Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo

CITY OF WALLS

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TERESA P. R. CALDEIRA

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To Jim,
explorer of cities, real and imagined

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ABBREVIATIONS

BNH	Banco Nacional de Habitação
CID	common-interest development
MRSP	metropolitan region of São Paulo
MS	minimum salary
MSP	municipality of São Paulo
OM	other municipalities of the metropolitan region
PM	Polícia Militar
PNAD	Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios
PT	Partido dos Trabalhadores
ROTA	Rondas Ostensivas Tobias de Aguiar, a division of São Paulo's military police
SEADE	Fundação Sistema Estadual de Análise de Dados

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book has lived with me for a long time. I started to think of the relationship of violence, democracy, and the city in the early 1980s in São Paulo, when I was studying social movements on the periphery and listening to people talk about the increase in crime. Just after I wrote the first article on what I would later call "the talk of crime," I took a leave from my jobs in São Paulo and came to the University of California at Berkeley for doctoral studies in anthropology. Since then, I have moved back and forth. This book is situated in these constant displacements. It owes a great deal to many people and institutions who have supported me along the way and whom I can finally acknowledge.

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partment of Anthropology. I am grateful to all these institutions for their support, and especially to my colleagues at Cebrap and Unicamp.

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The dissertation was transformed into a book as I shifted jobs and moved from Brazil to the United States. I acknowledge the indispensable support of the Department of Anthropology, my colleagues, and the School of Social Sciences of the University of California at Irvine. I am grateful for a Faculty Career Development Award granted by UC Irvine that allowed me time to concentrate on the revisions. I finished the book during a year in residence at the International Center for Advanced Studies of New York University, as a fellow of the program "Cities and Urban Knowledges." It was a year of stimulating discussions and much creativity, for all of which I would like to thank especially Thomas Bender, the center's director.

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Olivia entered our lives in August 1998 as I finished revising the manuscript in São Paulo. To research and write on violence produces many anxieties. Yet what sustained my study of urban violence and segregation is the dream of a different city life that I wish for her.

INTRODUCTION
Anthropology with an Accent

I

Violence and fear are entangled with processes of social change in contemporary cities, generating new forms of spatial segregation and social discrimination. In the last two decades, in cities as distinct as São Paulo, Los Angeles, Johannesburg, Buenos Aires, Budapest, Mexico City, and Miami, different social groups, especially from the upper classes, have used the fear of violence and crime to justify new techniques of exclusion and their withdrawal from traditional quarters of the cities. Groups that feel threatened by the social order taking shape in these cities commonly build exclusive, fortified enclaves for their residence, work, leisure, and consumption. The discourses of fear that simultaneously help to legitimize this withdrawal and to reproduce fear find different references. Frequently they are about crime, and especially violent crime. But they also incorporate racial and ethnic anxieties, class prejudices, and references to poor and marginalized groups. The circulation of these discourses of fear and the proliferation of practices of segregation invariably intertwine with other processes of social transformation: transitions to democracy in Latin America, the end of apartheid in South Africa and of socialism in Eastern Europe, and immigration in Southern California. Nevertheless, the forms of exclusion and enclosure under which current spatial transformations occur are so generalized that one feels tempted to treat them as a formula adopted by elites in large cities everywhere.

This book focuses on São Paulo and presents a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which crime, fear of violence, and disrespect of citizenship rights have intertwined with urban transformations in the last two decades to produce a new pattern of urban segregation. This was the period of democratic consolidation following the military regime that ruled Brazil from

1964 to 1985. The increase in violent crime in São Paulo since the mid-1980s generated fear and a series of new strategies of protection and reaction, of which the building of walls is the most emblematic. Both symbolically and materially, these strategies operate by marking differences, imposing partitions and distances, building walls, multiplying rules of avoidance and exclusion, and restricting movement. Several of these operations are accomplished in the everyday discourses that I call the talk of crime. The everyday narratives, commentaries, conversations, and jokes that have crime and fear as their subject counteract fear, and the experiences of being a victim of crime, and simultaneously make fear circulate and proliferate. The talk of crime promotes a symbolic reorganization of a world disrupted both by the increase in crime and by a series of processes that have profoundly affected Brazilian society in the last few decades. These processes include political democratization and persistent high inflation, economic recession, and the exhaustion of a model of development based on nationalism, import substitution, protectionism, and state-sponsored economic development. Crime offers the imagery with which to express feelings of loss and social decay generated by these other processes and to legitimate the reaction adopted by many residents: private security to ensure isolation, enclosure, and distancing from those considered dangerous.

The talk of crime works its symbolic reordering of the world by elaborating prejudices and creating categories that naturalize some groups as dangerous. It simplistically divides the world into good and evil and criminalizes certain social categories. This symbolic criminalization is a widespread and dominant social process reproduced even by its victims (the poor, for example), although in ambiguous ways. Indeed, the universe of crime (or of transgression or of accusations of misbehavior) offers a fertile context in which stereotypes circulate and social discrimination is shaped, not only in São Paulo but everywhere. This universe of crime and fear is obviously not the only one generating discrimination in contemporary societies. But it is especially important because it stimulates the development of two novel modes of discrimination: the privatization of security and the seclusion of some social groups in fortified and private enclaves. Both processes are changing concepts of the public and of public space that used to be dominant in Western societies until very recently.

The privatization of security challenges the state's monopoly of the legitimate use of force, which has been considered a defining characteristic of modern nation-states (see Weber 1968:54–56; Tilly 1975; Elias 1994 [1939]). In recent decades, security has become a service bought and sold on the market, fueling a very profitable industry. By the mid-1990s, the number of

guards employed in private security outnumbered police officers three to one in the United States and two to one in Britain and Canada (U.S. House 1993:97, 135; Bayley and Shearing 1996:587). Citizens of these and many other countries increasingly depend on private security not only for protection from crime but also for identification, screening, surveillance, and isolation of undesired people, exactly those whose stereotypes are elaborated in the talk of crime.

In São Paulo, the privatization of security is escalating, but security guards do not yet outnumber police officers. Nevertheless, the trend acquires a perverse and worrisome characteristic in the context of the distrust of the institutions of order: the police forces and the justice system. Even under democratic rule, the police in Brazil frequently act outside the boundaries of the law, abusing, torturing, and executing suspects, and the justice system is considered ineffective by the population. As a result, an increasing number of residents of São Paulo are opting for types of private security and even private justice (through either vigilantism or extralegal police actions) that are mostly unregulated and often explicitly illegal. Frequently these privatized services infringe on, and even violate, the rights of citizens. Yet these violations are tolerated by a population that often considers some citizenship rights unimportant and even reprehensible, as evidenced in the attack on human rights that I analyze in later chapters.

This widespread violation of citizenship rights indicates the limits of democratic consolidation and of the rule of law in Brazil. The universe of crime not only reveals a widespread disrespect for rights and lives but also directly delegitimates citizenship. This disrespect for individual rights and justice represents the main challenge to the expansion of Brazilian democracy beyond the political system, where it has been consolidated in recent decades. Moreover, the privatization of security equally presents a challenge for consolidated and traditional democracies such as the United States, as their citizens increasingly choose private policing and private enclaves and, by doing without public services and authorities, delegitimate them.

The new pattern of urban segregation based on the creation of fortified enclaves represents the complementary side of the privatization of security and transformation of notions of the public in contemporary cities. Although segregation has always been common in cities, its instruments and rules have changed over time. They have also obviously varied in different cities, helping to shape each one's particular identity. However, it is possible to identify patterns of spatial organization and segregation and their instruments that constitute repertoires from which the most diverse cities borrow. Examples of widely used models include the Laws of the Indies,[1] corridor

streets, Haussmann boulevards, the Garden City, and the CIAM (Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne) modernist city. The fortified enclaves transforming cities such as São Paulo exemplify a new way of organizing social differences in urban space. It is a model that segregates middle and upper classes around the world. It generates another type of public space and of interaction among citizens. This new model does not use totally new instruments in either its design or its location. Walls are old indeed, various design features are modernist, and the enclaves are usually located in the suburbs, where the middle classes have isolated themselves for decades. However, the new model of segregation separates social groups with an explicitness that transforms the quality of public space.

Fortified enclaves are privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work. They can be shopping malls, office complexes, or residential gated communities. They appeal to those who fear the social heterogeneity of older urban quarters and choose to abandon those spaces to the poor, the "marginal," and the homeless. Because access to enclaves is privately controlled, even if they have collective and semipublic uses, they deeply affect the character of public space. In fact, they create a space that contradicts the ideals of openness, heterogeneity, accessibility, and equality that helped to shape both modern public spaces and modern democracies. Privatization, enclosures, policing of boundaries, and distancing devices create a public space fragmented and articulated in terms of rigid separations and high-tech security: a space in which inequality is an organizing value. In the new type of public space, differences are not to be overlooked, taken as irrelevant, or left unattended. Neither are they to be disguised to sustain ideologies of universal equality or of peaceful cultural pluralism. The new urban environment that enforces and values inequalities and separations is an undemocratic and nonmodern public space. That this type of space often emerges at the moment when a society undergoes political democratization, the end of a racist regime, or social and ethnic heterogenization indicates the complexity of the links between urban forms and political forms. Moreover, it indicates that the built environment may be the arena in which democratization, social equalization, and expansion of citizenship rights are contested. Therefore, this book explores how social inequality is reproduced in contemporary cities and how this reproduction intersects with processes that, in theory, should eliminate discrimination and authoritarianism. However, the fact that private and fortified enclaves are as much a feature of Los Angeles and Orange County as of São Paulo and Johannesburg should prevent us from classifying the new model as a characteristic of postcolonial societies. The new model seems to have spread

widely. The challenges it poses to democracy and citizenship are not restricted to newly democratized societies.

II

This book is about São Paulo, the city where I grew up, spent most of my life, have done anthropological fieldwork since the late 1970s, and worked as a researcher and professor for fifteen years. Its first version was written in California, where I did my doctoral studies in anthropology and now work as a professor. I wrote it in Los Angeles and in La Jolla, and I started to revise it during my commute between La Jolla and Irvine, in the heart of Southern California. I finished the revisions in New York City and back in São Paulo, where I spend about three months every year. My thinking about violence, urban public life, and spatial segregation is marked by my experiences as a resident of these cities, and especially by the struggles and tensions provoked by the confluence of these different experiences and the knowledge they generate. Displacement is at the heart of this book, both as lived experience and as epistemological and critical device.

The struggle over language is probably one of the most frustrating parts of this displacement. I am a native speaker of Portuguese, the language in which I studied up to my master's degree, wrote my first book, and conducted the research for this one. Yet I wrote this book in English. In writing it I faced daily the realization that, more than my words, my thinking was shaped in a certain style and in a certain language. When I write, I can hear the repetitive and eventually exasperated complaint of one of my copy-editors: "What is the subject? Do not write in the passive voice! Can't you learn it?" Useless to explain that a sophisticated academic style in Portuguese is frequently structured in the passive voice and often with an ambiguous subject; pointless to come up with an interpretation of the meaning of the different grammar choices in each academic style. I was no longer writing in that most taken-for-granted language and was no longer allowed the freedom and the security of unconscious constructions. But, obviously, the question was not of words and grammar alone: it was epistemological and methodological. Anthropology and social theory have what one might call an "international style," that is, a corpus of theory, method, and literature shared by practitioners worldwide. Although this corpus offered me a reference point as I went back and forth between Brazil and the United States, I became acutely aware that academic questions have strong local and national biases and that the discipline is, in fact, plural: there are anthropologies, not anthropology. What American academic discussions emphasize as

relevant and exciting is not often among the central concerns of my Brazilian colleagues, and vice versa. At a certain point, the perception of the local framing of questions was so acute that I considered writing two books, or at least two introductions, one for each audience, in Portuguese and English, each addressing different questions. I concluded, however, that this approach also was an impossibility, since my thinking and my perception had already been transformed and shaped by my simultaneous immersion in both contexts and could be squeezed into one or the other mold only artificially and with some loss. My languages, my writing, my thinking, my critiques all had acquired a peculiar identity. I came to realize that as my English has an accent, so does my anthropology; it persists no matter from what perspective I look at it or in which language I write it.

III

> And Polo said: "Every time I describe a city I am saying something about Venice. . . . To distinguish the other cities' qualities, I must speak of a first city that remains implicit. For me it is Venice."
>
> Italo Calvino, *Invisible Cities*

Had I written this book in Portuguese for my Brazilian colleagues, as I did my first book (Caldeira 1984), it would add to the list of studies by anthropologists about their own society, the norm in Brazil and in many of the so-called "national anthropologies" (in contrast to the "imperial" ones).[2] But I wrote this book in English, and I was thinking of my American colleagues in addition to my Brazilian ones. This does not automatically make it a work in the "Euro-American style," however, since I continue to be a "native" investigating my own society and did not experience any of the estrangements and oddities of traveling abroad to do fieldwork. Otherness was definitively not an issue framing my research methodologically, although it was certainly one of its central themes.[3] To talk about my fieldwork among fellow citizens in Brazil as an "encounter with the other" or to invert things and conceive of my experience in graduate school in the United States and of what I learned there as "other" would require some rhetorical and symbolic acrobatics I find little sense in undertaking. In this study, there is no otherness, in the sense that there is no fixed other; there is no position of exteriority, as there are also neither stable identities nor fixed locations. There are only dislocations.

