: 1) the intensification of nationally specific patterns of capitalist industrialization; and 2) the institutional regulation of the new forms of uneven geographical development induced through this first, state-centric round of globalization.²⁰ From this perspective, the wave of globalization that unfolded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries actually entailed the *consolidation* of the state's role at once as a territorialized scaffolding for accelerated capitalist expansion and as an institutional interface between sub- and supra-national scales. Throughout this period, globalization and nationalization proceeded in tandem as mutually constitutive processes of socio-spatial restructuring.²¹ Below I argue that contemporary states continue to operate as key forms of territorialization for capital, but that the political geography of this state-organized territorialization process is being reconfigured in ways that undermine state-centric conceptions of capitalist territorial organization.

The epistemology of state-centrism

John Agnew has recently questioned whether discussions of space, territory, and place in the contemporary social sciences amount to a fully-fledged "sociospatial turn." Insofar as social science has always been permeated by historically specific geographical assumptions, Agnew argues, the notion of a "resurgence" or "reassertion" of spatial influences makes little sense.²² Although I believe that contemporary studies of globalization have indeed confronted the problematic of spatiality with a renewed intensity, this section provides support for Agnew's argument. State-centric approaches do not exclude geographical considerations to constitute a "despatialized" or "spaceless" social science: a distinctively ahistorical spatial ontology, the notion of "space-as-container," lies at their very heart. State-centrism can be defined in terms of its two most essential, if implicit, geographical assumptions: 1) the conception of space as a static platform of social action that is not itself constituted or modified socially; and 2) the conception of state territoriality as a preconstituted, naturalized, or unchanging scale of analysis.²³ The first assumption results in a *spatial fetishism* in which space is seen as being timeless, and therefore, immune to historical change. The second assumption results in a

methodological territorialism that analyzes all spatial forms and scales as being self-enclosed and territorially bounded geographical units. Taken together, these assumptions produce an internalist model of societal development in which territoriality operates as the static, timeless container of historicity.

Defined in this manner, a state-centric epistemology has dominated the modern social sciences since their inception during the late nineteenth century.²⁴ Not surprisingly, political science has been the most explicitly state-centric among the social sciences. States have been viewed as politically sovereign and economically self-propelled entities, with state territoriality understood as the basic reference point in terms of which all sub- and supra-state processes are to be classified. On this basis, the state is viewed as the container of society, while the interstate system is mapped in terms of a distinction between “domestic” politics and “foreign” relations that reinforces the state’s container-like character as the boundary separating “inside” from “outside.”²⁵ However, the above definition extends the problematic of state-centrism well beyond those fields of inquiry that are focused directly upon state-level processes (e.g., international relations theory; political sociology; comparative politics; development studies) to various modes of anthropological, sociological, and economic analysis in which the concept of the state is not explicitly deployed. As defined above, it can be argued that a state-centric epistemology has underpinned significant strands of sociology (with its focus on geographically fixed societies and communities), anthropology (with its focus on bounded, territorialized cultures) and macro-economics (with its focus on purportedly self-contained national economies).

First, as it has traditionally been deployed, the concept of society has implied that the boundaries of social relations are spatially congruent with those of the territorial nation-state.²⁶ Even when society has not been defined explicitly in terms of the state’s territorial boundaries, it has still been widely understood as a territorially self-enclosed entity, essentially as a sub-national replication of the state-defined society, its geographical analog on a smaller spatial scale.²⁷ Although anthropology avoided this explicit form of state-centrism prior to the advent of area studies during the postwar era, throughout its history most of the discipline has still presupposed a territorialized concept of culture as a localized, spatially fixed “community.”²⁸ Finally, from Smith and Ricardo to List, Keynes, and the contemporary monetarists, macro-economic theory has conceived the territorialized national economy as

its most basic unit of analysis, the preconstituted container of production, exchange, and consumption that is likewise said to be spatially coextensive with the state's territorial boundaries.²⁹ Trade theory has long contained an explicitly international dimension, but this too has remained state-centric insofar as states have been viewed as the primary geographical blocks between which the factors of production are moved and in terms of which comparative advantage is measured.³⁰

This unhistorical conception of spatiality can be usefully characterized as a state-centric epistemology because its widespread intellectual plausibility has been premised upon a naturalization of the modern state's specifically territorial form. Among the most rudimentary features of territoriality in social life is its role as a strategy grounded upon the parcelization and enclosure of space.³¹ However, in the modern interstate system, territoriality has assumed an historically specific geographical significance that Peter Taylor has concisely characterized in terms of "exhaustive multiplicity."³² With the dissolution of feudal hierarchies in late medieval Europe, political space came to be organized in terms of exclusive state control over self-enclosed territorial domains. This development was institutionalized in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which recognized the existence of an interstate system composed of contiguous, bounded territories ruled by sovereign states committed to the principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The consequence of this transformation has been the long-term enclosure of political, economic, and military power within a global patchwork of mutually exclusive yet contiguous state territories. This bundling of territoriality to state sovereignty is the essential characteristic of the modern interstate system.³³ "Exhaustive multiplicity" refers to: 1) the *territorialization* of state power, through which each state strives to exercise exclusive sovereignty over a delineated, self-enclosed geographical space; and 2) the *globalization* of the state form, through which the entire globe is subdivided into a single geopolitical grid composed of multiple, contiguous state territories.³⁴

The notion of territoriality is a polysemic category and not all of its meanings refer to this statist global geography. However, since the late nineteenth century the social sciences have come to presuppose a territorialist image of social space derived from the form of territory-sovereignty nexus produced and continually reinscribed within the modern interstate system. By the mid-twentieth century, each of the conceptual building blocks of the modern social sciences – in particular the notions of state, society, economy, culture, and community – had

come to presuppose this territorialization of social relations within a parcelized, fixed, and essentially timeless geographical space. The resultant territorialist epistemology has entailed the transposition of the historically unique territorial structure of the modern interstate system into a generalized model of sociospatial organization, whether with reference to political, societal, economic, or cultural processes.³⁵ Within this framework, socio-historical change is said to occur within the fixed territorial boundaries of a state, society, culture, or economy rather than through the continual production, reconstitution, or transformation of those boundaries and the spatial practices they enclose.

Particularly from a late twentieth-century vantage point, it is crucial to recognize that the epistemology of state-centrism was not mere fantasy. Its widespread intellectual plausibility was derived from the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century historical-geographical context in which the social sciences first emerged, during which the territorial state's role in "encaging" socioeconomic and politico-cultural relations within its boundaries dramatically intensified.³⁶ Although the lineages of this statist developmental configuration can be traced to the late eighteenth century, when England's "territorial economy" superseded the "city-centered economy" of Amsterdam, it was above all during the twentieth century that the interstate system came to operate increasingly like "a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality."³⁷ As Karl Polanyi famously argued, Britain's attempt to institutionalize a "self-regulating" world market during the nineteenth century by combining imperialist expansion with trade liberalization eventually resulted in a countervailing "great transformation" in which increasingly autarkic, protectionist regulatory frameworks were constructed throughout western Europe and North America.³⁸ Lash and Urry interpret the nationally organized forms of state regulation that were subsequently introduced as the socio-institutional basis for "organized capitalism," the global regime of accumulation that prevailed from the early twentieth century until the world economic crises of the early 1970s.³⁹ During the postwar period, under the rubric of U.S. global hegemony and the Bretton Woods global monetary regime, national-developmental practices and ideologies were further consolidated throughout the world economy, grounded upon the notion that each state would guide its society through a linear, internally-defined, and self-propelled process of "modernization." Samir Amin describes the resultant, national-developmental configuration of capitalist globalization as a form of "autocentrism"

oriented toward a nationally scaled spatial congruence between political and economic structures.⁴⁰

This intensified territorialization of social relations on the national scale suggests that “the state-centric nature of social science faithfully reflected the power containers that dominated the social world it was studying.”⁴¹ However, the theorization of globalization outlined previously points toward a somewhat different interpretation: the epistemology of state-centrism is to be viewed less as a “faithful reflection” of its historical-geographical context than as a state-induced *misrecognition* of that context. In our terms, the epistemology of state-centrism was tightly enmeshed within the national-developmental round of globalization that unfolded during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the one hand, processes of space-time compression intensified in conjunction with the second industrial revolution, the globalizing expansion of the world economy, and the era of high imperialism. On the other hand, this simultaneous extension and acceleration of capitalism was premised upon the construction of large-scale territorial configurations, above all the production, transportation, and communications infrastructures of major industrial cities and the highly bureaucratized institutional-regulatory systems of territorial states. However, state-centric modes of analysis focus upon only one pole of this dialectic of de- and reterritorialization, that of territorial fixity, as embodied in the state’s bounded, territorialized form.

