Mapping the Futures

mapping the futures
local cultures, global change

The Futures

edited by
jon bird, barry curtis, tim putnam
george robertson and lisa tickner

ROUTLEDGE

Mapping the Futures

There are now new experiences of space and time; new tensions between globalism and regionalism, socialism and consumerism, reality and spectacle; new instabilities of value, meaning and identity—a dialectic between past and future. How are we to understand these?

Mapping the Futures is the first of a series which brings together cultural theorists from different disciplines to assess the implications of economic, political and social change for intellectual inquiry and cultural practice. The series arises from and continues the concerns of *BLOCK* (1979–89), the journal of visual culture.

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The editors: Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson and Lisa Tickner all lecture at Middlesex University.

The contributors: Micha Bandini, Jon Bird, Iain Chambers, Steven Connor, Barry Curtis, Peter Dunn and Loraine Leeson, Mike Featherstone, Ashraf Ghani, David Harvey, Dick Hebdige, Robert Hewison, Peter Jackson, Ruth Levitas, Doreen Massey, Meaghan Morris, Francis Mulhern, Tim Putnam, George Robertson, Gillian Rose, Neil Smith, Lisa Tickner, Judith Williamson.

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Edited by Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam, George Robertson and Lisa Tickner

Recent postmodern philosophers have undermined the viability of social and cultural futures as an urgent priority for cultural theory. The 'Futures' series sets out to reinstate the discussion of the future in cultural enquiry through a critical engagement with postmodernity. The books arise from and continue the concerns of *Block* (1979–1989), the journal of visual culture. Each volume will draw together new developments in a range of disciplines that have taken as their common focus some particular aspect of social transformation and cultural analysis.

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Edited by Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam,
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Notes on contributors

Micha Bandini is Head of the Department of Architecture and Interior Design at the University of North London and teaches history and theory on the postgraduate programme at the Architectural Association. She is currently researching contemporary critical practice in architecture and large-scale urban design.

Jon Bird is Principal Lecturer in History of Art and Cultural Studies at Middlesex University. He is a founder editor of *BLOCK*, a co-editor (with Lisa Tickner) of a forthcoming art history series for Routledge, and has written extensively on contemporary art.

Iain Chambers teaches courses on contemporary British culture, cultural theory and aesthetics at the Istituto Universitario Orientale, Naples. He is the author of *Urban Rhythms: Pop Music and Popular Culture* (1985), *Popular Culture: The Metropolitan Experience* (1986) and *Border Dialogues: Journeys in Postmodernism* (1990).

Steven Connor is Reader in Modern English Literature and Director of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research at Birkbeck College, University of London. He is the author of *Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary* (1989) and *Theory and Cultural Value* (1992).

Barry Curtis is a Senior Lecturer in Cultural Studies, Film, Media and Design Studies at Middlesex University. A founder editor of *BLOCK*, he is working on architectural and cultural theory in postwar Britain.

Peter Dunn and Loraine Leeson are the founders of The Art of Change and Docklands Community Poster Project. They both teach fine art and critical studies at St Martin's School of Art.

Mike Featherstone is Professor of Sociology at the University of Teesside. He has edited *Theory, Culture and Society* since its foundation in 1982. His publications include *Consumer Culture and Postmodernism* (1991), *Global Culture* (ed.) (1990) and *The Body* (ed.) (1991).

Ashraf Ghani is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Johns Hopkins University. He is currently working on a book on Afghanistan.

David Harvey is Halford Mackinder Professor of Geography at the University of Oxford. His previous books include *Social Justice and the City*

(1973), *The Limits to Capital* (1982), *The Urban Experience* (1989) and, most recently, *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989).

Dick Hebdige is Reader in Communications at Goldsmiths' College, University of London, and is currently serving as Dean of Critical Studies at the California Institute of Arts. He has been a regular contributor to *BLOCK* with articles on design and taste. His most recent publication is a collection of essays *Hiding in the Light* (1988).

Robert Hewison is the author of *Future Tense: A New Art for the Nineties*, the companion volume to his study *The Heritage Industry* (1987). He has published a three-volume history of the arts in Britain, 1939–75, and is now working on a critical account of postwar cultural policies and politics. He writes on theatre and the arts for the *Sunday Times* and is a regular presenter of *Night Waves* on Radio 3.

Peter Jackson teaches social and cultural geography at University College London. He is the author of *Maps of Meaning* (1989) and the editor of *Race and Racism* (1987).

Ruth Levitas is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Bristol. She has published widely in the field of social and political theory. She edited *Ideology of the New Right* (1986) and is author of *The Concept of Utopia* (1990)

Doreen Massey is Professor of Geography at the Open University. She is a member of the editorial board of *New Left Review* and the author of several books on economic geography including *Spatial Divisions of Labour* (1984). Her most recent publication (with Paul Quintas and David Wield) is *High Tech Fantasies: Science Parks in Society, Science and Space* (1992).

Meaghan Morris is an Australian-based theorist and writer who has written extensively on film, cultural studies and feminist theory, and is the author of *The Pirate's Fiancée: Feminism, Reading, Postmodernism* (1988).

Francis Mulhern is Senior Lecturer in English at Middlesex University. He is the author of *The Moment of Scrutiny* (1979), and for many years was on the editorial board of *New Left Review*.

Tim Putnam is Principal Lecturer in History at Middlesex University and co-ordinates post-graduate courses in history of design and modern social history. He has recently written (with Judith Alfrey) *The Industrial Heritage* (1991), and edited (with Charles Newton) *Household Choices* (1990).

George Robertson is a Research Scholar in Art and Design at Middlesex University. He lectures in cultural studies and art history and is working on utopian discourses and the avant-garde.

Gillian Rose teaches social and cultural geography at Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London. She has published several papers on the construction of space and place, and has just completed a book-length study of the masculinism of the geographical imagination, *Feminism and Geography*.

Neil Smith is Professor and Chair of Geography at Rutgers University, New Jersey. He is the author of *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space* (1984) and editor (with Peter Williams) of *Gentrification of the City* (1986).

Lisa Tickner is Reader in the History of Art and Design at Middlesex University. She is a founder editor of *BLOCK*, a member of the editorial advisory board of *Women: A Cultural Review*, and co-editor (with Jon Bird) of a series of art history books in preparation for Routledge. She is author of numerous articles on art history and theory and of *The Spectacle of Women: Imagery of the Suffrage Campaign 1907–1914* (1988).

Judith Williamson is a writer and critic who lives in London and teaches part-time at Middlesex University. She is the author of *Decoding Advertisements* (1978) and *Consuming Passions* (1986); her latest book is *Deadline at Dawn*.

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Introduction

This book grew out of a conference which grew out of a journal—*BLOCK*—that first appeared in 1979. *BLOCK* was edited by a group of art historians with extra-curricular interests. It was intended not only to 'address the problems of the social, economic and ideological dimensions of the arts in societies past and present', but to contribute to an interdisciplinary study of representation in general, beyond the limits of art history as that was conventionally understood. In this, it was one more sign of the times; one of a number of similiar initiatives aiming to introduce into the field of visual culture a more rigorously materialist and political analysis. Ten years and fifteen issues later, it seemed to us that we had helped to achieve a useful merging and enriching of politics, cultural theory and aesthetics; but also that that original moment had, for various reasons, passed.

BLOCK tried to be timely as well as theoretical; to address popular as well as high culture; to apply the perceptions developed in some disciplines to analyses in others. This could produce problems for writers, editors and readers alike. Feelings ran high; it was hard to be rigorous, accessible and relevant in the 1980s without being occasionally opaque, dogmatic or beside the point. We like to think we managed it on the whole. We were much xeroxed (the ultimate accolade). Others will judge.

BLOCK, of course, has a material history of its own. The core group of editors has stayed almost unchanged since 1979. It is not a house journal, but all of us teach in the School of Art History and Related Studies at Middlesex University, and have benefited from the support of immediate colleagues as well as of a more dispersed circle of regular contributors and friends. All these people—and hence *BLOCK* itself—have suffered from cuts in resources in higher education. There are fewer writers, harder pressed, who, in consequence, publish less. The editors teach across a variety of courses in art history, design history, cultural studies and film: the contents and methodologies of which have grown out of work on *BLOCK* and found expression in it. On these courses, too, there are rapidly increasing student numbers and diminishing resources.

So in 1989, and despite an expanding readership, we decided to change direction. There were new pressures, but also new titles—a range of publications in the arts, cultural studies and media that had not existed in 1979—and new opportunities (not least new audiences among those who had moved across subject boundaries and taught or studied on inter—and multi-disciplinary courses).

With help from the Arts Council of Great Britain and with the collaboration of the Tate Gallery and Routledge, we embarked on a programme of three conferences, each of which would focus speculation and debate in a particular area of cultural analysis and lead to publication in book form. This is the first. It *is* a book, rather than a collection of conference papers (it has additional contributors and a different structure). But we should at this point acknowledge the contributions and influence of all those at the November 1990 'Futures' conference at the Tate Gallery who made this book possible.

We wanted to begin by looking at space and place in a context of massive global change: political, economic, social, technological and geographic. We wanted to bring cultural studies and cultural geography closer together. We wanted to find ways of 'thinking futures' amid the accelerating instabilities of all kinds of value, meaning and identity. (We also hoped to avoid getting stuck in the now-rutted mire of 'postmodernity' as a catch-all term.) Geographers—particularly David Harvey as our keynote speaker here—have been able to bring to cultural analysis a new focus on space, distribution and the various and apparently paradoxical interpenetrations of the local and the global. Their views have not gone uncontested. And we do not mean to suggest that it is possible to bolt together political economy, cultural geography and cultural studies (let alone art history) into a new master narrative or *grand récit*. But the partial and contingent, while less presumptuous, may well fall short. A social and cultural analysis—or a series of related and supportive analyses—that is adequate (in its explanations), non-reductive (in its effects) and enabling (of positive social change) still has to be argued for.

Part I of the book groups together contributions from David Harvey, Meaghan Morris, Ashraf Ghani, Doreen Massey and Gillian Rose, all of which address (in different ways) the cultural politics of space. Part II, with essays by Neil Smith, Jon Bird, Peter Dunn and Loraine Leeson and Tim Putnam, looks at changes in particular localities and in the organization and representation of place, both public and domestic. Part III identifies the likely effects of traditional histories, loyalties and cultures on political futures within both global and local perspectives, with essays by Mike Featherstone, Iain Chambers and Francis Mulhern. Part IV, with contributions from Peter Jackson, Steven Connor, Micha Bandini and Robert Hewison, considers shifting values in cultural and critical practices in relation to the 'condition of postmodernity'. Part V, from Ruth

Levitas, Judith Williamson and Dick Hebdige, takes a speculative leap into the future, but a leap constrained, as they argue, by the exigencies of the present, including our own unexamined vocabularies and habits of thought.

Thinking about the future is not an everyday activity for people whose professional work is usually regarded as a reordering of the past. It is hard not to feel numb, or powerless, or apocalyptic. With so much of the world so recently, and in some cases so bloodily and comprehensively reordered, it is difficult to avoid a sense of momentous geographical trauma. For those of us who regarded our interest in culture as inevitably compounded with an awareness of the operations of power, this would seem to be a particularly significant time. The purpose of these essays is to try to gain some purchase on present changes and to extrapolate from them possible futures.

Jon Bird, Barry Curtis, Tim Putnam,
George Robertson, Lisa Tickner

Part I

The cultural politics of space

Chapter 1
From space to place and back again: Reflections on the condition of postmodernity

David Harvey

Counting the cars on the New Jersey Turnpike
They've all gone to look for America
All gone to look for America
(Simon and Garfunkel)

INTRODUCTION

In the conclusion to *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Harvey 1989:355) I proposed four areas of development to overcome the supposed crisis of historical materialism and Marxism. These were:

1 The treatment of difference and 'otherness' not as something to be added on to more fundamental Marxist categories (like class and productive forces) but as something that should be omnipresent from the very beginning in any attempt to grasp the dialectics of social change.
2 A recognition that the production of images and discourses is an important facet of activity that has to be analysed as part and parcel of the reproduction and transformation of any social order.
3 A recognition that the dimensions of space and time matter and that there are real geographies of social action, real as well as metaphorical territories and spaces of power that are the sites of innumerable differences that have to be understood both in their own right and within the overall logic of capitalist development. Historical materialism, in short, must take its geography seriously.
4 A theoretical and practical recognition that historical-geographical materialism is an open-ended and dialectical mode of enquiry rather than a closed and fixed body of understandings. Marx's theory of a capitalist mode of production, for example, is not a statement of total truth but an attempt to come to terms with the historical and

> geographical truths that characterize capitalism, both in general as well as in its particular phases and forms.

It is in this spirit that I turn to just one particular topic broached in *The Condition of Postmodernity* and attempt both a clarification and an elaboration of its importance to the overall argument. I want to examine in more detail the shifting relations between space and place and to explain, in particular, why it might be that the elaboration of place-bound identities has become more rather than less important in a world of diminishing spatial barriers to exchange, movement and communication.

THE PROBLEM OF PLACE

An initial point of clarification will, I fear, not clarify much. There are all sorts of words such as milieu, locality, location, locale, neighbourhood, region, territory and the like, which refer to the generic qualities of place. There are other terms such as city, village, town, megalopolis and state, which designate particular kinds of places. There are still others, such as home, hearth, 'turf', community, nation and landscape, which have such strong connotations of place that it would be hard to talk about one without the other. 'Place' also has an extraordinary range of metaphorical meanings. We talk about the place of art in social life, the place of women in society, our place in the cosmos, and we internalize such notions psychologically in terms of knowing our place, or feeling we have a place in the affections or esteem of others. We express norms by putting people, events and things in their proper place and seek to subvert norms by struggling to define a new place from which the oppressed can freely speak. Place has to be one of the most multi-layered and multi-purpose words in our language.

While this immense confusion of meanings makes any theoretical concept of place immediately suspect, I regard the generality, the ambiguity and the multiple layers of meanings as advantageous. It suggests, perhaps, some underlying unity which, if we can approach it right, will reveal a great deal about social, political and spatial practices in interrelation with each other. So, although I shall concentrate mainly on the territoriality of place, the very looseness of the term lets me explore connections to other meanings. I shall suggest, for example, that while the collapse of spatial barriers has undermined older material and territorial definitions of place, the very fact of that collapse (the threat of 'time-space compression' as I called it in *The Condition of Postmodernity*) has put renewed emphasis upon the interrogation of metaphorical and psychological meanings which, in turn, give new material definitions of place by way of exclusionary territorial behaviour. Explorations of this sort should help clarify the thorny problem of 'otherness' and 'difference' (made

so much of in post-modern rhetoric) because territorial place-based identity, particularly when conflated with race, ethnic, gender, religious and class differentiation, is one of the most pervasive bases for both progressive political mobilization and reactionary exclusionary politics.

There is, it also happens, a theoretical lesson to be had from such an enquiry. It permits reflection on the question of how to sustain and elaborate general theory in the face of particularity and difference. In this respect, geographers' experiences are of interest. When the rest of social science was dealing with general theories specified in time, geographers were struggling with the specificities of place. Furthermore, the incorporation of space into existing social theory, of whatever sort, always seemed to disrupt its power. The innumerable contingencies, specificities and 'othernesses' which geographers encountered could be (and often were) regarded by geographers as fundamentally undermining (dare I say 'deconstructing') of all forms of social scientific metatheory. The prime source of this difficulty is not hard to spot. None of us can choose our moment in time and, being determinate, time is more easily open to theories of determination. But we do have a range of choices as to location and such choices matter because the potential fixity of spatial configuration (a building, a city) permits that choice to have the apparent effect of freezing time (if only for a moment). The effect is to fragment and shatter the more easily specified processes of temporal change. These sorts of arguments have recently entered into literary theory. Kristin Ross (1988), for example, follows Feuerbach in suggesting that 'time is the privileged category of the dialectician, because it excludes and subordinates where space tolerates and coordinates'. The inference, of course, is that geography is not open to universal theory and *is* the realm of specificity and particularity. My own view, however, is that while too much can be made of the universal at the expense of understanding particularity, there is no sense in blindly cantering off in the other direction into that opaque world of supposedly unfathomable differences in which geographers have for so long wallowed. The problem is to rewrite the metatheory, to specify dialectical processes in time-space, rather than to abandon the whole project. An account of the role of place in social life should prove helpful in this regard.

The first step down that road is to insist that place in whatever guise is, like space and time (see Harvey 1990) a social construct. The only interesting question that can be asked is: by what social process(es) is place constructed? I shall try to get a fix on that problem by looking at two quite different answers and then triangulate in to suggest a conceptual resolution of the problem.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PLACE AND CONSTRUCTION UNDER CAPITALISM

I begin with a consideration of capitalism's historical trajectory of geographical expansion through the construction of actual places. Since I have written extensively on this topic elsewhere (Harvey 1982, 1985), I shall here offer a very abbreviated account.

Capitalism is necessarily growth oriented, technologically dynamic, and crisis prone. It can temporarily and in part surmount crises of overaccumulation of capital (idle productive capacity plus unemployed labour power) through geographical expansion. There are two facets to this process. First, excess capital can be exported from one place (region, nation) to build another place within an existing set of space relations (e.g. the recent history of Japanese investment of capital surpluses in overseas real estate development). Second, space relations may be revolutionized through technological and organizational shifts that 'annihilate space through time'. Such revolutions (the impact of turnpikes, canals, railways, automobiles, containerization, air transport and telecommunications) alter the character of places (if only in relation to each other) and thereby interact with the activities of place construction.

In either case, new networks of places (constituted as fixed capital embedded in the land) arise, around which new territorial divisions of labour and concentrations of people and labour power, new resource extraction activities and markets form. The geographical landscape that results is not evenly developed but strongly differentiated. 'Difference' and 'otherness' is *produced* in space through the simple logic of uneven capital investment and a proliferating geographical division of labour. There are tensions within this process. To begin with, it is necessarily speculative (like all forms of capitalist development). Place construction ventures often go wrong or become mired down in speculative swindles. Charles Dickens used the history of a mythical New Eden in *Martin Chuzzlewit* as a witty denunciation of a process which continues to this day as pensioners head down to their retirement plot in sunny Florida to find it is in the middle of a swamp. Thorsten Veblen (1967) argued, and I think he was basically correct, that the whole settlement pattern of the United States should be understood as one vast venture in real estate speculation. To say, therefore, that place construction is a given in the logic of capitalism's production of space is not to argue that the geographical pattern is determined in advance. It is largely worked out a posteriori through competition between places.

The second difficulty arises out of the inevitable tension between speculative investment in land development and the geographical mobility of other forms of capital. Those who have invested in the former have to ensure that activities arise that render their investments profitable.

Coalitions of entrepreneurs actively try to shape activities in places for this purpose. Hence the significance of local 'growth-machine' politics of the sort that Logan and Molotch (1987) describe and of local class alliances to promote economic development in places. The 'social networking' which occurs in and through places to procure economic advantage may be intricate in the extreme but at the end of the day some sort of coalition, however shifting, is always in evidence. But such coalitions cannot always succeed. Competition between places produces winners and losers. The differences between places to some degree become antagonistic.

The tension between fixity and mobility erupts into generalized crises, however, when the landscape shaped in relation to a certain phase of development (capitalist or precapitalist) becomes a barrier to further accumulation. The landscape must then be reshaped around new transport and communications systems and physical infrastructures, new centres and styles of production and consumption, new agglomerations of labour power and modified social infrastructures (including, for example, systems of governance and regulation of places). Old places have to be devalued, destroyed and redeveloped while new places are created. The cathedral city becomes a heritage centre; the mining community becomes a ghost town; the old industrial centre is deindustrialized; speculative boom towns or gentrified neighbourhoods arise on the frontiers of capitalist development or out of the ashes of deindustrialized communities. The history of capitalism is punctuated by intense phases of spatial reorganization. There has been, as I sought to show in *The Condition of Postmodernity* a powerful surge of this from about 1970, creating considerable insecurity within and between places.