At a certain point in Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities*, Marco Polo declares that he has told the Great Khan about all the cities he knows. Then the Great Khan asks him about Venice, the only city Polo has never talked about. He

smiles: "What else do you believe I have been talking to you about?" To the Great Khan's argument that he should have made his model explicit in his descriptions, Polo replies: "Memory's images, once they are fixed in words, are erased. . . . Perhaps I am afraid of losing Venice all at once, if I speak of it. Or perhaps, speaking of other cities, I have already lost it, little by little" (Calvino 1974:86).

Anthropologists of the "Euro-American style" usually proceed like Marco Polo: they describe the foreign cities they have visited to people who have never been there, without talking about their own societies and cultures. Like Marco Polo, they frequently make invisible comparisons to their own cultures, the constant hidden references in relation to which the unknown culture can be described as different. For classic anthropologists and Marco Polo alike, this procedure guarantees that their own cultures and cities remain untouched—preserved, perhaps—by their analysis. Like Marco Polo, classic anthropologists transform into method the silence about their own society and the selection of all other cultures around the world as the object of their detailed descriptions and analyses.[4]

Marco Polo's position, however, is not accessible to all. It requires an empire of cities to be described, an emperor eager to know about them, and a nostalgic describer interested in maintaining the image of his or her native city intact. For colonial, postcolonial, and "national" ethnographers, silence about one's native city is often neither a possibility nor a choice. Usually, they do not go abroad because they have neither resources for nor interest in doing so. Instead, they are interested in their own societies and, more important, in their own nations. In contrast to the anthropologies marked by the constitution of empires, peripheral anthropologies are frequently associated with processes of nation-building and therefore are concerned with the internal predicaments of their own societies.

Nation-building engages anthropologists in paradoxical ways. One dimension of this engagement is the role of the intellectual. In Brazil, as in other postcolonial countries, intellectuals have a prominent role in public life. They think of themselves first as public intellectuals, working to influence public debates, and only second as academics.[5] As a consequence, many Brazilian anthropologists study what is politically relevant to them. Moreover, most public intellectuals (including anthropologists) conceive of their work as a civic responsibility. This view shapes their relationships with their fellow citizens and with the subjects of their research. When public intellectuals study their own cities, they tend to write as citizens, not as detached observers. This means that they talk not only to fellow intellectuals but to the broadest public they can reach. It also means that even when they

write in a scientific and authoritative tone, and in spite of all the inherent powers of a professional and social elite, their view of their society is more liable to contestation both by other social analysts and by fellow citizens. Theirs is only one perspective in a public debate, although it is usually a powerful one. Their position is thus different from that of specialists in foreign cultures talking to an academic audience in a debate among specialists about distant places.

When I write about São Paulo in Portuguese for a Brazilian audience, then, I write as a public intellectual and as a citizen, and therefore I approach the city in a certain way. The cities of which we are citizens are cities in which we want to intervene, build, reform, criticize, and transform.[6] We cannot leave them untouched, implicit, unspoken about. Maintaining the imagery of one's city untouched is incompatible with a study (or a project) of social transformation. The cities that remain crystallized in images we are afraid of touching are not cities we inhabit as citizens but cities of nostalgia, cities we dream about. The cities (societies, cultures) we live in are, like ourselves, continuously changing. They are cities to make sense of, to question, to change. They are cities we engage with.

My engagement with São Paulo as one of its citizens—which marks anything I write about it in Portuguese for the Brazilian public—is significantly displaced, however, when I write in English. The position of the public intellectual writing as a citizen concerned with the predicaments of her society is not available to me in American academia. Because the role of intellectuals in the United States does not include the same public perspectives, this type of engagement is not available to other American anthropologists either. In American academia, one's concerns as a citizen are frequently divorced from one's subjects of study, in spite of all the efforts of feminists and minority scholars to unite the two. From the Brazilian concept of public intellectuals, I retain the critical intention. However, writing in English, I lose the public space for engaging in debates with the other citizens of the city. And although I still translate and publish the same works in Portuguese, an undisguisable American accent changes the way in which I am read in Brazil, too.

IV

As "national anthropologists" study their own societies almost exclusively, they can work with the "international style," and its methodological requirements of otherness and comparison, only in problematic ways. The position of researchers trying to be strangers to their own culture is intrinsically dubious. Yet the imperative of otherness has been maintained fairly

uncritically as a methodological device in national anthropologies, even when it cannot be effectively practiced.[7] This paradox exposes two types of power relations framing the practice of national anthropologies such as the Brazilian. On the one hand, the fact that national anthropologists study "themselves" and not "others," and yet insist on the construction of otherness without criticizing it, indicates the power of the international style in shaping the discipline on the periphery. On the other hand, the fact that national anthropologists have long been successfully investigating their own societies and cultures reveals that otherness is less an immutable requirement of method than an effect of power.

Intellectual historians (Corrêa 1982; Martins 1987; Miceli 1979; Peirano 1980) have shown that Brazilian intellectuals, including anthropologists, have usually engaged in nation-building by studying various subaltern social groups who, at different moments, present challenges for the nation. Often claiming to constitute a vanguard, intellectuals identified the Brazilian other to be known (and brought to modernity) as the poor, the black, the Indian, the members of ethnic minorities, and the working-class organizers of social movements—in short, those whose membership in the modern nation might be problematic. As "national intellectuals" are usually members of a social elite, it is evident that the "self" about which these studies frequently keep silent is the elite, secure in its position of leadership.[8] Otherness becomes again a matter of power relations, but in this case the relations are internal to the society of anthropologists.

In contrast with this tendency to a certain kind of silence in national anthropology (as well as in international anthropologies), I assume that my data and knowledge are produced interactively in relationships framed by the social positions of those involved. In Brazil, my middle-class and academic position framed my relationships with people of all the social groups I studied. It framed the detailed answers of working-class people who felt obliged to attend to my requests for interviews and who talked about crime in their neighborhoods even when their fear and insecurity justified refusal and silence. Refusals increased as I talked with people farther up the social hierarchy, who felt confident in saying no to a middle-class person. Interviews with upper-class people were hard to obtain and required introductions.[9] Thus my position equally framed the silence of upper-class people and their frequent dismissal of some of the questions that all working-class people answered: elites assumed I shared their own views and knowledges, and answered my requests for further explanations with "You know what I mean!" Finally, my social position shaped my interactions with politicians and businessmen, who gave me the attention a university professor com-

mands even when they strongly disagreed with me on matters such as human rights.

My research for this book contrasts with the national style in another important way: it is comparative. If Euro-American anthropologies tend to avoid the national self, national anthropologies tend to focus too much on their own nation. Instead of becoming internationalized, they become parochial. National anthropologists read broadly and are well-trained in all international discourses, which they absorb and transform as they look at their own societies. Although they thereby look to the center, they rarely look to the side to make comparisons or to conduct research in other societies. Thus, Brazilian anthropologists do not write or teach about other countries, even about their neighbors in Latin America. This localism significantly narrows the scope of their discussions.[10] As a result, their research tends to emphasize uniqueness. Moreover, localism prevents Brazilian anthropologists (and other national anthropologists) from establishing a critical dialogue with the international literature and the production of the knowledge they consume. This isolation helps to maintain the international style in a form unmodified by local anthropologies. In fact, the strong epistemological critique generated by recent American anthropology has not changed the relationship between national anthropologies and the international ones, even if it has changed the individual relationships of some international anthropologists with the people they study. Rather, international anthropologies still tend to treat national anthropologies as native information, as data, and do not accord it a status equivalent to that of the knowledge produced in the international style and published in the international languages.[11]

V

Although I engaged with São Paulo's problems as a citizen and produced the most comprehensive study I could of the city's current violence and spatial segregation, my intent is not to highlight its unique and national character. Rather, it is to understand and criticize processes of social transformation and segregation that São Paulo exemplifies. This book is about São Paulo, then, but it is also about Los Angeles, Miami, and many other metropolitan regions that are adopting walls, separations, and the policing of boundaries as ways of organizing differences in urban space. These regions are obviously different, but difference does not preclude their use of similar instruments and common repertoires. The combination of fear of violence, reproduction of prejudices, contestation of rights, social discrimination, and creation of new urban forms to keep social groups apart certainly have specific and perverse characteristics in São Paulo, but they are manifestations of processes of social change taking place in many cities. Therefore, the comparison with Los Angeles has theoretical interest and furthers our understanding of widespread processes of spatial segregation. Moreover, comparison keeps me in check, forcing me to relativize São Paulo's uniqueness and to frame its analysis in terms that make sense to those studying other cities. As I write about São Paulo while living in Southern California and thinking of Los Angeles, and also while living in São Paulo and thinking about Los Angeles, São Paulo does not become "the other" or strange to me. Yet it is certainly not the same as if I had never left. Because of this displacement, my Brazilian colleagues may think that I end up doing what Marco Polo feared: losing São Paulo as I speak about other cities. But I think not. São Paulo already changed for me when I studied its periphery, and it continues to change as I study it in new ways.

VI

My research, conducted in São Paulo from 1988 to the present, relies on a combination of methodologies and types of data. Participant observation, usually considered as the method par excellence of an ethnographic study, was not often viable for this study, for a number of interconnected reasons. First, violence and crime are difficult, if not impossible, to study through participant observation. Second, the unit of analysis for the study of spatial segregation had to be the metropolitan region of São Paulo. An urban area of sixteen million inhabitants cannot be studied with methods designed for the study of villages. I could have studied neighborhoods, as anthropologists have frequently done in cities and as I have done in earlier research on the city's periphery. However, I was primarily interested not in the ethnography of different areas of the city but in the ethnographic analysis of experiences of violence and segregation, and those could not be studied equally in different neighborhoods. Whereas working-class neighborhoods still have a public life and are relatively open to observation and participation, in middle- and upper-class residential neighborhoods social life is interiorized and privatized, and there is little public life. Because observers in these neighborhoods are suspect and become targets of the private security services, participant observation is not viable there. To rely on participant observation in poor areas and on other methods on the rich areas would mean to "primitivize" the working classes and disregard the relationships between class and public space. Finally, because I was interested in a process of social

change that could be only marginally captured through direct observation, I had to use other types of information.

It was necessary, then, to use a combination of methods and types of data, bringing to my anthropology the perspectives of the other social sciences. To understand violent crime in contemporary São Paulo, I analyzed crime statistics. To evaluate these, I had to study the history of the civil and military police forces and uncover how their practice is entangled with the reproduction of violence. To understand changes in patterns of spatial segregation, I reconstructed the urbanization of São Paulo using demographic and socioeconomic indicators produced by different state agencies and academic institutions. To understand the new style of closed collective residences, I analyzed real estate advertisements in newspapers.

Although these and other methods and sources of data provided information about broad processes of change, they could not tell me much about how Paulistanos were living out these processes. For that understanding, I relied on open-ended interviews with residents. I also used newspapers as a source of public debates on human rights and capital punishment. Finally, I interviewed public authorities, human rights activists, journalists, and people involved in the provision of security either in private enterprises or in fortified enclaves. I also draw on my own experiences and memories as a resident of São Paulo to discuss some of its transformations. Most of the interviews were conducted in the years 1989 to 1991. In chapter 1 I discuss the specificity of this period in Brazilian history.

I conceived this research as a cross-class investigation of experiences of fear and crime and their relations with processes of social change. This cross-class perspective is central to my research for three interconnected reasons: because this is a study of social and spatial segregation; because social inequalities are acute in São Paulo; and because violence is a widespread phenomenon that both cuts across class lines and emphasizes class differences. To focus on only one social group or on one area of the city would limit severely the understanding of phenomena that fundamentally affect the relationships between groups and the ways in which the spaces and the possibilities of interactions between people from different social classes are structured in the city. Moreover, to capture the diversity of experiences of violence and crime and understand how associated measures of protection help to reproduce social inequality and spatial segregation, I needed to investigate them in different social contexts.

Although I could have conducted interviews all around the metropolitan region, I decided to concentrate on three areas of the city occupied by people from different social classes. To conduct interviews that would reveal in-depth information about experiences of fear and violence, and especially to be able to interpret them, I needed to observe people's everyday lives and the spaces in which they lived. This was more easily done by concentrating my interviews in a few areas of the city, which I came to know well. This study is not, however, an ethnography of these areas. It is rather an ethnographic analysis of experiences of violence, the reproduction of social inequality, and spatial segregation as expressed in some areas and by the residents of São Paulo who live there.