Henri Lefebvre’s analysis of the modern state as a form of “violence directed towards a space” sheds light upon this territorialist misrecognition.⁴² In Lefebvre’s view, the modern state is grounded intrinsically on the drive to rationalize, unify, and homogenize social relations within its territorial space: “Each state claims to produce a space wherein something is accomplished, a space, even, where something is brought to perfection: namely, a unified and hence homogenous society.”⁴³ But as Lefebvre is quick to add: “The space that homogenizes ... has nothing homogenous about it.”⁴⁴ One of the basic features of state-centric modes of analysis is to conflate the historical *tendency* toward the territorialization of social relations on a national scale – which has undoubtedly intensified during much of the twentieth century – with its historical *realization*. Territorialization is thus represented as a natural precondition of social and political existence rather than being seen as a product of historically determinate strategies of parcelization, centralization, enclosure, and encaging. As

Lefebvre elaborates with reference to the “abstract space” of modern capitalism:

Abstract space *is not* homogenous; it simply *has* homogeneity as its goal, its orientation, its “lens.” And, indeed, it renders homogenous. But in itself it is multiform.... Thus to look upon abstract space as homogeneous is to embrace a representation that takes the effect for the cause, and the goal for the reason why the goal was pursued. A representation which passes itself off as a *concept*, when it is merely an image, a mirror and a mirage; and which instead of challenging, instead of refusing, merely *reflects*. And what does such a specular representation reflect? It reflects the result sought.⁴⁵

Only in this specific sense, then, did the epistemology of state-centrism “reflect” its historical-geographical context – not through an act of mimesis, but through a form of reification in which the “result sought,” the “fetishization of space in the service of the state,” is treated as an actualized reality rather than as a tendency within an ongoing dialectic.⁴⁶

The crucial point in the present context, therefore, is that territorialization – whether on national, sub-national, or supra-national scales – must be viewed as an historically specific, contradictory, and conflictual *process* rather than as a pregiven, fixed, or natural condition. By contrast, state-centric epistemologies freeze the image of state territoriality into a generalized ontological feature of social life, and thereby neglect the ways in which the latter has been continually produced, reconfigured, and transformed as a key geographical infrastructure for capital’s developmental dynamic.

Conceptualizing globalization: The re-scaling of territoriality

Since the early 1970s, the geographies of capitalism have been transformed in ways that directly underscore the socially produced, historical character of space. As Neil Smith indicates, the entrenched geopolitical and geoeconomic structures of twentieth-century capitalism have been radically reconfigured at once on global, national, regional, and urban scales.⁴⁷ On the *global* scale, a “new international division of labor” has been consolidated in conjunction with the globalization of productive capital and the concomitant industrialization of various erstwhile Third World countries. By 1989, with the dismantling of the Second World, the postwar geopolitical division of the globe had been thoroughly redifferentiated, fragmented, and rearranged. On the *na-*

tional scale, territorial borders have become increasingly porous to international capital, particularly in its financial and monetary forms; and since the dissolution of the Bretton Woods currency system in the early 1970s, the viability of nationally organized monetary policies has been decisively undermined. At the same time, however, the nation-state form has been further entrenched through a burst of resurgent nationalisms and the proliferation of ethnic warfare among populations struggling to redraw national territorial boundaries. On *regional* scales, the industrial heartlands of North Atlantic Fordism have experienced dramatic deindustrialization, while an array of new industrial spaces have sprouted up in urbanized regions from Silicon Valley and Orange County to southern England, Baden-Württemberg, and the Third Italy. Inherited patterns of urban-rural polarization are being superimposed upon a distinctively post-Fordist landscape of geographical unevenness in which regional industrial cores throughout the world economy compete ever more directly with one another. Finally, on the *urban* scale, processes of urban redevelopment and gentrification have redefined the map of metropolitan and suburban growth that underpinned the postwar wave of urbanization. In this context, new forms of local and regional state regulation are being mobilized at once to promote this geographical reconcentration of capital and to exercise control over the urban spaces in which it occurs. In the face of this kaleidoscope of intertwined geographical transformations, Neil Smith concludes:

The solidity of the geography of twentieth century capitalism at various scales has melted; habitual spatial assumptions about the world have evaporated.... It is as if the world map as jig-saw puzzle had been tossed in the air these last two decades, leaving us to reconstruct a viable map of everything from bodily and local change to global identity. Under these circumstances, the taken-for-grantedness of space is impossible to sustain. Space is increasingly revealed as a richly political and social product, and putting the jig-saw puzzle back together – in practice as well as in theory – is a highly contested affair.⁴⁸

Smith's formulation puts into relief one of the central methodological challenges of contemporary globalization research: to map the geographies of contemporary capitalism in ways that transcend the "habitual spatial assumptions" of state-centric epistemologies. As the geographical foundations of twentieth-century capitalism are profoundly unsettled, deconstructed, and reworked, an urgent need arises for analytical frameworks that do not imprison the social sciences within timeless, territorialist, and unhistorical representations of social space.

To date, however, most globalization researchers have confronted this methodological challenge in one of two ways – either through an analysis of the global scale in implicitly state-centric terms, as a globally stretched territorial grid; or through an emphasis on processes of “deterritorialization,” which purportedly trigger the demise, erosion, or contraction of state territoriality. The former approach transposes state-centric mappings of space onto the global scale, and thus remains trapped within a narrowly territorialist understanding of contemporary capitalism. The latter approach transcends the territorialist epistemology of state-centrism on the basis of two equally problematic assumptions: 1) the notion that globalization is an essentially non-territorial, borderless, supra-territorial, or territorially disembedded process; and 2) the notion that globalization entails the erosion of the state. My goal throughout the rest of this article is to indicate why neither of these methodological strategies can provide an adequate mapping of the contemporary round of globalization, and to begin to outline the basic elements of an alternative methodology for globalization studies.

The core of my argument is the claim that the contemporary round of globalization has radically reconfigured the scalar organization of territorialization processes under capitalism, *relativizing* the significance of the national scale while simultaneously *intensifying* the role of both sub- and supra-national forms of territorial organization. On the one hand, the contemporary round of globalization must be viewed as yet another wave of de- and reterritorialization through which global socioeconomic interdependencies are being intensified, deepened, and expanded in conjunction with the production, reconfiguration, and transformation of relatively fixed forms of territorial organization on sub-global geographical scales. On the other hand, however, the social, economic, and political geographies of this dynamic of de- and reterritorialization are being radically reorganized relative to the entrenched, state-centric patterns that have prevailed since the late nineteenth century. Whereas previous rounds of de- and reterritorialization occurred largely *within* the geographical framework of state territoriality, contemporary processes of globalization have significantly decentered the role of the national scale both as a self-enclosed container of socioeconomic relations and as an organizational interface between sub- and supra-national scales. As this “denationalization of the state” has proceeded apace, a wide range of sub- and supra-national forms of territorial organization – from global city-regions, industrial districts, and regional state institutions to transnational economic blocks and

regulatory systems such as NAFTA, ASEAN, and the EU – have acquired increasingly crucial roles as geographical infrastructures for capitalism.⁴⁹

These shifts in the scalar organization of capitalism have been variously described as processes of “re-scaling” or “jumping scales.”⁵⁰ Their central consequence has been to thrust the apparently ossified, entrenched fixity of state territoriality abruptly and dramatically into historical *motion*, radically redefining its geographical significance, its organizational structures, and its interconnections to both sub- and supra-national scales. Processes of territorialization remain endemic to capitalism, but today they are jumping at once above, below, and around the national scale upon which they converged throughout much of the last century. Consequently, state territoriality currently operates less as an isomorphic, self-enclosed block of absolute space than as a polymorphic institutional mosaic composed of multiple, partially overlapping levels that are neither congruent, contiguous, nor coextensive with one another.⁵¹ I view this re-scaling of territoriality as the *differentia specifica* of the currently unfolding round of globalization. Crucially, this re-scaling of territoriality does not entail the state’s erosion but rather its *reterritorialization* onto both sub- and supra-national scales. States continue to operate as essential sites of territorialization for social, political, and economic relations, even if the political geography of this territorialization process no longer converges predominantly or exclusively upon any single, self-enclosed geographical scale.

A detailed empirical-historical account of these ongoing geographical transformations lies beyond the scope of this article.⁵² My concern here is to elaborate the notion of a re-scaling of territoriality through an immanent critique of the two major strands of globalization research mentioned above. Because so much of contemporary globalization research remains grounded upon state-centric or otherwise problematic geographical assumptions, I consider this type of epistemological critique to be a crucial prerequisite for the task of analyzing the currently emergent geographies of globalization.

Global territorialism: State-centrism on a world scale

All accounts of globalization entail some version of the claim that the global scale has become increasingly important as an organizing locus

of social relations. However, this emphasis on the global scale has been intertwined with extremely diverse conceptualizations of global social space. This section considers approaches to globalization research that conceive global space in essentially state-centric terms, either as a pre-given geographical container or as a form of territoriality stretched onto the global scale.