I can now venture a first cut at explaining why it is that place has become more rather than less important over the past two decades:

1 Space relations have been radically restructured since around 1970 and this has altered the relative locations of places within the global patterning of capital accumulation. Urban places that once had a secure status find themselves vulnerable (think of Detroit, Sheffield, Liverpool and Lille); residents find themselves forced to ask what kind of place can be remade that will survive within the new matrix of space relations and capital accumulation. We worry about the meaning of place in general when the security of actual places becomes generally threatened.
2 Diminished transport costs have made production, merchanting, marketing and particularly finance capital much more geographically mobile than heretofore. This allows a much freer choice of location which, in turn, permits capitalists to take more rather than less advantage of small differences in resource qualities, quantities and costs between places. Multinational capital, for example, has become

much more sensitive to the qualities of places in its search for more profitable accumulation.

3 Those who reside in a place (or who hold the fixed assets in place) become acutely aware that they are in competition with other places for highly mobile capital. The particular mix of physical and social infrastructures, of labour qualities, of social and political regulation, of cultural and social life on offer (all of which are open to construction) can be more or less attractive to, for example, multinational capital. Residents worry about what package they can offer that will bring development while satisfying their own wants and needs. Places therefore differentiate themselves from other places and become more competitive (and perhaps antagonistic and exclusionary with respect to each other) in order to capture or retain capital investment. Within this process, the selling of place, using all the artifices of advertising and image construction that can be mustered, has become of considerable importance. 'Someday we all go to a better place', announces a vast hoarding in Croydon, advertising for relocation in Milton Keynes.

4 Profitable projects to absorb excess capital have been hard to find in these last two decades, and a considerable proportion of the surplus has found its way into speculative place construction. The lack of wisdom in much of this is now becoming clear in the massive default of savings and loan institutions in the United States ($500bn—larger than the combined Third World debt) and the shaky position of many of the world's largest banks (including the Japanese) through overinvestment in real estate development. The selling of places and the highlighting of their particular qualities (retirement or tourist resorts, communities with new lifestyles, etc.) become even more frenetic.

The upshot has been to render the coercive power of competition between places for capitalist development more rather than less emphatic and so provide less leeway for projects of place construction that lie outside of capitalist norms. The concern to preserve a good business environment or to realize a profit from speculative development dominates. Interplace competition is not simply about attracting production, however. It is also about attracting consumers through the creation of a cultural centre, a pleasing urban or regional landscape, and the like. Investment in consumption spectacles, the selling of images of places, competition over the definition of cultural and symbolic capital, the revival of vernacular traditions associated with places, all become conflated in interplace competition. I note in passing that much of postmodern production in, for example, the realms of architecture and urban design, is precisely about the selling of place as part and parcel of an ever-deepening commodity

culture. The result is that places that seek to differentiate themselves end up creating a kind of serial replication of homogeneity (Boyer 1988).

The question immediately arises as to why people accede to the construction of their places by such a process. The short answer, of course, is that often they don't. The historical geography of place construction is full of examples of struggles fought for socially just reinvestment (to meet community needs); for the development of 'community', expressive of values other than those of money and exchange; or against deindustrialization, or the despoliation of cities through highway construction (even the upper classes organize against the destruction of their neighbourhoods by the activities of some crass developer). Henri Lefebvre (1991) is quite right, therefore, to insist that class struggle is everywhere inscribed in space through the uneven development of the qualities of places. Yet it is also the case that such resistances have not checked the overall process (speculative capital when denied the option to despoil one city has the habit of quickly finding somewhere else to go).

But instances of popular complicity with speculative activities are also plentiful. These typically arise out of a mixture of coercion and co-optation into support of capitalist projects of place construction. Co-optation is largely organized around

1 dispersed property ownership which provides a mass base for speculative activity (no one wants to see the value of their house tumbling);
2 the benefits supposedly to be had from expansion (bringing new employment and economic activities into town); and
3 the sheer power of pro-capitalist techniques of persuasion (growth is inevitable as well as good for you).

For these reasons, labour organizations often join rather than oppose local growth coalitions. Coercion arises either through interplace competition for capital investment and employment (accede to the capitalist's demands or go out of business; create a 'good business climate' or lose jobs) or, more simply, through the direct political repression and oppression of dissident voices (from cutting off media access to the more violent tactics of the construction mafias in many of the world's cities).

But I doubt that the purchase of place over our thinking and our politics can simply be attributed to these trends, powerful and persuasive as they may be in many instances. The generalization of civic boosterism, of growth-machine politics, of cultural homogenization through diversification, hardly provides what many would regard as an authentic basis for place-bound identities and it cannot account for the strength of political attachments which people manifest in relation to particular places. So where can we look for other explanations?

HEIDEGGER AND PLACE AS THE LOCUS OF BEING

'Place', said Heidegger, 'is the locale of the truth of Being.' Many writers—particularly those within the phenomenological tradition—have drawn heavily from him and it is useful to see how his argument unfolds. The following quotation contextualizes his argument:

> All distances in time and space are shrinking…. Yet the frantic abolition of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in shortness of distance. What is least remote from us in point of distance, by virtue of its picture on film or its sound on radio, can remain far from us. What is incalculably far from us in point of distance can be near to us…. Everything gets lumped together into uniform distancelessness…. What is it that unsettles and thus terrifies? It shows itself and hides itself in the *way* in which everything presences, namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent.
>
> (Heidegger 1971:165)

Notice the sense of terror at the elimination of spatial barriers (cf. the 'terror of time-space compression' which I have commented on elsewhere). This terror is ineluctably present in daily life because all mortals 'persist through space by virtue of their stay among things' and are therefore perpetually threatened by changing space relations among things. Physical nearness does not necessarily bring with it understanding or an ability to appreciate or even appropriate a thing properly. Heidegger recognizes that the achieved shifts in space relations are a product of commodification and market exchange and he invokes an argument close to Marx's:

> the object-character of technological dominion spreads itself over the earth ever more quickly, ruthlessly, and completely. Not only does it establish all things as producible in the process of production; it also delivers the products of production by means of the market. In self-assertive production, the humanness of man and the thingness of things dissolve into the calculated market value of a market which not only spans the whole earth as a world market, but also, as the will to will, trades in the nature of Being and thus subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that dominates most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need of numbers.
>
> (Heidegger 1971: 114–15)

Heidegger, however, reacts to all this in a very particular way. He withdraws from the world market and seeks ways to uncover the truths of human existence and meaning through meditation and contemplation. The concept that he focuses on is that of 'dwelling'. He illustrates it with a description of a Black Forest farmhouse:

> Here the self-sufficiency of the power to let earth and heaven, divinities and mortals enter in simple oneness into things, ordered the house. It places the farm on the wind-sheltered mountain slope looking south, among the meadows close to the spring. It gave it the wide overhanging shingle roof whose proper slope bears up under the burden of snow, and which, reaching deep down, shields the chambers against the storms of the long winter nights. It did not forget the altar corner behind the community table; it made room in its chamber for the hallowed places of childbed and the 'tree of the dead'—for that is what they call a coffin there; the Totenbaum—and in this way it designed for the different generations under one roof the character of their journey through time. A craft which, itself sprung from dwelling, still uses its tools and frames as things, built the farmhouse.
>
> (Heidegger 1971: 160)

Dwelling is the capacity to achieve a spiritual unity between humans and things. From this it follows that 'only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build'. Indeed, buildings 'may even deny dwelling its own nature when they are pursued and acquired purely for their own sake' (ibid.: 156). Although there is a narrow sense of homelessness which can perhaps be alleviated simply by building shelter, there is a much deeper crisis of homelessness to be found in the modern world; many people have lost their roots, their connection to homeland. Even those who physically stay in place may become homeless (rootless) through the inroads of modern means of communication (such as radio and television). 'The rootedness, the autochthony, of man is threatened today at its core.' If we lose the capacity to dwell, then we lose our roots and find ourselves cut off from all sources of spiritual nourishment. The impoverishment of existence is incalculable. The flourishing of any genuine work of art, Heidegger insists (1966: 47–8), depends upon its roots in a native soil. 'We are plants which—whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not—must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and bear fruit.' Deprived of such roots, art is reduced to a meaningless caricature of its former self. The problem, therefore, is to recover a viable homeland in which meaningful roots can be established. Place construction should be about the recovery of roots, the recovery of the art of dwelling.

Heidegger's 'ontological excavations' have inspired a particular approach to understanding the social processes of place construction. He focuses our attention on the way in which places 'are constructed in our memories and affections through repeated encounters and complex associations' (Relph 1989: 26). He emphasizes how 'place experiences are necessarily time-deepened and memory-qualified'. He provides, it is said, 'a new way to speak about and care for our human nature and environment', so that 'love of place and the earth are scarcely sentimental extras to be indulged only when all technical and material problems have been resolved. They are part of being in the world and prior, therefore, to all technical matters' (ibid.: 27–9). There are, however, some difficulties. Like most great philosophers, Heidegger remained extraordinarily vague in his prescriptions, and his commentators have had a field day elaborating on what all this might mean. For example, what might the conditions of 'dwelling' be in a highly industrialized, modernist and capitalist world? He recognizes explicitly that we cannot turn back to the Black Forest farmhouse, but what is it that we might turn to? The issue of authenticity (rootedness) of the experience of place is, for example, a difficult one. To begin with, as Dovey (1989: 43) observes, the problem of authenticity is itself peculiarly modern. Only as modern industrialization separates us from the process of production and we encounter the environment as a finished commodity does it emerge. Being rooted in place, Tuan argues, is a different kind of experience from having and cultivating a sense of place: 'A truly rooted community may have shrines and monuments, but it is unlikely to have museums and societies for the preservation of the past' (Tuan 1977: 198). The effort to evoke a sense of place and of the past is now often deliberate and conscious. But herein lies a danger. The quest for authenticity, a modern value, stands to be subverted by the market provision of constructed authenticity, invented traditions and a commercialized heritage culture. The final victory of modernity, MacCannell (1976: 8) suggests, is not the disappearance of the non-modern world but its artificial preservation and reconstruction.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a widespread acceptance of Heidegger's claim that the authenticity of dwelling and of rootedness is being destroyed by the modern spread of technology, rationalism, mass production and mass values. Place is being destroyed, says Relph (1976), rendered 'inauthentic' or even 'placeless' by the sheer organizational power and depth of penetration of the market. The response is to construct a politics of place which is then held up as the political way forward to the promised land of an authentic existence. Here, for example, is Kirkpatrick Sale, writing in a left-wing journal *The Nation* (22 October 1990): 'The only political vision that offers any hope of salvation is one based on an understanding of, a rootedness in, a deep commitment to, and a resecralization of, *place*.'

This, then, permits a second cut at the initial question. Place is becoming more important to the degree that the authenticity of dwelling is being undermined by political-economic processes of spatial transformation and place construction. What Heidegger holds out, and what many subsequent writers have drawn from him, is the possibility of some kind of resistance to or rejection of that simple capitalist (or modernist) logic. It would then follow that the increasing penetration of technological rationality, of commodification and market values, and capital accumulation into social life (or into what many writers, including Habermas, call 'the life world'), together with time-space compression, will likely provoke increasing resistances that focus on alternative constructions of place (understood in the broadest sense of that word). The search for an authentic sense of community and of an authentic relation to nature among many radical and ecological movements is the cutting edge of exactly such a sensibility. Even such a trenchant socialist critic as Raymond Williams saw place as more than 'just the site of an event… but the materialization of a history which is often quite extensively retracted' (Williams 1979a: 276) and wrote a series of novels on the border country of Wales to explore its political and affective meaning. There is certainly enough credibility in the Heideggerian argument to make it worthy of careful consideration, even if, as I hope to show, there are strong grounds for its rejection in its pure Heideggerian manifestation.

TOWARDS A RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCE

The differences between the Marxist and Heideggerian traditions highlight some of the supposed oppositions between modernist and postmodernist ways of thinking and feeling. For Marx, analysis of the world of money and commodity production, with all its intricate social relations and universal qualities, defines an equally universal sphere of moral, economic and political responsibility which, though characterized by alienation and exploitation, has to be rescued by a global, political-economic strategy. This does not imply that the daily experiential world, which lies, as it were, within the confines of market fetishism, is irrelevant. Indeed, it is precisely Marx's point that this experience is so authentic as to tempt us permanently to regard it as all there is and so ground our sense of being, of moral responsibility and of political commitments entirely within its frame. Marx (1964) seeks to go beyond that frame and try, as he puts it in his early work, to construct a sense of 'species being' by a politics in which individuals realize their full individuality only through free association with others across the surface of the earth. This is notoriously vague and uncertain rhetoric. But it suggests that we cannot go back; that we cannot reject the world of sociality which has been achieved by the interlinking of all peoples into a global economy; that we should somehow build upon

this achievement and seek to transform it into an unalienated experience. The network of places constructed through the logic of capitalist development, for example, has to be transformed and used for progressive purposes rather than be rejected or destroyed.

The more progressive side of the modernist impulse drew much from this sentiment (though the concern with place transformation has been peculiarly muted in the Marxist revolutionary tradition). But it is also not hard to see how modernism could become complicitous with the universalisms of money, commodity, capital and exchange without in any way challenging the alienation. It cosied up to a corporate bureaucratic and state capitalist view of the world, and imposed a common language (in the construction of Hilton hotels, for example) of a sort that inhibited any response to alienation. Internationalist, working-class politics that abstracted from the immediate experiential world of daily life in particular places could likewise lose its purchase and credibility.

Heidegger, on the other hand, totally rejects any sense of moral responsibility beyond the world of immediate sensuous and contemplative experience. He rejects any dealings with the world of commodity, money, technology and production via any international division of labour. He contracts his field of vision to a much narrower, experiential world to ask questions about the innate and immanent qualities of experience of things. He insists upon the irreducibility of the experience of dwelling and specificities of place and environment. In so doing, he evokes a sense of loss of community, of roots and of dwelling in modern life which evidently strikes a potent chord with many people.

> If places are indeed a fundamental aspect of man's existence in the world, if they are sources of security and identity for individuals and for groups of people, then it is important that the means of experiencing, creating and maintaining significant places are not lost.
>
> (Relph 1976: 96)

The problem is that such sentiments easily lend themselves to an interpretation and a politics that is both exclusionary and parochialist, communitarian if not intensely nationalist (hence Heidegger's respect for Nazism). Heidegger refuses to see mediated social relationships (via the market or any other medium) with others (things or people) as in any way expressive of any kind of authenticity. Indeed, mediated relationships of this sort are felt as threatening to identity and any true sense of self, while anything that contributes to or smacks of rootlessness is rejected outright (does this explain his antagonism to the diaspora and rootlessness of the Jews?). Experience, furthermore, becomes incommunicable beyond certain bounds precisely because authentic art and genuine aesthetic sense can spring only out of strong rootedness in place. This exclusionary vision

becomes even more emphatic given his views on the power of language over social life. Places become the sites of incommunicable othernesses. There can be no interlinkage in the world of aesthetics or of communicable meanings of the sort that modernism often sought, even in a context of strong interlinkage in the material world of production and exchange.

From this standpoint, it is not hard to see how Heidegger figures so often in postmodern thinking as a precursor of ideas concerning the creation of 'interpretive communities', fragmented language games, and the like. And it is not hard to see how the crass and commercial side of postmodernism could play upon these sentiments and market the vernacular; simulate the authentic; and invent heritage, tradition and even commercialized roots. Yet, oddly, there persists another commonality with Marx. Heidegger persists in seeing authentic communities as materially and physically rooted in particular places through dwelling, rather than as being constructed solely, as so frequently happens in postmodernist rhetoric, in the realms of discourse.

But if I am correct, and modernism (as it is now generally interpreted) and postmodernism are dialectically organized oppositions within the long history of modernity (Harvey 1989: 339), then we should start to think of these arguments not as mutually exclusive but as oppositions that contain the other. Marx regards experience within the fetishism as authentic enough but surficial and misleading, while Heidegger views that same world of commodity exchange and technological rationality as at the root of an inauthenticity in daily life that has to be repudiated. This commonality of perception of the root of the problem—though specified as peculiarly capitalist by Marx and as modernist (i.e. both capitalist and socialist) by Heidegger—provides a common base from which to reconstruct a better understanding of place. What happens, then, when we see the differences as dialectical oppositions inherent in the condition of both modernity and postmodernity rather than as irreconcilable contradictions?

The simple answer is that we live in a world of universal tension between sensuous and interpersonal contact in place (with intense awareness of the qualities of that place within which temporal experiences unfold) and another dimension of awareness in which we more or less recognize the obligation and material connection that exists between us and the millions of other people who had, for example, a direct and indirect role in putting our breakfast on the table this morning. Put more formally, what goes on in a place cannot be understood outside of the space relations that support that place any more than the space relations can be understood independently of what goes on in particular places. While that may sound banal or trivially true, the manner of its conception has major ramifications for political thinking and practice.

Consider, for example, a recent essay by Young (1990). She begins with a criticism of some dominant strains of feminism that have focused on the ideal of community. The 'desire for unity or wholeness in discourse', she complains, 'generates borders, dichotomies, and exclusions'. In political theory, furthermore, the concept of community 'often implies a denial of time and space distancing' and an insistence on 'face-to-face interaction among members within a plurality of contexts'. Yet there are 'no conceptual grounds for considering face-to-face relations more pure, authentic social relations than relations mediated across time and distance'. This is a crucial issue. For while it may be true that 'in modern society the primary structures creating alienation and domination are bureaucracy and commodification', it does not follow that all mediated relations are alienating. By positing 'a society of immediate face-to-face relations as ideal, community theorists generate a dichotomy between the "authentic" society of the future and the "inauthentic" society we live in, which is characterized only by alienation, bureaucratization and degradation'. Her criticism of the Heideggerian tradition is strong. 'Racism, ethnic chauvinism, and class devaluation…grow partly from the desire for community, that is, from the desire to understand others as they understand themselves and from the desire to be understood as I understand myself.' In the United States today, she argues, 'the positive identification of some groups is often achieved by first defining other groups as the other, the devalued semihuman'.

Young's solution to this is to replace the ideal of face-to-face community with that of an 'unoppressive city', by building upon those positive experiences of city life in which differences of all sorts are embodied, negotiated and tolerated in the midst of all sorts of mediated relations in time and space. The 'unoppressive city' is defined as 'openness to unassimilated otherness'. While this solution is rather naïvely specified in relation to the actual dynamics of urban experience, the direction to which it points—the celebration of difference and diversity within some overarching unity—is of interest. It presupposes the possibility of somehow bridging the Marxian and Heideggerian conceptions within a new kind of radical politics. There is, however, one other major issue to be considered. Young cites Sandel:

> Insofar as our constitutive self-understandings comprehend a wider subject than the individual alone, whether a family or a tribe or a city or a class or nation or people, to this extent they define a community in the constitutive sense. And what makes such a community is not merely a spirit of benevolence, or the prevalence of communitarian values, or even certain 'shared final ends' alone, but a common vocabulary of discourse and a background of implicit practices and

> understandings within which the opacity of persons is reduced if never finally dissolved.
>
> (Sandel 1982: 172–3)

One of the major preoccupations of postmodernist thinking is the discursive construction of identity and 'places' in the social order in ways that have little or nothing to do, except coincidentally, with physical location or territorial expression. This complicates the argument only if an uncompromising break is inserted between how communities and places are represented and imagined on the one hand and how they are actually constituted through material social practices on the other. Yet the insistence upon the roles of both imagination and language has the signal virtue of demonstrating, as Anderson (1983) points out, that communities and places cannot be distinguished in the realms of discourse 'by their falsity/ genuineness, but [only] by the style in which they are imagined'. This conclusion is fundamentally at odds with the idea of some easily definable distinction between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' communities or places. If Marx (1967: 177–8) is right and imagination and representation always precede production, then Heidegger's view becomes just one possible imagined kind of place awaiting a material embodiment. Heidegger may have invoked a long deep past and the seemingly deep permanence of a pristine language, but he also recognized that it was impossible to go back to a world made up of Black Forest farmsteads and that it was necessary to press forward, in ways which national socialism then seemed to promise, to construct a new kind of 'authentic' community appropriate to that time and place.