The first area in which I did research was the poor working-class periphery, created through "autoconstruction." This is the process through which workers build their own houses in precarious neighborhoods distant from the center of the city (see chapter 6). Workers thus simultaneously become property owners, urbanize the outskirts of the metropolitan region, and are politicized. In demanding their "rights to the city," the new homeowners of the periphery have affirmed their citizenship rights and organized most of the social movements of the 1970s and 1980s, contributing to the political changes that led to the overthrow of military rule and to democratization. Most of my research on the periphery was conducted in Jardim das Camélias, in the eastern district of São Miguel Paulista. I have been doing research and following the organization of social movements in this area since 1978 (Caldeira 1984). Because of my familiarity with the area, I draw on observations and interviews with its residents from earlier studies, although for this research I conducted new interviews about violence. Moreover, I use interviews and observations from other neighborhoods in the periphery of São Paulo during the years 1981 through 1983, when the concern about crime started to increase. These interviews were part of a research project on the expansion of the periphery and the political mobilization of its inhabitants, in which we paid special attention not only to the process of democratization but also to the problems shaping everyday life on the periphery.[12]

The second area in which I did fieldwork was Moóca, a lower-middle-class neighborhood close to downtown. Moóca became an important part of São Paulo at the beginning of the twentieth century, when it was one of the first areas to be industrialized. However, it is no longer an important industrial area. Although its landscape is still marked by decaying warehouses and industrial buildings, most of the traditional textile and food factories have closed down. Moóca's deindustrialization began in the 1950s, when new industries were placed in other municipalities or on the periphery. The industrial workers who settled in Moóca around 1900 were European migrants: mostly Italians, but also Spanish, Portuguese, and eastern Europeans. Most

of their children never became industrial workers but instead took jobs in commerce and service. By the 1960s, Moóca had become a lower-middle-class neighborhood. The deindustrialization of the area was accompanied by a displacement of residents who rose socially and moved to other parts of the city. This out-migration, which has continued for four decades, reduced the local population. Currently, although Moóca still retains its warehouses and factories and many of its old working-class houses, and although its population still cultivates an Italian accent and ethnic identity, two new and contradictory processes are reshaping the neighborhood. On the one hand, many old and large houses have been transformed into *cortiços*, a type of tenement occupied by workers who cannot afford to own a home, even through autoconstruction. On the other hand, the construction of a subway line has led to reurbanization and gentrification. The construction of luxurious apartment buildings, mansions, and a more sophisticated commerce cater to a richer part of the population that prefers not to move out and to wealthier residents from other neighborhoods who are moving in. All these processes have produced a social heterogeneity and a social tension previously unknown in the neighborhood. This tension is clearly expressed in the talk of crime.[13]

Finally, I did research in upper- and upper-middle-class neighborhoods in the western part of town, specifically in Morumbi and Alto de Pinheiros. Until the 1970s these were areas with a small population, many green areas, and immense houses on large lots. After the mid-1970s, they were transformed by the construction of high-rise apartments, many built on the model of the closed condominium. Morumbi represents most clearly the new pattern of urban expansion that I describe in chapters 6 and 7. Today rich people who used to live in traditional central neighborhoods move to Morumbi to live in fortified enclaves. Morumbi is also more socially heterogeneous than those traditional areas because the rich enclaves are adjacent to some of the largest favelas (shanty towns) of the city, where its poorest residents live. As a consequence, Morumbi expresses most clearly the city's new pattern of spatial segregation. Alto de Pinheiros pioneered the construction of closed condominiums in the 1970s, but the pace of construction was slower, and today it has fewer favelas than Morumbi.

I conducted all interviews on condition of anonymity. In marked contrast to other research projects I have done, in which residents were eager to talk to me and to see their words and ideas in printed form, in this project I faced resistance and reluctance toward discussing crime and violence. Many times people initially asked me not to tape-record the interviews, although they always gave me permission to take notes. In most cases they eventually gave me permission to record as well. When people fear the institutions of order, and when they feel that their rights are not guaranteed by the justice system, this reaction is understandable. I decided not to use fictitious names to identify the interviewees: since I cannot acknowledge their real names, I prefer to omit names altogether as a sign of the fear in which they live. This rule of anonymity does not apply to state officials, members of human rights groups, journalists, and private security businesspeople, who talked to me in their capacity as public figures and in full knowledge that I could make their statements public.

VII

This book is divided into four parts. Part 1 focuses on the talk of crime. In chapter 1, I analyze the structure of narratives of crime and the way in which they symbolically reorder a world disrupted by experiences of crime. I also give an overview of Brazilian political, social, and economic transformations in the 1980s and 1990s. Chapter 2 focuses on some of the specific themes articulated by the talk of crime: the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, the end of the era of progress and social mobility, the images of the criminal and of the spaces of crime, and conceptions of the spread of evil and its control by strong authorities and institutions.

Part 2 deals with crime and the institutions of order. In chapter 3, I analyze statistics of crime to demonstrate the significance of violent crime after the mid-1980s. Chapter 4 traces the history of the Brazilian police forces and shows their routine abuse of the population, especially of those in subservient social positions. Chapter 5 continues the analysis of police abuse, demonstrating how it escalated during the transition to and consolidation of democratic rule in the early 1980s. These abuses are associated with the population's distrust of the justice system and their adoption of private and violent measures of security (which help to boost a private industry of security). Moreover, this association has contributed to persistent violence and to the erosion of the rule of law. The abuses by the police, the difficulties of police reform, the discrediting of the justice system, and the privatization of security generate what I call a cycle of violence. This cycle constitutes the main challenge to the consolidation of democracy in Brazilian society.

Part 3 analyzes the new pattern of urban segregation. It indicates how discourses and strategies of protection intertwine with urban transformations to create a new model of segregation based on enclosures and a new type of public space. Chapter 6 presents the history of São Paulo's urbanization during the twentieth century and its three patterns of spatial seg-

regation, with special attention to recent transformations. Chapter 7 focuses on the fortified enclaves that constitute the core of the new mode of segregation. I explore especially its residential version, the closed condominiums. I also show the difficulties of organizing social life within its walls and demonstrate that an aesthetic of security has become dominant in the city in the last twenty years. Chapter 8 analyzes the changes in public space and in the quality of public life that occur in a city of walls. The new pattern of spatial segregation undermines the values of openness, accessibility, freedom of circulation, and equality that inspired the modern type of urban public space and creates instead a new public space that has inequality, separation, and control of boundaries as organizing values. I use the comparable case of Los Angeles to demonstrate that the pattern of segregation inspired by these values is widespread.

Part 4 has one chapter, in which I focus on a crucial aspect of the disjunction of Brazilian democracy: the association of violence, disrespect for civil rights, and a conception of the body that I call the unbounded body. I ground my arguments on the analysis of two issues that surfaced after the beginning of democratic rule in the early 1980s: a widespread opposition to defenders of human rights and a campaign for the inclusion of the death penalty in the Brazilian constitution. In these debates, a dominant theme is the limit (or lack of limit) to violent intervention in the criminal's body. I show that notions of individual rights are associated with conceptions of the body and indicate that in Brazil there is a great toleration for manipulating the body, even violently. On the basis of this association, I argue that this toleration of intervention, the proliferation of violence, and the delegitimation of justice and civil rights are intrinsically connected.

PART 1

The Talk of Crime

and the unwillingness of many public authorities to bring police activities within the parameters of the rule of law or to develop democratically based policies of public security.

Violent crime and its control are not the only contexts in which we can observe tendencies toward privatization, delegitimation of public mediation, and increasing inequality. These tendencies are shaping urban space, its patterns of segregation, new forms of residence, work, and circulation, public interactions and, consequently, public life. I analyze these aspects in the next three chapters. In chapter 9, I return to the disjunction between the escalation of violence, privatization, and illegal practices of vengeance and the process of democratic consolidation in the political system. The paradoxical character of this configuration derives from the obvious fact that the logic of a cycle of violence is the opposite of the logic of a democratic order based on the respect of citizenship rights and institutions. I suggest that there is widespread association of exercise of authority with infliction of violence. This association is at the root of the cycle of violence I have described and of the delegitimation of individual rights in Brazilian society.

PART 3

Urban Segregation, Fortified Enclaves, and Public Space

CHAPTER 6

São Paulo

Three Patterns of Spatial Segregation

Segregation—both social and spatial—is an important feature of cities. Rules organizing urban space are patterns of social differentiation and separation. These rules vary culturally and historically, reveal the principles that structure public life, and indicate how social groups relate to each other in the space of the city. Throughout this century, social segregation has had at least three different forms of expression in São Paulo's urban space. The first lasted from the late nineteenth century to the 1940s and produced a condensed city in which different social groups were packed into a small urban area and segregated by type of housing. The second urban form, the center-periphery, dominated the city's development from the 1940s to the 1980s. It has different social groups separated by great distances: the middle and upper classes concentrated in central and well-equipped neighborhoods and the poor exiled into the hinterland. Although residents and social scientists still conceive of and discuss the city in terms of the second pattern, a third form has been taking shape since the 1980s, one that has already exerted considerable influence on São Paulo and its metropolitan region. Superimposed on the center-periphery pattern, the recent transformations are generating spaces in which different social groups are again closer to one another but are separated by walls and technologies of security, and they tend not to circulate or interact in common areas. The main instrument for this new pattern of spatial segregation is what I call "fortified enclaves." These are privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work. Their central justification is the fear of violent crime. They appeal to those who are abandoning the traditional public sphere of the streets to the poor, the marginalized, and the homeless.

My interest in describing and analyzing these changes, especially those of the last fifteen years, is twofold. First, I want to demonstrate the need to

remake the cognitive map of social segregation in the city, updating the references through which everyday life and social relationships are understood. Unless the opposition of center and periphery is revised, and the way in which we conceive of the embodiment of social inequality in urban form is modified, we cannot understand the city's present predicaments. Second, these spatial changes and their instruments are transforming public life and public space. In cities fragmented by fortified enclaves, it is difficult to maintain the principles of openness and free circulation that have been among the most significant values of modern cities. With the construction of fortified enclaves the character of public space changes, as does citizen participation in public life. The transformations in the public sphere in São Paulo are similar to changes occurring in other cities around the world, and therefore they express a particular version of a more widespread pattern of spatial segregation and transformation in the public sphere.

The art historian T. J. Clark analyzes the organization of urban life and class interaction in late nineteenth-century Paris and shows how it is expressed in contemporary painting. Writing of Degas's painting "Place de la Concorde" and the characters depicted in it, he argues that

> the typical scene—this the new painting certainly suggested—was likely to be one in which the classes coexisted but did not touch; where each was absorbed in a kind of dream, cryptic, turned in on itself or out to some spectacle, giving off equivocal signs. . . . Class exists, but Haussmann's spaces allow it to be overlooked. . . . History exists, but Haussmann's spaces have room for it to be hidden. . . . Their inattention is *provided for* by the empty spaces and the stream of sights. (Clark 1984:73, 75)

This insight into the relationship between urban forms, class interactions, and artistic expression suggests ways to consider São Paulo's patterns of spatial segregation, especially the recent transformations. Clark identifies the main characteristics of the new type of public space (and its representation) that were exemplified in the late nineteenth century by the redevelopment of Paris. Haussmann's boulevards embodied conditions of anonymity and individualism, allowing both free circulation and inattention to differences and therefore helping to consolidate the image of an open and egalitarian public space. These are exactly the values that are under fire in contemporary São Paulo and in many other cities, where public space no longer relates to the modern ideals of commonality and universality. Instead, it promotes separateness and the idea that social groups should live in homogeneous enclaves, isolated from those who are perceived as different. Consequently, the new pattern of spatial segregation grounds a new type of public sphere that accentuates class differences and strategies of separation.

In what follows, I outline the general characteristics of the São Paulo's three patterns of segregation and use geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic indicators to characterize each and describe the processes of change. In chapter 7, I focus on the most revealing aspects of the new model of segregation: the creation of the walled and private spaces occupied by the upper and middle classes. In chapter 8, I discuss the resulting transformations in public life and public interactions and use the case of Los Angeles for comparison.

THE CONCENTRATED CITY OF EARLY INDUSTRIALIZATION

From the 1890s to about 1940, urban space and social life in São Paulo were characterized by concentration and heterogeneity.[1] In the 1890s, the population of São Paulo grew 13.96 percent per year (see table 7), but the urban area did not expand proportionally; by 1914, the city's population density was 110 inhabitants per hectare, compared to 83 inh/ha in 1881 (F. Villaça, cited in Rolnik 1997:165). With the advent of industrialization, the once-calm city devoted to services and the financial business associated with the export of coffee—the dominant economic activity in the state of São Paulo until the 1930s—was transformed into a chaotic urban space. At the turn of the century, construction was intensive: new factories were built one after the other, and residences had to be built quickly for the waves of workers arriving every year.[2] Functions were not spatially separated: factories were built close to houses, and commerce and services were mixed with residences.

Although the elite and workers lived relatively close to each other, the elite tended to occupy the highest part of town—toward the *espigão central*, where Avenida Paulista was to be located—and workers to live in the lower-lying areas along the margins of the Tamanduateí and Tietê rivers and the railroads. In the beginning of the century, social segregation was also expressed through housing arrangements: while the elite (of industry and coffee production) and a small middle class lived in their own mansions or houses, more than 80 percent of São Paulo's dwellings were rented (Bonduki 1983:146). Home ownership was definitely not an option for workers, most of whom lived in *cortiços* or *casas de cômodo*. These precarious constructions constituted a good investment for landlords, and they proliferated throughout the city. Like those existing today in central neighborhoods such as Moóca, they were houses with a warren of rooms in each of which a whole

TABLE 7 Evolution of the Population, City of São Paulo and Metropolitan Region, 1872–1996

Year	São Paulo	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Other Municipalities	Annual Growth Rate (%)	Metropolitan Region Total	Annual Growth Rate (%)
1872	31,385					
1890	64,934	4.12				
1900	239,820	13.96				
1920	579,033	4.51				
1940	1,326,261	4.23	241,784		1,568,045	
1950	2,198,096	5.18	464,690	6.75	2,662,786	5.44
1960	3,781,446	5.58	957,960	7.50	4,739,406	5.93
1970	5,924,615	4.59	2,215,115	8.74	8,139,730	5.56
1980	8,493,217	3.67	4,095,508	6.34	12,588,725	4.46
1991	9,646,185	1.16	5,798,756	3.21	15,444,941	1.88
1996	9,839,436	0.40	6,743,798	3.07	16,583,234	1.43

SOURCES: For 1872–1991 IBGE, Brazilian census; for 1996, IBGE *Contagem* 1996.
The metropolitan region of São Paulo is formed by the municipality (city) of São Paulo and thirty-eight other municipalities around it.

family slept, cooked and entertained, and shared external or corridor bathrooms and water sources with other families.[3] There were no apartment buildings. A minority of skilled workers rented single-family homes, which were generally constructed in rows *(casas geminadas)*. Sometimes factories built these row houses for their skilled workers as a means of both attracting them with better housing and disciplining them with the threat of eviction.