The deployment of this type of “global territorialist” methodology is frequently quite explicit, as in Albrow’s definition of globalization as “those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, a global society.”⁵³ Indeed, the concept of “world society” has played a defining role within a major strand of globalization research, according to which globalization entails not only the growing interconnectedness of distinct parts of the globe, but in Waters’s characteristic formulation, the construction of “a *single* society and culture occupying the planet.”⁵⁴ Other globalization researchers have elaborated analogous accounts of “global culture” and “transnational civil society.”⁵⁵

In each case the modifier “global” is positioned before a traditionally state-centric term – “society,” “civil society,” or “culture” – to demarcate a realm of sociocultural interaction that transcends the borders of any single state territory. Whether this sphere of interaction is understood in normative terms (e.g., as a site of universalistic values such as human rights, equality, peace, and democracy), institutionally (e.g., as a framework of globally standardized economic, political, educational, and scientific practices) or experientially (e.g., as a worldwide diffusion of American, European, or Western cultural influences), these “world society” approaches share a conception of global space as a structural analog to state territoriality. Insofar as the interpretation of global space is derived directly from an understanding of the territorially configured, national spaces of “societies” and “cultures,” the question of the qualitative sociospatial organization of world-scale processes is essentially foreclosed through a choice of conceptual grammar. The difference between global and national configurations of social space is thereby reduced to a matter of geographical size. Meanwhile, because globalization is understood primarily as a world-scale process, the role of national and sub-national territorial transformations in the globalization process cannot be explicitly analyzed. In this sense, even as their unit of analysis is extended beyond national territorial boundaries, “world society” approaches remain deeply embedded within a state-centric epistemology that conceives space – on both global and national

scales – as a timeless, territorial container of social relations. The preconstituted geographical space of the globe is presumed to be simply *filled* by the sociocultural practices associated with the globalization process rather than being produced, reconfigured, or transformed through the latter.

Roland Robertson's neo-Parsonsian cultural sociology of globalization instantiates a somewhat less explicit version of this global territorialist approach.⁵⁶ Here global space is not defined in directly state-centric terms such as "society" or "culture," but rather through the more geographically ambiguous categories of "place" and "field." For Robertson, globalization is a multi-faceted process that has led to the formation of what he terms a situation of "global unicity" – the development of the world "as a single place," or "the concrete structuration of the world as a whole."⁵⁷ Robertson's analysis of globalization consists of a synchronic aspect (a "dimensional model" of the "global field") and a diachronic aspect (a "sequential phase model of globalization"). According to Robertson, the "global field" is an invariant structural matrix upon which sociocultural conceptions of the world are organized; its components are the "quintessential features of the terms in which it is possible to conceive of the world."⁵⁸ Robertson classifies the latter according to four basic dimensions, "societies, individuals, the system of societies and mankind," which are together said to constitute the "global-human condition."⁵⁹ Globalization is then defined as a heightened "self-consciousness" of the relations among these dimensions, which leads in turn to an increasing "differentiation of the main spheres of globality."⁶⁰ Robertson elaborates a five-stage periodization to describe this world-historical trend towards intensified "global unicity": the "germinal" phase (fifteenth to eighteenth centuries); the "incipient" phase (mid-eighteenth century to 1870s) the "take-off" phase (1870s–1920s); the "struggle-for-hegemony" phase (1920s–1960s); and the "uncertainty" phase (1960s–present).⁶¹

However, despite his concern to analyze world-scale processes, Robertson's analysis reproduces a state-centric image of global space as a timeless, territorial framework that contains historicity without itself evolving historically. First, Robertson conceives the global scale as a self-enclosed territorial container in which the structural differentiation of individuals, societies, inter-societal relations, and humanity occurs: "globality" is viewed as a macro-geographical form of state territoriality. Thus conceived, as in the "world society" approaches discussed above, globalization entails an intermeshing of preconsti-

tuted *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* structures on the scale of the “world-as-a-whole” rather than a qualitative restructuring of these inherited, statist forms of territorial organization. Second, Robertson’s conception of global space is essentially unhistorical. Robertson analyzes the changing interdependencies among individuals, states, societies, and the “global-human condition” in orthodox Parsonsian terms, as a unilinear, evolutionary process of structural differentiation among preconstituted spatial scales.⁶² This differentiation is said to occur within the pre-given space of “globality”; yet this global space is not said to be constituted, modified, or transformed historically. Instead the “global field” is viewed as an invariant, systemic hierarchy, stretching from the individual and society to the interstate system and the “global human condition.” In Robertson’s theorization, the globalization process passes *through* each of these components without qualitatively transforming them or the hierarchy in which they are embedded. By subsuming currently unfolding global transformations within this universal, historically invariant process of structural differentiation, Robertson’s analysis excludes *a priori* the possibility of qualitative sociospatial transformations on any geographical scale. Robertson’s cultural sociology of globalization therefore entails the transposition of state-centrism onto a world scale rather than its transcendence.

One further instance of a global territorialist approach to globalization research can be excavated from Immanuel Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis, which is otherwise among the most powerful, sustained critiques of explicitly state-centric frameworks yet to be developed in the social sciences. By demonstrating the long-run and macro-geographical parameters of capitalism, Wallerstein’s pioneering studies have also served as a useful corrective to excessively presentist interpretations of the post-1970s wave of globalization that exaggerate its discontinuity with earlier historical configurations of capitalist development.⁶³ Nonetheless, despite these substantial achievements, I believe that Wallerstein’s theoretical framework replicates on a global scale the methodological territorialism of the very state-centric epistemologies he has otherwise criticized so effectively. To elaborate this claim, the intersection of global space and state territoriality in Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis must be examined more closely.

Wallerstein conceptualizes capitalism as a geographically integrated historical system grounded upon a single division of labor. Global space is conceived neither as “society,” “culture,” nor as “place,” but

rather in terms of the more geographically and historically specific notion of the “modern world-system.” Although Wallerstein defines this capitalist world-system on multiple levels – e.g. in terms of the drive toward ceaseless accumulation; the commodification of production, distribution, and investment processes; and the antagonistic class relation between capitalists and wage-laborers – he argues repeatedly that its unique *scalar* form is one of its constitutive features.⁶⁴ In contradistinction to previous historical systems (“world-empires”), in which the division of labor, state power, and cultural forms overlapped more or less congruently within the same territorial domains, capitalism is composed of “a *single* division of labor but *multiple* polities and cultures.”⁶⁵ It is through this abstract contrast between two geometrical images – world-empires in which the economic division of labor is spatially congruent with structures of politico-cultural organization; and world-economies in which a single division of labor encompasses multiple states and multiple cultural formations – that Wallerstein delineates the geographical foundations of capitalism. In essence, Wallerstein grasps the specificity of capitalist spatiality in terms of the *territorial non-congruence* of economic structures (“singular”) with politico-institutional and cultural forms (“multiple”). According to Wallerstein, the long-run reproduction of capitalism has hinged crucially upon the durability of this sociospatial arrangement, which has provided capital with “a freedom of maneuver that is structurally based [and thereby] made possible the constant economic expansion of the world-system.”⁶⁶ On this basis, Wallerstein outlines the long-run history of world capitalism with reference to three intersecting spatio-temporal processes – first, the Kondratieff cycles, secular trends, and systemic crises of the world-scale accumulation process; second, the cycles of hegemonic ascension and decline among the core states; and third, the geographical incorporation of “external areas” until, by the late 19th century, the international division of labor had become co-extensive with most of the planet’s physical-geographical surface.⁶⁷

However, considering Wallerstein’s avowed concern to transcend state-centric models of modernity, states occupy a surprisingly pivotal theoretical position within his conceptual framework. Although the division of labor in the capitalist world-economy is said to be stratified into three supra-state zones (core, semi-periphery, and periphery), Wallerstein argues that its most elemental geographical units are nevertheless states, or more precisely, the bounded territories over which states exercise sovereignty. To be sure, Wallerstein maintains that the economic division of labor within the world-system transcends the territorial

boundaries of each individual state; yet he consistently describes the historical dynamics of the world economy in terms of the differential positions of the *states* within its stratified core-periphery structure, rather than, for instance, with reference to firms, industries, circuits of capital, or urban systems. For Wallerstein, the economic division of labor is *intrinsically* composed of states; capitalist enterprises are in turn said to be “domiciled” within their associated national state structures.⁶⁸ Wallerstein’s conception of global space is thus most precisely described as an *inter-state* division of labor: state territoriality serves as the basic geographical unit of the world economy; meanwhile global space is parcelized among three zonal patterns (core, semi-periphery, periphery), which are in turn composed of nationally scaled territorial economies. State territoriality and global space are thereby fused together into a seamless national-global topography in which the inter-state system and the world economy operate as a single, integrated system.⁶⁹

In this sense, it can be argued that Wallerstein’s concern to analyze the global scale as a distinctive unit of analysis does not lead to any qualitative modification in the way in which this space is conceptualized. In Wallerstein’s framework, the primary geographical units of global space are defined by the territorial boundaries of states, which in turn constitute a single, encompassing macro-territoriality, the world interstate system. The national scale is thereby blended into the global scale while the global scale is flattened into its national components. As in the tale of the traveler Gulliver who encounters identical micro- and macro-scopic replications of human society, a “society of midgets” and a “society of giants,” the global and the national scales are viewed as structural analogs of a single spatial form – territoriality.⁷⁰ The global merely multiplies national territoriality without modifying its essential features. Thus Wallerstein’s approach to world-system analysis entails the replication of a territorialist model of space not only on the national scale of the territorial state but on the global scale of the world system.