Yet it is, paradoxically, the very conditions against which Heidegger revolts which permit the search for an imagined authentic community to become a practical proposition. The long historical geography of capitalism has so liberated us from spatial constraints that we can imagine communities independently of existing places and set about the construction of new places to house such communities in ways that were impossible before. The history of utopian thinking, from Thomas More and Francis Bacon onwards, is illustrative of the discursive point: the penchant for constructing and developing new towns from Welwyn Garden City to Chandigarh, Brazilia or the much talked-about Japanese plan for Multifunctionopolis in Australia testifies to the frequent attempt to materialize such ideas through actual place construction. The difficulty, however, is to reconcile such transformative practices with the desire to retain familiarity, security and the deep sense of belonging that attachment to place can generate.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF PLACES THROUGH SPATIAL PRACTICES

The material practices and experiences entailed in the construction and experiential qualities of place must be dialectically interrelated with the way places are both represented and imagined. This leads me back to the 'Lefebvrian matrix' described in *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Harvey 1989: 220–1) as a way to think through how places are constructed and experienced as material artefacts; how they are represented in discourse; and how they are used in turn as representations, as 'symbolic places', in contemporary culture (Lefebvre 1991). The dialectical interplay between experience, perception and imagination in place construction then becomes the focus of attention. But we also need to work simultaneously across the relations between distanciation (presence/absence and spatial scale), appropriation, domination and production of places. This may all seem rather daunting, especially when coupled with the fact that the matrix provides a mere framework across which social relations of class, gender, community, ethnicity or race operate. But this seems to me the only way to attack the rich complexity of social processes of place construction in a coherent way, while finding some sort of bridge between the concerns expressed in the Marxian and Heideggerian approaches. Let me illustrate.

Times Square in New York City was built up as a pure piece of realestate and business speculation around the creation of a new entertainment district in the 1890s. In the early 1900s, the name was pushed through by the *New York Times* which had just relocated in the square (after all, the *New York Herald*, its big rival, was located in Herald Square further downtown). The *Times* organized the grand New Year's Eve celebration of fireworks and, ultimately, the celebratory lowering of the ball, as a promotional gimmick. Thousands came not only on that day but throughout the year to sample the entertainments, watch people, eat out, survey the latest fashions and pick up gossip or information on anything from business and real estate deals to latest trends in entertainment and the private lives of eminent people. Soon the square became the centre of an advertising spectacle which in itself drew in the crowds. Times Square was, in short, created as a representation of everything that could be commercial, gaudy, promotional and speculative in the political economy of place construction. It was a far cry from that authentic dwelling in the Black Forest and, on the surface at least, it surely ought to qualify as the most *ersatz*, or as cultural critics might prefer to call it, 'pseudo-place' on earth. Yet it soon became the symbolic heart of New York City and, until its decline (largely under the impact of television) from the 1950s onwards, it was the focus of a sense of togetherness and community for many New Yorkers. Times Square became *the* place where everyone congregated to celebrate, mourn or express their collective anger,

joy or fear. Produced and dominated in the mode of political economy, it was appropriated by the populace in an entirely different fashion. It became an authentic place of representation with a distinctive hold on the imagination, even though as a space of material social practices it had all the character of a purely speculative and commodified spectacle. How could this happen?

Times Square rose to prominence as the modern metropolitan New York of five boroughs and sprawling suburbs began to take shape. Its rise coincided with an extraordinary boom in real-estate speculation; with the coming of mass-transit systems which changed the whole nature of space relations between people within the city (the subway came to Times Square in 1901); with the maturing of new systems of international and national communication (the radio in particular), of information and money flow, of commercialism and the marketing of fashion and entertainment as mass-consumption goods. This was a phase of rapid 'time-space compression', as Kern (1983) records, and even many New Yorkers seemed to lose their sense of identity. The stresses of rapid urban growth kept New Yorkers 'on the run', as it were, perpetually undermining the fragile immigrant and neighbourhood institutions which from time to time gave some sense of security and permanence in the midst of rapid change. What seems to have been so special about Times Square in its halcyon days was that it was a public space in which all classes of society could intermingle: as a classless (or rather a multiclass) place, it had the potential to be the focus of a sense of community which recognized difference but which also celebrated unity. The demi-monde rubbed shoulders with the aristocracy; immigrants of all sorts could share the spectacle; and the democracy of money appeared to be in charge. But community in this instance was not shaped by face-to-face interaction: it was achieved by the act of a common presence in the face of the spectacle, a spectacle which was shamelessly about the community of money and the commodification of everything. New York's Times Square certainly represented the community of money, but it also became a representation of a quite different notion of community in the minds and affections of millions of New Yorkers who, to this day, will contest plans to transform and redevelop this particular public space precisely because of its unique symbolic meaning and place in the collective memory.

This same sort of story can be told from an exactly opposite direction. The search for authentic community, and in particular a form of community which is expressive of values outside of those typically found in a capitalist, materialist and highly monetized culture, has frequently led to direct attempts at community and place construction according to alternative visions. Yet all those that have survived (and that is a very small proportion) have almost without exception done so by an accommodation to the power of money, to commodification and capital accumulation, and

to modern technologies. The survivors have also exhibited a capacity to insert and reinsert themselves into changing space relations. This is as true for such massive upheavals as the fundamentalist Islamic revolution in Iran (which is now walking the tightrope of how to reinsert itself into the world capitalist economy without appearing too overtly to accommodate to Satan) as it was for the innumerable communitarian movements which hived off from capitalism to become, in many instances, the cutting edge of further capitalist development—such as the French Icarians who settled in the United States (see Johnson 1974); the extraordinary wave of communalism and place building (including the Mormons, the Shakers and the early feminists) that had its origins in Western New York State in the first half of the nineteenth century; the anarchist and syndicalist movements which spawned dispersed settlements as far apart as Patagonia and Siberia and which even inspired the New Towns movement of Geddes and Ebenezer Howard. This whole history of place building suggests that a cultural politics has just as frequently been at the root of the inspiration of place construction as has a simple desire for profit and speculative gain. Yet the intertwining of the two is omnipresent and, in some instances, the cultural politics seems more like a means to a political-economic end than an end in itself.

Fitzgerald (1986) in *Cities on a Hill*, provides a fascinating picture of precisely this intersection in the US context. The studies of the gay community's appropriation and subsequent domination of the Castro district of San Francisco, of Jerry Falwell's religious empire in Lynchburg, and of Sun City (a retirement community in Florida), all illustrate the cultural politics of capital accumulation in different ways. By far the oddest of Fitzgerald's studies is, however, that of Rajneeshpuram. Founded in 1981 in a sparsely populated and semi-arid ranching area of Oregon as a 'self-sufficient' commune of the disciples of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, it had all the trappings of a new-age community from the standpoint of lifestyle, yet it also was characterized by a powerful use of money, by high technology and a worldwide internationalism founded on the network of disciples that Rajneesh had cultivated over the years. The ranch cost $1.5m and within two years the Rajneeshis had spent more than £60m in Oregon, by Fitzgerald's account, and had gone a long way towards building a whole new settlement, replete with airstrip, large reservoir, power station, irrigated fields, housing and a whole range of facilities which could support more than 3,000 people permanently and offer temporary accommodation for many thousands more. Rajneesh looked down upon Ghandi and Mother Teresa because of their interest in the poor. Money became the means to the good life. 'Religion is a luxury of the rich', he argued and had twenty-one Rolls-Royces to prove it. Yet the commune demanded at least twelve hours' hard labour a day from its residents and pulled together some highly educated and often technically

talented people who set to work in an atmosphere of overtly non-hierarchical social relations and with seeming joy and relish to create a place within which the human potential for personal growth might be realizable. Yet the exclusionary politics of the commune were so strong as to lead it to be represented internally as an island in a sea of spiritual and material decay, and externally as a cancerous foreign body inserted into the heart of rural America. The dissolution of the commune, the deportation of Rajneesh, and the arrest of some of the leading luminaries who, within a few years, had turned the commune from a mecca of personal liberation and human growth into an armed camp (engaging in all kinds of violent acts such as poisoning various officials and introducing salmonella into a neighbouring community's water supply), detracted little, according to Fitzgerald, from the intense feelings of affection felt by many who had passed through the commune. It had provided a home, however temporary, and a range of personal experiences for which people felt grateful. It had met a need, it had fulfilled desires, had allowed fantasies to be lived out in ways that were unforgettable. Yet it had also exhibited all of the intolerance of internal difference, all the subtle hierarchy and exclusionary politics which Young correctly fears is the inevitable end-product of communitarian politics. And for the brief moment of its success, it had all the attributes of a low-wage workcamp sustained out of moral fervour and delivering Rolls-Royces by the score to the guru of the establishment. This was not the first, nor will it be the last time that a cultural politics striving to produce an authenticity of place was to be co-opted and used for narrow financial gain.

The lesson is simple enough. Everyone who moves to establish difference in the contemporary world has to do so through social practices that necessarily engage with the mediating power of money. The latter is, after all, global and universal social power that can be appropriated by individual persons (hence it grounds bourgeois individualism) and any 'interpretive' or 'political' community which seeks to forge a distinctive identity has to accommodate to it. Indeed, in many instances (such as all of those that Fitzgerald investigated), possession of sufficient money power is a necessary condition for exploring difference through place construction. Rajneesh's comment that 'religion is a luxury of the rich' is, in this regard, rather too close for comfort. It is, in short, precisely the universality and sociality of money power that allows all kinds of othernesses to take on an independent existence and to survive. There is nothing in itself particularly wrong with that (if we have the resources, why not be as eclectic as Jencks or Lyotard suggest we should?), but it does force us to consider the relation between the production of difference and otherness in the contemporary world and the organization and distribution of political-economic power. The examples illustrate how cultural politics in general (and the search for affective community in particular) and political-

economic power intertwine in the social processes of place construction. It is, we may conclude, inadmissible to try to examine the one without the other.

PLACE AND POWER

To write of 'the power of place', as if places (localities, regions, neighbourhoods, states, etc.) possess causal powers, is to engage in the grossest of fetishisms; unless, that is, we confine ourselves rigorously to the definition of place as a social process. In the latter case, the questions to be posed can be rendered more explicit: why and by what means do social beings invest places (localities, regions, states, communities, or whatever) with social power; and how and for what purposes is that power then deployed and used across a highly differentiated system of interlinked places?

The production and reproduction of power differentiations is central to the operations of any capitalist economy. There is not only that great divide between the proletariat (reified as 'human resources', as if they were more or less substitutable by oil or firewood) and the capitalist class, but there are also the multiple and more nuanced hierarchical divisions which inevitably arise within the detail, social and territorial divisions of labour (between, for example, line workers, overseers, managers, service workers, designers, etc.) as well as those that factionalize the bourgeoisie (different interests in finance, land, production, merchanting, administration, law, science, military and police powers). Differences that preceded the capitalist order—of gender, race, language, ethnicity, religion and pre-capitalist social class—have been absorbed, transformed and reconstructed by a social system in which the accumulation of capital is assured through the domination of nature and control over wage labour. The manner of such reconstitutions deserves scrutiny. The connection between the rise of 'print capitalism', as Anderson (1983) calls it, and the transformation of linguistic diversity into 'imagined communities' of nations that ground the modern state, is one such case in point. Similarly, the bourgeois tactic of depicting some segment of humanity (women or 'the natives') as a part of nature, the repository of affectivity and as inevitably chaotic and unruly, allowed those segments to be subsumed within the general capitalistic project of the rational and orderly domination and exploitation of nature. The effect was to transform gender and racial oppression into forms not hitherto experienced. Furthermore, the revolutionary dynamic of capitalism ensures that such transformations are not once-and-for-all events, but continuous and often contradictory movements within the historical geography of capitalist development, even in the absence of explicit struggle on the part of the oppressed or active engagement in the politics of place construction on the part of disempowered social groups

(in, for example, the long history of decolonization or the attempts by women (see Hayden 1981) to construct alternative kinds of living and working spaces).

It is in such a context that we have to interpret the changing meaning of the production of place amongst all realms of the social order. And if I revert, once more, to the Lefebvrian matrix, it is because it permits a rapid reconnaisance of the intricacies of such a process. For we need to understand not merely how places acquire material qualities (as, for example, constellations of productive forces open to capitalistic use or as bundles of use values available to sustain particular ways and qualities of life). The evaluation and hierarchical ranking of places occurs, for example, largely through activities of representation. Our understanding of places here gets organized through the elaboration of some kind of mental map of the world which can be invested with all manner of personal or collective hopes and fears. The wrong side of the tracks and skid row are hardly parallel places in our mind to the gold coasts of Miami Beach. Psychoanalytic theory teaches, of course, that the field of representation is not necessarily all that it seems; that there are all manner of (mis) representations to which places are prone. If individual identity is constituted by fantasy, then can the identity human beings give to place be far behind?

Representations of places have material consequences in so far as fantasies, desires, fears and longings are expressed in actual behaviour. Evaluative schemata of places, for example, become grist to all sorts of policy-makers' mills. Places in the city get red-lined for mortgage finance; the people who live in them get written off by city hall as worthless, in the same way that much of Africa gets depicted as a basket-case. The material activities of place construction may then fulfil the prophecies of degradation and dereliction. Similarly, places in the city are dubbed as 'dubious' or 'dangerous', again leading to patterns of behaviour, both public and private, that turn fantasy into reality. The political-economic possibilities of place (re)construction are, in short, highly coloured by the evaluative manner of place representation.

Struggles over representation are, as a consequence, as fiercely fought and as fundamental to the activities of place construction as bricks and mortar (see, for example, Rose's (1990) discussion of the clash of ideologies in the definition of Poplar in the 1920s). And there is much that is negative as well as positive here. The denigration of others' places provides a way to assert the viability and incipient power of one's own place. The fierce contest over images and counter-images of places is an arena in which the cultural politics of places, the political economy of their development, and the accumulation of a sense of social power in place frequently fuse in indistinguishable ways.

By the same token, the creation of symbolic places is not given in the stars but painstakingly nurtured and fought over, precisely because of the hold that place can have over the imagination. I think it correct to argue that the social preservation of religion as a major institution within secular societies has been in part won through the successful creation, protection and nurturing of symbolic places. But imaginations are not easily manipulated or tamed to specific political-economic purposes. People can and do define monuments in ways that relate to their own experience and tradition. The places where martyrs fell (like the famous Mur-des-Fédérés in Père Lachaise cemetery) have long gripped the imagination of working-class movements. Yet no amount of formal monument construction (the extraordinary monumental palace that Ceauşescu had constructed in Bucharest, for example) can make a hated dictator beloved.

The strength of the Lefebvrian construction, however, is precisely that it refuses to see materiality, representation and imagination as separate worlds and that it denies the particular privileging of any one realm over the other, while simultaneously insisting that it is only in the social practices of daily life that the ultimate significance of all forms of activity is registered. It permits, therefore, an examination of the processes of place construction in which the material grounding still retains its force and salience. But in the process, we also understand that political mobilization through processes of place construction owes as much to activities in the representational and symbolic realms as to material activities, and that disjunctions frequently occur between them. Loyalty to place can and does have political meaning, even under circumstances where the daily practices of people in that place show little commonality. There was an element of that in the uprising of the Paris Commune, for example; while the fact that a category like 'New Yorkers' can make sense to the polyglot millions who occupy that place testifies precisely to the political power that can be mobilized and exercised through activities of place construction in the mind as well as on the ground.

There is, then, a politics to place construction ranging dialectically across material, representational and symbolic activities which find their hallmark in the way in which individuals invest in places and thereby empower themselves collectively by virtue of that investment. The investment can be of blood, sweat, tears and labour (the kind of building of affection through working to build the tangible product of place). Or it can be the discursive construction of affective loyalties through preservation of particular qualities of place and vernacular traditions; or new works of art which celebrate or (as with artefacts in the built environment) become symbolic of place. And it is precisely in this realm that the intertwining with place of all those other political values of community, of nation and the like, begins its work.

Yet this activity continues in a world in which the objective of 'accumulation for accumulation's sake', no matter what the political, social or ecological consequences, has remained unchallenged and unchecked. And while there are innumerable signs of decentralization of power to places, there is simultaneously a powerful movement towards a reconcentration of power in multinational corporations and financial institutions (Harvey 1989). The exercise of this latter power has meant the destruction, invasion and restructuring of places on an unprecedented scale. The viability of actual places has been powerfully threatened through changing material practices of production, consumption, information flow and communication, coupled with the radical reorganization of space relations and of time horizons within capitalist developtnent.

The necessity of place reconstruction has created dilemmas for spatial practices as well as for the way places get represented and themselves become representations. It is in such a context that the febrile attempt to reconstruct places in terms of imagined communities, replete, even, with the building of places of representation (the new monumentalities of spectacle and consumerism, for example) or the forging of imagined communities as a defence against these new material and social practices, becomes more readily understandable. But the building of exclusionary walls implicit in the new communitarian politics (a leitmotif among many postmodernist thinkers such as Rorty and Unger), although it may intervene in relations of production, consumption, exchange and reproduction, is always porous with respect to the universalizing power of money, while simultaneously becoming increasingly exclusionary and hence disempowered of collective capacity to control that money.

This brings me back to the rule that I spelled out in *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Harvey 1989). Oppositional movements are generally better at organizing in and dominating place than they are at commanding space. The 'othernesses' and 'regional resistances' that postmodernist politics emphasize can flourish in a particular place. But they are easily dominated by the power of capital to co-ordinate accumulation across universal fragmented space. Place-bound politics appeals even though such a politics is doomed to failure.

This, interestingly, is the central problem with which Raymond Williams wrestles in his trilogy on *Border Country*. As one of the characters in *The Fight for Manod* puts it:

> The whole of public policy…is an attempt to reconstitute a culture, a social system, an economic order, that have in fact reached their end, reached their limits of viability. And then I sit here and look at this double inevitability: that this imperial, exporting and divided order is ending, and that all its residual social forces, all its political formations, will fight to the end to reconstruct it, to re-establish it,

> moving deeper all the time through crisis after crisis in an impossible attempt to regain a familiar world. So then a double inevitability: that they will fail, and that they will try nothing else.
>
> (Williams 1979b: 181)

Is there, then, no way to break out of that inevitability?

CONCLUSION

Places, like space and time, are social constructs and have to be read and understood as such. There are ways to provide a materialist history of this literal and metaphorical geography of the human condition and to do it so as to shed light on the production of a spatially differentiated otherness as well as upon the chimerical ideals of an isolationist communitarian politics and the dilemmas of a non-exclusionary and hence universal emancipatory politics.