In such a concentrated city, which had grown and changed so fast, concerns with discriminating, classifying, and controlling the population were strong. As was typical in European cities during early industrialization, these concerns were often expressed in terms of health and sanitation, which were always associated with morality. Questions of how to house the poor and how to organize urban space in a society undergoing industrialization were tied to sanitation. Together, they became the central motif of the elite's concerns and of the government's policies during the first decades of the twentieth century.

The Paulista elite diagnosed the city's social disorders in terms of disease, filth, and promiscuity, all ideas soon associated with crime. In 1890, the state of São Paulo created the Sanitary Service, which was followed by

the Sanitary Code of 1894. Immediately thereafter, state agents started visiting poor residences, especially *cortiços*, looking for the sick and keeping statistics and records. These visits generated negative reactions: sanitary services were associated with social control by the working classes.[4] In addition to controlling the poor, the elite started to separate themselves. Fearing epidemics—as they fear crime today—and identifying the poor and their living conditions with disease, they started to move out of the densely populated city center and into exclusive developments. One of these areas was a new neighborhood in an isolated area of town that they hoped to keep only for themselves: Higienópolis—literally, hygiene city. They also moved to two other new exclusive areas: Campos Elísios and Avenida Paulista. At the same time, elite leaders in the city administration and in institutions such as the Federation of Industries were planning to organize, clean, and open the city center as Haussmann had done in Paris, and to move the workers out, settling them in single-family houses to improve their moral standards. They identified the concentration of workers and the unsanitary conditions associated with them as an evil to be eliminated from city life. They imagined dispersion, isolation, openness, and cleanliness as solutions for the chaotic urban environment and its social tensions.

During the 1920s and 1930s—years that can be considered a transition period between different patterns of organization of social differences in the city and between different modes of intervention by the public authorities—concerns with sanitation and social control are evident in the municipal government, the association of industrialists, the trade union and popular movements, and the federal government. At the municipal level, mayors and officials sought to open avenues, widen streets, embellish, and organize the downtown area. However, the city was ill-equipped to deal with the urban transformations resulting from the huge influx of new residents at the turn of the century. Ideas of urban planning and of state intervention in the space were quite undeveloped until the second decade of the twentieth century. (Morse 1970: chapters19 and 21; Leme 1991). The only early urban legislation—the Código de Posturas of 1875, revised and consolidated in 1886—showed a preoccupation with sanitation, natural resources, and the ordering of public space and public behavior. It established the width of streets and avenues, the height of buildings and the number of floors, and the dimensions of doors and windows, and it prohibited most types of private use of the streets, which were meant to be kept open for circulation (see Rolnik 1997:32–35). The first laws on construction and zoning were passed in the mid-1910s, and the most important pieces of urban legislation and intervention came in the late 1920s.[5]

The main effect of this early urban legislation was to establish a disjunction between a central territory for the elite (the urban perimeter), ruled by special laws, and the suburban and rural areas inhabited by the poor and relatively unlegislated, where laws were not enforced. The mechanism that produced this disjunction is equivalent to what I described in chapter 4 in the case of the police: legal ambivalence. This mechanism is constitutive of Brazilian land occupation and legislation since the beginning of colonization (Holston 1991b). Because the boundaries of the legal and illegal are ill-defined, the executive has the de facto authority to give the final word on land disputes and to determine legality on a case-by-case basis. The urban laws of the 1910s established a division of the city into four zones: central, urban, suburban, and rural. Most of the laws created during that period applied only to the central and urban zones, leaving the other areas (to which the poor were moving) unregulated. When legislation was extended to these areas, such as requirements for registering developments and rules for opening streets, exceptions were soon formulated. The requirements that new streets have infrastructure and minimum dimensions, for example, could be legally bypassed after 1923, when a new law offered the possibility of creating "private streets" in suburban and rural areas. The legal rules for the urban perimeter would not apply to these "private streets." But probably the best example of this mechanism relates to the installation of urban infrastructure by the city which, starting at the beginning of the century, depended on the legal status of a street. Most of the new streets, especially in the suburban and rural areas, were by principle either irregular or illegal and therefore lacked urban infrastructure. And although they were progressively assimilated into the urban legality through various amnesties (1936, 1950, 1962, and 1968), the decrees were each sufficiently ambiguous as to leave to executive discretion the determination of which streets met the criteria for legalization, and therefore for urban improvement, and which did not.[6]

The most famous urban undertaking of the municipal government in the beginning of the century led to a transformation of the pattern of segregation and represented a shift in the conception of state intervention in urban planning. It was the so-called Plano de Avenidas (plan of avenues), elaborated by Francisco Prestes Maia during the administration of José Pires do Rio, the last mayor of the Old Republic.[7] The plan proposed opening a series of large avenues radiating from the center to the outskirts. It required considerable demolition and remodeling of the downtown area, whose commercial zone was renewed and enlarged, stimulating real estate speculation. Consequently, the working classes, who could not afford the increased rents,

were driven out. The Plano de Avenidas also chose to enhance roads instead of expanding public trolley transportation in the city. One of the causes of the city's concentration was its dependence on the trolley system, which required expensive installations and so expanded slowly. Because the system covered only a small area, it was difficult to move poor residents away from the center, where they worked. The launching of a bus system, associated with the progressive opening of new avenues, made possible the expansion of the city toward the periphery.

The second major influence on urban transformations was the group of industrialists congregated at the Federation of Industries and headed by Roberto Simonsen. They were interested in studying the patterns of working-class consumption and housing in order to change them. They promoted the creation of institutions that specialized in the study and documentation of working-class living conditions, especially housing, considered to be the "the preeminent social problem" (Bonduki 1983:147). Convinced that employers could not bear the responsibility of solving this problem, they favored home ownership for workers, which could reduce their housing expenses and increase their disposable income. They were also, obviously, interested in organizing the city space for industrial expansion.

The third influence was the trade union movement, which became quite strong under anarchist influence. It promoted a series of important strikes in São Paulo during the 1910s (Fausto 1977), and in the 1920s it joined forces with other opposition movements. This coalition led to the overthrow of the Old Republic, ruled by rural oligarchies (among them the Paulista coffee producers), in 1930. Housing was an important theme in the working-class movements, expressed primarily in discussions about rent and rent control. After the 1910s, the anarchist unions proposed the formation of "renters' leagues" *(ligas de inquilinos)* to go on rent strikes. Despite this mobilization, and in spite of its contribution to change the political regime, no collective action was taken on the "housing question."

The fourth influence on urban change was the federal government, especially after the revolution of 1930, which initiated what would become the populist dictatorship of Getúlio Vargas. Vargas created a totally new structure of labor management in Brazil, which remains largely in place to this day and which was partially inspired by the Italian Fascist corporatist model. The newly created labor ministry defended the creation of opportunities for the urban classes to become homeowners. In the same way as the industrialists, labor officials were interested in cutting housing expenses, and in disseminating the value of home ownership, which they considered to be one of the bases of social stability. To increase home ownership the federal

government took several initiatives, not all of them equally successful.[8] The change that was to have the greatest effect on the city—and on housing arrangements for workers in modern Brazil—occurred in 1942, in the context of a housing crisis marked by high rents provoked by the economic crisis associated with World War II and the remodeling of downtown areas in various Brazilian cities. This factor was the *Lei do Inquilinato* (renter's law), which froze all rents at December 1941 levels. It was supposed to last for two years but was successively renewed for residential properties until 1964, with only a few minor increases in response to high inflation. In São Paulo, the immediate consequence was a tightening of the rental market, as fewer rental units were built. This trend accelerated the departure of the working classes to the periphery, where they could find cheap (and irregular) land on which to build their own houses.[9]

The interaction of these various initiatives and policies, along with a sharp increase in internal migration to the city after the early 1930s, led to a pattern of urban segregation that was to characterize São Paulo for the next fifty years.[10] In the new arrangement, poor and rich lived apart: distance, economic growth, and political repression allowed a peculiar inattention to one another.

CENTER-PERIPHERY: THE DISPERSED CITY

The new pattern of urbanization is usually called the center-periphery model, and it has dominated São Paulo's development since the 1940s. It has four principal characteristics. (1) It is dispersed instead of concentrated: population density dropped from 110 inhabitants per hectare in 1914 to 53 in 1963 (F. Villaça, cited by Rolnik 1997:165). (2) The social classes live far apart in the city space: the middle and upper classes live in central, legalized, and well-equipped neighborhoods, the poor on the precarious and mostly illegal periphery. (3) Home ownership became the general rule for both rich and poor. (4) Transportation depends on roads, with buses for the working classes and automobiles for the middle and upper classes.[11] This pattern of urbanization was consolidated at the same time that the city became the industrial center of the country, as modern heavy industries replaced the traditional textile and food manufacturers (a change associated with automobile production), and as the city received a flood of migrants from the northeast of Brazil.[12] During this period, urban expansion and industrial dynamics surpassed the limits of the municipality of São Paulo, stimulating rapid transformations of its surrounding areas, formally named the Metropolitan Region of São Paulo.

Roads, Illegality, and Autoconstruction: The Expansion of the Periphery

The launching of a public bus system was a driving force in the new pattern of urbanization. Although the price of land on the periphery was relatively low, and there had been subdivisions of land *(loteamentos)* for sale since the 1910s,[13] the outskirts of the city remained unoccupied mainly because of the lack of transportation. Until the end of the 1930s, the only occupied *loteamentos* away from the city were those close to railroad stations. However, these were few and the possibility of expansion limited, for people had to walk to the station.[14] At the end of the 1930s, the opening of the new avenues made possible the widespread use of buses. The first buses started running in 1924, and by the end of the decade they were already challenging the monopoly of the trolley system owned by the São Paulo Tramway Light & Power Co., popularly known as Light.[15] Requiring less infrastructure and thus being more flexible, buses were brought through unpaved streets to neighborhoods far from the city center. Whereas in 1948 commuting trips by trolley accounted for 52.2 percent of all commutes on public transportation, in 1966 they were down to 2.4 percent of the total. At the same time, commutes by bus jumped from 43.6 percent in 1948 to 91.2 percent in 1966 (R. Velze, cited by Kowarick and Bonduki 1994:153). Trolley transportation was ended in 1968.

The main agent of the expansion of bus services was not the government, but private entrepreneurs, most of them also real estate speculators.[16] As a consequence, the system was irregular and aleatory: it was designed to serve real estate interests rather than residents. It made possible the sale of lots in remoter areas, but it helped create as a counterpart a peculiar type of urban space in which occupied and vacant areas are distributed randomly through a large region. There was no plan of development: the areas that were occupied were those in which speculators decided to invest. Their strategy was to leave vacant areas in between those that were occupied so that the former could be put onto the market later, at higher prices.

In fact, the urbanization of the periphery was left mostly to private initiative, with little control or assistance from government authorities until the 1970s. In spite of elite and government discourses promoting home ownership for the poor and the rational planning of the city's expansion, the process of opening and selling lots in the periphery, which expanded the city dramatically from the 1940s on, was chaotic. The law itself guaranteed the exceptional status of the periphery: while it carefully regulated the defined urban perimeter, it left suburban and rural areas largely unregulated and

therefore open to exploration and exploitation. Speculators developed a multitude of illegal and irregular practices aimed at maximizing profits, from outright fraud to failure to provide the basic urban services or minimum lot dimensions required by law. As a result, the majority of workers who bought land on the periphery to build their own houses discovered eventually that their deeds were jeopardized by some form of illegality. They might have bought a fraudulently sold lot or one that could not be registered either because its dimensions were below the legal limits or because it was located in a development without the infrastructure required by municipal codes. In addition, workers usually built their houses without registering them, an extra cost they could not afford. Consequently, even when the lots were legal, frequently the construction was not.[17]

São Paulo's Planning Bureau has recently estimated that 65 percent of the entire population of the city lives in residences that are illegal in some respect (Rolnik et al. n.d.: 95). Nevertheless, workers have always understood that it is exactly the illegality of the lots and the construction, and the precarious legal character of the periphery as a whole, that enables them to become homeowners and solve their housing problems (see Caldeira 1984: chapters 1–3; Holston 1991b). The lots were affordable both because of their illegality and because they were in the middle of nowhere: a long bus ride from the center in neighborhoods without paving, electricity, water, sewage services, telephones, schools, or hospitals.[18] Such urban infrastructures and services were installed or improved only during democratic periods and under pressure from political action by the residents. In the 1950s, populist politicians, especially Jânio Quadros, established a policy of exchanging urban infrastructure for votes; this practice resulted in the urbanization of the first ring of the periphery, which in turn became his political base. The most important mobilization of residents of the periphery, however, started in the late 1970s and was marked by the organization of autonomous social movements on the outskirts of the city.