Wallerstein’s methodological fusion of the global and the national scales also leads to an interpretation of globalization primarily as a physical-geographical expansion of capitalism rather than as a reconstitution or transformation of the social and political spaces upon which it is based. To be sure, Wallerstein conceives global space as a historical product of capitalist expansion, but he acknowledges its historicity only in a limited sense, in contrast to previous historical systems such as world-empires. For *within* the capitalist historical system, space

appears to be frozen into a single geometric crystallization – “one economy, multiple states” – that cannot change qualitatively without exploding capitalism’s identity as a distinctive *type* of historical system. Each long wave of capitalist expansion reproduces the structurally invariant geographical pattern upon which capitalism is grounded, a grid of nationally organized state territories linked through a core-periphery structure to a single, global division of labor. Paradoxically, Wallerstein’s definition of the modern world-system as a global amalgamation of national spaces generates the state-centric methodological consequence that a specifically *capitalist* form of globalization can unfold only among *nationally scaled* forms of political and economic organization. The possibility that the globalization process might unhinge itself from this entrenched national-global couplet to privilege other sub- or supra-national forms of capitalist territorial organization is thereby excluded by definitional fiat.⁷¹

Two general methodological conclusions can be derived from this critical analysis of global territorialist approaches. First, the emphasis on global space does not necessarily lead to an overcoming of state-centric epistemologies. Global territorialist approaches represent global space in a state-centric manner, as a pre-given territorial container within which globalization unfolds, rather than analyzing the historical production, reconfiguration, and transformation of this space. As noted, one of the major deficiencies of state-centric modes of analysis is to conceive territorialization as a static condition rather than as an ongoing, dialectical process. Global territorialist approaches transpose this state-centric misrecognition from the national to the global scale. The current round of globalization does indeed appear to be intensifying globally scaled forms of interaction and interdependence. However, global territorialist approaches reify this emergent tendency into an actualized, globally scaled territoriality and thus circumvent the methodological task of analyzing global space as an historically constituted arena of multiple, superimposed spatial forms.

Second, state-centric conceptions of global space mask the territorial state’s *own* crucial role as a site and agent of the globalization process. The global territorialist approaches discussed above treat state territoriality as a static institutional framework over and above which the globalization process occurs, and thereby bracket the massive transformations of state territorial organization that have played a crucially enabling role in the contemporary round of globalization. The persistence of state-centric epistemologies in globalization studies thus

presents a major intellectual barrier to a more adequate understanding of currently emergent forms of state territoriality and political space.

As noted, I conceive the contemporary round of globalization as a conflictual reconfiguration of social space that unfolds simultaneously upon multiple, superimposed geographical scales. I now return to these ongoing re-scalings through a critical discussion of “deterritorialization” approaches to globalization studies.

Jumping scales: Deterritorialization as re-scaling

In contrast to global territorialist approaches, analyses of deterritorialization confront explicitly the task of analyzing spatiality in a historically specific manner. From this perspective, territoriality is viewed as an historically specific form of sociospatial organization that is being undermined in the contemporary round of globalization. New geographies of networks and flows are said to be supplanting the inherited geography of state territories that has long preoccupied the sociological imagination. Deterritorialization researchers have analyzed these emergent, purportedly “post-territorial” geographies as expressions of various factors, including the deployment of new informational, military, and transportation technologies; the internationalization of capital and financial markets; the virtualization of economic activity through electronically mediated monetary transactions; the global crisis of territorialized definitions of citizenship; the intensified role of electronic media in organizing socio-cultural identities; and the increasing density and velocity of transnational diasporic population movements.

Most deterritorialization research has represented the spaces of globalization (based upon circulation, flows, and geographical mobility) and the spaces of territorialization (based upon enclosure, borders, and geographical fixity) as mutually opposed systems of interaction. In Scholte’s characteristic formulation:

Global space is placeless, distanceless and borderless – and in this sense “supraterritorial.” In global relations, people are connected with one another pretty much irrespective of their territorial position. To that extent they effectively do not have a territorial location, apart from the broad sense of being situated on the planet earth. Global relations thus form a non-, extra-, post-, supra-territorial aspect of the world system. In the global domain, territorial boundaries present no particular impediment and distance is covered in effectively no time.⁷²

This image of global space as a “placeless, distanceless, and borderless” realm is the geographical essence of deterritorialization approaches. From Castells’s account of the “space of flows,” Jameson’s theorization of “postmodern hyperspace,” Ruggie’s interpretation of the EU as the world’s “first postmodern political form” and Appadurai’s concept of “ethnoscapes” to Ohmae’s notion of a “borderless world” and O’Brien’s still more radical thesis of an “end of geography,” analyses of deterritorialization have generally been premised upon this basic conceptual opposition between the “supra-territorial” or “deterritorialized” spaces in which globalization occurs and sub-global territories, localities, and places.⁷³

The logical corollary of this conceptualization is the assertion that globalization signals the decline, erosion, or disempowerment of the territorial state. Whereas global territorialist approaches map global space essentially as a territorial state writ-large, studies of deterritorialization invert this image to emphasize the increasing permeability or even total negation of state territoriality. The decline of state territorial power is viewed at once as the medium and the result of processes of deterritorialization. On the one hand, the erosion of nationally scaled forms of territorial enclosure is said to open up a space for increasingly non-territorial forms of social interaction and interdependence on a global scale. On the other hand, these globally scaled processes of deterritorialization are in turn said to accelerate the state’s loss of control over its national borders and thus further undermine its territoriality. In this sense, the state decline thesis and the notion of deterritorialization entail cumulative, mutually reinforcing rather than merely additive, externally related conceptions of global spatial transformation. Global space can be viewed as non-territorial in form precisely because it is defined through the trope of an eroding or disappearing national scale; meanwhile the thesis of state decline is elaborated not through an account of the national scale but of various globally scaled, purportedly supra-territorial spatial forms associated with processes of deterritorialization.

By emphasizing the historicity of territoriality, deterritorialization approaches have begun to articulate an important challenge to the epistemology of state-centrism. This methodological denaturalization of territoriality has also enabled deterritorialization researchers to construct alternative geographical categories for describing currently emergent spatial forms that no longer presuppose their enclosure within territorially bounded geographical spaces. Nevertheless, viewed

through the lens of the conception of globalization outlined above, deterritorialization approaches contain three major deficiencies.

First, the historicity of territoriality is reduced to an either-or choice between two options, its presence or its absence. Consequently, the possibility that territoriality is being reconfigured and re-scaled rather than eroded cannot be adequately explored. Second, the relation between global space and territoriality is viewed as a zero-sum game in which the growing importance of the former necessarily entails the decline of the latter. By conceiving geographical scales as mutually exclusive rather than mutually constitutive levels of social interaction, this dualistic conceptualization cannot explore the essential role of sub-global transformations – of state territories, regions, cities, localities, and places – in the globalization process. Third, and most crucially, deterritorialization approaches bracket the various forms of spatial fixity, localization, and (re)territorialization upon which global flows are necessarily premised. Processes of deterritorialization are not delinked from territoriality, for their very existence presupposes the production of fixed socioterritorial infrastructures within, upon, and through which global flows can circulate. Thus the deterritorialization of social relations on a global scale hinges intrinsically upon their simultaneous *reterritorialization* on sub-global scales within relatively fixed and immobile configurations of territorial organization.

These arguments can be concretized through a critical reinterpretation of two commonly invoked forms of deterritorialization – the deterritorialization of capital, and the deterritorialization of the state. As noted, I conceive the contemporary round of globalization as a re-scaling of the nationally organized forms of territoriality that have long served as the basic geographical scaffolding for capitalist expansion. In the context of this ongoing scalar shift, processes of deterritorialization can be coherently reinterpreted as concerted yet uncoordinated strategies of *denationalization* through which the national scale of state territorial organization is being at once decentered, relativized, and reconfigured. If territoriality operates as a strategy grounded upon the enclosure of social relations within a bounded space, deterritorialization can be reinterpreted as a countervailing strategy to “jump scales,” i.e., to circumvent or dismantle historically entrenched forms of territorial organization and their associated scalar morphologies. Currently unfolding processes of deterritorialization are reshuffling the entrenched, nationally scaled configurations of territorial organization upon which capitalist industrialization has been grounded since the late nineteenth

century. This denationalizing strategy of “jumping scales” has also been tightly intertwined with various, highly conflictual forms of reterritorialization through which new sub- and supra-national forms of state territorial organization are being constructed. As in the previous state-centric round of globalization, however, it can be argued that the territorial state remains a crucial geographical infrastructure upon, within, and through which this multi-scalar dialectic of de- and reterritorialization is currently unfolding.

1. *The re-scaling of capital.* The concept of deterritorialization was first developed in the early 1970s to describe the apparently footloose activities of transnational corporations in coordinating globally dispersed production networks. Since this period, the notion of deterritorialization has acquired a broader meaning to encompass as well the role of new information and communications technologies in linking geographically dispersed parts of the globe to create a temporally integrated world economy. The massive expansion in the role of transnational finance capital since the demise of the Bretton Woods currency controls in the early 1970s presents a further indication of capital’s increasing velocity and geographical mobility in the world economy. Under these circumstances, the worldwide circulation of capital cannot be adequately conceived in terms of strictly territorial representations of space, with reference to autocentric national economies or the image of a world economy parcelized into distinct, self-enclosed national-territorial spaces.