I have, however, considered the significance of place with scarcely a mention of modernism and postmodernism. In part, that tactic was deliberate because I think the way that opposition has evolved is obscuring rather than revealing of fundamental issues. Besides, the fight over such concepts is largely confined within the 'cultural mass' (a term I borrow from Daniel Bell (1979) to refer to those working in broadcast media, films, theatre, the plastic and graphic arts, painting, universities, publishing houses, cultural institutions, advertising and communications industries, etc.). Post-modernism is hardly of concern to trade unionists, social workers, health providers, the unemployed or the homeless. Like Rajneesh's religion, postmodernism appears to be the preoccupation of a segment of the privileged classes. Yet the cultural mass, in part under the banner of postmodernism, has internalized a whole host of political and ideological struggles that do have general significance—anti-racism, feminism, ethnic identity, religious tolerance, cultural decolonization and the like. Postmodernism within the cultural mass can be viewed from this stand-point as a welcome catching-up and coming-to-terms with the facts of fragmentation, difference and otherness, which have long been a central feature of capitalist political economy and culture. Yet the preoccupation with 'discourses' and 'representations' within the cultural mass has added a new dimension to how repression, oppression and exploitation can be received—a dimension which, when taken by itself, threatens to lose contact with any other forms of social practice but which, when put solidly back into the Lefebvrian formulation, has much to teach. And I think it true to say, furthermore, that more has been done to highlight various forms of oppression and repression within the cultural mass than in many other spheres of social life.

From this latter standpoint it is possible to view the cultural mass as home to some kind of democratized and mass-based avant-garde of the politics of the future. Even if there were no truth in this argument, the politics of the cultural mass are still important since they define and circumscribe symbolic orders, imaginative realms, and forms of representation in crucial ways. Postmodernist claims to be a liberatory and deconstructive force within the cultural mass must therefore be taken seriously. But there are two problems to this. First, struggles for power *within* the cultural mass have inevitably led to the use of postmodern or deconstructionist rhetoric in an entirely *ad hoc* way, and not a little of the argument has all the flavour of intellectual and political opportunism (quite a few rather second-rate white male Anglos have risen to stardom within their professions on the postmodern bandwagon). The second problem is that the fight is being waged within a relatively homogeneous and privileged class configuration, so that issues of class oppression, while always on the agenda, are by no means as strongly and personally felt as would be the case with, say, women factory operatives in the Philippines or Mexico.

Consideration of the class positioning of the whole debate on modernism and postmodernism leads to even deeper objections to postmodernist claims. The cultural mass, by virtue of its own class position, has many of the characteristics of those white-collar workers that Speier (1986) studied in the 1930s. Collectively, we 'tend to lack the reassuring support of a moral tradition that [we] can call our own'. We tend, therefore, to be 'value parasites', drawing our values from association with other dominant interests in society. In the 1960s, the cultural mass drew much inspiration from an association with working-class movements, but the political attack on and decline of the latter cut loose the cultural mass to shape its own concerns around money power, individualism, entrepreneurialism and the like (Harvey 1989: 347–9). And its own concerns are limited by its own product—representations, symbolic forms, images, etc.

All of which brings me back to the problem of place. One of the most powerful strands of independent politics within the cultural mass is to focus rather strongly on the meaning and qualities of community, nation and place. The shaping of place identity and local tradition is very much within the purview of workers within the cultural mass (from the writers of novels and makers of films to the writers of tourist brochures), and there are strong institutional forms taken by that shaping (everything from universities that keep local languages and the sense of local history alive to museums, cultural events, etc.). The more the cultural mass explores its own interior values, the more it tends to align itself with a political economy and a cultural politics of place. Hence the outpouring of books on precisely that topic over the past twenty years (see, for example, recent works by Agnew and Duncan 1989; Davis *et al.* 1990; Lilburne 1989; Pred 1990;

Probyn 1990; Tindall 1991) and the rise of a whole set of supportive political activities within the cultural mass for place-bound cultural movements (including the extraordinary role of cultural figures like Havel in the revolutions in Eastern Europe). As the cultural mass has dropped its association with proletarian movements and has sought to avoid a directly subservient position to capitalist bourgeois culture, it has become more closely identified with a cultural politics of place.

Not all of this must be cast in a positive light, however. The stereotyping of other places is one of the more vicious forms of bloodletting within the media (one only has to read the *Sun*'s descriptions of the French to get the point). Defining the other in an exclusionary and stereotypical way is the first step towards self-definition. The rediscovery of place, as the case of Heidegger shows, poses as many dangers as opportunities for the construction of any kind of progressive politics. Deconstruction and the post-modern impulse, as Said demonstrates in his study of *Orientalism* (Said 1978), certainly provide a means to attack the appalling stereotyping of other places, but there is a huge problem of public perspectives, representation and politics within the overall work of the cultural mass in this regard that desperately needs to be confronted.

Yet place is hardly a discovery of postmodernity. The politics of place and of turf, of local identity and nation, of regions and cities, has been there all along and been of great importance within the uneven geographical development of capitalism. The rediscovery of place, with all its multilayered meaning, within the rhetoric of the cultural mass and, through that, within the rhetoric of politics, is what is significant here rather than the fact that the world has changed in some way to make the political economy or cultural politics of place more important now than in the past. Yet there is indeed a sense in which the latter proposition is also true, because it is in the face of a fierce bout of time-space compression, and of all the restructurings to which we have been exposed these last few years, that the security of place has been threatened and the map of the world rejigged as part of a desperate speculative gamble to keep the accumulation of capital on track.

Such loss of security promotes a search for alternatives, one of which lies in the creation of both imagined and tangible communities in place. The issue of how to create what sort of place becomes imperative for economic as well as political survival. Talk to the mayors of Baltimore, Sheffield and Lille and you will find that this has been their precise preoccupation over the last few years. And it is here, too, that the politics of the cultural mass can take on considerable importance. For if, as Marx insisted, we get at the end of every labour process a result that is the product of our imaginations at the beginning, then how we imagine communities and places of the future becomes part of the jigsaw of what our future can be. Rajneeshpuram existed in someone's imagination and captured the

imaginations of many caught up in the human potential movement who worked so hard to make it the temporary place it was. And even if, as in this case, there is many a slip between imagination and realization, and a whole host of unintended consequences to be countered and discounted on the path, the question of how we imagine the future and with what seriousness we invest in it is always on the agenda.

From that standpoint, the conflict between modernism and postmodernism, as also between the political-economic and cultural politics of place, has much to teach about the problems of place creation. But the whole game becomes worthwhile only if we are prepared to learn and act upon the lessons. And one of those lessons must surely be that all attempts to construct places and build imagined communities should, as Eric Wolf so cogently puts it, 'take cognizance of processes that transcend separable cases, moving through and beyond them and transforming them as they proceed' (Wolf 1982: 17).

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Chapter 4
Power-geometry and a progressive sense of place

Doreen Massey

TIME-SPACE COMPRESSION AND THE GEOMETRIES OF POWER

Much of what is written about space, place and postmodern times emphasizes a new phase in what Marx once called 'the annihilation of space by time'. The process is argued, or more usually asserted, to have gained a new momentum, to have reached a new stage. It is a phenomenon which Harvey (1989) has termed 'time-space compression'. And the general acceptance that something of the sort is going on is marked by the almost obligatory use in the literature of terms and phrases such as speed-up, global village, overcoming spatial barriers, the disruption of horizons and so forth.

Yet the concept of time-space compression remains curiously unexamined. In particular, it is a concept which often remains without much social content, or with only a very restricted, one-sided, social content. There are many aspects to this. One is, of course, the question of to what extent its current characterization represents very much a Western, colonizer's view. The sense of dislocation which so many writers on the subject apparently feel at the sight of a once well-known local street now lined with a succession of cultural imports—the pizzeria, the kebab house, the branch of the middle-eastern bank—must have been felt for centuries, though from a very different point of view, by colonized peoples all over the world as they watched the importation of, maybe even used, the products of, first, European colonization, maybe British (from new forms of transport to liver salts and custard powder); later US products, as they learned to eat wheat instead of rice or corn, to drink Coca-Cola, just as today we try out enchiladas.

But there are just two points which it seems particularly important to raise in the current context. The first concerns causality. Time-space compression is a term which refers to movement and communication across space. It is a phenomenon which implies the geographical stretching-out of social relations (referred to by Giddens (1984) as time-

space distanciation), and to our experience of all this. However, those who argue that we are currently undergoing a new phase of accelerated time-space compression usually do so from a very particular view of its determination. For Jameson and for Harvey these things are determined overwhelmingly by the actions of capital (Jameson 1984; Harvey 1989). For Harvey it is, in his own terms, time space and money which make the world go round, and us go round (or not) the world. It is capitalism and its developments which are argued to determine our understanding and our experience of space. This is, however, clearly insufficient. There are many other things that clearly influence that experience, for instance, ethnicity and gender. The degree to which we can move between countries, or walk about the streets at night, or take public transport, or venture out of hotels in foreign cities, is not influenced simply by 'capital'. Harvey describes how Frédéric Moreau, hero of Flaubert's *L'Éducation Sentimentale*,

> glides in and out of the differentiated spaces of the city, with the same sort of ease that money and commodities change hands. The whole narrative structure of the book likewise gets lost in perpetual postponements of decisions precisely because Frédéric has enough inherited money to enjoy the luxury of not deciding.

Reflecting on this, Harvey argues that

> it was the possession of money that allowed the present to slip through Frédéric's grasp, while opening social spaces to casual penetration. Evidently, time, space and money could be invested with rather different significances, depending upon the conditions and possibilities of trade-off between them.
>
> (Harvey 1989: 263–4)

Time, space and *money*? Did not Frédéric, as he 'casually penetrated' these social spaces, have another little advantage in life, too (see also Massey 1991b)? Or again Birkett, reviewing books on women adventurers and travellers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, suggests that 'it is far, far more demanding for a woman to wander now than ever before' (Birkett 1990: 41). The reasons for this, she argues, are a complex mix of colonialism, ex-colonialism, racism, changing gender relations, and relative wealth. Harvey's simple resort to 'money' alone could not begin to get to grips with the issue. (Incidentally, of course, the example also indicates that 'time-space compression' has not been happening for everyone in all spheres of activity.) In other words, and simply put, there is a lot more determining how we experience space than what 'capital' gets up to. Most of the arguments so far around time-space compression do not recognize

this. Moreover, to argue for this greater complexity is not in any way to be anti-materialist, it is simply not to reduce materialism to economism.

The second point about the inadequacy of the notion of time-space compression as it is currently used is that it needs differentiating socially. This is not just a moral or political point about inequality, although that would be sufficient reason to mention it: it is also a conceptual point. Imagine for a moment that you are on a satellite, further out and beyond all actual satellites; you can see 'planet earth' from a distance and, rare for someone with only peaceful intentions, you are equipped with the kind of technology that allows you to see the colours of people's eyes and the number on their number-plates. You can see all the movement and tune-in to all the communication that is going on. Furthest out are the satellites, then aeroplanes, the long haul between London and Tokyo and the hop from San Salvador to Guatemala City. Some of this is people moving, some of it is physical trade, some is media broadcasting. There are faxes, e-mail, film-distribution networks, financial flows and transactions. Look in closer and there are ships and trains, steam trains slogging laboriously up hills somewhere in Asia. Look in closer still and there are lorries and cars and buses and on down further and somewhere in sub-Saharan Africa there's a woman on foot who still spends hours a day collecting water.

Now, I want to make one simple point here, and that is about what one might call the *power-geometry* of it all; the power-geometry of time-space compression. For different social groups and different individuals are placed in very distinct ways in relation to these flows and interconnections. This point concerns not merely the issue of who moves and who doesn't, although that is an important element of it; it is also about power in relation *to* the flows and the movement. Different social groups have distinct relationships to this anyway-differentiated mobility: some are more in charge of it than others; some initiate flows and movement, others don't; some are more on the receiving end of it than others; some are effectively imprisoned by it.

In a sense, at the end of all the spectra are those who are both doing the moving and the communicating and who are in some way in a position of control in relation to it. These are the jet-setters, the ones sending and receiving the faxes and the e-mail, holding the international conference calls, the ones distributing the films, controlling the news, organizing the investments and the international currency transactions. These are the groups who are really, in a sense, in charge of time-space compression; who can effectively use it and turn it to advantage; whose power and influence it very definitely increases. On its more prosaic fringes this group probably includes a fair number of Western academics.

But there are groups who, although doing a lot of physical moving, are not 'in charge' of the process in the same way. The refugees from E1

Salvador or Guatemala and the undocumented migrant workers from Michoacán in Mexico crowding into Tijuana to make perhaps a fatal dash for it across the border into the USA to grab a chance of a new life. Here the experience of movement, and indeed of a confusing plurality of cultures, is very different. And there are those from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Caribbean, who come halfway round the world only to get held up in an interrogation room at Heathrow.

Or again, there are those who are simply on the receiving end of time-space compression. The pensioner in a bedsit in any inner city in this country, eating British working-class-style fish and chips from a Chinese take-away, watching a US film on a Japanese television, and not daring to go out after dark. And anyway, the public transport's been cut.

Or—one final example to illustrate a different kind of complexity—there are the people who live in the favelas of Rio; who know global football like the back of their hand, and have produced some of its players; who have contributed massively to global music; who gave us the samba and produced the lambada that everyone was dancing to a few years ago in the clubs of Paris and London; and who have never, or hardly ever, been to downtown Rio. At one level they have been tremendous contributors to what we call time-space compression; and at another level they are imprisoned in it.

This is, in other words, a highly complex social differentiation. There is the dimension of the degree of movement and communication, but also the dimensions of control and of initiation. The ways in which people are inserted into and placed within 'time-space compression' are highly complicated and extremely varied. It is necessary to think through with a bit more conceptual depth, a bit more analytical rigour, quite how these positions are differentiated. Moreover, recognition of this complexity raises the important issue of *which* condition of postmodernity we are talking about—*whose* condition of postmodernity?

More immediately, two points arise from these considerations. The first raises more directly questions of politics. If time-space compression can be imagined in that more socially formed, socially evaluative and differentiated way, then there may be the possibility of developing a politics of mobility and access. For it does seem that mobility and control over mobility both reflect and reinforce power. It is not simply a question of unequal distribution, that some people move more than others, some have more control than others. It is that the mobility and control of some groups can actively weaken other people. Differential mobility can weaken the leverage of the already weak. The time-space compression of some groups can undermine the power of others. This is well established and often noted in the relationship between capital and labour. Capital's ability to roam the world further strengthens it in relation to relatively immobile workers, enables it to play off the plant at Genk against the plant at

Halewood. It also strengthens its hand against struggling local economies the world over as they compete for the favour of some investment. But also, every time someone uses a car, and thereby increases their personal mobility, they reduce both the social rationale and the financial viability of the public transport system—and thereby also potentially reduce the mobility of those who rely on that system. Every time you drive to that out-of-town shopping centre you contribute to the rising prices, even hasten the demise, of the corner shop. And the 'time-space compression' which is involved in producing and reproducing the daily lives of the comfortably-off in first-world societies—not just their own travel but the resources they draw on, from all over the world, to feed their lives—may entail environmental consequences, or hit constraints, that will limit the lives of others before their own. We need to ask, in other words, whether our relative mobility and power over mobility and communication entrenches the spatial imprisonment of other groups.

A politics of mobility might range over issues as broad as wheelchair access, reclaiming the night and the streets of cities for women and for older people, through issues of international migration, to the whole gamut of transport policy itself. Conceptualizing space, mobility and access in a more socially imaginative way, and abandoning easy and excited notions of generalized and undifferentiated time-space compression, might enable us to confront some of these issues rather more inventively.

The second point is simply a question. Why is it that for so many of the academics who write about time-space compression, who are in relative control of their new mobility and means of communication, who jet off to (or from) Los Angeles to give a paper on it, does it generate such feelings of insecurity? Harvey (1989), for instance, constantly writes of vulnerability, insecurity and the unsettling impact of time-space compression. This question is important less in itself than because, as will be argued in the next part of this chapter, it seems also to have generated in them, as a counter to all this insecurity, a very particular (and unprogressive) sense of place.

A PROGRESSIVE SENSE OF PLACE

Those writers who interpret the current phase of time-space compression as primarily generating insecurity also frequently go on to argue that, in the middle of all this flux, one desperately needs a bit of peace and quiet; and 'place' is posed as a source of stability and an unproblematical identity. In that guise, place and the spatially local are rejected by these writers as almost necessarily reactionary. Space/place is characterized, after Heidegger, as Being; and, as such, as a diversion from the progressive

dimension of Time as Becoming (see Harvey (1989); and Massey (1991a) for a critique of this position).

There are a number of serious inadequacies in this argument, ranging from the question of why it is assumed that time-space compression will produce insecurity, through the need to face up to—rather than simply deny—people's need for attachment of some sort, whether through place or anything else. It is also problematical that so often this debate, as in the case of Harvey, starts off from Heidegger, for if it had not started off from there, perhaps it would never have found itself in this conceptual tangle in the first place.

None the less, it is certainly the case that there is at the moment a recrudescence of some problematical senses of place, from reactionary nationalisms to competitive localisms, to sanitized, introverted obsessions with 'heritage'. Instead of refusing to deal with this, however, it is necessary to recognize it and to try to understand what it represents. Perhaps it is most important to think through what might be an adequately progressive sense of place, one which would fit in with the current global-local times and the feelings and relations they give rise to, *and* one which would be useful in what are, after all, our often inevitably place-based political struggles. The question is how to hold on to that notion of spatial difference, of uniqueness, even of rootedness if people want that, without it being reactionary.

There are a number of distinct ways in which the notion of place which is derived from Heidegger is problematical. One is the idea that places have single essential identities. Another is the idea that the identity of place —the sense of place—is constructed out of an introverted, inward-looking history based on delving into the past for internalized origins, translating the name from the Domesday Book. Wright (1985) confronts both these issues. He recounts the construction and appropriation of Stoke Newington and its past by the arriving middle class (the Domesday Book registers the place as 'Newtowne': 'There is land for two ploughs and a half.… There are four villanes and thirty seven cottagers with ten acres' (ibid.: 227, 231)), and he contrasts this version with that of other groups—the white working class and the large number of important minority communities.

Another problem with the conception of place which derives from Heidegger is that it seems to require the drawing of boundaries. Geographers have long been exercised by the problem of defining regions, and this question of 'definition' has almost always been reduced to drawing lines around a place. I remember some of my most painful times as a geographer have been spent unwillingly struggling to think how one could draw a boundary around somewhere like 'the East Midlands'. Within cultural studies, some of the notions of 'cultural area' sometimes seem equally to entail this problematical necessity of a boundary: a frame

in the sense of a concave line around some area, the inside of which is defined in one way and the outside in another. It is yet another form of the construction of a counterposition between us and them.

And yet if one considers almost any real place, and certainly one not defined primarily by administrative or political boundaries, these supposed characteristics have little real purchase. Take, for instance, a walk down Kilburn High Road, my local shopping centre. It is a pretty ordinary place, north-west of the centre of London. Under the railway bridge the newspaper-stand sells papers from every county of what my neighbours, many of whom come from there, still often call the Irish Free State. The postboxes down the High Road, and many an empty space on a wall, are adorned with the letters IRA. The bottle and waste-paper banks are plastered this week with posters for a Bloody Sunday commemoration. Thread your way through the often almost stationary traffic diagonally across the road from the newsstand and there's a shop which, for as long as I can remember, has displayed saris in the window. Four life-sized models of Indian women, and reams of cloth. In another newsagent I chat with the man who keeps it, a Muslim unutterably depressed by the war in the Gulf, silently chafing at having to sell the *Sun*. Overhead there is always at least one aeroplane—we seem to be on a flight-path to Heathrow and by the time they're over Kilburn you can see them clearly enough to discern the airline and wonder as you struggle with your shopping where they're coming from. Below, the reason the traffic is snarled up (another odd effect of time-space compression!) is in part because this is one of the main entrances to and escape-routes from London, the road to Staples Corner and the beginning of the M1 to the north. These are just the beginnings of a sketch from immediate impressions but a proper analysis could be done, of the links between Kilburn and the world. And so it could for almost any place.