The workers on the periphery were further neglected in that they never received any kind of financing to build their own houses. The few lending programs created for them either had requirements they could not fulfill or were quickly redirected to the middle classes, as was the case with the National Housing Bank (Banco Nacional de Habitação, hereafter BNH). Therefore, workers ended up building their own houses by a process called *autoconstrução*, or autoconstruction. This is a lifetime process in which the workers buy a lot and build either a room or shack at the back of it, move in, and then spend decades expanding and improving the construction, furnishing, and decorating the house. This process radically changed the resi-



MAP 1. Expansion of the urban area, MRSP. *Source:* Emplasa and Cebrap, LED.

dential status of the majority of the population. Beginning in the 1940s, home ownership in São Paulo expanded considerably, and the number of renters decreased. Whereas in 1920 only 19.1 percent of domiciles were owned by their residents, in 1960 41 percent were owned, and in 1991 63.2 percent were in this category.[19] Today, the proportion of dwellings owned by their occupants in peripheral neighborhoods (68.51 percent) is higher than the city average (63.57 percent), confirming that autoconstruction is the main form of working-class housing (see table 8 below).

The expansion of the urban area, resulting primarily from the movement of the working classes toward the periphery and from the installation of industries in some of these areas, is shown in map 1.[20] The greatest expansion occurred during the 1950s. From the 1940s to the 1980s, peripheral expansion affected not only the city of São Paulo but also the thirty-eight surrounding municipalities that formed a conurbation to constitute the metropolitan area of São Paulo. In fact, many of these municipalities demonstrate the same precarious urban character and same high rates of demographic growth as the districts in the capital's periphery, and they function as an extension of the periphery. These municipalities also accommodated many of the new industries established in the 1950s and 1960s. The main area of industrial development was the ABCD region southeast of the city.

As the metropolis expanded, the concerns of public authorities with regulating the built environment, taming expansion, and remedying its most perverse effects also grew: regulations and urban plans multiplied geometrically after the 1950s. Nevertheless, as had happened since the early 1900s, the effects of these urban public policies were felt mostly in upper- and middle-class areas, while the peripheries were almost completely neglected until the mid to late 1970s.

Housing the Rich and Improving the Center

The pattern of housing for São Paulo's middle classes also changed, especially after the late 1960s. They too became property owners, but through a completely different process. In contrast to what was happening to the working classes, the middle and upper classes received financing and did not have to build their own residences. They were moving to apartment buildings, the first type of housing to be produced by large enterprises. The apartment housing market expanded significantly in the 1970s, transforming the central neighborhoods. High-rises also became the main form of office building, not only downtown but also in new areas in the southern and western parts of town.

An analysis of the history of São Paulo's intense vertical build-up can provide insights into how public authorities, both local and federal, tried to regulate urban expansion and shape the richer areas of town. Municipal zoning and construction regulations determined where high-rises could be built and what dimensions they could have, and they created barriers to the construction of apartments for the working classes. Federal policies dictated the conditions for financing apartments for the middle classes and for the proliferation of the big real-estate development enterprises that have dominated the collective housing market since the 1970s. Together, those policies helped make apartment buildings the main type of residence for the middle and upper classes.

The construction of high-rises in São Paulo began in the first decade of the twentieth century and, according to the urban pattern of that period, was concentrated in the downtown area. As Nádia Somekh Martins Ferreira shows, until 1940, 70 percent of all high-rises were in central neighborhoods and 65 percent were nonresidential. In 1940, only 4.6 percent of the population of the city of São Paulo lived in apartment buildings, and only 2.1 percent of the domiciles were apartments (Ferreira 1987:54,75).[21] During the 1940s, the construction of high-rises remained limited to the downtown area and to a few surrounding neighborhoods, but the percentage of residential buildings started to increase. It was already possible to sell units in apartment buildings, but the majority of residential high-rises were rented.[22] According to Carlos Lemos, a historian of Paulista architecture (1978:54), when construction of residential apartment buildings began in the 1940s, they were stigmatized by their association with *cortiços*, poverty, and a lack of privacy and freedom. The apartment building was thus the choice only for that part of the bourgeoisie that could not afford to live in a detached house in the center of the city. This interpretation is confirmed by a survey carried out by Ibope (Instituto Brasileiro de Opinião Pública e Estatística) in December 1945 among upper- and middle-class residents of the city of São Paulo, in which 90.8 percent of the those surveyed declared that they preferred houses to apartments, and 83.3 percent were in fact living in houses.[23] At that time, the majority of those interviewed were paying rent. Only 17.2 percent of the men interviewed owned their homes; 53.2 percent intended to buy a house, but only 1.6 percent intended to buy an apartment.

Until the late 1950s, the construction of high-rises was relatively uncontrolled by the city. From 1957 on, however, municipal laws aimed at controlling the expansion of construction in the city affected, in particular, the building of high-rises. The laws had two main effects. On the one hand, they excluded the low-income population from buying apartments; on the

other, they directed the high-rises out of downtown. Both of these effects accompanied the remodeling of the downtown area that expelled the poor to the new peripheries. These tendencies have persisted from the 1950s to the present.

In 1957, Municipal Law 5,261 limited for the first time the *coeficiente de aproveitamento*, or the terrain's utilization rate: it could not exceed six in commercial buildings or four in residential buildings (that is, the total built area could not exceed four or six times the size of the lot).[24] Moreover, it determined that the *cota mínima de terreno* per apartment should be 35 square meters; that is, each individual unit should correspond to at least 35 square meters of the terrain area. Although this law has never been fully enforced—developers have always submitted their plans for residential buildings to City Hall as if they were commercial, thus managing to raise the real utilization rate—it ended up increasing the size of apartments and directing the construction of residential high-rises to areas away from the city center, where lots were cheaper. From this time on, apartments became almost exclusively a middle-class form of residence.

If the municipal laws explain why the construction of lower-income apartments was interrupted and why high-rise construction started to move out of the downtown area, they do not explain why, a few years later, the middle classes were moving into apartments. This phenomenon can be better understood in relation to the next important intervention in the apartment market, this time on the federal level: the creation in 1964 of the BNH and the Sistema Financeiro de Habitação (the housing financing system, SFH). This system, which started to operate on a large scale in 1967, was created specifically to promote the construction and financing of homes for low- and very low-income families. However, by the 1970s the BNH had instead become the most important source of financing for the middle classes, and it financed mostly apartment units in newly constructed buildings. Of the total funds provided by the SFH between 1965 and 1985, only 6.4 percent went to families with an income lower than 3.5 minimum salaries (MS) (Brant et al. 1989:98).[25]

The SFH provoked a deep transformation in a real estate market that had been dominated by relatively small entrepreneurs and by families building their own houses. It stimulated the formation of big real estate development companies, which borrowed money from the SFH to build high-rises or complexes of houses to be sold with BNH financing. Although data for São Paulo are not available, Ribeiro and Lago show that in Rio de Janeiro, from the total number of real estate developers registered in the city in the late 1980s, 60 percent entered into business during the 1970s (1995:375).

These developers had much more capital than previous entrepreneurs and completely dominated the real estate market from the 1970s on, first in the central areas of the metropolitan regions and later on the peripheries as well. These developers build primarily high-rises but also some horizontal closed condominiums.

Especially during the 1970s, the military years of the so-called economic miracle, the BNH (associated with big developers) played a central role in the real estate market. In São Paulo, 80.8 percent of the residential apartment buildings put on the market between 1977 and 1982 received financing from BNH (Salgado 1987:58). The SFH's entrance into the real estate market more than doubled the number of apartment buildings registered per year in the municipality of São Paulo.[26] Since 63 percent of the units financed by the SFH between 1970 and 1974 were for the so-called middle market (i.e., for the middle classes), 25 percent for the economic market, and only 12 percent for the lowest-income market (Rolnik et al. n.d.: 111), it is not difficult to conclude that apartment buildings were middle-class housing. In other words, the middle classes were getting cheap mortgages subsidized by the government, and the working classes, who could not afford to buy on the formal market and who only rarely met the BNH requirements for a loan application, were building their houses by themselves on the periphery without any public financial help. Moreover, the massive financing of apartment buildings by the SFH is probably one of the main reasons that the middle classes in São Paulo have abandoned the dream of the single-family house.

As would be expected, during the 1970s the distribution of apartments in the city expanded considerably, mostly in the southwest part of town. The type of buildings and their spatial distribution were again influenced by a new municipal regulation: the São Paulo Zoning Code, approved in 1972, which divided the city into eight zones with different utilization rates and land uses (residence, commerce, industry, services, etc.). The maximum utilization rate in the city was fixed at four and was allowed in an area corresponding to only 10 percent of the total urban area. Most of the elite neighborhoods fell in zones classified as exclusively residential and with low utilization rates. Since it had become more difficult to approve fraudulent plans once the BNH started to finance construction (it only financed residences), the new code caused an increase in land prices and reinforced the trend to locate apartment buildings away from central areas.

Middle-class apartment buildings continued to be built mostly toward the southwest, farther and farther from the center. At the same time, the first big developments of closed condominiums were built, on the pattern

of quasi-clubs, some of them on the outskirts of the city. This type of development was stimulated by the new zoning codes, which allowed buildings to exceed the utilization rates in some zones if they lowered the occupant rate and provided common green areas and facilities for collective use. The construction of commercial and office high-rises during the 1970s followed the same trend. Downtown São Paulo was no longer the only center of commerce and services. Offices had spread to Avenida Paulista, the neighborhoods called Jardins, and Avenida Faria Lima, all in the southwestern part of town. High-rises for both commerce and residence were being built one after another in an ever-expanding area.

Large Distances, Large Disparities

By the 1970s, São Paulo had become a city in which people from different social classes were not only separated by large distances but also had radically different housing arrangements and quality of life. Since the late 1960s, the city had been undertaking studies that indicated these disparities. In 1968 the Plano Urbanístico Básico (PUB—basic urban plan) showed that 52.4 percent of all domiciles lacked water, 41.3 percent lacked sewage services, and 15.9 percent lacked garbage collection (cited in Camargo et al. 1976:28).[27] Moreover, it indicated that 60 percent of the streets were unpaved and 76 percent had no street lighting (São Paulo—Sempla 1995:19). The distribution of infrastructure and public services was uneven. Whereas in the central district (Centro) 1.3 percent of the domiciles lacked water, 4.5 percent lacked sewage treatment, 1.7 percent lacked paving, and 0.8 percent lacked garbage collection, in Itaquera, a new district in the eastern periphery, 89.3 percent of the domiciles lacked water, 96.9 percent lacked sewage services, 87.5 percent lacked paving, and 71.9 percent lacked garbage collection.[28]

The expansion of the periphery under these circumstances created serious sanitation and health problems. As a consequence, mortality rates, and especially infant mortality rates, which had decreased between 1940 and 1960, increased between 1960 and the mid-70s. Life expectancy dropped from 62.3 years in the period 1959–1967 to 60.8 years in the period 1969–1971. At the same time, infant mortality rose from 62 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 80 in 1975. Infant mortality rates were much higher in the periphery than in the central districts. In 1975, for example, the rate in São Miguel Paulista, in the eastern periphery, was 134, whereas in the wealthy district of Jardim Paulista it was 44.6. (São Paulo—Emplasa 1982:419).

In sum, in the 1970s the poor lived on the periphery, in precarious neighborhoods, and in autoconstructed houses; the middle and upper classes lived

in centrally located and well-equipped neighborhoods, a significant portion of them in apartment buildings (see photos 1 and 2). The dream of the Old Republic's elite was fulfilled: the majority owned and lived in single-family houses, with the poor out of their way. This pattern of residential segregation depended on roads, cars, and buses,[29] and its consolidation occurred at the same time that São Paulo and its metropolitan region were becoming the main industrial center of the country and its more important economic pole. The new heavy industries were located on the city's periphery and in surrounding municipalities. Commerce and services remained in the central areas, not only in the traditional downtown but also close to new middle- and upper-class areas toward the southern zone of the city.

The censuses of 1970 and 1980 demonstrated the extent of the center-periphery split. A 1977 study produced by Seplan (Secretariat of Economy and Planning of the State of São Paulo), based on data from the 1970 census, illustrated the segregation. It did a factorial analysis using the following variables for each district of the city: family income, domiciles connected to the sewage system, demographic density, population growth, and residential use of urban land. This study found that the districts of the city were distributed into eight homogeneous areas, that is, groups of districts with similar urban and social characteristics. Area I was central, the richest, and best equipped; area VIII was the poorest, with the least urban infrastructure, and the most distant from the center (São Paulo—Seplan 1977). Of the others, the richer districts lay closer to the center. Data from the 1980 census confirmed this pattern. In Area I, which had only 6.9 percent of the domiciles and 6.3 percent of the population, 99.1 percent of the domiciles had electricity, 97.6 percent had sewage services, and 73.2 percent had telephones. In area VIII, which had 22.0 percent of the domiciles and 24.1 percent of the population, 98.8 percent of the domiciles had electricity, but only 19.1 percent had sewage services, and only 4.9 percent had telephones. With respect to household income, in area I those receiving less than five minimum salaries accounted for 18.4 percent of the total; in area VIII they were 64.6 percent of the total (Caldeira 1984:26–28).

This separation of social groups in the city was associated with a period of relative inattention to class differences. At least three factors account for this inattention and helped to create a silence and a separation between the classes that many saw as a sign of social tranquility. First, the spatial separation of classes made their encounters infrequent, restricting them mainly to circulation in a few central areas. Second, the economic growth from the 1950s on, and especially during the 1970s—the "miracle years"—generated optimism and helped strengthen the belief in progress and social mobility.

PHOTO 1. Consolação, a central district of São Paulo that combines residential and commercial buildings, 1980. Photo by Teresa Caldeira.

Third, the repression of the military regime (1964–1985) banished political organization and public dissent.