However, despite its rapidly accelerating turnover times, capital remains as dependent as ever upon relatively fixed, localized, and territorially embedded technological-institutional ensembles in which technology, the means of production, forms of industrial organization and labor-power are productively combined to create and extract surplus-value. The processes of deterritorialization associated with the current round of economic globalization are therefore only one moment of a broader restructuring process in which the reindustrialization of urban-regional agglomerations – e.g., global cities, industrial districts, technopoles, offshore financial centers, and other flexible production complexes – has played a constitutive role.⁷⁴ In this context Swyngedouw has analyzed the proliferation of new “glocal” accumulation strategies through which key forms of industrial, financial, and service capital attempt to secure competitive advantages within global production filières precisely through the promotion and exploitation of locally and regionally specific conditions of production.⁷⁵ Although the growth of these

densely networked regional industrial production complexes has been crucially conditioned by the national political-economic frameworks in which they are embedded, it can be argued that urbanized regions are currently superseding national economies as the most rudimentary geographical units of world capitalism.⁷⁶ In this sense, capital's drive to diminish its place-dependency does not entail the construction of a quasi-autonomous, placeless "space of flows," as writers such as Castells have argued, but rather a complex re-scaling and reterritorialization of the historically entrenched, state-centric geographical infrastructures that have underpinned the last century of capitalist industrialization. As Neil Smith notes:

Capital ... may entertain the fantasy of spacelessness and act accordingly, but in practice, every strategy to avoid and supersede "historically established mechanisms" [i.e., places] and territories of social control involves not the extinction of place per se but *the reinvention of place at a different scale* – a capital-centered jumping of scale. Indeed, the perpetuation of control by these organizations (and classes) depends precisely on this reinvention of discrete places where power over and through the space of flows is rooted.⁷⁷

Deterritorialization, in other words, must be viewed as a distinctively geographical accumulation strategy, a mechanism of "global localization," through which globally oriented capitalist firms are attempting to circumvent and restructure the nationally organized systems of social, monetary, and labor regulation that prevailed throughout the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation. To be sure, capitalist strategies of deterritorialization may well succeed in circumventing the constraints imposed by national territorial boundaries but this hardly translates into hypermobility or placelessness. As capital strives to "jump scale," it is forced simultaneously, on other geographical scales, to reconstitute or create anew viable territorial infrastructures for its circulation process – whether through the reindustrialization and reterritorialization of existent scales or through the construction of qualitatively new scales. In this sense, capital's apparent transcendence of nationally scaled regulatory systems in recent decades has been bound inextricably to the production of new sub- and supranational spaces of accumulation and state regulation. The drive toward deterritorialization incessantly reinscribes the role of places and territories on capitalism's geographical landscape while, at the same time, radically reconfiguring this landscape to enhance its locationally specific productive capacities.

2. *Re-scaling the state.* As noted, most accounts of deterritorialization conceptualize the emergence of global space through the trope of a declining or eroding state territoriality. Although the current round of globalization has indeed rendered states increasingly permeable to transnational flows of various types, this development has not triggered the state's demise but rather its reterritorialization onto both sub- and supra-national geographical scales. As traditional Keynesian macro-economic policy instruments proved increasingly ineffectual during the global economic crisis of the 1970s, a wide range of supply-side regulatory strategies were deployed at once to enhance the global competitive advantage of nationally based firms and to promote social and industrial restructuring within each state's major growth poles. Since this period, the older industrial states of the OECD zone have actively facilitated globalization not only by dismantling major elements of the postwar Fordist-Keynesian regulatory order (e.g., national welfare regimes; nationally organized collective bargaining arrangements), which are increasingly viewed as a hindrance to global economic competitiveness, but through the creation of a wide range of new policy instruments and institutional forms to attract capital investment and to encourage flexibility and technological innovation. Robert Cox has described these ongoing shifts as an "internationalization of the state" through which "adjustment to global competitiveness [becomes] the new categorical imperative."⁷⁸ In this sense, the neoliberal project of deregulation and liberalization, which has been pursued since the 1980s, has been closely intertwined with various forms of *reregulation* through which states have actively promoted the globalization process. These internationalizing, reregulatory strategies have included the deployment of new forms of industrial, technology, and urban-regional policy; the construction of new legal regimes and financial regulations; and the establishment of new entrepreneurial institutional forms to enhance the productive force of selected urban-regional growth poles within each state's territory.⁷⁹ Thus emerges, as Cerny argues, a new type of "competition state" whose central priority is to create a favorable investment climate for transnational capital; consequently, "the state itself becomes an agent for the commodification of the collective, situated in a wider, market-dominated playing field."⁸⁰

This qualitative reorientation of state policies toward the promotion of global economic competition has been closely intertwined with a reterritorialization and re-scaling of the state itself – a process that has been described as a "hollowing out" or "glocalization" of state territoriality.⁸¹ This re-scaling of the state is not merely a defensive response

to intensified global economic competition, but a concerted strategy to create new scales of state regulation to facilitate and coordinate the globalization process. On one scale, states have promoted economic globalization by forming supra-national economic blocs such as the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, and the like, which operate at once to enforce regional structural competitiveness and as protective barriers to global competition. Supra-national agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank have likewise acquired an expanding role in enforcing market-led strategies of socioeconomic restructuring. On sub-state scales, meanwhile, states have devolved substantial aspects of their governance capacities to regional and local institutions, which are better positioned to restructure major urban regions.⁸² This downward devolution of state power has also frequently served as a centrally organized strategy to promote efficient capital investment on urban and regional scales, whether through large-scale infrastructural projects, locally organized “workfare” policies, or through other entrepreneurial initiatives such as public-private partnerships. The current wave of state re-scaling can therefore be interpreted as a strategy of political restructuring that aims to enhance the locationally specific productive forces of each level of state territorial organization.

Cerny has vividly described this simultaneous institutional fragmentation and re-scaling of state power as a “whipsaw effect” through which each level of the state attempts to react to an overwhelming range of pressures, forces, and constraints.⁸³ A central geographical consequence of this “whipsaw effect” has been the construction of “pluri-lateral” forms of state power that no longer converge upon any one optimal scale or coalesce together within a nationally scaled bureaucratic hierarchy.⁸⁴ As John Ruggie has argued, the rise of these new, “multi-perspectival” institutional forms also appears to signal an “unbundling” of the isomorphic link between territory and sovereignty that has long underpinned the modern interstate system.⁸⁵ Crucially, however, this unbundling of territory and sovereignty does not herald the end of state territoriality, as Ruggie’s analysis of the “postmodern space of flows” implies, but rather the consolidation of increasingly polymorphic political geographies in which territoriality is redifferentiated and reparcelized among multiple institutional forms that are not clustered around a single predominant center of gravity. If the traditional Westphalian image of political space as a self-enclosed geographical container is today becoming increasingly obsolete, territoriality remains a fundamental component of state power and an essential geographical scaffolding for the globalization process. Territoriality is no longer

organized predominantly or exclusively on the national scale, but sub- and supra-national configurations of state territorial organization continue to play crucial roles as fixed geographical infrastructures upon, within, and through which global flows circulate. Consequently, as James Anderson has argued, new geographical metaphors and concepts are needed to grasp these emergent, post-Westphalian political geographies:

The contemporary world is not a ladder up or down which processes move from one rung to the next in an orderly fashion, the central state mediating all links between the external or higher levels and the internal or lower ones. That was never the case, but it is even less true today. Not only are there now more rungs but qualitatively they are more heterogenous; and direct movements between high and low levels, missing out or bypassing “intermediate” rungs, are now a defining characteristic of contemporary life. A complex set of climbing frames, slides, swings, ropes and rope ladders, complete with weak or broken parts ... might be nearer the mark. The metaphor of adventure playgrounds, with their mixture of constructions, multiple levels and encouragement of movement – up, down, sideways, diagonally, directly from high to low, or low to high – captures the contemporary mixture of forms and processes much better than the ladder metaphor.⁸⁶

By indicating the ways in which a historically entrenched form of state territoriality is currently being superseded, deterritorialization researchers have made an important contribution to the project of theorizing social space in an explicitly historical manner. However, because they recognize the historicity of territoriality primarily in terms of its disappearance, obsolescence, or demise, deterritorialization approaches to globalization research cannot analyze the types of qualitative reconfigurations and re-scalings of territoriality that have been briefly sketched above. If the role of the national scale as an auto-centric socioeconomic container has been undermined during the last three decades, the importance of territoriality has actually intensified: for it is only through the construction of fixed geographical infrastructures that the global circulation of capital, money, commodities, and people can be continually accelerated and expanded. The reterritorialization and re-scaling of nationally organized configurations of state power has proved to be a major strategy for securing this moment of territorialization under contemporary global conditions.

The challenges of globalization

Like the forms of state-centrism that have dominated the social sciences for much of the last century, the methodological opposition between global territorialist and deterritorialization approaches to globalization studies can be viewed as a real abstraction of contemporary social relations. Throughout the preceding discussion I have argued that each of these approaches grasps real dimensions of contemporary social reality. As noted, capital has long presupposed a moment of territorial fixity or place-boundedness as a basic prerequisite for its circulation process. Whereas state-centric epistemologies fetishize this territorialist moment of capitalism, deterritorialization approaches embrace an inverse position, in which territoriality is said to erode in the face of globalization. The bifurcation of contemporary globalization studies into these opposed methodological approaches reflects these contradictory aspects of contemporary spatial practices without critically explaining them.