Kilburn is a place for which I have a great affection; I have lived here many years. It certainly has 'a character of its own'. But it is possible to feel all this without subscribing to any of the Heideggerian notions of 'place' which were referred to above. First, while Kilburn may have a character of its own, it is absolutely not a seamless, coherent identity, a single sense of place which everyone shares. It could hardly be less so. People's routes through the place, their favourite haunts within it, the connections they make (physically, or by phone or post, or in memory and imagination) between here and the rest of the world vary enormously. If it is now recognized that people have multiple identities, then the same point can be made in relation to places. Moreover, such multiple identities can be either, or both, a source of richness or a source of conflict. Second, it is (or ought to be) impossible even to begin thinking about Kilburn High Road without bringing into play half the world and a considerable amount of British imperialist history. Imagining it this way provokes in you (or at

least in me) a really global sense of place. Third, and finally, I certainly could not begin to, nor would I want to, define it by drawing its enclosing boundaries.

So, at this point in the argument, get back in your mind's eye on a satellite; go right out again and look back at the globe. This time, however, imagine not just all the physical movement, nor even all the often invisible communications, but also and especially all the social relations. For as time-space compression proceeds, in all its complexity, so the geography of social relations changes. In many cases, such relations are increasingly stretched out over space. Economic, political and cultural social relations, each full of power and with internal structures of domination and subordination, stretched out over the planet at every different level, from the household to the local area to the international.

It is from that perspective that it is possible to envisage an alternative interpretation of place. In this interpretation, what gives a place its specificity is not some long internalized history but the fact that it is constructed out of a particular constellation of relations, articulated together at a particular locus. If one moves in from the satellite towards the globe, holding all those networks of social relations and movements and communications in one's head, then each place can be seen as a particular, unique point of their intersection. The uniqueness of a place, or a locality, in other words is constructed out of particular interactions and mutual articulations of social relations, social processes, experiences and understandings, in a situation of co-presence, but where a large proportion of those relations, experiences and understandings are actually constructed on a far larger scale than what we happen to define for that moment as the place itself, whether that be a street, a region or even a continent. Instead then, of thinking of places as areas with boundaries around, they can be imagined as articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings. And this in turn allows a sense of place which is extra-verted, which includes a consciousness of its links with the wider world, which integrates in a positive way the global and the local.

This is not a question of making the ritualistic connections to 'the wider system'—the people in the local meeting who bring up international capitalism every time you try to have a discussion about rubbish-collection—the point is that there are real relations with real content, economic, political, cultural, between any local place and the wider world in which it is set. In economic geography, the argument has long been accepted that it is not possible to understand the 'inner city', for instance its loss of jobs, the decline of manufacturing employment there, by looking only at the inner city. Any adequate explanation has to set the inner city in its wider geographical context. Perhaps it is appropriate to think how that kind of understanding could be extended to the notion of a sense of place.

These arguments, then, highlight a number of ways in which a progressive concept of place might be developed. First of all, it is absolutely not static and in no way relates to the Heideggerian view of Space/Place as Being. If places can be conceptualized in terms of the social interactions which they tie together, then it is also the case that these interactions themselves are not static. They are processes. One of the great one-liners in Marxist exchanges has for long been 'ah, but capital is not a thing, it's a process'. Perhaps this should be said also about places; that places are processes, too. One of the problematical aspects of the Heideggerian approach, and one which from the point of view of the physical sciences now looks out of date, is the strict dichotomization of time and space. In the current debate around molecular biology and theories of evolution we find this other one-liner, from an article with the subtitle 'The integration of science with human experience', and completely apposite to the discussion here: 'form is dynamic through and through' (Ho 1988). In other words, form *is* process. It is invalid in that sense simply to dichotomize between diachronic and synchronic, between time and space. And on the other side of the academic disciplines, here we have an argument about Rimbaud, who invites us

> to conceive of space not as a static reality, but as active, generative, to experience space as created by an interaction, as something that our bodies reactivate, and that through this reactivation, in turn modifies and transforms us.... [T]he poem [*Rêvé pour I'hiver*] creates a 'non-passive' spatiality—space as a specific form of operations and interactions
>
> (Ross 1988, cited in Gregory 1990: 9).

Second, places do not have to have boundaries in the sense of divisions which frame simple enclosures. 'Boundaries' may, of course, be necessary —for the purposes of certain types of studies for instance—but they are not necessary for the conceptualization of a place itself. Definition in this sense does not have to be through simple counterposition to the outside; it can come, in part, precisely through the particularity of linkage *to* that 'outside' which is therefore itself part of what constitutes the place. This therefore gets away from that association between penetrability and vulnerability. Mumford (1961: 5) has characterized human life as swinging between two poles, 'movement and settlement'. As Robins argues, 'these two poles have been at the heart of urban development—the city as container and the city as flow' (Robins 1991: 11). But why, then, does settlement so often have to be characterized as 'enclosure' (Robins 1991: 12; Emberley 1989: 756)? For it is this kind of characterization that makes invasion by newcomers so threatening. A notion of places as social relations, on the other hand, facilitates the conceptualization of the relation between

the centre and the periphery, and the arrival of the previously marginal in the (first-world-city) centre (although it should be pointed out, since it is usually forgotten, that some alien others—women—have been living there for a long time).

Third, clearly places do not have single, unique 'identities'; they are full of internal differences and conflicts (Massey 1991a). Davis (1985) captures this in his studies of Los Angeles. It is exemplified too by London's Docklands, a place currently quite clearly defined by conflict: a conflict over what its past has been (the nature of its 'heritage'); conflict over what should be its present development; conflict over what could be its future.

Fourth, and finally, none of this denies place nor the importance of the specificity of place. The specificity of place is continually reproduced, but it is not a specificity which results from some long, internalized history. There are a number of sources of this specificity—the uniqueness of place (Massey 1984). There is the fact that the wider relations in which places are set are themselves spatially internally differentiated. *Contra* some of the debate within cultural studies, globalization does not entail simply homogenization. Indeed, the globalization of social relations is yet another source of (the reproduction of) geographical uneven development, and thus of the specificity of place. An approach which focused on cultural relations or flows (see, for instance, Appadurai 1990) rather than, or as well as, culture areas might make this point easier to appreciate since individual 'places' are precisely located differentially in the global network of such relations. Further, the specificity of place also derives from the fact that each place is the focus of a distinct *mixture* of wider and more local social relations and, further again, that the juxtaposition of these relations may produce effects that would not have happened otherwise. And, finally, all these relations interact with and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place, with that history itself conceptualized as the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages both local and to the wider world. In her portrait of Corsica, *Granite Island*, Dorothy Carrington (1984) travels the island seeking out the roots of its character. All the different layers of peoples and cultures are explored: the long tumultuous relationship with France, with Genoa and Aragon in the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; back through the much earlier incorporation into the Byzantine Empire; and before that domination by the Vandals; before that being part of the Roman Empire; before that the colonization and settlements of the Carthaginians and the Greeks…; until we find that even the megalith builders had come to Corsica from somewhere else.

It is a sense of place, an understanding of 'its character', which can only be constructed by linking that place to places beyond. A progressive sense of place would recognize that, without being threatened by it: it would be

precisely about the *relationship* between place and space. What we need, it seems to me, is a global sense of the local, a global sense of place.

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Chapter 6
Homeless/global: Scaling places

Neil Smith

The Homeless Vehicle is a jarring intervention in the landscapes of the evicted. Designed by Krzysztof Wodiczko, a New York artist, the vehicle was first exhibited in 1988. The prototype was constructed in consultation with homeless men and subsequently women; it was first tested in the streets of New York's Lower East Side, then elsewhere in the city and in Philadelphia. An ongoing project, it has undergone continual revision and modification, and there are now four variants of the Homeless Vehicle. Its design and development has been funded by several art galleries and public art councils as well as by the artist himself. But more than simply a critical artwork heavy with symbolic irony, the Homeless Vehicle is deliberately practical: indeed, it works as critical art only to the extent that it is simultaneously functional.[1]

The Homeless Vehicle builds on the vernacular architecture of the supermarket trolley, and facilitates some basic needs: transport, sitting, sleeping, shelter, washing. Spatial mobility is a central problem for people evicted from the private spaces of the real estate market. Without a home, or anywhere else to store possessions, it is difficult to move around the city because you have to carry all your belongings with you. In the late 1980s in New York City, with homelessness estimated at between 70,000 and 100,000 people—between 1 and 1.5 per cent of the city's population—many evictees took to using supermarket trolleys or canvas postal carts for ferrying their belongings around, and for scavenging cans and bottles that could be redeemed for their nickel deposit.[2] Wodiczko elaborates on this appropriation. The lower compartment of the vehicle is designed to carry belongings—bags, clothes, blankets, food, water, empty cans.

Finding a place to sleep is also a major problem, and so the top compartment, which can be used to carry things by day, can also be pulled out into its three sections. Each section is draped with heavy plastic tarpaulin, and when expanded this upper compartment forms a sleeping space. Thus Wodiczko has also referred to it as a 'shelter vehicle'.[3] Daily ablutions too are a problem for the evicted: the vehicle's aluminium nosecone, satirically redolent of a rocket or some other high-tech military



Figure 6.1 The Homeless Vehicle designed by Krzysztof Wodiczko.

device, folds down to become a wash-basin. In one model, Wodiczko tried to design a biochemical toilet on the rear of the vehicle but this proved impractical.

An appropriately extreme response to mass social eviction, the Homeless Vehicle neither is nor is meant to be a solution. It 'is not a home but illegal real estate', according to Papo Colo; it is an 'architecture provoked by poverty, a missile, the indication of flight, of retreat, or invasion and attack'.[4] With the appearance of a high-precision, military-industrial instrument, it expresses the social absurdity and obscenity of widespread homelessness in the capitalist heartland, but it does so only to the extent that the vehicle is rigorously functional. The prosaic usefulness of the nose-cone for everyday needs contrasts abruptly with the pathological waste of a $300bn defence budget, as if to point out that there is more social use in a single wash-basin than in the entire national armoury of high-tech junk. The supermarket trolley, a softer symbol, but nevertheless an icon of aggressive, expansive consumerism, becomes a means of production as well as consumption, a basic technology for conducting daily life. The vehicle's absurdity depends on its practicality. It expresses and exposes the relations of empowerment and disempowerment defining homelessness.

Evicted from the private spaces of the real estate market, homeless people occupy the public spaces, but their consequent presence in the urban landscape is fiercely contested. Their visibility is consistently erased by institutional efforts to move them elsewhere—to shelters, out of buildings and parks, to poor neighbourhoods, out of the city, to other marginal spaces. Evicted people are also erased by the desperate personal campaigns of the housed to see no homeless, even as they step over bodies in the street. This ongoing erasure from the public gaze is reinforced by media stereotypes that either blame the victim and thereby justify their studied invisibility or else drown them in such lugubrious sentimentality that they are rendered helpless puppets, the pathetic other, excused from active civic responsibility and denied personhood.

The Homeless Vehicle is an impertinent invention that empowers the evicted to erase their own erasure. It 'retaliates' by making homeless people visible and enhancing their identities, and it 'dramatizes the right of the poor not to be isolated and excluded'. Disrupting the ruling coherence of the urban landscape, it perpetrates a 'socially created scandal'; it becomes 'a vehicle for organizing the interests of the dominated classes into a group expression, employs design to illuminate social reality, supporting the right of these groups to refuse marginalization'.[5] The Homeless Vehicle provides a potential means by which evictees can challenge and in part overcome the social dislocation imposed on them by homelessness. Emphatically not a solution, it works only partly and unevenly; it addresses most explicitly the needs of single male evictees and

is less responsive to women's security needs or the needs of homeless families.

The tension between absurdity and functionality is expressed not simply through the vehicle's design, but through its practical revelation of the politics of daily life as inherently spatial. The Homeless Vehicle expresses a strategic political geography of the city. Evictees' immobility traps them in space, or rather traps them in the interstices of an urban geography produced and reproduced in such a way as to exclude them.[6] The Homeless Vehicle, by contrast, is simultaneously a means of production and reproduction, allowing evictees to make and remake space in a way that enhances their means of survival. It is a means to carve a more sympathetic, geographical politics in a city of exclusionary spaces. By allowing wider spatial mobility, it opens up the possibilities for scavenging and panhandling; it puts more distant can and bottle redemption centres within reach; makes new places accessible for sleeping; enables speedier and more effective escape in the face of police harassment and assaults; in general, it streamlines the routine of daily life. 'It facilitates the seizing of space by homeless subjects rather than containing them in prescribed locations'. Operators of the Homeless Vehicle 'possess space by their obligation to invent it'.[7] And enhanced mobility enhances the opportunity for public gathering and public organizing; it renders 'the homeless' more dangerous to the brittle coherence of the ruling political geographies of the city.

If the Homeless Vehicle provides an oppositional means for reinscribing and reorganizing the urban geography of the city, it does so in very specific way. It opens new spaces of interaction but does not do so randomly. Rather, it stretches the urban space of productive and reproductive activity, fractures previous boundaries of daily intercourse, and establishes new ones. It converts other spaces, previously excluded, into the known, the made, the constructed. In short, it redefines the scale of everyday life for homeless people. The liberatory intent of the Homeless Vehicle, the political empowerment it facilitates, the sharpness of the contradiction between absurdity and functionality, all these hinge on this reinscription of geographical scale. It promises not just the production of space in the abstract, but the concrete *production and reproduction of geographical scale* as a political strategy of resistance. As an instrument of political empowerment, the Homeless Vehicle works precisely to the extent that, symbolically and practically, it enables evicted people to 'jump scales'—to organize the production and reproduction of daily life and to resist oppression and exploitation at a higher scale—over a wider geographical field. Put differently, jumping scales allows evictees to dissolve spatial boundaries that are largely imposed from above and that contain rather than facilitate their production and reproduction of everyday life.

CONTEXT: TOMPKINS SQUARE PARK

On 6 August 1988, just about the time Wodiczko was preparing the first prototype of the Homeless Vehicle for exhibition at a downtown art gallery, New York City witnessed its largest riot since the 1960s. Homelessness and gentrification—the conversion of previously working-class neighbourhoods for middle-class consumption and the eviction of existing residents—defined both text and subtext of the police riot which took place in and around Tompkins Square Park in the Lower East Side. It was in Tompkins Square Park that Krzysztof Wodiczko had begun consulting with homeless men about the design of the Homeless Vehicle. Gentrification began pulsing through the area from west to east in the late 1970s and accelerated in the 1980s. Its causes were global as much as local: the rapid expansion of the world financial markets focused on Wall Street and the adjacent Financial District; national economic expansion following the recessions of 1973 to 1982; recovery from the city's fiscal crisis; the availability of a dramatically undervalued stock of tenement buildings, resulting from decades of disinvestment intensified since the 1950s; the planned as well as spontaneous centring of an alternative art industry in the area which became the cultural anchor around which reinvestment hype could be organized; and the active encouragement of myriad city and state programmes devoted to housing rehabilitation and redevelopment, anti-drug and anti-crime campaigns, and a park reconstruction programme.[8]

By the late 1980s, the costs of gentrification and the broader crisis in housing affordability were increasingly evident throughout the city but especially in Tompkins Square Park. By August 1988 between fifty and a hundred people were living in the park on a regular basis. A major symbol of political resistance and organization since the 1850s (the first in a series of police riots in the park came against a march of the unemployed in 1874), and located in an extraordinarily heterogeneous working-class and counter-culture neighbourhood that thrives on alternatives to white middle-class definitions of the mainstream, the park had become a growing focus for evictees from around the city.[9] As part of the Koch administration's active support for gentrification, its effort to reimpose that mainstream culture, and a related citywide effort to 'take back the parks' and other public spaces from appropriation by evictees, city police tried to invoke an old, forgotten law mandating a night-time curfew on all parks. The curfew would re-evict the evictees who had made the park their home. In 1988, a four-hour riot ensued that engulfed hundreds of onlookers and others who had simply wandered on to the scene. 'They'd taken a relatively small protest and fanned it out over the neighbourhood, inflaming hundreds of people who would have never gone near the park in the first place.' According to an eyewitness, 'the policemen were radiating

hysteria'. They perpetrated 'isolated, insane beatings', according to another. The police finally retreated and jubilant protestors retook the park. A group of activists attached the most hated symbol of gentrification in the neighbourhood, the Christadora Condominium. The Christadora, abandoned in the 1960s, unsuccessfully marketed in the 1970s, was eventually renovated by developers in the 1980s to yield $1.2 million penthouse apartments sold the year before the riot. When the *New York Times* covered the riot, it did so under the heading: 'Class struggle erupts along Avenue B'.[10]

If the Homeless Vehicle was developed in the context of emerging struggles over homelessness and gentrification in the Lower East Side, and with the active consultation of people living in the park, the political rhetoric of the riot and its aftermath mirrors the lessons of geographical scale highlighted by the Homeless Vehicle. Various slogans galvanized the anti-gentrification movement and the demonstrations up to and on 6 August 1988, some more nihilistic than others: 'Die Yuppie Scum'; 'Gentrification is Genocide'; 'End Spatial Deconcentration'; 'Class War'. But the slogan that came to define the struggle on the night of the police riot was: 'Whose park is it? It's our fucking park'.

This tight spatial definition and focus for a much broader struggle over housing and public space repeated unknowingly the script of 1874, when an Irish immigrant asked on the eve of the first Tompkins Square police riot: 'Is the Square private, police or public property? Has martial law been declared?' Spatial definition of the contested terrain was intermeshed with social vilification of the 1874 protestors. Both before and after the 1874 riot, the police sought to justify their intervention by branding rally organizers as 'communists', 'revolutionaries', 'atheists', and 'drunkards'. 'Communists, Internationalists and other social disturbers' bent on causing 'social anarchy', were responsible, added a union leader opposed to the march that precipitated the police riot.[11]

In the aftermath of the 1988 riot, the same language emerged. Much as the earlier police commissioner had done, Phil Caruso, President of the Patrolman's Benevolent Association (PBA) sought to defend his officers for instigating the riot, but unlike his predecessor, he had to contend with the results of late-twentieth-century technology and the democratization of surveillance—specifically a damning four-hour videotape of the riot by local videoartist Clayton Patterson which showed repeated police brutality by dozens of officers (some 121 civilian complaints were eventually filed against the police in connection with the riot). The videotape notwithstanding, in the eyes of Caruso, the riot was caused by the 'social parasites, druggies, skinheads' and 'communists' who used and inhabited the park. 'Anarchists', added Mayor Koch, who also described the park as a 'cesspool', while ordering that the curfew be suspended. Two years after the riot, in an exchange of letters in the *New York Times*, the city's

Commissioner of Parks and Recreation was forced to concede that it still remained a contested question to 'whom the park belongs'.[12]

Tompkins Square expresses not just the spatialization of struggle in the abstract, but the social and political inscription of the geography of the city, through which urban space comes to represent and define the meanings of these struggles. In vilifying its denizens as they conceded the park, the city authorities in 1988 were forced to accept not just the liberation of the park but the geographical scale of the struggle set by the protestors. During early August 1988, it was understood as first and foremost a protest for the park, and the park's borders marked the firmest spatial boundaries of the struggle. The park was alternately scripted as a retreat from the wild city or as a symbol of the widest degeneration the city could offer,[13] but most of all it defined the scale of the struggle.

But the political ambition on different sides of this contest stretched far beyond the park borders. In the first days after the riot, there was an explosion of graffiti in the neighbourhood around the park, directly commenting on the riot, gentrification, displacement, financial crash of the year before, and the social purposes of art. Stencil artists specifically retaliated against the official definition of the park and its residents, and the implied confinement of struggle, by scripting the park's entire vicinity as an 'NYPD RIOT ZONE'. At the same time, hastily constructed links were built between park residents, squatters and housing activists and 'Whose park is it?' was replaced by the slogan: 'Tompkins Square Everywhere!' Some political connections were made at the citywide scale through the participation of squatters and evictee activists in housing and squatting struggles across the city, but it didn't jump scales so quickly or easily. At this stage, the focus of contest had expanded to the whole Lower East Side, but not yet to the city level.