The calm did not last long, however. In the last years of the military regime, the trade union movement was reorganized in the metropolitan region of São Paulo, and social movements demanding urban services and equipment were organized throughout the periphery. The elite had not foreseen that home ownership, instead of ensuring social stability and working-class docility, would, to the contrary, politicize the working classes and make them claim their rights to the city. As soon as the military regime decided to start the so-called political opening in the mid-70s, social movements based in poor neighborhoods emerged throughout the periphery. The poor residents of São Paulo, who had been forgotten on the outskirts of the city, learned quickly that if they could organize, they could probably improve the quality of life in their neighborhoods.[30]

The political mobilization of those previously excluded from the political arena made the population of São Paulo conscious of its pattern of social segregation and spatial organization. The center-periphery model was invoked in political negotiations between government officials and representatives of the social movements. It was also the model used by the mass media in their frequent reporting of demonstrations, and by social scientists



PHOTO 2. Jardim das Camélias, a neighborhood on the eastern periphery of the city of São Paulo, 1980. Photo by Teresa Caldeira.

who observed with fascination a politicization they had not foreseen. It quickly became a common reference for residents, political organizations, government planners, and social theorists. However, as the periphery was finding its way into the political and intellectual life of the city, other processes were already changing the configuration of the city so that, in a short time, the center-periphery model no longer accurately represented the social and spatial dynamics of the city.

PROXIMITY AND WALLS IN THE 1980S AND 1990S

São Paulo in the late 1990s is more diverse and fragmented than it was in the 1970s. A combination of processes, some of them similar to those affecting other cities, transformed the pattern of distribution of social groups and activities throughout the metropolitan region. São Paulo continues to be highly segregated, but social inequalities are now produced and inscribed in different ways. New forces are already generating other types of spaces and a different distribution of social classes and economic activities. São Paulo today is a more complex metropolitan region that cannot be mapped out by the simple opposition of center-rich versus periphery-poor. It is no longer a city providing conditions for inattention to class differences, but

rather a city of walls, with a population obsessed by security and social discrimination.

In the 1980s and 1990s the rate of population growth in the region dropped significantly as a result of a sharp decrease in fertility rates (see chapter 1) combined with emigration: that is, population trends that had characterized the city for the last hundred years were reversed. This demographic shift intersected with a transformation in residential patterns, especially for the richest and the poorest residents. For the first time in the history of modern São Paulo, rich residents are leaving the central and well-equipped areas of the capital to inhabit distant areas. Although wealth continues to be geographically concentrated, most upper- and middle-class central neighborhoods lost population between 1980 and 1996, while the proportion of wealthier residents increased substantially in some municipalities in the northwest of the metropolitan region and the south of the city, where previously only poor people lived. In these new areas, the main type of housing is the fortified enclave. At the same time, home ownership through autoconstruction on the periphery has become a less viable alternative for the working poor because of the impoverishment caused by the economic crisis of the 1980s, the improvements in the urban infrastructure in the periphery, and the legalization of land resulting from the pressure of social movements and action by local governments. In other words, while incomes went down, the periphery improved and became more expensive. As a result, many poor residents had to put aside the dream of home ownership and increasingly opted for living either in favelas or in *cortiços*, numbers of which increased substantially.

The economic dynamic and the distribution of economic activities changed as well. The industrial sector, especially in the city of São Paulo, lost its main economic role to new tertiary activities. Former industrial areas decayed, while new sites of office and commercial development attracted both wealthy residents and high investment. Finally, the increase in violent crime and fear since the mid-80s provoked the rapid walling of the city, as residents from all social classes sought to protect their living and working spaces. Moreover, as fear and crime increased, prejudices related to the talk of crime not only exacerbated the separation of different social groups but also increased the tensions and suspicions among them.

To analyze these processes and their effects on the pattern of segregation in São Paulo and its metropolitan region, I use demographic and socioeconomic indicators from the censuses of 1980 and 1991, the population count of 1996 *(Contagem da População)*, and the PNADs (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílio, the national survey of households), all produced by IBGE, the census bureau. For analyzing recent transformations in the urban space, all these sources present limitations. The PNADs, which are biennial, are available only for the metropolitan region as a whole. For a more detailed analysis, it is necessary to break down the information by municipalities or by districts. However, the subdivision of the city into districts was completely revised between the two censuses, making direct comparisons impossible.[31] Since there are no other appropriate data available for the 1980s, I have had to rely on an analysis that looks at each year and tries to compare the main trends.[32] The same problem does not exist for the other municipalities of the metropolitan region, whose boundaries remained practically unchanged and which are smaller and more homogeneous.

Reversing the Pattern of Growth

In the 1980s and 1990s the images of uninterrupted and rapid growth that have described the city since the nineteenth century lost their referents. From some perspectives, the city that "cannot stop" almost did. Its urban area still expanded and its population still increased, but at rates that pale compared to previous ones (see map 1). São Paulo's urban area expanded by 12.68 percent between 1980 and 1994 (from 733.4 square kilometers to 826.4 square kilometers [São Paulo—Sempla 1995:30]), compared to an expansion of 37.5 percent between 1965 and 1980. In the metropolitan region, urban expansion was still significant, 24 percent (from 1,423 square kilometers in 1980 to 1,765 square kilometers in 1990), but much lower than the 91.2 percent increase in the period 1965–1980 [Marcondes 1995, cited by Leme and Meyer 1996:9]).[33] However, one of the most significant reversals of the 1980s and especially the 1990s was the sharp decline in population growth. As table 7 shows, the annual growth rate of the population in the city was 1.16 percent between 1980 and 1991 and 0.4 percent between 1991 and 1996, compared to 3.67 percent in the 1970s. For the other municipalities of the metropolitan region, the rates were still high, at 3.21 percent and 3.07 percent in the two periods, but half the 6.34 percent rate of the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1991, almost 760,000 people left the city of São Paulo.[34] The central and more urbanized part of the city in particular lost population, as is shown by the census data, while the western and northern parts of the metropolitan region gained.

In fact, 40.6 percent of the districts of the city (in which 33.5 percent of its population lived in 1991) had a population decline between 1980 and

1991;[35] and from 1991 to 1996, 59.4 percent of the districts lost population. These numbers include the whole of the expanded city center, the area with the richest population and best urban infrastructure. The tendency for the center to grow less than the periphery has been clear since the 1950s, when some of the city's oldest industrial areas (Pari, Brás, Moóca, Bom Retiro) and the old downtown (Sé, Santa Ifigênia) started to lose population,[36] although most of the central areas continued to grow. In the 1980s, however, the depopulation affected traditional middle-class neighborhoods such as Santo Amaro, Pinheiros, Consolação, Perdizes, Vila Mariana, and Itaim Bibi, which had grown a great deal in the previous decades. These districts continued to lose population at even higher rates during the 1990s.[37] The same process affected the first ring of the city's periphery, developed mostly in the 1940s and 1950s (Vila Maria, Ipiranga, Vila Guilherme, Vila Prudente, Santana). Moreover, more distant areas of the periphery, which had grown more than 10 percent a year in the 1960s, hardly grew at all (less than 1 percent a year) during the 1980s and lost population during the early 1990s. These areas include Freguesia do Ó, Limão, Campo Belo, São Miguel, Socorro, Jaçanã, Artur Alvim, and Jaguaré, neighborhoods located throughout the periphery that saw significant infrastructure improvements during the 1980s. The only areas that continued to have high rates of growth were those on the edges of the city that had not been urbanized before.[38]

In the other municipalities of the metropolitan region, the average population growth has been significantly higher than in the capital (table 7). The lowest rates of growth were either in rural municipalities on the fringes of the region or in important industrial centers such as the ABCD area and Osasco, which are again some of the most urbanized municipalities, with better urban infrastructure. Some of the latter also had emigration, whereas all the others received new migrants.[39] The highest rates of growth were in the west and north, and in the 1980s in a few eastern municipalities. In general, the western areas reveal a new economic and social dynamic. The increase in population there may be partially due to the relocation of residents from the city of São Paulo, especially richer ones, as well as to economic transformations. The city with the highest migration rate in the metropolitan region was Santana do Parnaíba. This was the site of intensive real estate investment in upper-class residences as well as new office and commerce complexes. Meanwhile, the growth on the east side seems largely to stem from autoconstruction. Nevertheless, I am talking about general tendencies; the west also has autoconstruction, and the east has several new tertiary developments.

Improvement and Impoverishment in the Periphery

The urbanization of the city's outskirts, caused by the settlement of the poorest residents, continued, although at a much lower pace than in the preceding decades. In 1991, the twenty districts with the highest percentage of heads of households making less than 3 MS per month were districts at the limits of the city, especially the eastern region.[40] In eleven of these districts, more than 50 percent of the heads of households earned less than 3 MS. As could be expected, the poorest districts tend also to be very homogeneously poor, including only a very small proportion of residents with higher incomes. In the poorest districts, the ratio of residents making less than 3 MS to those making more than 20 is around 350:1.

The poorest residents of São Paulo settling in the limits of the city continued to rely on autoconstruction and illegality, as a comparison of census data and the city registry of urban properties indicates. The areas in the periphery that had the highest increase in population and number of domiciles are those in which there is the largest discrepancy between the number of domiciles counted by the 1991 census and the number of residential units officially recorded at TPCL in 1990. TPCL (Cadastro de Propriedades Urbanas) is the municipality's register of urban construction. It includes only legal constructions, whereas the census records all types of domiciles.[41] Therefore, the discrepancy between the two sources indicates the extent of illegal construction. The most dramatic discrepancy is from the district of Guaianazes at the eastern limits of the city, where it was 433.12 percent![42] Guaianazes had a population growth of 145 percent between 1980 and 1991 (the highest in the city), and an increase of 230 percent in the number of domiciles, but an increase in registered residential constructed area of only 65.8 percent between 1977 and 1987.[43] By contrast, in central residential neighborhoods, where the rich live, where there is a predominance of apartment buildings and which have always constituted the legal city, the difference between the census data on domiciles and TPCL is less than 5 percent.[44]

Other data indicate that the autoconstruction and peripheral expansion model has seen some important transformations during the 1980s and early 1990s. These years presented paradoxical conditions for the poor. At the same time that the working classes became important political actors, organizing social movements and demanding their rights and better living conditions, and at the same time that the infrastructure of the periphery indeed improved significantly, their incomes dropped, and their capacity to become property owners through autoconstruction was reduced.

All indicators of urban infrastructure improved both in the capital and

in the metropolitan region from 1980 to 1991. The changes were especially important on the periphery and consequently diminished the degree of inequality in access to urban infrastructure and public services. Because of the change in district boundaries used by the 1980 and 1991 censuses, it is difficult to analyze in detail what happened in different areas of the city during the 1980s. To address this problem and to describe what was going on at the periphery, I aggregated various districts and created one large area comparable to the poorest periphery of the 1980s. I used as a reference a study by Seplan that established eight socioeconomically homogeneous areas of the city (São Paulo—Seplan 1977; see above). I considered the twelve districts that Seplan's study classified as belonging to area VIII, the poorest area of the city in the 1980s. I studied these districts on the map and identified the corresponding twenty-eight districts for 1991. Their limits do not correspond exactly, but they are very close. The comparative data indicate broad changes between 1980 and 1991.[45] Table 8 summarizes the indicators for this area and for the city in 1980 and 1991.

While the city's central districts lost population, the poorest periphery grew an average of 3.26 percent a year in the 1980s. In 1991, the area housed approximately one-third of São Paulo's residents. Its urban infrastructure improved: in 1991, 74.0 percent of the domiciles were connected to the sewage system (compared to 19.1 percent in 1980), 96.03 percent had piped water, and 96.5 percent had garbage collection. Paved roads and public illumination increased, too, and a subway line was constructed in the eastern region that improved public transportation. Moreover, many childcare centers, health clinics, and schools were built by the local and by the state administration in those districts. As a consequence, although incomes remained low (48.78 percent of heads of households made less than 3 MS in 1991), the quality of life on the periphery improved (see photos 3 and 4). A good indicator is the rate of infant mortality. In the city, it dropped from 50.62 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 26.03 in 1991. In the poorest area of the periphery, the decrease was even more radical. In São Miguel Paulista, one of its poorest districts, where Jardim das Camélias is located, the infant mortality rate dropped from 134 in 1975 to 80.46 in 1980 and to 27.29 in 1994. Another indicator of the change in quality of life is the construction of a series of modern shopping and leisure centers in the periphery, such as large supermarkets.

The significant improvement on the periphery is to a large extent the result of the political action of its residents who, since the late 1970s, have organized social movements to claim their rights as city residents. These social movements are a central element both in the democratization of

TABLE 8 Socioeconomic Indicators, 1980 and 1991, City of São Paulo and its Poorest Periphery

Indicators	*Periphery 1980*	*Periphery 1991*	*São Paulo 1980*	*São Paulo 1991*
Population	2,044,689	3,062,538	8,493,226	9,646,185
Households	453,140	732,491	2,062,196	2,539,953
households with sewage services (%)	19.12	74.00	57.73	86.31
households with piped water (%)	79.31	96.03	92.16	98.41
owned residences (%)	54.42	68.51	51.40	63.57
rented residences (%)	34.62	22.56	40.02	28.75
difference households/ registered residences (%)[a]		164.23		69.51
vertical residences (%)[b]		5.71		33.62

SOURCES: For population and households: 1980 and 1991 censuses. For officially registered residences: TPCL in São Paulo—Sempla (1992:148–50).

[a]Refers to the proportional difference between the number of households observed by the census in 1991 and the number of residential units registered by the city (TPCL) in 1990.

[b]Refers to vertical residential units registered by the city (TPCL).