The theorization of globalization developed here suggests that both territorialization and deterritorialization are constitutive moments of an ongoing dialectic through which social space is continually produced, reconfigured, and transformed under capitalism. Thus conceived, the contemporary round of globalization entails neither the absolute territorialization of societies, economies, or cultures on a global scale nor their complete deterritorialization into a supra-territorial, distanceless, borderless space of flows, but rather a multi-scalar *restructuring* of capitalist territorial organization. In my view, a crucial challenge for future globalization research is to develop an epistemology of social space that can grasp both these dimensions of contemporary spatial practices. The present article has attempted to outline some broad methodological guidelines for this task. In particular, three central methodological challenges can be emphasized.

1) *The historicity of social space.* Globalization has put into relief the historicity of state territoriality as a form of sociospatial organization. As the role of state territoriality as an organizational framework for social relations is decentered, relativized, and transformed, the historical, dynamic character of social space becomes manifest both in everyday life and in sociological analysis. The overarching methodological challenge that flows from this circumstance is to analyze globalization as an ongoing historical process in which the spatiality of social relations is continually reconfigured and transformed.

2) *The historical geography of spatial scales.* Globalization has de-centered the national scale of social relations and intensified the importance of both sub- and supra-national scales of territorial organization. These transformations undermine conceptions of geographical scale as a static, fixed platform and reveal its socially produced and politically contested character. Geographical scales are not only a product of political-economic processes but serve at once as their presupposition and their medium. As the territorial organization of scales is transformed, new scalar configurations emerge that in turn provide relatively stabilized, territorial frameworks for social relations until the next round of re-scaling and reterritorialization. The resultant methodological challenge, therefore, is to conceive configurations of geographical scales at once as the territorial scaffolding within which the dialectic of de- and reterritorialization unfolds and as the historically produced, incessantly changing medium of that dialectic.

3) *Territorial organization, territoriality, and sociospatial form.* Today state territoriality is increasingly intertwined with and superimposed upon various emergent spatial forms – from the institutional structures of the EU and NAFTA to global financial flows, post-Fordist forms of industrial organization, global urban hierarchies, and transnational diasporic networks – that cannot be described adequately as contiguous, mutually exclusive, and self-enclosed blocks of space. Meanwhile state institutions are themselves being radically re-scaled at once upward, downward, and outward to create polymorphic layers of state territorial organization that no longer overlap evenly with one another or converge upon a single, dominant geographical scale. Under these circumstances, the image of global social space as a complex mosaic of superimposed and interpenetrating nodes, levels, scales, and morphologies has become more appropriate than the traditional Cartesian model of homogenous, interlinked blocks of territory associated with the modern interstate system.⁸⁷ New representations of sociospatial form are needed to analyze these emergent pluri-territorial, polycentric, and multi-scalar geographies of globalization. A crucial methodological challenge for globalization studies is therefore to analyze currently emergent geographies in ways that transcend the imperative to choose between purely territorialist and non-territorialist or deterritorialized mappings of social and political space.

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Notes

1. John Agnew, "The hidden geographies of social science and the myth of the 'geographic turn,'" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 13 (1995): 379.
2. The social-scientific literatures on globalization have grown immensely during the last two decades. For recent general overviews, see e.g., Ulrich Beck, *Was ist Globalisierung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1997); Joseph Camilleri and Jim Falk, *The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World* (Brookfield, Vt.: Edward Elgar, 1992); David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (London: Polity, 1995); *Culture, Globalization and the World-System*, ed. Anthony King (London: Macmillan, 1991); *Globalization: Theory and Practice*, ed. Eleonore Kofman and Gillian Youngs (London: Pinter, 1996); *Globalization and Territorial Identities*, ed. Zdravko Mlinar (Brookfield: Averbury, 1992); *Globalization: Critical Reflections*, ed. James Mittelman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997); Leslie Sklair, *Sociology of the Global System* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); and Malcom Waters, *Globalization* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
3. On these and other controversies among globalization researchers, see, e.g., Ash Amin, "Placing globalization," *Theory, Culture & Society* 14/2 (1997): 123–137; Samir Amin, "The challenge of globalization," *Review of International Political Economy* 3/2 (1996): 216–259; *Jenseits der Nationalökonomie? Weltwirtschaft und Nationalstaat zwischen Globalisierung und Regionalisierung*, ed. Steffen Becker et al. (Hamburg: Argument Verlag, 1997); David Harvey, "Globalization in question," *Rethinking Marxism* 8/4 (1995): 1–17; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (London: Polity, 1996); Michael Mann, "Has globalization ended the rise and rise of the nation-state?" *Review of International Political Economy* 4/3 (1997): 472–496; Jan Aart Scholte, "Global capitalism and the state," *International Affairs* 73/3 (1997): 427–452; *The Limits to Globalization*, ed. Alan Scott (London: Routledge, 1997); Robert Wade, "Globalization and its limits: reports of the death of the national economy are greatly exaggerated," in *National Diversity and Global Capitalism*, ed. Susanne Berger and Robert Dore (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).
4. This phrase is the subtitle of Edward Soja's *Postmodern Geographies* (New York: Verso, 1989).
5. See e.g., John Agnew, "The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory," *Review of International Political Economy* 1/1 (1994): 53–80; Peter J. Taylor, "Embedded statism and the social sciences: opening up to

- new spaces," *Environment and Planning A* 28/11 (1996): 1917–1928; R. B. J. Walker *Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); *Open the Social Sciences: Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences*, ed. Immanuel Wallerstein et al. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1996).
6. P. Taylor, "Embedded statism," 1923.
 7. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science. The Limits of 19th Century Paradigms* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1: "It is quite normal for scholars and scientists to rethink issues. When important new evidence undermines old theories and predictions do not hold, we are pressed to rethink our premises. In that sense, much of nineteenth-century social science, in the form of specific hypotheses, is constantly being rethought. But, in addition to rethinking, which is 'normal,' I believe we need to 'unthink' nineteenth century social science, because many of its presumptions – which, in my view, are misleading and constrictive – still have far too strong a hold on our mentalities. These presumptions, once considered liberating of the spirit, serve today as the central intellectual barrier to useful analysis of the social world."
 8. This contribution is part of a larger project on globalization, state territorial restructuring, and the production of space that attempts to deploy the methodological and epistemological strategies proposed here to analyze various ongoing transformations of state spatiality in contemporary European global city-regions. For a more empirically oriented discussion of the same constellation of issues, see Neil Brenner, "Global cities, glocal states: Global city formation and state territorial restructuring in contemporary Europe," *Review of International Political Economy* 5/1 (1998): 1–37.
 9. For a trenchant critique of this "timeless" conception of space, see Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1991 [1974]). For other critiques by critical human geographers, see, e.g., John Agnew, "The devaluation of place in social science," in *The Power of Place*, ed. John Agnew and James Duncan (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 9–29; J. Agnew, *Place and Politics. The Geographical Mediation of State and Society* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Derek Gregory, *Geographical Imaginations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994); *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, ed. Derek Gregory and John Urry (London: Macmillan, 1985); David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989); Doreen Massey, "Politics and space/time," in *Space, Place, Gender* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); D. Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labor* (London: Macmillan, 1984); *Production, Work, Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of Industrial Capitalism*, ed. Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986); E. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies*; and *The Power of Geography: How Territory Shapes Social Life*, ed. Jennifer Wolch and Michael Dear (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
 10. On this aspect of globalization, see, e.g., *States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalization*, ed. Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache (London: Routledge, 1996); Peter Dicken, *Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity* (London: Guilford Press, 1991); and Wim Ruigrok and Rob van Tulder, *The Logic of International Restructuring* (New York: Routledge, 1995). For various dissenting views, see, e.g., David Gordon, "The global economy: new edifice or crumbling foundations?" *New Left Review*, 168 (1988): 24–65; P. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question*; and R. Wade, "Globalization and its limits."
 11. See Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*