The media establishment also participated in this escalation of the scale at which housing, eviction and homelessness were contested. Local television stations and newspapers began running periodic background stories depicting the whole Lower East Side, and not just the park, as 'non-traditional', 'bohemian', or endowed with a rich 'ambience' of danger and romance. While softer and more patronizing than the direct denunciations from the Mayor and police, these stories effectively identified and differentiated the whole neighbourhood as quite other than some vaguely implied white, middle-class, middle-American, mainstream normalcy. The whole Lower East Side, not just the park, had become 'Indian Country'.[14] In the media, this redefinition of the scale of the villain peaked with a local TV news series which, leaning heavily on police sources, depicted the riot as the work of a Lower East Side cult conspiracy led by the local rock group, Missing Foundation.

In the nine months after the riot, the number of squats increased to approximately forty buildings, with the number of squatters estimated at

over 500. The population in the park also increased to perhaps 250, now a stronger magnet for evictees citywide. But by May 1989 the city was ready to resume the offensive; it used an arson fire and consequent damage at a twenty-five-person squat at 319 East 8th Street, half a block from the park, to initiate a selective neighbourhood-wide campaign of demolition and eviction. Nearly 200 police in riot gear and thirty-five plainclothes police tried to enforce the demolition but an opposition of squatters, evictees and activists held them off for three days, during which 'for people in the neighborhood, it was like a state of siege'.[15] The night after the demolition was eventually accomplished, the doors of the Christadora were again smashed in.

In the short term, the alliance of evictees and squatters—whose presence in the neighbourhood was often resented by more conservative housing and community groups—was only enhanced. According to one witness and participant,

> [t]he current police clampdown has driven squatters and park crusaders into a closer and more militant alliance with the homeless than ever before. The homeless have picked up on the squatters' direct-action tactics, fighting for their turf with a sense of moral indignation they have not expressed before. And the homeless have given the squatters more credibility, making it difficult to dismiss them as just a bunch of white kids from the 'burbs who forgot the '60s are over.

As a squatter expressed the connection: 'In our case it's an abandoned building, in their case it's a park bench, but it's all a general squatting movement. The squatters and the homeless are on the front lines of the struggle against repression.'[16]

As the arena of struggle expanded to fill the Lower East Side, the park remained a contested zone. In the sharpest frost of the winter in December 1988, it hit the headlines again when an evictee froze to death on a park bench. Regular political rallies, speakouts, musical events, and spontaneous happenings secured the park's symbolism at the core of the loose housing, homeless and anti-gentrification coalition in the neighbourhood.

By July 1989, with a heightened police campaign against squatters now underway and meeting less organized resistance, the city felt emboldened enough to begin its own reconquest of Tompkins Square Park. Eleven months to the day after the riot, the main target was the forty to fifty structures comprising several shanty-towns and 'tent cities' in the park: 'the officers with riot equipment sealed off the park while park crews knocked down the shanties with sledgehammers and axes and threw debris, along with food, clothes and other belongings, into three garbage

trucks'. More than 400 people, infiltrated by thirty plainclothes police who picked off thirty-one demonstrators for arrest, protested the destruction and eviction. Fearing a more violent response, the city allowed that evictees could sleep in the park as long as they did not construct any kind of shelter.[17]

The emerging housing coalition in the Lower East Side was at its peak in the summer of 1989. The growth of squatting in the neighbourhood had certainly encouraged squatting elsewhere in the city—Harlem, the South Bronx, and some Brooklyn neighbourhoods—but the connections between them remained weak. Preoccupied with defending Tompkins Square Park and the squats in the Lower East Side against periodic assaults by police, parks officials, or the city's Housing and Preservation Department, neighbourhood activists did not move about sufficiently to other struggles around the city and did not forge lasting connections between different struggles. Nor were squatters and activists from other neighbourhoods able to make sufficient links to establish a functional, citywide movement as an alternative to more institutional organizations, such as the Metropolitan Council on Housing, that are committed to radicalizing housing legislation, but within the current legal and political structures. In the Lower East Side itself, activists in the emerging housing alliance only numbered in the hundreds at their peak—possibly a thousand.

Repeated police raids followed the July eviction. Some people filtered into local squats, themselves under heightened attack. A new tent city was established on a vacant lot on 4th Street across from an abandoned school, also squatted. But the park was also reoccupied, and as winter approached as many as 300 people lived there on a regular basis. Finally, in the early morning of 14 December 1989, one of the coldest days of winter, and with the blessing of incoming Mayor Dinkins—supposedly elected on a progressive platform and with widespread support from housing advocates—the police and Parks and Recreation Department workers carried out a second sortie against park dwellers. They destroyed more than ninety reconstructed shanties, tents and other structures. For the next year and a half, there was an uneasy stand-off between city agencies on one side and squatters and homeless people on the other. As a local resident put it in response to the neighbourhood's progentrification lobby: 'whether one likes it or not, by living in the East Village, one is obligated to take a stand on one side or the other.'[18]

SPACE, DIFFERENCE AND METAPHOR

The reassertion of space in social discourse is now well documented and widely discussed, and it provides a vital theoretical and political context for the foregoing discussion of the Homeless Vehicle, Tompkins Square Park and the Lower East Side. I have chosen to tell these stories in a way that

retrieves from a habitual invisibility the spatiality of local politics and especially the constitutive role of geographical scale. The reassertion of space in social discourse emanates from various sources: from geographers whose traditional concern with material space was dramatically enlivened and rendered social in the wake of the political uprisings of the 1960s and the spatial restructurings at all geographical scales that followed; from social theories of the 1970s and 1980s, for whom (in the context of the rigorously historicist tradition that has dominated social thought arguably since the eighteenth century) space is being rediscovered as a neglected world of potentially novel and unexplored concepts; from literary and cultural theorists, especially but not exclusively feminists, for whom the language of space has yielded a reservoir of freshly revealing metaphors and new meanings.[19] These different expositions and rediscoveries of space have in their own ways been highly political projects, whether an effort to understand the constructed geographies of capitalism or to employ a spatial language for decentring previously dominant political concerns (e.g., class) and complementing or replacing them with new ones such as gender and race. Others would surely put it differently, but Jameson may be the most explicit—and he is certainly not alone—in coming to the conclusion that, further, 'a model of political culture appropriate to our own situation will necessarily have to raise spatial issues as its fundamental organizing concern'.[20]

A central obstacle, however, in this reassertion of space lies in the lack of any articulated language of spatial difference and differentiation. In so far as the grammar of social theory has been avowedly historicist, a language of temporal difference has been developed as a means to delineate different experiences. It is hardly that historians agree to some objective and universally applicable division of social history into formal eras and epochs; rather, the significant point is that the intensely political debates and struggles that go into the continual definition and redefinition of historical periods is not at all replicated *vis-à-vis* space. No such contentiousness has evolved over the categories and politics of spatial differentiation. Where are the political debates over the scale at which neighbourhoods are constructed, the boundaries of the urban, what makes a region of the nation state, or indeed what makes the global scale? It is not that such debates have never occurred—they have, although they have generally been obscure[21]— but that regardless, the division of the world into localities, regions, nations and so forth is essentially taken for granted.

In 'Western' social theory throughout the twentieth century, the subordination of space to time meant that spatial difference was usually either ignored or, conversely, treated as trivial: spatial difference pervaded social theory only to the extent that one could see different social processes and patterns in different places. Accordingly, space *per se* (as opposed to the social events that happened 'in' space or 'across' space) was treated as

self-evident, therefore unproblematic and unrequiring of theory. Geographers who might have been expected to develop a language of spatial differentiation were indeed centrally concerned with spatial questions and not at all inclined to dismiss space during this period, but they harboured none the less a fatal reticence towards theory in general, and a complete reluctance to see geographical scale as socially constructed. With only rare exceptions, they too trivialized geographical scale as merely a question of methodological preference for the researcher. The clearest such trivialization came with the particularly conservative strain of regional geography that emanated from the US between the 1930s and the early 1960s, and which based itself on the unexamined edifice of a peculiarly historicist neo-Kantianism still rooted in eighteenth-century idealism.[22] While it was certainly meritorious to have asked 'How are regions defined?', mid-century American geographers resorted to an anti-intellectual renunciation of the very real social processes of regionalization when they answered in virtual harmony: 'Any way you want them to be defined'.

In this context, the significance of the two stories with which I began will, I hope, be more sharply evident. I have recounted the struggle for Tompkins Square Park and for the Lower East Side not just as histories of the production of space, nor simply as examples of the making of place, but rather as political contests over the production of scale. I have been trying to suggest several things. First, that the construction of geographical scale is a primary means through which spatial differentiation 'takes place'. Second, that an investigation of geographical scale might therefore provide us with a more plausible language of spatial difference. Third, that the construction of scale is a social process, i.e., scale is produced in and through societal activity which, in turn, produces and is produced by geographical structures of social interaction. Fourth, and finally, the production of geographical scale is the site of potentially intense political struggle.

If these propositions have even partial validity, then a theoretical exploration of the production of scale may help to provide both a language and a set of connections for dealing with spatial difference. But before pursuing such an enquiry, it is important to clarify the language of space and scale I intend here; for quite different conceptions are invoked in this broader rediscovery of space and it is vital they be made explicit. As Foucault once suggested, it is a task of 'making the space in question precise'.[23] In particular, the metaphorical uses of space that have become so fashionable in literary and cultural discourse seem increasingly divergent from the more material conceptions of space that have dominated the 'new' geographies of the last two decades. This is not as simple as a mere semantic contest between supposedly real and ideal conceptions of space, but a quite contested *rapprochement* between multiple political visions. It was also Foucault, of course, who argued that

while temporal metaphors tapped questions of individual consciousness, the effort 'to decipher discourse through the use of spatial, strategic metaphors enables one to grasp precisely the points at which discourses are transformed in, through and on the basis of relations of power'.[24] Not only is the production of space an inherently political process, then, but the use of spatial metaphors, far from providing just an innocent if evocative imagery, actually taps directly into questions of social power.

Much social and cultural theory in the last two decades has depended heavily on spatial metaphors.[25] The myriad 'decentrings' of modernism and of reputedly modern agents (e.g., the working class), the displacement of political economy by cultural discourse, and a host of other 'moves' have been facilitated by a very fertile lexicon of spatial metaphors: subject positionality, locality, mapping, grounding, travel, (de/re)centring, theoretical space, ideological space, symbolic space, conceptual space, space of signification and so forth. If such metaphors functioned initially in a very positive way to challenge, aerate, even discard a lot of stodgy thinking, they may have now taken on a much more independent existence that discourages as much as it allows fresh political insight. It may be too soon to suggest that these spatial metaphors are out of control,[26] but they are headed that way, and a little timely reflection may not be a bad idea. Foucault's fleeting reflection on the purpose of spatial metaphor is rare; for the most part they are employed unselfconsciously.

First, the distinction between material and metaphoric conceptions of space is almost certainly overstated as I have laid it out here. The material and metaphorical are by definition mutually implicated and no clear boundary separates the one discretely from the other. Metaphors greatly enhance our understanding of material space—physical space, territory—just as our conceptions of material space are fecund raw material for metaphor. Neither is there a crude dualism working here; I am not somehow trying to discard metaphor—that would be an absurd project. Instead, I think that it is necessary to articulate the connections between material and metaphorical conceptions of space in order to understand the sources and potential of metaphorical power. Only in this way are we likely to be able to prevent the meanings from following the metaphors out of control.

The central danger in an unreflective use of spatial metaphors is that it implicitly repeats the asymmetries of power inherent in traditional social theory. Foucault again gives the most vivid description: 'Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic.'[27] This asymrnetrical relationship between time and space assumes history as the independent variable, the actor, and geography as the dependent—the ground on which events 'take place', the field within which history unfolds. Where

geography is self-evidently given—it simply is—history hides all the secrets of social complexity. If the blossoming of spatial metaphors seems at first sight to represent an enervation of history and the championing of a reenergized space, things are not always what they seem. In fact, spatial metaphors tend to reinforce precisely this deadness of space. Metaphor works in many different ways but it always involves an assertion of otherness. Some truth or insight is revealed by asserting that an incompletely understood object, event or situation *is* another, where the other is assumed known: social definition (by race, for example) is called 'location' because it reveals the connection between social experience and place in the social structure; emerging ideas are said to occupy a distinct 'theoretical space' because such an imagery puts the clutter of existing and competing ideas at some remove—in another 'space'. In all such spatial metaphors, space is assumed as the unproblematic other, already known, and this suggests the Janus face of metaphor. To the extent that metaphor continually appeals to some other assumed reality as known, it systematically disguises the need to investigate the known.

Spatial metaphors evoke a very specific and contested representation of space. They assume as given what geographers, physicists and philosophers all recognize as 'absolute space'. In its absolute conception, space is represented as a field or container, within which the location of all objects and events can be fixed using a simple coordinate system. It is the dead, fixed and immobile space of which Foucault talked, and it presents itself for metaphorical service today precisely because, with all other rigidities rendered fluid in poststructuralist social theory, the fixity of absolute space provides the anchor that tethers otherwise free-floating ideas to material experience. Refracted against the mirror of a highly rigid, absolute space, metaphorical space carves out 'room to move', the space in which to be fecund, dialectical, life-giving. It is in this way that metaphorical space gains its richness—at the expense of material space, the impoverishment of which it reinforces. Indeed, the metaphors succeed only by retaining the most traditional and most totalizing of modernist spatial concepts. In so far as they problematize the universal assumption of absolute space, notions such as Henri Lefebvre's 'production' also render problematic the whole range of spatial metaphors grounded in the assumption of absolute space. Absolute space can no longer be equated with 'real space' even for the purpose of grounding alternative metaphors.

In providing a language of spatial differentiation, a more formal discussion of geographical scale may provide some clues for connecting material and metaphorical conceptions of space.

PRODUCTION OF SCALE: ICONOGRAPHY OF PLACE

It is possible to conceive of scale as the geographical resolution of contradictory processes of competition and co-operation. The continual production and reproduction of scale expresses the social as much as the geographical contest to establish boundaries between different places, locations and sites of experience. The making of place implies the production of scale in so far as places are made different from each other; scale is the criterion of difference not so much between places as between different *kinds* of places. When I first began to think of scale in this way, I conceived it in strictly political economic terms.[28] To take an obvious example, it is possible to see the scale of the nation state as a territorial compromise between differing needs of the capitalist class. On the one hand, competition between producers is a basic requirement of the capitalist economy but, on the other, unrestrained competition threatens anarchy. The capitalist class also co-operates internally in order to create the appropriate conditions for capital accumulation and social reproduction, and to deal with challenges to its power. If hardly thought out with quite such explicit or detached voluntarism amidst national formation, the nation state represents an enduring but ultimately temporary and historically specific territorial resolution of this contradiction between competition and co-operation. Within the geographical boundaries of the nation state, the national ruling class co-operates broadly over such questions as the conditions for reproducing labour power, legal constitution of the economy, provision of infrastructures of production and circulation, and certain ideological institutions—even as separate capitals compete for markets, capital, labour, technology and land. Between different national markets there is also co-operation, but it is economic competition that prevails.

The resolution of this particular contradiction pivots on the structure of the nation state. That there is no abrupt and clearly demarcated boundary between competition and co-operation—producers of similar products and services compete within the nation state while nations can also co-operate—does not belie such a conceptualization of the nation state but rather confirms it. The territorial boundaries of the national scale elicit a (sometimes weakly, sometimes strongly) ordered alignment of co-operative and competitive economic relations. If the consequent territorialization of conflict resolution takes on a certain fixity in the landscape—national boundaries, for example—it is also marked by long-term fluidity. As the scale of economic accumulation expands, and with it the necessary scale of competition and co-operation, the territorially institutionalized form of resolution becomes increasingly obsolete, and alternative spatial forms are developed. This is the significance of the United Nations, of international

trading co-operatives such as ASEAN or COMECON, or a unified Western Europe, all of which provide alternative (higher) geographical scales at which this particular contradiction is resolved—again presumably temporarily.

At the other end of the hierarchy of scales, the Homeless Vehicle highlights the way in which the scale of the community is constructed. While there is obviously an economic dimension to the functionality of the Homeless Vehicle, its significance is much broader, involving political and cultural access to, and production of, the space of the community: it challenges the ideological definition of community. The Homeless Vehicle highlights the connection between the everyday details of social reproduction and the construction of space at different scales. As Herod points out, a much wider array of social processes is involved in the production of scale than the political economic.[29] Feminist work has long focused on the home and community as a means to understand the relationship between social production and reproduction, and more recent feminist writing has explored the scale of the body. Grounded more in metaphorical appropriations of space, and emphasizing social and cultural processes, this theoretical work on the body none the less connects in many different ways to the more geographical focus of, for example, discussions of the nation state. A coherent, spatialized politics will have to find a way of exposing these connections.

The construction of scale is not simply a spatial solidification or materialization of contested social forces and processes; the corollary also holds. Scale is an active progenitor of specific social processes. In a literal as much as metaphorical way, scale both *contains* social activity and at the same time provides an already partitioned geography within which social activity *takes place*. Scale demarcates the sites of social contest, the object as well as the resolution of contest. Viewed this way, the production of scale can begin to provide the language that makes possible a more substantive and tangible spatialized politics. 'The orderliness of respectability', says Iris Young, 'means things are under control, everything in its place, not crossing the borders.'[30] It is geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which control is exerted *and* contested.

I would like to explore this further by examining a sequence of specific scales: body, home, community, urban, region, nation, global. I want to focus loosely on at least four aspects of each scale: identity, or the characteristics that render each scale coherent; internal differences; borders with other scales; and political possibilities for resistance inherent in the production of specific scales, the abrogation of boundaries, the 'jumping of scales'.

A few caveats are necessary before broaching such a schematic and exploratory discussion. With this typology of discretely different scales, I

am not implying some rigid separation of spatial spheres. As the Homeless Vehicle suggests, it is precisely the active social connectedness of scales that is vital, yet we have no coherent, critically thought-out language for different scales. The strategic bias in what follows is therefore towards differences rather than homologies of scale. Second, the hierarchical character of this typology is deliberate, and reflects a practical rather than philosophical judgement. I am in no way proposing some ontological system of scales; rather I argue that geographical scale is hierarchically produced as part of the social and cultural, economic and political landscapes of contemporary capitalism and patriarchy. Put differently, the point is not to 'freeze' a set of scales as building blocks of a spatialized politics, but to understand the social means and political purposes through and for which such freezing of scales is none the less accomplished—albeit fleetingly. Such a hierarchical order of scales is certainly a candidate for abolition in a revolutionized social geography: by discussing challenges to and political contests over specific scales, I hope to indicate ways in which this might be accomplished, places from which it could be made to happen. Finally, although it stretches from the scale of the body to the global, this typology is inherently incomplete and open-ended. It could hardly be otherwise if, as I have claimed, scale is actively produced. At best, this typology provides a framework for organizing a more coherently thoughtout analysis of spatial scale.