PHOTOS 3 AND 4. A street in Jardim das Camélias in 1980 and in 1989. In the early 1980s, only one street of Jardim das Camélias had asphalt and sidewalks; none was illuminated or had sewers. By the 1990s, all streets had asphalt, sidewalks, lighting, and sewers, although many houses were still under construction. Photo 3 by Teresa Caldeira and 4 by Teresa Caldeira and James Holston.

Brazilian society and in the change in the quality of life in many large cities. São Paulo is probably the best example of these processes. The social movements and political democratization forced transformations in the action of the state, especially the local administration, which reoriented its policies to meet the demands of the residents on the periphery.[46] Even right-wing politicians learned that their political future in a free electoral system depended on their paying attention to the periphery. In fact, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the municipal and state administrations of São Paulo (as well as of various other Brazilian states) sponsored intensive infrastructure development projects, especially in sanitation, which transformed Brazil into the World Bank's largest borrower in the area of urban development (Melo 1995:343).

The social movements influenced the action of the local administration not only in creating public services and urban infrastructure but also in transforming the legal status of the periphery. One of the main demands of the social movements was the legalization of properties on the periphery. Social movements forced the municipal governments to offer amnesties to illegal developers, making it possible to regularize their lots and bring them

into the formal property market. The approval of the Lehman Law (Federal Law 6,766) in 1979 made it easier to prosecute real estate developers selling land without the infrastructure required by law and therefore discouraged this common practice.[47] However, it also diminished the stock of irregular and cheap lots available, since land value increased as a result of both the construction of infrastructure and urban equipment and the regularization of lot subdivisions. Because legal developments and lots in areas with a better infrastructure are obviously more expensive than illegal lots in marginally developed areas, the neighborhoods that received these improvements became too expensive for the already impoverished population.[48]

The phenomenon of improvement plus legalization associated with a drop in population growth is most apparent not on the fringes of the city, where expansion through illegal autoconstruction continues, but in a ring inside it, which constituted the newest periphery in the 1970s. This includes an area on the eastern periphery, along the new subway line and around the old district centers. The new district of São Miguel Paulista, for example, which corresponds to the oldest part of the previous larger district, had an annual population growth of 2.66 percent from 1980 to 1991, while most of the districts in the eastern border of the city grew between 35 percent and 85 percent. Nevertheless, in various areas of the eastern periphery, including São Miguel, the rate of officially registered construction increased

considerably from 1977 to 1987 (123 percent in São Miguel, 110 percent in Ermelino, and 84 percent in Itaquera), indicating their improvement and their legalization. Although this development has been limited, it seems that some of these areas are starting to enter the legal land market and to undergo a process of capitalization in housing development, as bigger entrepreneurs start to invest and build legal housing, especially apartment buildings.[49] This type of housing remains less accessible to the poorest population.

People who cannot afford to build their houses but still live on the periphery may become squatters. Residents in favelas represented 1.1 percent of the city's population in 1973, 4.4 percent in 1980, 8.9 percent in 1987, and 19.1 percent in 1993—that is, more than 1.9 million people. The majority of the favelas in 1993 were located on the periphery, especially on the southern and northern borders (Freguesia do Ó, Campo Limpo, Capela do Socorro, and Pirituba-Jaraguá) (Seade 1990:63 and São Paulo—Sempla 1995:77).

Estimates of the numbers of people living in *cortiços* in the city of São Paulo vary widely. Sempla estimates that in 1991, 15.8 percent (1,506,709) of the population of the municipality lived in *cortiços* (São Paulo—Sempla 1995:79–80). This is a much higher number than the estimate of Fipe (Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas, Universidade de São Paulo) for 1993, which is 595,110, or 6 percent of the population, distributed among almost 24,000 *cortiços*.[50] All *cortiços* are rentals, the majority (55.6 percent) of the residents are younger than twenty-five, and the majority of the heads of households (54.3 percent) are between fifteen and thirty-five years old (Fipe 1994:13, 14). These data support the hypothesis that the *cortiços* are an alternative for a new generation of urban poor who cannot afford autoconstruction.

All sources agree, however, on the localities of the *cortiços*. Although there are *cortiços* on the periphery, the majority are either in the old downtown (Sé) or in old industrial areas and decaying lower middle-class neighborhoods, where many large houses and factories are transformed into *cortiços* (Moóca, Brás, Belém, and Liberdade). Some of these areas have shown a persistent decrease in population since at least the early 1960s. In fact, the highest rates of population loss are in industrial districts and working-class neighborhoods formed at the turn of the century. In the last decade, however, parts of these neighborhoods have shown signs of renewal and gentrification. Moóca is one such case. Although its residents consider the increase in *cortiços* to be one of its main problems, other processes are also affecting the neighborhood. These include the opening of the east-west subway line, which has been accompanied by the construction of new apartment buildings for the middle classes, some of which are closed condominiums. A few factories have also been turned into leisure and shopping centers. These transformations in urban, residential, and social patterns in those areas contribute to the sense of uncertainty and loss felt by the older residents.

Transformations in the Center and Displacement of the Rich

Wealth continues to be highly concentrated in a very small part of the city of São Paulo, as map 2 demonstrates. Therefore, the center-periphery model constituted in the previous decades still shapes the urban space. However, various indicators strongly suggest recent changes in this pattern. Although the concentration of wealth is still significant, an unprecedented displacement of rich residents and the construction of new areas of commerce and services are reshaping the spatial pattern of social segregation.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the middle and upper classes changed their lifestyles and their use of the city in various ways. As a consequence, the districts in which they used to live and the ones to which they were moving underwent various changes. In 1991, only 11.4 percent of the city's districts had a population in which more than 25 percent of heads of households made more than 20 MS. These districts contain 10 percent of the population but 41 percent of the heads of households who make more than 20 MS.[51] The majority of these districts lost population, or grew very little between 1980 and 1991. Only two had increased population growth: Morumbi (2.33 percent) and Vila Andrade (5.93 percent). Between 1991 and 1996, all but Vila Andrade lost population. The highest decreases were in traditional middle-class neighborhoods that had had higher rates of growth in the 1970s, which were associated with the boom of apartment buildings and financing for the middle classes. In fact, most of them have the highest rates of vertical construction and population density in the city. Two of these districts (Jardim Paulista and Moema) are the most homogeneously rich in the city.[52]

Because a significant proportion of the middle and upper classes live in apartment buildings, either in the neighborhoods that grew in the 1970s or the new neighborhoods to which they started to move in the 1980s, to look at the real estate market for apartments can help us to understand their displacement.[53] In the 1980s and 1990s, São Paulo's apartment market was much different from that of the 1970s. The change was caused not only by the economic crisis of the early 1980s but also by the reduction of BNH financing, which in 1987 was reduced to 10 percent of what it had been in 1980 (Nepp 1989:492). The single exception for the real estate market was 1986, the year of the Plano Cruzado, in which a short-lived economic re-



MAP 2. Average income of heads of households (in minimum salaries), MRSP, 1991. *Source:* 1991 Census.

covery reduced inflation, increased the profits of many financial ventures, and increased both the number of developments launched (677) and the price per square meter.[54] Thereafter, however, the market dropped even lower, especially after the extinction of BNH at the end of 1986 and the return of inflation with the failure of the Plano Cruzado. In 1991 and 1992 the number of registered new developments was the lowest since the mid-70s (around 150). With high inflation and virtually no financing, it was much more difficult for the middle classes to buy their own apartments. As a result, there are indications of what some analysts call an "elitization" in the production of apartments, that is, the development of larger, more sophisticated residences for the upper classes (Ferraz Filho 1992:29).[55] After 1993, the number of developments started to increase again, and the annual average for the period 1993–1996 (365) is higher than that for the ten years preceding the end of the BNH (280, according to Embraesp 1997:7). One of the factors in this increase is the emergence of cooperatives of future homeowners and systems of autofinancing, which in 1996 were responsible for 10 percent of the new developments. Their introduction caused a decrease in the average price of apartments in 1996 (Embraesp 1997:32). The end of high inflation as a result of the success of the Plano Real, as well as new opportunities for long-term financing, made possible the increase in the real estate market after 1993.

Despite the real estate crisis, more apartments continued to be built. In 1957, apartment buildings were found in twenty central districts; in 1979, they were found in forty-seven districts (Ferreira 1987:77, 141).[56] In 1991, there was a significant number of apartment buildings in all but twelve of the ninety-six districts of the city. Apartments not only spread but were also being constructed according to different patterns, from popular complexes built by government housing companies to luxury developments. One of the most interesting phenomena in this regard, and the one producing the most important changes in the way the upper and middle classes live, is the growth of closed condominiums *(condomínio fechado)*. This is a development of multiple residences, mostly high-rises, invariably walled and with security-controlled entrances, usually occupying a large area with landscaping, and including all sorts of amenities for collective use. In the last decade, they have become the preferred residence for the rich.

Closed condominiums are not constructed in the traditional central neighborhoods, as they require large lots that are affordable only in undeveloped areas. The change in the predominant style of apartment building is indicated by a change in the relationship between the total area of terrain and constructed areas. According to the TPCL, from 1980 to 1990 the total

constructed area of residential high-rises in the city increased 59.27 percent, while the total area used by residential high-rises increased 75.34 percent. As a result, the utilization rate of residential apartment buildings in São Paulo dropped from 4.36 to 3.95.[57] The fact that construction shifted from central to more peripheral areas is attested to by the unprecedented development of two districts in the southwest part of the city, Morumbi and Vila Andrade.

These two noncentral and adjacent districts are emblematic of the most dramatic changes occurring in the city. (Similarly radical changes are happening in some municipalities in the northwest of the metropolitan region.) They have been affected by the intensive real estate investment not only in the new type of residences for the rich but also in new complexes of similarly enclosed office and commercial buildings. That the new developments were located in these areas is partially due to favorable zoning codes that allowed both mixed-use construction (instead of exclusively residential as in parts of the central districts) and utilization rates as high as four. Some of these areas were either rural or already inhabited by poor people. As a result, as the new developments spread, they presented a new pattern of spatial organization: one that mixes rich and poor residents on the one hand, and residence and work on the other, thus creating a new pattern of both social inequality and of functional heterogeneity.

Morumbi and Vila Andrade had significant population growth in the 1980s.[58] Although Morumbi had been an upper-class neighborhood for at least twenty-five years, after the early 1980s it changed radically. What used to be a neighborhood of immense mansions, vacant lots, and green areas is being transformed, after a decade of frenetic construction, into a forest of high-rises. In the late 1970s, it was "discovered" by developers, who decided to take advantage of its cheap land and favorable zoning code and transformed it into the fastest-growing neighborhood in the city during the 1980s and 1990s. More than 400 new residential developments, with more than 14,000 new units, were built between 1980 and 1996.[59] In spite of that, it still has only 0.6 percent of the city's apartments, compared to 5.75 percent in Jardim Paulista. Whereas in Jardim Paulista 88 percent of the domiciles are apartments, in Morumbi the figure is 33.6 percent. Vila Andrade, adjacent to Morumbi, is a extension of the same process in a place that used to be poorer but has continued to expand as Morumbi has seemed to lose its dynamism in the last few years.

The construction of closed condominiums began in the 1970s, during the boom in the real estate market and state financing. The project that launched the area's frenetic development was Portal do Morumbi. This complex of

sixteen twenty-five-story blocks was inaugurated in 1976. It has eight hundred apartments, half with four bedrooms, the other half with three bedrooms, and it houses 3,500 residents, one-third of whom are under fourteen years old. The total area of the development is 160,000 square meters, of which 120,000 are common areas, including parks, sports facilities, and entertainment facilities. This complex was literally put up in the middle of nowhere. All of the required urban infrastructure (including electricity, water, and street construction) was provided by the developer, Construtora Alfredo Mathias. To this day the back streets of the complex remain nonurbanized and without paving or sidewalks (see photos 5 and 6).

This type of development, with its low utilization rate, along with the fact that the transformation is recent and there are still many mansions and unoccupied spaces, explains why Morumbi and Vila Andrade still have a population density considerably lower than that of Jardim Paulista (3,500 and 4,200 inhabitants per square kilometer in comparison to 16,900). There are also important social differences between the two areas. Although they are all wealthy, Morumbi and Vila Andrade are not as homogeneously rich as the old central neighborhoods. In Morumbi today, 43.9 percent of heads of household make more than 20 MS (the highest percentage in the city), while in Vila Andrade, the proportion is 26.2 percent. The average income in Morumbi is 28.82 MS (the highest average in the city); in Vila Andrade it is 17.94. However, in both areas the ratio of heads of households making more than 20 MS in relation to those making less than 3 is significantly lower than in Jardim Paulista (2.55 in Morumbi and 0.87 in Vila Andrade, compared to 4.59 in Jardim Paulista and 3.98 in Moema).[60] While in Jardim Paulista only 8.36 percent of the residents make less than 3 MS, in Morumbi 17.22 percent do, and in Vila Andrade 30.02 percent do (whereas 26.19 percent make more than 20 MS). This greater heterogeneity in income distribution is a characteristic of the new areas of expansion of the city and the metropolitan region, where developments for people with higher incomes are located in previously poorer or uninhabited areas and apartments for the rich are constructed alongside huge favelas.

The neighbors of the closed condominiums around Real Parque and Giovanni Gronchi Avenue in the heart of Morumbi are residents of two of the most famous favelas in São Paulo. In 1987, there were 233,429 people living in favelas in the western and southwestern districts of the city, corresponding to 28.62 percent of São Paulo's residents in favelas.[61] By 1993, favelas residents in these districts had increased to 482,304, representing 25.36 percent of São Paulo's squatters (São Paulo—Sempla 1995:76).