- (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); *Global Culture*, ed. Mike Featherstone (London: Sage, 1990); Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in *Culture, Globalization and the World System*, 19–40; Warren Magnusson, *The Search for Political Space* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Peter Marden, "Geographies of dissent: globalization, identity and the nation," *Political Geography* 16/1 (1997): 37–64; Jan Aart Scholte, "The geography of collective identities in a globalizing world," *Review of International Political Economy* 3/4 (1996): 565–607.
12. This definition is developed by Anthony Giddens in *The Consequences of Modernity* (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1990). See also Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*; and Anthony McGrew, "A global society?" in *Modernity and its Futures*, ed. Stuart Hall et al. (Cambridge: Open University Press, 1992), 61–116.
 13. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse. Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: Penguin, 1973 [1857]), 539.
 14. See David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); D. Harvey, *The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); and D. Harvey, "The geopolitics of capitalism," in D. Gregory and J. Urry, editors, *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, 128–163. The term "space-time compression" is introduced in Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*. On the sociospatial dialectic under capitalism, see Edward Soja, "The socio-spatial dialectic," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 70 (1980): 207–255.
 15. D. Harvey, "The geopolitics of capitalism," 145.
 16. *Ibid.*, 150, *passim*; D. Harvey, *The Urbanization of Capital*.
 17. See H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 37, *passim*; Lefebvre, *De l'État: Les contradictions de l'État moderne*, volume 4 (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1978); Lefebvre, *De l'État: Le mode de production étatique*, volume 3 (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1977).
 18. On the notion of space as a "second nature," see Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 345, 348, *passim*.
 19. This conception of the state as a form of territorialization for capital is elaborated at greater length in Neil Brenner, "Between fixity and motion: accumulation, territorial organization and the historical geography of spatial scales," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 16 (1998): 459–481; and N. Brenner, "Global, fragmented, hierarchical: Henri Lefebvre's geographies of globalization," *Public Culture* 10/1 (1997): 137–169.
 20. Lefebvre, *De l'État: Le mode de production étatique*.
 21. See Manu Goswami, "Thinking through modularity: beyond objectivist and subjectivist approaches to nationalism," Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, manuscript.
 22. See John Agnew, "Spacelessness versus timeless space in state-centered social science," *Environment and Planning A* 28/11 (1996): 1929–1932; J. Agnew, "The hidden geographies of social science." The main target of Agnew's critique is apparently Edward Soja's *Postmodern Geographies*, which argues for a domination of "historicism" over spatial considerations in much of postwar social science. Soja's recent work preserves his earlier emphasis on the "reassertion of space in social theory" while recognizing the existence of geographical assumptions even in "historicist" modes of analysis. See Edward Soja, *Thirdspace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996).
 23. The term "state-centric" has a very different meaning in the literature on "bringing

- the state back in,” in which “state-centered” approaches are contrasted to “society-centered” approaches. In these discussions, many of which have been inspired by the work of Theda Skocpol and her followers, state-centered theories emphasize the autonomous institutional power of the state over and against societal or class-based forces. On this literature, see Bob Jessop, “Anti-Marxist Reinstatement and post-Marxist Deconstruction,” in *State Theory. Putting the Capitalist State in its Place* (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 278–306. In contrast to this literature, the notion of state-centrism developed here refers to a more generalized spatial ontology that has been implicit within a wide range of research paradigms throughout the social sciences.
24. See, e.g., Taylor, “Embedded statism”; and Wallerstein, editor, *Open the Social Sciences*.
 25. See, e.g., Agnew, “The territorial trap”; Agnew, *Place and Politics*; William Connolly, “Democracy and Territoriality,” *Millenium* 20/3 (1991): 463–484; and Walker, *Inside/Outside*.
 26. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
 27. For various examples, see John Agnew, “Representing space: space, scale and culture in social science,” in James Duncan and David Ley, editors, *Place/Culture/Representation* (London: Routledge, 1993), 251–271; Ira Katznelson, *Marxism and the City* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 16–27; and Carl Pletsch, “The three worlds, or the division of social scientific labor, circa 1950–1975,” *Comparative Studies of Society and History* 23/4 (1981): 565–590.
 28. See Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, “Beyond ‘culture’: space, identity and the politics of difference,” *Cultural Anthropology* 7/1 (1992): 6–23; Liisa Malkki, “National geographic: The rooting of peoples and the territorialization of national identity among scholars and refugees” *Cultural Anthropology* 7/1 (1992): 24–44; and Eric Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982), 13–19.
 29. See Manu Goswami, “From *swadeshi* to *swaraj*: nation, economy and territory in colonial South Asia,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 40/4 (1998); Hugo Radice, “The national economy: a Keynesian myth?” *Capital and Class* 22 (1984): 111–140; and P. Taylor, “Embedded statism.”
 30. Taylor, “Embedded statism,” 1925. As Taylor notes (*ibid.*, 1922–1923), until relatively recently even the discipline of human geography has replicated this territorialized, state-centric conceptual orientation, either with reference to the urban scale (urban ecology and the study of urban “systems”), the state scale (political geography) or the trans-state scale (geopolitics). Due to its anarchist, anti-statist roots in the work of theorists such as Elisée Reclus and Peter Kropotkin, regional geography provides an exception to this tendency insofar as regions were viewed as ecologically delimited, contextually specific environments rather than as territorial sub-units of the state. Likewise, in major stands of the discipline of history, this idiographic notion of “space-as-context” provided an important alternative to that of “space-as-container,” which dominated the other, more nomothetically oriented social sciences.
 31. See Robert Sack, *Human Territoriality. Its Theory and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
 32. See Peter J. Taylor, “The state as container: territoriality in the modern world-system,” *Progress in Human Geography* 18 (1994): 51–162.

33. See also Jean Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1983); John Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations," *International Organization* 47/1 (1993): 139–174; and Walker, *Inside/Outside*.
34. Taylor, "The state as container."
35. This is not the place to analyze the complex institutional histories through which this state-centric epistemology gradually became hegemonic as a mode of social-scientific inquiry, particularly in the postwar United States but also in Europe, the Soviet Union, and much of the Third World. My concern here is less to examine the institutional consolidation of state-centrism than to characterize analytically its essential geographical presuppositions. For various accounts of the institutional histories of state-centrism, see, e.g., Pletsch, "The three worlds"; Ravi Arvind Palat, "Fragmented visions: Excavating the future of area studies in a post-American world," *Review*, XIX, 3 (1996): 269–315; Taylor, "Embedded statism"; and Wallerstein, editor, *Open the Social Sciences*. In this context, it is also crucial to note that these state-centric tendencies in the classical social sciences co-existed uneasily with an opposing, if subterranean, "globalist" strand of theory and research. This globalist mode of analysis was elaborated during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries above all in Marx's theory of capital accumulation and in the theories of imperialism developed by Lenin, Luxemburg, and Bukharin. Though major strands of Marxian social theory were also eventually infused with state-centric assumptions (e.g., the notion that the national scale was the main strategic locus of class struggle), I view this intellectual tradition as the most important alternative to state-centrism within classical sociological discourse. Following the Second World War, various non-Marxist alternatives to state-centrism also emerged, including the *Annales* school of historiography and the figurational sociology of Norbert Elias. In addition to these strands of research, Taylor ("Embedded statism," 1918–1919) detects various late nineteenth-century "contextualist" alternatives to state-centric conceptions of space, such as idiographic approaches to historiography and Marshallian-inspired economic analyses focused on the problem of urban-regional agglomeration.
36. On these "encaging" processes see Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
37. Taylor, "The state as container," 152. On the shift from "city-centered" to "territorial" economic systems, see Fernand Braudel, *The Perspective of the World*, trans. Sian Reynolds (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983), 295, 352–385.
38. See Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957); as well as Giovanni Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century* (New York: Verso, 1994), 239–300; and Robert Cox, *Production, Power and World Order* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 111–210.
39. Scott Lash and John Urry, *The End of Organized Capitalism* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
40. S. Amin, "The challenge of globalization," 236, *passim*; S. Amin, *Re-reading the Post-War Period: An Intellectual Itinerary* (New York: Monthly Review Press: 1994).
41. Taylor, "Embedded statism," 1920.
42. H. Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 280.
43. *Ibid.*, 281.
44. *Ibid.*, 308.

45. *Ibid.*, 287; italics in original.
46. *Ibid.*, 21.
47. See Neil Smith, "Antinomies of space and nature in Henri Lefebvre's *The Production of Space*," *Philosophy and Geography* 2 (1997): 50–51, *passim*; as well as, more generally, John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
48. Smith, "Antinomies," 50–51.
49. On the denationalization of the state, see Bob Jessop, "Capitalism and its future: Remarks on regulation, government and governance," *Review of International Political Economy* 4/3 (1997): 561–581; B. Jessop, "Die Zukunft des Nationalstaats – Erosion oder Reorganisation? Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zu Westeuropa," *Jenseits der Nationalökonomie*, 50–95; and Saskia Sassen, "The state and the new geography of power," in *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 1–30.
50. On "re-scaling," see Erik Swyngedouw, "Neither global nor local: 'glocalization' and the politics of scale," in *Spaces of Globalization*, ed. Kevin Cox (New York: Guilford Press, 1997), 137–166; and E. Swyngedouw, "The Mammon quest: 'Glocalisation,' interspatial competition and the monetary order: the construction of new scales," in *Cities and Regions in the New Europe*, ed. Mick Dunford and Grigoris Kafkalas (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 39–68. On "jumping scales," see Neil Smith, "Homeless/global: scaling places," in *Mapping the Futures, Local Cultures, Global Change*, ed. Jon Bird et al. (London: Routledge, 1993), 87–119; N. Smith, "Remaking scale: competition and cooperation in prenational and post-national Europe," in *Competitive European Peripheries*, ed. Heikki Eskelinen and Folke Snickars (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1993), 59–74. Another important recent analysis of shifts in the scalar organization of contemporary capitalism is Philip Cerny, "Globalization and the changing logic of collective action," *International Organization* 49/4 (1995): 595–626.
51. See James Anderson, "The shifting stage of politics: New Medieval and post-modern territorialities," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 14 (1996): 133–155.
52. For more empirically detailed analyses of this ongoing re-scaling of territoriality, see Brenner, "Global cities, glocal states"; Cerny, "Globalization"; Jessop, "Die Zukunft des Nationalstaates"; Smith, "Remaking scale"; and Swyngedouw, "Neither global nor local."
53. Martin Albrow, "Introduction," in *Globalization, Knowledge and Society*, ed. M. Albrow and E. King (Sage: London, 1990), 9. This conceptualization is elaborated at greater length in Martin Albrow, *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity* (Oxford: Polity, 1996).
54. See M. Waters, *Globalization*, 3, italics added. For other exemplary uses of the concept of "world society" among globalization researchers, see, e.g., Tony Spybey, *Globalization and World Society* (Oxford: Polity, 1996); Karl Otto Hondrich, "World societies versus niche societies," in *Social Change and Modernity*, ed. Hans Haferkamp and Neil Smelser (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 351–366; John Meyer, "The changing cultural content of the nation-state: a world society perspective," in *New Approaches to the State in the Social Sciences*, ed. George Steinmetz (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); John Meyer, John Boli, George Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez, "World Society and the Nation-State," *American Journal of Sociology* 103/1 (1997): 144–181; Martin Shaw, "Global society and global responsibility: The theoretical, historical and