The body

The primary physical site of personal identity, the scale of the body is socially constructed. The place of the body marks the boundary between self and other in a social as much as physical sense, and involves the construction of a 'personal space' in addition to a literally defined physiological space. The body is also a 'cultural locus of gender meanings', according to Judith Butler,[31] and this suggests that more than most scales, the identity of the body *per se* is closely intertwined with bodily differences. The dialectic of identity and difference is central to the definition of scale but nowhere more important than with the body. Indeed, Simone de Beauvoir argued that masculine culture identifies women with the sphere of the body while reserving for men the privilege of disembodiment, a non-corporeal identity.[32] Not just gender, obviously, but other forms of social differences are constructed around the identity of the body. Young, in particular, argues that 'the scaling of bodies', as she puts it, appropriates a variety of corporeal differences in addition to sex—most obviously race, but also age and ability—as the putative bases for social oppression and 'cultural imperialism'.[33]

As the site of biological reproduction, the body has specific needs that are equally social in definition and delivery. As the site of pleasure and

pain, it also has wants, desires and fears, and it is the biological organ around which social definitions of sickness and health are constructed. Care for the body, physical access to and by the body, and control over the body are the central avenues of contest at this scale. If women do not necessarily monopolize the scale of the body, as Beauvoir suggests, contests at this scale are none the less dominated by gender. The politics of abortion, rape, prostitution, reproduction and bodycare (the provision and preparation of food, clothing shelter, warmth) focus on access to women's bodies, work women do with their bodies, and the boundary between individual and state control over the body. The manual, *Our Bodies Ourselves*,[34] helped galvanize an emerging feminist movement in the early 1970s precisely because it enabled women to reclaim their bodies and control the conquest of the scale of the body; it affirmed the body as a site of struggle over which feminists staked a powerful claim. The same boundary between individual and state control of the body is contested in the politics of abortion and of sexual preference. The politics of the body are not delineated by gender alone, of course, no matter how dominant gender is at this scale. Bodily style and clothing mediate personal constructions of identity with regional, national and global cultures and provide access to the body by the international fashion industry. Gendered as it is, bodily style is also a class question.

The impudence of the Homeless Vehicle demonstrates the importance of access *by* the body to wider spaces—bodily access as a means of jumping scales—but history reveals less cryptic examples. The feminist geographer Marston interprets the turn-of-the-century 'voluntary motherhood' movement in a parallel way. Determined to control fertility and the number of births, women activists transformed the norms of their own sexuality and, in the process of constructing a movement for 'domestic feminism', challenged a variety of assumptions and ideals about the wider social roles of women. Marston asks succinctly:

> How did women construct the various scales of resistance from the body to the home to the community, the state and the nation-state *and* how was knowledge and meaning translated between and among scales… leading eventually to transformations of the boundaries of difference with the wider male dominated social world?[35]

Since the emergence of AIDS at the beginning of the 1980s, the most unprecedented contest for the body has been played out on a global scale. First labelled GRID (Gay-Related Immune Deficiency) by the medical profession, and traced to Central Africa and Haiti, AIDS is still generally vilified as the result of voluntary mistreatment of one's own body. The political and professional response to AIDS has involved a hardening of spatial boundaries at all spatial scales. The United States refuses to admit

non-citizens who test HIV-positive; national governments advocate compulsory AIDS testing; Cuba isolates AIDS victims, while many other national governments wish ruefully they could do likewise; communities expel HIV-positive students from local schools; police forces are issued surgical gloves for use in gay and lesbian demonstrations; physical attacks against gays and lesbians burgeon along with the moral cacophony against drugs and for sexual abstinence. The containment of AIDS is a highly spatial strategy which, by policing the boundaries of different scales, reinforces differences as spatial ones. The boundaries—not just of the body but of all other places the body might go—are subject to heightened surveillance. The response from AIDS activists such as Act-Up (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power) and from gay and lesbian organizations such as Queer Nation has been to refuse, at all scales, social containment on the pretext of medical control. The most symbolic refusal of containment may have come with Douglas Crimp's defiant appeal for principled promiscuity.[36]

The home

The site of personal and familial reproduction, the home is a physical location and perhaps a structure—permanent or temporary. Routine acts of social reproduction—eating, sleeping, sex, cleansing, child-rearing—are based (but not exclusively practised) in and around the home. If the size of the home, its external appearance and location are largely a function of class difference, and in some societies of racial difference, the home *per se* is a heavily gendered site in many societies and is viewed as the locus of female activity, contrasting with a wider masculine realm. The form taken by this gendering differs widely, in part as a result of very different definitions of 'family' and the household. Internally, the differentiation of the home can vary from a single inside/outside dichotomy to more elaborate division; it represents a spatialization of different social experiences, activities and functions or combinations thereof, and is furnished accordingly. The interrelatedness of class and gender differences is suggested by Witold Rybczynski's study of the formation and identity of the bourgeois home: 'The feminization of the home in seventeenth-century Holland', which pioneered bourgeois domesticity, he argues, 'was one of the most important events in the evolution of the domestic interior'.[37] Age and social function also divide the home into different uses and places—bedroom, kitchen, bathroom, dining room, smoking room, study, playroom—which usually none the less retain the markings of class and gender difference in contemporary Euro-American culture. The differentiation of the home might also take on the simpler geometrical polarities of front/back or upstairs/downstairs.[38]

The borders of the home may be sharply defined, as in the walls of a structure or the markers of private property that include other private space such as garden or courtyard—a relatively recent and geographically specific invention—or they may be more fluidly defined as the space of the home fades into community space. Internally, the home is a contested zone, especially in gender terms, with the wider, socially sanctioned authority of men pitted, in numerous cultures, against the authority of women rooted in the routine of the home. If the interest of men lies largely in containing women within the home, the interest of women lies more in extending the power and pride experienced in the home to higher geographical scales. Both castle and prisonhouse, the home is socially if not always physically walled, and access out as well as in is controlled in various ways. As a means to control access to women's bodies, for example, the scope especially of young women's mobility can be severely restricted to the environs of the home, whether formally in many Islamic cultures with the tradition of purdah, or less formally as in many inner cities in the US.[39]

Although it was suggested that the scale of the body defines the site of personal identity, the scale of the home provides the most immediate context within which this takes place. Homelessness is a dramatic loss of power over the way in which one's identity is constructed, since the home no longer shields from the public gaze. Squatting reasserts rights to social privacy against the dictates of economic privacy protected in the real estate market. The home itself is defined within a larger context, and no matter how sharp the physical boundary separating homes from one another, these borders always retain some porosity. Economic change, neighbourhood-wide disinvestment in the housing stock, or the expansion or contraction of local transport systems, for example, can severely affect the property values of individual homeowners, regardless of their own actions in and on the home. Porosity is equally marked in the opposite direction in so far as the home becomes the geographical basis for political struggle and mobilization. In a case study of working-class housing activities in Harlem, Leavitt and Saegert find that women predominate in tenants and neighbourhood organizations largely because they refuse to recognize the physical boundaries of the home but instead treat the community as a virtually borderless extension of the home.[40]

Community

The community is properly conceived as the site of social reproduction, but the activities involved in social reproduction are so pervasive that the identity and spatial boundaries of community are often indistinct. In addition to a grouping of homes, the community incorporates myriad intertwined social and cultural institutions—educational, religious,

recreational—themselves intertwined with the local state. It also includes places of work, from the home to the factory, the office to the store. To the extent that such institutions take a fixed form, they become distinct places within the community. Community is therefore the least specifically defined of spatial scales, and the consequent vague yet generally affirmative nurturing meaning attached to 'community' makes it one of the most ideologically appropriated metaphors in contemporary public discourse. From 'the community of nations' fighting a murderous war against Iraq, to 'the business community' attempting to justify class-based exploitation, the idea of community is appropriated to rescript less salubrious realities. Identities established at other scales are easily rolled into struggles over community.

Communities are socially defined and can take very different spatial forms. Working-class communities in contemporary, advanced, capitalist cities may be broadly homologous with the spatial confines of a neighbourhood. The identity of the neighbourhood and community may significantly overlap, based on intraclass characteristics such as type of work, ethnicity, race. national origin, or some vaguer continuity of tradition, social propinquity, or identification of property with place. This certainly describes many rural communities but also New York's Lower East Side: Herbert Gans's 'urban village' in Boston's North End is perhaps the classic exemplar. The upper middle class, meanwhile, construct and live in a very different kind of community, usually more diffusely defined, with a far wider spatial reach, and rarely coterminous with any spatially contiguous neighbourhood: the Kennedys hardly live in and Irish neighbourhood. In addition to the environs of the home, it may include the locale of a summer home hundreds or even thousands of miles away; the private school where the kids are sent; and a whole orbit of non-contiguous but habitually visited places.[41] It is not just that the rich express their freedom by their ability to overcome space while the poor are more likely to be trapped in space; differential access to space leads to differential power in constructing the spatial scale of daily, weekly and seasonal life.

The spatialization of struggles at this scale is central to the social identity of the community. In the summer of 1989, Yusef K.Hawkins, a black teenager, went to buy a car in Bensonhurst, a virtually all-white, heavily Italian part of Brooklyn. A mob of white male teenagers, claiming he was the new boyfriend of a neighbourhood girl, attacked and murdered him. Defence of community here involved not just reactionary violence but the conflation of several scales at which identity is constructed, a 'defence' of the neighbourhood against non-whites, but also a patriarchal defence of 'community property'—the woman's body. But place-based struggles can also galvanize a more progressive response as previously fragmented social groups coalesce into a politically defined community. Thus, in many

British cities in 1981, amidst tumultuous uprisings sparked by unemployment, police brutality, and racist attacks on blacks and Asians, many young Asians, who had traditionally seen themselves as quite separate from even superior British blacks and Afro-Caribbeans, began to call themselves 'black', in a clear act of solidarity that expressed their own experience of racism. As the scale of black identity was thereby expanded, this had the effect of unifying and expanding the scale of struggle against racism. If the body is the immediate source of corporeal difference appropriated in the construction of racism, it is at the scale of the community that racism and, indeed, every form of localism is most firmly rooted.

Community-based struggles that are not simply defensive develop as political recognition of social identity-class, race, national origin, environmental vulnerability—is emancipated from parochial, spatial constraint. Spatial definition is not abandoned, but as the examples of Tompkins Square Park and the Lower East Side suggest, the re-spatialization of community and consequent definition of scale can become a means of constraining struggles within fixed borders or expanding them into new spaces. Thus, it was primarily the scale of the community that Harvey had in mind when he argued that 'working-class movements are… generally better at organizing in and dominating *place* than they are at commanding *space*.'[42]

Urban

The urban represents the daily sphere of the labour market. It involves the most accomplished centralization of capital and social resources devoted to social production, consumption and administration. Manuel Castells defines 'the specificity of the urban' as the field of 'collective consumption', the realm of reproduction, as opposed to the regional which he sees as the scale of production.[43] While this distinction is suggestive, Castells falsely equates consumption and reproduction, and confuses the definition of the spatial limits of the urban with the processes and forces that constitute the urban scale.

Urban space is divided according to different activities and functions. In contemporary capitalist cities, the allocation of different land uses to different spaces is largely mediated through the land market with its system of differential ground rent. Differential levels of ground rent facilitate a spatial sorting of commercial, industrial, residential, recreational and other activities. Within the city, the ground rent structure, government policy and private financial institutions structure a differentiation of residential space largely but not exclusively along class and race lines—a structural differentiation that is culturally constructed into a mosaic of neighbourhood enclaves. The most definitive spatial distinction in the

advanced capitalist city has involved the separation of work and home, precipitating a gendered urban geography. But with the emergence of gentrification and the integration of the suburbs in recent decades, together with the resurgence of homeworking and the increasing percentage of women who work outside the home, the gendered geography of the city is being restructured.[44]

The unprecedented growth of cities over the last few centuries reflects both the dramatic centralization of capital and the development of the means of transport that allowed increasing geographical dispersion. Most urban areas are legally defined by administrative boundaries, but these only accidentally reflect the range of everyday social intercourse. The spatial extent of the urban scale is demarcated much more acutely by the field over which a daily journey to work is feasible.

The coherence of the urban scale is challenged in a series of ways. Internal to capital, ground rent is a periodically unreliable means of allocating land uses in so far as it also responds to larger signals in the economy and transmits wider economic disruptions to the urban scale. By contrast, rapid urban development can also disrupt the coherence of the urban scale in that escalating land values and the receding spatial boundaries of the suburban fringe force many of the working class to choose between a dilapidated neighbourhood and a several-hour commute. Either way, urban development puts significant pressure on the value of labour. To the extent that larger conurbations incorporate larger and larger concentrations of oppressed and exploited people, often in distinct communities, and provide them too with the means of transport, the economic requirements of an expanded labour market also create the conditions for political organization of the oppressed. Urban fiscal crises, whether periodic or chronic, bring cutbacks in services (the means of reproduction) and employment around which citywide organization can emerge, while continued expansion endangers the very economic and environmental conditions that stimulated growth, provoking the emergence of no-growth movements.

Region

The site of economic production, the regional scale is closely bound up with the larger rhythms of the national and global economy, and regional identity is constructed disproportionately around the kinds of work performed there. The region can be conceived as a concentrated network of economic connections between producers, suppliers, distributors and myriad ancillary activities, all located in specific urban or rural locations—'ensembles of production', as Scott has recently suggested.[45] Traditional regional geography identified agricultural and industrial regions on precisely this basis: for late nineteenth-century Britain, Lancashire meant

cotton, Yorkshire was woollens and heavy engineering, the Clyde was shipbuilding, the West Midlands was electrical engineering. The same kind of regional mosaic could be identified in other national and international spaces, for example New England. This regional structure was specific to the early industrial stage of capitalist development, but the emergence of Fordism in the postwar world was accompanied by a radical change in regional structure and a dramatic expansion of the regional scale. New England, for example, ceased to be the mosaic of local regions it had been prior to the Depression, but by the late 1960s had become part of a larger coherent region incorporating the whole Northeast.[46]

If productive activities—specific forms of industry and agriculture, tourism and mining, for example—define the broad contours of regional identity, the rhythms of daily, weekly and seasonal life etch a distinctive cultural identity for some regions more than others. In arguing that what people are 'coincides with their production, both with *what* they produce and *how* they produce',[47] Marx and Engels should be read as proposing not some universal ontology of individual identity but a social theory connecting work and culture most applicable at the regional scale. If the emphasis here is increasingly on economic relationships, this does not imply a diminished social construction of geography. It does, however, imply that the social and cultural construction of the regional scale is less the result of immediate, individual and local agency but mediated to a greater extent through more generalized cultural, political and especially economic structures.

The social division of labour is most sharply expressed in spatial terms at the regional scale. Different social conditions, means and levels of production characterize various urban and rural places. Much as it is internally constructed, the social economy of the region is also fashioned in the swirl of national and international economic processes, events and developments; and in so far as regions specialize in specific types and conditions of production, making commodities or selling services for a wider market, regional borders are highly porous and changeable. While postwar New England lost much of its traditional regional identity, merging into a larger Northeast, the deindustrialization of the 1960s and 1970s in turn eroded the territorial coherence of this larger Northeastern region. The Northeast fragmented into a mosaic of much smaller regions at the behest of larger economic and political shifts at the national and global scales. Conversely, new patterns of high-technology growth, a shift towards producer and consumer services, and a move towards flexible specialization in production processes and output began to establish very different regional ensembles, such as Silicon Valley, which reconstituted regional space at a diminished scale.[48]

In as much as regional identity focuses on productive activity, regional struggles are disproportionately class struggles, with work as the basis of

political organization. Intraclass co-operation enhances interclass competition, and the spatial organization of class co-operation and competition contribute to the definition of regional boundaries. The fragmentation of the Northeast in recent decades was not simply the result of economic recession and absorption into the world market; in a series of givebacks, several powerful unions relinquished national and regional scale bargaining for myriad separate local agreements.[49] The restructured regional geographies of the 1980s were marked by fluidity and flexibility, and this applies equally to the scale of regional construction.

Regional political movements may be highly defensive, combating some perceived external invasion. This would apply to some anti-deindustrialization coalitions of recent years, which identified external capital or foreign nations as the villain, but it also describes some emerging environmental and antigrowth coalitions. Most defensive of all, politically very diverse and often the most volatile, are those regional movements based less directly on political economic demands than on historic, often romantic, cultural claims that seek to reinstate certain regions as separate nation states. Regional difference and chauvinism here work to contain class-based and other regional struggles within territorial bounds. At worst, regionalism can give vent to racism and other forms of localism generated at lower spatial scales. But regionalism and connected claims to national sovereignty can also be a basis for progressive social movements, and these succeed to the extent that they continue to challenge not just regional but national containment of struggle—to the extent that their project is a global and not just a nationalist anti-imperialism.

Nation

If it represents a division of the world market, the national scale is none the less primarily a political construct, the site of state power. It was not always so. State power in earlier social formations was often vested at the urban scale (as in the city states of Athens or of West Africa) or at the regional scale with an array of duchies, fiefdoms, sheikhdoms and sultanates. By contrast, the nation state evolved as the dominant scale of state power with the emergence of capitalism, and it differs from past formations of the state in that citizenship is defined exclusively on the basis of a territorial rather than a kinship definition of the nation, as evidenced by the comparatively recent invention of passports and erection of fences, walls and custom posts. The more extensive scale of the nation state compared with its predecessors results largely from the increased scale of economic activity and accumulation attendant on an emergent capitalism, but the actual boundaries separating nation states are more usually the product of war, military conquest, political disputes and treaties.

If a territorial definition of the 'body politic' supersedes a genetic one, the localism inherent in the latter is not thereby vanquished. Ethnic, racial, religious or regional differences can divide the nation state internally, and citizenship confers foreign status as surely and as emotionally as it confers national identity. Nationalism is perhaps the most imporous of spatially based *ideologies*—in contrast to the increasing economic porosity of national *boundaries*—and challenges to state power only rarely question the basis of state power *per se* or the legitimacy of the national scale of social organization. The majority of challenges seek not to abolish the power of the nation state but to replace the leadership. But there are exceptions, and the nation state is today a peculiarly vulnerable scale of social organization. First, to the extent that capital organizes itself through the world market, global corporations may retain significant economic power over nation states. The working class too can outflank national ruling classes by organizing internationally, but despite the long-established ambition that 'Workers of the World Unite', the international working class is nowhere as organized as its adversary. Nationalism has largely contained class-based assaults on state power, from the shambles of the Second International in 1914 to the diversion of postcolonial struggles throughout Latin America, Africa and Asia into the reconstruction of separate national bourgeoisies. The same fate befell Poland's Solidarnosc.

State power is held not only by a minority ruling class, but generally by men, and possibly too by a distinct racial, ethnic or religious group. To the extent that these social interests are systematically incorporated in the legal and ideological fabric of the state, exploitation and oppression on the basis of class, race, gender and other social differences are institutionalized in national structures of enfranchisement and property law. As such, the state also polices the borders of lower spatial scales, especially the body, home and community, and challenges to state power emanate from these and other sources of oppression even if they are rarely so neatly defined. It was the patriarchal state that Virginia Woolf sought to vault over when she declared: 'As a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world.'[50]

Global

It might seem that the borders of the global scale are self-evidently given by the natural borders of the planet but, as with other scales, the global scale *per se* is socially produced. The world of the Roman Empire, to take an obvious example, covered only a small percentage of the planet's surface, while conversely, the realities of space travel strongly suggest the imminent expansion of the 'global' scale. Indeed, hundreds of billions of dollars devoted to space travel have already had a significant effect on the world economy over the last four decades. With the capitalist mode of

production, the global scale is primarily a construct of the circulation of capital.

The conquest of the global scale is difficult to discuss except historically. Sub-planetary global worlds—whether highly localized (as with the various peoples of Amazonia, Central Africa or Borneo who were periodically 'discovered' by nineteenth-century European explorers) or the larger empires such as Ming Dynasty China—were constructed by various mixes of political, cultural, economic and ideological power. The economic construction of a unified global scale came only with the globalization of the world market in the early twentieth century. Since then, the global scale has been less demarcated by the political colonization of 'new' territories, previously outside the world market, by nationally based European capitals; rather, it is the internal dynamics of economically uneven development, structured according to the specific social and economic relations of capitalist society, that patterns the global scale. Accordingly, the global is divided not only according to the political divisions of the nation state, but according to the differential levels of development and underdevelopment experienced and achieved by these states in the world market.

The conquest of the global scale may seem like an impossible idea or set of events to grasp, but it is very real. In class terms, the capitalist class came to rule through a series of more or less recognizable national revolutions between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries; some were violent political overthrows of previous ruling classes, others were quieter revolutions resulting from an accretion of power in the market. The important point is that they did not remain isolated in separate states but that through political as well as economic means the rising bourgeoisie actively coalesced different islands of national power into global hegemony. Integrally involved were not only projects of class domination but also those of oppression, especially but not exclusively on the basis of race and gender. These intertwined histories of conquest—enslavement, robbery, denial of property ownership, disenfranchisement—sought to contain incipient social struggles at a lower geographical scale, as struggles over the body or over nationalism for example, while asserting the global claims of capitalism.

The opposition to contemporary global power emerges out of a number of nationally as well as internationally based struggles: anti-imperialist and anti-war movements obviously, and post-colonial struggles, but also environmental and feminist movements that may have local inspiration but global potential. The ability of revolutionary socialism, rooted in a class analysis of capitalist society, to extract a whole nation state from global capitalism provoked an extraordinary global defence involving an economic embargo, placing sixteen national armies on Soviet soil in 1919, and leading eventually to the Cold War. Despite its avowed



Figure 6.2 Salomon Brothers advertisement.

internationalism, however, and with the failed revolutions of 1919, the Soviet leadership did not manage to 'jump scales'. They were not only contained as a hostile island in the world economy by the capitalist embargo but, under Stalin, they succumbed to the disastrous belief in 'socialism in one country'. Socialism in the Soviet Union was stifled well before the events of 1989.

If the political connectedness of the bourgeois revolutions and their class, gender and racial agendas are today erased in the jingoistic celebration of separate national Independence Days and revolutionary wars, this ideological erasure comprises part of a perpetual policing of the global scale. In so far as the ruling class attempts to reproduce its own vision of the world, it also seeks to establish a definition of global alongside national citizenship. The erasure of difference implied in 'the universal subject' is one insinuation of such global citizenship, but it also takes more popular forms. 'The global' is very actively constructed. 'We do business in

only one place', reads a Salomon Brothers ad for their financial services, beneath a dreamy spaceshot of spaceship earth.

The critique of the universal subject has itself become near universal, but the more difficult question is how a political subject or coalition of subjects can be reconstructed without on the one hand replicating the assumption of a white, male, ruling-class subject, and on the other reverting to a radical individualism. This familiar epistemological dilemma seems to require a negotiation of privilege based on different subject positionalities, and is usually thereby seen as a quintessentially local project, but the reconstruction of the political subject(s) is at the same time intensely global. 'The personal', Cynthia Enloe reminds us, 'is international', and this can be denied only by bracketing off scales in a self-defeating way. To avert any dangers of academic idealism, the discussion about a reconstructed political subject(s) also needs to take place with greater attention to the *objects* of political conquest, and it is for that reason that I introduce it here in a discussion of the global scale. It was only eighteen years but a very long way from Jim Morrison's 1967 threat—'We want the world and we want it *now*'—to the thoroughly idealistic Band Aid lament of the 1980s: 'We are the world'. 'We' are not the world, but there are many who still want it, and we will only find the internally differentiated identity of 'we' in so far as we also continue to want the world.[51]

CONCLUSION

Marx detected in capitalism a tendency towards what he called 'the annihilation of space by time'.[52] We can see this at all scales—from the global, where advances in communications and transport technology quite literally make for a smaller world, to the scale of the body, where the space of the body is erased in favour of temporal freedom, much as Beauvoir detected and indeed mirrored. A spatialized politics recovers space from this annihilation, much as Lefebvre's notion of the production of space seeks to recover social space from the abstractions constructed by the capitalist state or through the market. This suggests the double-edged nature of scale. By setting boundaries, scale can be constructed as a means of constraint and exclusion, a means of imposing identity, but a politics of scale can also become a weapon of expansion and inclusion, a means of enlarging identities. Scale offers guideposts in the recovery of space from annihilation.

In June 1991, Tompkins Square Park became the site of a swift, direct and officious annihilation of space. The preceding year had been comparatively quiet, but with homeless people filtering back to the park and as many as seventy shanties rebuilt since the second raid, the progentrification lobby in the neighbourhood had become increasingly vocal. Many other residents who sympathized with the needs of evictees in

the park none the less became increasingly frustrated with the lack of provision of services for the growing homeless population. On 28 May 1991, a memorial day concert celebrated 'Housing is a Human Right', and the park again became the venue for clashes between police and park users. In the aftermath, the local pro-gentrification lobby was bolstered by the *New York Times*, which has traditionally maintained close ties to real estate developers. In a now-familiar script, the newspaper blamed the riot on 'anarchists', and 'political extremists', and galvanized citywide support for closing the park. In a polemic that began by quoting *Webster's Dictionary* on the definition of a park, a *New York Times* editorial noted that 'A park is not a shantytown…unless it is Tompkins Square Park in Manhattan's East Village'. The park had come to 'symbolize governmental failure', it continued, ignoring any failures of the real estate market to provide affordable housing, and demanded that the city 'reclaim Tompkins Square Park' from the homeless people 'who have stolen it from the public'. Noting that many in the park were not 'legitimately homeless people' and that 'misplaced sympathy abounds', it demanded 'a clean sweep' and that the city then 'secure it with regular patrols'.[53]

The Dinkins administration closed Tompkins Square Park at 5am on 3 June 1991, evicting more than 200 park dwellers. Echoing the allegation that the park had been stolen from 'the community' by park evictees, Mayor Dinkins declared that 'The park is a park. It is not a place to live.'[54] Militarization of the park was completed with the immediate construction of an 8-foot chainlink fence and, amidst a serious budget crisis, the delegation of over a hundred uniformed and plainclothes police officers together with a communications truck devoted to 'securing' the park. In the following days, the park was ripped up by earthmovers as a putative $2.3m reconstruction began. Actually, three park entrances were kept open and guarded by police: one, opposite the gentrified Christadora condominium on Avenue B, provided access to a dog run; the others accessed a children's playground and basketball courts.

Closure of the park marked 'the death knell' of an occupation that 'had come to symbolize the failure of the city to cope with its homeless population', concluded Sarah Ferguson of the *Village Voice*,[55] but it hardly ended the struggle for housing or indeed for control of land and buildings in the Lower East Side. No alternative housing was offered evictees except for the city's notoriously dangerous shelter system, and although some evictees again moved into local squats or filtered out into the city, the largest group moved a block and a half east to a new shanty-town on a vacant lot which, three weeks after the clean sweep, already included more than twenty structures and housed about 100 people. The park closure and reconstruction were challenged in court on the grounds that no plan actually existed and the requisite local consultation and impact studies had not been carried out. And continual demonstrations attracted small groups

and large groups of protestors, including many Lower East Side residents who, while frustrated at the homeless encampment in the park, were far more angry that it was now closed. While the *New York Times*, presumably unwittingly, evoked Vietnam imagery as it celebrated 'barricading a public park to save it',[56] hundreds of neighbourhood residents, homeless people and protestors endured police harassment and linked hands around the park in a quietly defiant promise that the park would be reopened to the public. When the park did reopen fourteen months later, physically reconstructed, it was the immediate object of renewed protests to 'take back the park'.

NOTES

1 A somewhat different version of this paper appears in *Social Text* 33 (forthcoming). On the Homeless Vehicle, see David V.Lurie and Krzysztof Wodiczko, 'Homeless Vehicle Project', *October*, 1988, no. 47, pp. 53–67; Daniel, Krzysztof, Oscar and Victor, 'Conversations about a project for a Homeless Vehicle', *October*, 1988, no. 47, pp. 68–76; and the catalogue for Wodiczko's exhibit at Exit Art: *New York City Tableaux: Tompkins Square. The Homeless Vehicle Project*, New York, Exit Art, 1990.

2 The lower estimate of homelessness is from Peter Marcuse, 'Isolating homelessness from housing', in Carol Caton (ed.) *The Homeless in America*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989. The higher figure was publicized by the Coalition for the Homeless in 1987, although they later revised this downward to 70,000. In 1986, the City of New York would admit at most only half of this figure, and as the number of homeless people clearly grew in the late 1980s, they simply stopped reporting any figures at all. The language of 'the evicted' is from Rosalyn Deutsche, who argues that it better elucidates 'the specific historical, rather than mythical reasons for the presence of today's homeless'. See Rosalyn Deutsche 'Uneven development: public art in New York City', *October*, 1988, no. 47, p. 8.

3 Krzysztof Wodiczko and David Lurie, 'The Homeless Vehicle', *New York City Tableaux: Tompkins Square. The Homeless Vehicle Project*, New York, Exit Art, p. 22.

4 Papo Colo, 'Living rights are human rights', *New York City Tableaux: Tompkins Square. The Homeless Vehicle Project*, New York, Exit Art, p. 2.

5 Deutsche, op. cit. pp. 47–52.

6 For an early discussion of the urban geography of homeless people, predating the burgeoning homelessness of the 1980s, see James Duncan, 'Men without property: the tramp's classification and use of urban space', *Antipode*, 1978, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 24–34. More recently, see Susan Ruddick 'Heterotopias of the homeless: strategies and tactics of placemaking in Los Angeles', *Strategies*, 1990, no. 3, pp. 184–201.

7 Colo, op. cit., p. 2; Deutsche, op. cit., p. 50.

8 On gentrification in the Lower East Side, see Neil Smith, Betsy Duncan and Laura Reid, 'From disinvestment to reinvestment: tax arrears and turning

points in the East Village', *Housing Studies*, 1989, vol. 4, pp. 238–52. For a broader theoretical discussion of gentrification, see Neil Smith, 'Towards a theory of gentrification: a back to the city movement by capital not people', *Journal of the American Planners Association*, 1979, vol. 45, pp. 535–45.

9 For a synoptic history of Tompkins Square Park, see Neil Smith, 'Tompkins Square Park Time Line', *New York City Tableaux: Tompkins Square. The Homeless Vehicle Project*, New York, Exit Art, 1990, pp. 14–20. On the first Tompkins Square riot, see Herbert G.Gutman, 'The Tompkins Square "Riot" in New York City on January 13, 1874: a re-examination of its causes and its aftermath', *Labour History*, 1965, vol. 6, pp. 44–70.

10 For direct reporting of the riot from which this account is drawn, see C. Carr, 'Night clubbing. Reports from the Tompkins Square Riot', *Village Voice*, 16 August 1988, p. 10; Sarah Ferguson, 'Boombox wars', *Village Voice*, 16 August 1988; Leslie Gervitz, 'Slam dancer at NYPD', *Village Voice*, 6 September 1988, p. 12; Michael Wines, 'Class struggle erupts on Avenue B', *New York Times*, 10 August 1988, p. B1; *The New Common Good*, September 1988. For a broader discussion, see Neil Smith, 'Tompkins Square: riots, rents and redskins', *Portable Lower East Side*, 1989, vol. 6, pp. 1–36.

11 Quoted in Gutman, op. cit., pp. 48, 50, 60.

12 *New York Times*, 13 October 1990; 3 November 1990; 1 December 1990. See also Girvitz, op. cit.

13 On the political geography of parks as recuperative social constructions of nature and their ideological construction *vis-à-vis* the reproduction of social relations, see Cindi Katz and Andrew Kirby, 'In the nature of things: the environment and everyday life', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, 1991, vol. 16, pp. 259–71.

14 Jerome Charyn, *War Cries Over Avenue C*, New York, Donald I Fine, Inc., 1985, p. 7.

15 James C.McKinley Jr, 'Mêlée site quiet, but police stand guard', *New York Times*, 6 May 1989; Sarah Ferguson, 'Squatters' victory? Protestors piss off demolition crew—for now', *Village Voice*, 9 May 1989.

16 Quoted in Sarah Ferguson, 'Beyond Tompkins Square Park. Inside the squatters movement: occupied territories', *Village Voice*, 18 July 1989.

17 James C.McKinley Jr, 'City moves to clean up Tompkins Sq. after raid', *New York Times*, 7 July 1989.

18 Aaron Emke, letter to *New York Times*, 16 August 1989.

19 From geography, see especially the work of David Harvey: *Social Justice and the City*, London, Edward Arnold, 1973; *Limits to Capital*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982; *The Urbanization of Capital*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985; and, most recently, *The Condition of Postmodernity. An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989. See also Derek Gregory, *Ideology, Science and Human Geography*, London, Hutchinson, 1978; Michael Watts, *Silent Violence*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1983; Doreen Massey, *Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and the Geography of Production*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1984; Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1984; Edward Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The*

Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory, London, Verso, 1989; Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift (eds), *New Models in Geography. The Political Economy Perspective*, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989. From the side of social theory, the 'discovery' of space (and spatial concepts) has been advanced by Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, *Reading Capital*, New York, Monthly Review Press, 1977; Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, Basingstoke, Macmillan; Michel Foucault, 'Questions on Geography', in *Power/ Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977*, ed. C. Gordon, New York, Pantheon, pp. 63–77; Marshall Berman, *All That is Solid Melts into Air*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1982; Elspeth Probyn, Travels in the local: making sense of the local', in Linda J. Nicholson (ed.), *Feminism/ Postmodernism*, New York, Routledge, 1990, pp. 176–89. For a more historical approach, see E.D.Genovese and L.Hochberg (eds), *Geographic Perspectives in History*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1988. From literary criticism see Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of capitalism', *New Left Review*, 1984, no. 146, pp. 71, 89; Edward Said, *Orientalism*, New York, Pantheon, 1978; Said, 'Narrative, geography and interpretation', *New Left Review*, 1990, no. 180, pp. 81–97; Kristin Ross, *The Emergence of Social Space: Rimbaud and the Paris Commune*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1988. Of course, these categories of geography, social theory and literary criticism are not discrete and involve considerable and growing overlap. This is nowhere better exemplified than in the pioneering work of Henri Lefebvre, 'Reflections on the politics of space', *Antipode*, 1976, vol. 8, pp. 30–7; *La Revolution Urbaine*, Paris, Maspero, 1970; *The Production of Space*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991.

20 Jameson, 'Postmodernism', pp. 71, 89.

21 But consider the debate over the legal and territorial constitution of the United States, where the different geographical scales of political organization were keenly contested as very different models of political power. See Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, New York, Bantam Books, 1982 edn.

22 See Neil Smith, 'Geography as museum: private history and conservative idealism in "The Nature of Geography"', in J.Nicholas Entrikin and Stanley D.Brunn (eds) *Reflections on Richard Hartshorne's 'The Nature of Geography'*, Washington DC, occasional publication of the Association of American Geographers, pp. 91–120; Peter Gould, 'Reflections require a mirror', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 1991, vol. 81, pp. 328–34.

23 Foucault, 'Questions on Geography', p. 68.

24 ibid., pp. 69–70.

25 For an earlier exploration of material and metaphorical space on which the present discussion builds, see 'Afterword: the beginning of geography', in Neil Smith, *Uneven Development* Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 2nd edition 1990, pp. 160–78.

26 See Dick Hebdige, 'Training some thoughts on the future', Chapter 19 in this volume.

27 Foucault, 'Questions on Geography', p. 70.

28 N.Smith, *Uneven Development*, pp. 135–47. For a more empirical analysis of the production of scale, see N.Smith and W.Dennis, 'The restructuring of

geographical scale: coalescence and fragmentation of the northern core region', *Economic Geography*, 1987, vol. 63, pp. 160–82. The debate on scale has emerged mostly in the journal *Antipode* as part of the larger debate on localities and locality studies. See N.Smith, 'Dangers of the empirical turn: some comments on the CURS initiative', *Antipode*, 1987, vol. 19, pp. 59–68; K.Cox and A.Mair, 'Levels of abstraction in locality studies', *Antipode*, 1989, vol. 21, pp. 121–32; S.Duncan and M.Savage, 'Space, scale and locality', *Antipode*, 1989, vol. 21, pp. 179–206.

29 Andrew Herod, 'The production of scale in United States labour relations', *Area*, 1991, vol. 23, pp. 82–8.

30 Iris Marion Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 136.

31 Judith Butler, 'Variations on sex and gender: Beauvoir, Wittig and Foucault', in Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds) *Feminism as Critique. On the Politics of Gender*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 129.

32 Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex*, New York, Modern Library, 1952. There is of course considerable debate over Beauvoir's formulation, and this is not the place to elaborate. But see especially Monique Wittig's denial of any pre-social sexual difference underpinning the social construction of gender: *The Lesbian Body*, New York, Avon Press, 1975. Butler's criticism, that 'Beauvoir's dialectic of self and Other argues the limits of a Cartesian version of disembodied freedom' seems especially apt ('Variations on sex and gender', p. 133). Indeed, Beauvoir's dualism seems to resign women to entrapment in the body *vis-à-vis* the freedom of men in time.

33 Young, op. cit. pp. 122–55.

34 Boston Women's Health Collective, *Our Bodies Ourselves*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1973.

35 Sallie A.Marston, Transforming the boundaries: power and resistance among turn of the century American women', paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Institute of British Geographers, Sheffield, 2–5 January 1991.

36 Douglas Crimp, *October*, 1987, no. 43, pp. 237–71.

37 Witold Rybczynski, *Home, A Short History of an Idea*, New York, Viking, 1986, p. 72.

38 Anthony Giddens's discovery of social space and time-space distanciation pivots upon a generalization of these most elementary divisions within the home. For no apparent reason, the home becomes the basis for a metaphorical 'regionalization' that elides all differences of spatial scale. See *The Constitution of Society*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984, pp. 110–44.

39 Cindi Katz, 'Growing girls, closing circles', in C.Katz and J.Monk (eds) *Full Circles. Geographies of Women Over the Life Course*, London, Routledge, forthcoming.

40 Jackie Leavitt and Susan Saegert, *From Abandonment to Hope*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1989.

41 Herbert Gans, *The Urban Villagers*, New York, Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. I present these contrasting relations of community and neighbourhood in an

overly binary form. This is brought about by the abbreviated and highly schematic nature of this discussion and is not at all intended as an assertion of dual 'ideal types'.

42 David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 236.

43 Manuel Castells, *The Urban Question*, London, Edward Arnold, 1977, pp. 439–52.

44 David Harvey and Lata Chaterjee, 'Absolute rent and the structuring of space by financial institutions', *Antipode*, 1974, vol. 6.1, pp. 22–36; Ann Markusen, 'City spatial structure, women's household work, and national urban policy', *Signs*, 1980, vol. 5, pp. 23–44; Linda McDowell, 'Towards an understanding of the gender division of urban space', *Environment and Planning D*, 1983, vol. 1, pp. 59–72; Liz Bondi, 'Gender divisions and gentrification: a critique', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, New Series, 1991, vol. 16, pp. 190–8.

45 Allen, J.Scott, *New Industrial Spaces*, London, Pion, 1988.

46 Neil Smith and Ward Dennis, The restructuring of geographical scale: coalescence and fragmentation of the northern core region', *Economic Geography*, 1987, vol. 63, pp. 160–82.

47 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, New York, International Publishers, 1970, p. 42.

48 Smith and Dennis, op. cit.; Scott, op. cit.

49 Herod, op. cit.

50 Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas*, London, Hogarth Press, 1952 edn.

51 Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases. Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, p. 195. See also Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, for what I take to be a similar vision, and Donna Haraway, 'Situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective', in Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, New York, Routledge, 1991, pp. 183–201.

52 Karl Marx, *Grundrisse*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp. 524, 539.

53 Alessandra Stanley, 'Tompkins Sq. Park, where politics again turns violent', *New York Times*, 30 May 1991; 'Make Tompkins Square a park again', *New York Times*, 31 May 1991.

54 John Kifner, 'New York closes park to homeless', *New York Times*, 4 June 1991.

55 Sarah Ferguson, 'Should Tompkins Square be like Gramercy?', *Village Voice*, 11 June 1991.

56 'Retaking Tompkins Square', *New York Times*, 5 June 1991.