- political limits of international society," *Millenium 21* (1992): 421–434; and Waters, *Globalization*, passim. For critical discussions, see, e.g., A. McGrew, "A global society?"; and Elmar Altvater and Birgit Mahnkopf, *Grenzen der Globalisierung. Ökonomie, Ökologie und Politik in der Weltgesellschaft* (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1997), 44–76.
55. See, e.g., Ronnie Lipschutz, "Restructuring world politics: the emergence of global civil society," *Millenium 21* (1992): 389–421; Mike Featherstone, "Global culture: an introduction," in Featherstone, editor, *Global Culture*, 1–14; M. J. Peterson, "Transnational activity, international society and world politics," *Millenium 21/3*, (1992): 371–388; Anthony Smith, "Towards a global culture?" in *Global Culture* 171–192; Spybey, *Globalization and World Society*; and Paul Wapner, "Politics beyond the state: environmental activism and world civil politics," *World Politics* 47 (1995), 311–340. For a critical discussion, see P. Marden, "Geographies of dissent."
 56. Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992).
 57. *Ibid.*, 6, 53, passim.
 58. *Ibid.*, 25.
 59. *Ibid.*, 26, 77–78.
 60. *Ibid.*, 26–29, 50–51.
 61. *Ibid.*, 58–60.
 62. See Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1971).
 63. See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Publishers: New York, 1974); Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (New York: Academic Press, 1980); and Wallerstein, *The Modern World System III. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1940s* (New York: Academic Press, 1989). On the specific problematic of space in world-system analysis, see Wallerstein, "Inventions of TimeSpace realities: Towards an understanding of our historical systems," *Geography* 73/4 (1988): 289–297.
 64. For various definitions of capitalism in Wallerstein's work, see e.g., "The West, capitalism and the modern world-system," *Review* 15/4 (1992): 566–580; *Historical Capitalism* (New York: Verso, 1983), 13–19; "The rise and future demise of the world capitalist system: concepts for comparative analysis," in *The Capitalist World-Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, New York, 1979), 7–19; and *The Modern World System I*, 37–38, 348.
 65. Wallerstein, "The rise and future demise," 6, italics added. See also Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I*, 67, 348–349.
 66. Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I*, 348.
 67. In addition to the three volumes of *The Modern World-System*, see also the essays in *The Capitalist World-Economy*; and Wallerstein, *The Politics of the World-Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
 68. See, e.g., Wallerstein, "Three instances of hegemony in the history of the capitalist world-economy," in *The Politics of the World-Economy*, 39; "States in the institutional vortex of the capitalist world economy," in *ibid.*, 27–36; and *Historical Capitalism*, passim.
 69. It is not accurate, therefore, to reproach Wallerstein for reducing state power to economic structure, because in his framework the latter are fundamentally identi-

- cal. This “reductionist” critique of Wallerstein has been articulated, for example, in Theda Skocpol, “Wallerstein’s world capitalist system: a theoretical and historical critique,” *American Journal of Sociology* 82/5 (1977): 1075–1102.
70. On this “Gulliver fallacy,” see Walker, *Inside/Outside*, 133–140.
 71. Wallerstein interprets the global crises of the post-1970s period primarily in ideological terms, as the “end of liberalism.” See Wallerstein, *After Liberalism* (New York: The Free Press, 1995). It is also worth noting here that these problems with Wallerstein’s theory are not necessarily intrinsic to world-system analysis. For attempts to develop more historically specific analyses of capitalist spatiality within the parameters of world-system methodologies, see, e.g., Arrighi, *The Long Twentieth Century*; as well as Taylor, “The state as container”; and Taylor, “World cities and territorial states: the rise and fall of their mutuality,” in *World Cities in a World-System*, ed. Paul Knox and Peter J. Taylor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 48–62.
 72. Jan Aart Scholte, “What are the new spaces?” *Environment and Planning A* 28 (1996): 1968.
 73. See, e.g., Manuel Castells, “A powerless state?” in *The Power of Identity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997), 243–309; Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996); Castells, *The Informational City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1989); Frederic Jameson, *Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism* (Durham, N.C., 1991); Appadurai, *Modernity at Large*; Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the National State* (New York: The Free Press, 1995); Ohmae, *The Borderless World* (New York: Harper Collins, 1990); Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond”; and Robert O’Brien, *Global Financial Integration: The End of Geography* (London: Pinter, 1992). For extreme versions of this “end of geography” thesis, see also James Der Derian, “The (s)pace of international relations: simulation, surveillance and speed,” *International Studies Quarterly* 34 (1990): 295–310; and Paul Virilio, *Speed and Politics* (New York: Semiotexte, 1984).
 74. The literature on these “post-Fordist” forms of urban and regional restructuring has expanded massively in recent decades. For recent overviews see, e.g., Ash Amin, “Post-Fordism: Models, Fantasies and Phantoms of Transition,” in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994), 1–40; Alain Lipietz, “The local and the global: regional individuality or interregionalism?” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 18/1 (1993): 8–18; and Michael Storper, “The resurgence of regional economies, ten years later: the region as a nexus of untraded interdependencies,” *European Urban and Regional Studies* 2/3 (1995): 191–221.
 75. Swyngedouw, “Neither global nor local”; and Swyngedouw, “The heart of the place: the resurrection of locality in an age of hyperspace,” *Geografiska Annaler B*, 71/1 (1989): 31–42. See also Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, “Neo-Marshallian nodes in global networks,” *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 16/4 (1992): 571–587.
 76. See, e.g., *Les régions qui gagnent. Districts et réseaux: les nouveaux paradigmes de la géographie économique*, ed. Georges Benko and Alain Lipietz (Paris: PUF, 1992); *Industrial Change and Regional Development*, ed. Georges Benko and Mick Dunford (New York: Belhaven Press, 1992); Allen Scott, “Regional motors of the global economy,” *Futures* 28/5 (1996): 391–411; *Pathways to Industrialization and Regional Development*, ed. Allen Scott and Michael Storper (New York: Routledge, 1992); Christian Schmid, “Urbane Region und Territorialverhältnis – Zur Regulation des Urbanisierungsprozesses,” in *Unternehmen Globus*, ed. Michael Bruch and Hans-

- Peter Krebs (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 1996), 224–254; and Stefan Krátke, “Globalisierung und Regionalisierung,” *Geographische Zeitschrift* 83/3 (1995): 207–221.
77. Neil Smith, “Spaces of vulnerability: the space of flows and the politics of scale,” *Critique of Anthropology* 16/1 (1996): 72; italics in original.
 78. Robert Cox, “Structural issues of global governance: implications for Europe” in *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, ed. Stephen Gill (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 259–289.
 79. See Leo Panitch, “Globalization and the state,” in *The Socialist Register 1994*, ed. Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (London: Merlin, 1994), 60–93. See also, e.g., Sassen, *Losing Control*; Weiss, “The myth of the powerless state”; and Scholte, “Global capitalism and the state.”
 80. Cerny, “Globalization,” 620. See also Joachim Hirsch, *Der nationale Wettbewerbsstaat* (Berlin: ID-Archiv, 1995); and Bob Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State,” in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, 251–279.
 81. On the state’s “hollowing out” see Jessop, “Post-Fordism and the State.” On the “glocalization” of the state, see Swyngedouw, “Neither global nor local”; Brenner, “Global cities, glocal states”; and Brenner, “Globalisierung und Reterritorialisierung: Städte, Staaten und räumliche Restrukturierung im heutigen Europa,” *WeltTrends. Internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien* 17/4 (1997): 7–30.
 82. See, e.g., Margit Mayer, “The shifting local political system in European cities,” in *Cities and Regions in the New Europe*, 255–276; Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Searching for a new institutional fix: the after-Fordist crisis and the global-local disorder,” in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, 280–315; Richard Evans and Alan Harding, “Regionalisation, regional institutions and economic development,” *Policy and Politics* 25/1 (1997): 19–30; Helmut Voelzkow, “Der Zug in die Regionen. Politische Regionalisierung als Antwort auf die Globalisierung der Ökonomie,” *Berliner Debatte Initial* 5 (1996): 68–78.
 83. Cerny, “Globalization,” 618.
 84. *Ibid.*, 620–621.
 85. Ruggie, “Territoriality and beyond.”
 86. Anderson, “The shifting stage of politics,” 151.
 87. See Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, 87–88.