After fifteen years of intensive real estate development for the upper

PHOTOS 5 AND 6. Closed condominium "Portal do Morumbi," entrance and unpaved side street, 1994. Photos by Teresa Caldeira.

classes in areas with precarious infrastructure, combined with the proliferation of favelas, Morumbi exemplifies the new face of social segregation in the city (see photos 7 and 8). If one looks at the area around its main street, Avenue Giovanni Gronchi, and at the advertisements for its high-rises, one is struck by the imagination of the developers in endowing each apartment complex with "distinguishable" characteristics: in addition to monumental architecture and foreign, vaguely aristocratic names, the buildings display exotic features: one swimming pool per individual apartment, three maids' rooms, waiting rooms for drivers in the basement, and special rooms for storing crystal, china, silver, and so on. All this luxury contrasts with the views from the apartment windows: the more than five thousand shacks of the favela Paraisópolis, one of the biggest in São Paulo, which supplies the domestic servants for the condominiums nearby. For the people interested in living exclusively among their peers the walls have to be high indeed, and the rich residences do not conceal their electric fences, video cameras, and private guards.

Intense construction according to developers' interests and with little planning or state control has, in addition to completely transforming the landscape, created a chaotic space. Immense buildings were built one after



the other in narrow streets with inadequate infrastructure. In Vila Andrade, for example, only 57.6 percent of households are connected to the sewage system, a percentage much lower than in various districts on the poor periphery (for the whole periphery, the percentage is 74 percent). The buildings are immense, and many of the new streets do not have sidewalks—probably a feature intended to exclude people without cars. Traffic is very heavy, and traffic jams are routine.[62] In spite of heavy investment by the city and the construction of bridges, tunnels, and expressways connecting Morumbi to the city center across the Pinheiros river, the roads are insufficient, and public transportation is simply bad. This congestion increases the burden on the poor, but it is also inconvenient for the middle classes, as the neighborhood still lacks basic services and commerce. Although two big shopping centers and a couple of so-called hypermarkets are now operating in the area, buying groceries requires a car, a necessity unknown in most central neighborhoods in São Paulo, where, as people say, at least bread has to be available within walking distance. The transportation of children also depends on cars, even to the private schools in the neighborhood, one of its chief attractions.[63]

Unlike the old central neighborhoods and the poor areas in the periphery, then, Morumbi and Vila Andrade are not places where residents routinely walk on the streets. Ironically, these neighborhoods, with their nar-

PHOTO 7. Morumbi, unequal neighbors, 1992: the individual swimming pools of these apartments overlook the favela below. Photo by Celio Jr., Agência Estado.

row streets, bad infrastructure, and poor connections to the rest of the city, depend on cars for almost everything. As a consequence, moving to one of the area's luxury apartments means enduring heavy traffic and poor urban services. Nevertheless, for the residents of the new enclosures, the inconveniences seem to be more than compensated for by the feeling of security they gain behind the walls, living exclusively among their equals and far from what they consider to be the city's dangers.

Recession, Deindustrialization, and New Spaces for Tertiary Activities

It is not only the pattern of residence and distribution of poor and rich residents that is changing in the city and the metropolitan region. In the last two decades, São Paulo has gone through a significant economic recession



PHOTO 8. Morumbi, aerial view, 1992: luxury apartment buildings and favela shacks are side by side. Photo by Celio Jr., Agência Estado.

and a shift in the structure of its economic activities. Between 1980 and 1990, the total value added decreased by 3.75 percent in São Paulo.[64] In 1990, the total value added per capita was only 61.6 percent of what it had been in 1985 (Araújo 1993:35, 36). The crisis especially affected the industrial sector, which had been the most dynamic of the city and the metropolitan region since the 1950s. Although industrial production in São Paulo's metropolitan region continued to represent 30.7 percent of the national total in 1987, this proportion is significantly lower than the 43.5 percent it represented in 1970 (Araújo 1992:56).

While in 1970 the city of São Paulo had almost half of the industrial labor force of the state, in 1991 it had less than one-third (Gonçalves and Semeghini 1992; Leme and Meyer 1997:71). This decrease occurred throughout the state of São Paulo but was most pronounced in the capital.[65] While in the interior of the state the industrial sector in 1991 (38.4 percent) was

practically the same proportion of the labor force as in 1970 (39.7 percent) after having increased in 1980 (45.1 percent), in the capital the participation of the industrial sector in the labor force diminished significantly to 32.1 percent in 1991, after increasing consistently since the 1950s and reaching 42 percent in 1980 (Gonçalves and Semeghini 1992; Leme and Meyer 1997:64).[66] In the metropolitan region as a whole, the percentage of the industrial sector as a total of the labor force has dropped continuously in recent years, from 36.5 percent in 1988 to 29.6 percent in 1993 (Leme and Meyer 1997:77).

As the industrial sector shrank, the role of tertiary activities in the urban economy increased.[67] There is a great debate among social scientists regarding whether this expansion is due to an increase in "modern" or "traditional" activities. Some (for example, Gonçalves and Semeghini 1992; Araújo 1992) argue that the extension of the tertiary sector is a consequence of the development of a more flexible type of production, in which many activities previously recorded as industrial production started to be bought as services and the role of modern technology and financing activities expanded. Others, however, try to relativize these assertions, showing that expansion occurred in sectors of tertiary activity that are very precarious, for example the informal commerce of street vendors *(comércio ambulante)* and unskilled and low-paid activities performed without formal labor contracts (see, for example, Leme and Meyer 1997:63–79). Although it would be beyond the scope of this work to develop this hypothesis, I suggest that both processes are probably happening at the same time, and in this sense what is going on in São Paulo is no different from the industrial restructuring occurring in Los Angeles and other so-called global cities (Scott and Soja 1996; Sassen 1991). It is a characteristic of these processes that the most dynamic and the most precarious poles of the economy expand simultaneously, provoking sharper patterns of social inequality.

These economic changes have all sorts of implications for the built environment, from the abandonment or conversion of factories to the creation of new urban spaces and new installations for commerce and offices. After moving from downtown to Avenida Paulista and Avenida Faria Lima in the 1960s, the main office complexes are now moving southwest, along the Pinheiros river and in the same direction as the new residential complexes, shopping malls, and hypermarkets.[68] Therefore, the new urban spaces for tertiary activities are developing through a process well known in the United States: the relocation of jobs and residences from central and urbanized areas to more distant ones. The new buildings are the result of large investments, frequently by real estate developers who abandoned the residential

market when it became more difficult (Ferraz Filho 1992:29). They follow the same kind of architectural and planning model as the closed condominiums. If they are not necessarily walled like the residential complexes, they are certainly fortified and use extensive security services to keep out all undesirable people—and to control their own workers. As self-sufficient worlds, these arrangements can be placed anywhere land is cheap enough to make their investment profitable. As with the residential complexes, they are being installed in previously poor areas. The avenue that symbolizes the new expansion, Eng. Luís Carlos Berrini, has been quickly displacing an old favela under a program paid for by the new occupants of the area. By 1998, most of the slum-like dwellings had been removed, but many poor residences and commerce were still visible. It can be expected, however, that the avenue will soon be completely transformed by the new buildings, following a local version of postmodern architectural style, and will be purged of poor inhabitants. Until then, the avenue offers a spectacle of social inequality on a par with the Morumbi condominiums overlooking the favelas.

Finally, the displacement of the new tertiary activities to the west recreates an opposition between eastern and western parts of the city that the center-periphery model had eclipsed. While the new investments in office complexes and closed condominiums for the upper classes are concentrated in the city's southwest side, the eastern region, traditionally more industrial, has lost dynamism with the decrease of its industrial activities. Some of the old factories have been transformed into shopping centers, department stores, or leisure centers, but many have simply been abandoned. While the eastern and the southeastern zones remain the poorest, more industrial zones, expanding mainly through illegal construction and lacking a significant number of developments for the upper classes, the southwestern border houses the rich, their residential developments, and the new white-collar tertiary activities. This opposition adds complexity to a city landscape already transformed by the improvement of the periphery and the relative depopulation of the wealthy center. To complete the picture, however, it is necessary to look at the metropolitan region as a whole.

The Metropolitan Region

The other municipalities of the metropolitan region have frequently been treated as peripheral to the capital. This may have been true in the 1960s and 1970s, but in the last fifteen years the processes affecting these cities have been more complex. Urban infrastructure has improved significantly. From a demographic point of view, the other municipalities continue to

demonstrate typical peripheral behavior, as they are still growing much more than the center (table 7). From an economic point of view, however, the crisis of the 1980s had different effects on the municipalities that were heavily industrialized and those that were not, changing the simple relationship of complementarity with the capital. While the more industrial areas suffered drastically, large investments in real estate and tertiary activities in formerly rural locations generated good economic performance with continuous rates of growth in the west and northwest (Araújo 1993:37). The dynamism of these areas is such that for the first time some of the other municipalities became receivers of rich migrants from the center.

Although São Paulo was hit worst by the economic crisis of the 1980s, the cities of Osasco and the ABCD region in the southeast region were also affected.[69] The latter can be seen as a symbol of the previous era of industrial development, housing most of the heavy metal and machine factories that supported the auto industry boom in the 1950s and 1960s. To this day it has the highest concentration of industrial jobs in the metropolitan region and has been the center of a strong trade union movement, from which the PT and its most important leaders emerged. It still has better urban infrastructure than most and an impressive concentration of wealth. Only five municipalities in the metropolitan region have more than 5 percent of the heads of the households making more than 20 MS on average, and two of these are in the ABCD region: São Bernardo (5.8 percent) and São Caetano (6.3 percent).[70] Nevertheless, the recent economic performance of these municipalities has been poor, and their population is growing very little (São Caetano has lost population in the last fifteen years).

Various industrial municipalities on the eastern and northern sides of the metropolitan region also suffered during the economic recession.[71] These are among the poorest municipalities of the metropolitan region.[72] In none of the eastern municipalities is the proportion of heads of households making more than 20 MS higher than 3 percent; and in all the municipalities in this region, between 30 and 50 percent of the heads of households make less than 2 MS a month.

In contrast, the western and northwestern municipalities of Santana do Parnaíba, Barueri, and Cajamar reveal a picture of great dynamism and represent a new type of development. These areas had the most impressive rates of population growth from 1980 to 1996. They also demonstrated strong economic performance in a decade marked by economic stagnation and decrease.[73] This performance is associated with high investment in real estate developments (mostly closed condominiums), office complexes, business

centers, and shopping centers much on the model of American new suburbs. Because of that, many of the migrants to these areas are from the middle and upper classes (probably those abandoning the central part of the capital) instead of the working classes, as has been traditional on the periphery. Santana do Parnaíba, the city with the highest average income of the whole metropolitan region (9.8 MS), has a level of wealth that used to exist only in some of the central districts of São Paulo.

Santana do Parnaíba exemplifies what one might call a new suburbanization of São Paulo. Its growth has been neither the traditional expansion of poor and industrial areas nor the American suburban outgrowth of the 1950s and 1960s, but a new type of suburbanization of the 1980s and 1990s that brings together residence and tertiary activities. Santana do Parnaíba has not had the same economic performance as its adjacent municipalities, Barueri and Cajamar, but it shows more clearly how the area is becoming a new middle- and upper-class enclave. It was the municipality with the highest annual rate of population growth in the 1980s (12.76 percent) and the highest income.[74] Ninety percent of the population increase during the 1980s was due to migration, and it had the highest percentage of growth due to migration in the metropolitan region: 245 percent (São Paulo—Emplasa 1994:137). The immigrants were mainly wealthy residents. As the rich settle into areas that have been rural and extremely poor,[75] they create situations of dramatic social inequality, attested to by the fact that the GINI coefficient in Santana do Parnaíba is 0.7102, the highest of the metropolitan region.[76]

One of the differences between Morumbi and the new rich areas in the western metropolitan region is that their closed condominiums are mostly horizontal instead of vertical: that is, they consist of walled areas with detached houses instead of apartment buildings. Horizontal closed condominiums expanded at the same time that Morumbi was constructing its high-rises, and they share the same imagery as the apartment complexes. Today these condominiums are common around the metropolitan region of São Paulo and even in the interior of the state, especially in its richer and more industrialized areas. One of the most impressive, and one of the oldest, is Alphaville—named after Godard's movie about a fantasy city in a technologically dominated future. It includes not only enclosed residences but also shopping malls and offices. Together with the neighboring developments of Aldeia da Serra and Tamboré in the municipalities of Barueri and Santana do Parnaíba, the whole region has been aggressively marketed in Brazil as a true "edge city," or a new type of American suburb.

The New Segregation

Contemporary São Paulo is a more diversified and complex metropolitan region than it was fifteen years ago, when the center-periphery model sufficiently described its pattern of segregation and social inequality. These transformations have arisen from a combination of processes: the reversal in demographic growth; the economic recession, deindustrialization, and expansion of tertiary activities; the improvement of the periphery, combined with the impoverishment of the working classes; the displacement of part of the middle and upper classes from the center; and the widespread fear of crime that has made people from all social classes seek more secure forms of residence. In consequence, not only is São Paulo more unequal than it used to be—the GINI coefficient of the metropolitan region increased from 0.516 in 1981 to 0.586 in 1991—but this inequality has also become more explicit and visible as rich and poor residents live in closer proximity in the newly expanded areas of the city and of the metropolitan region. These new areas in fact have the highest GINI coefficients and the most shocking landscapes of adjacent wealth and poverty. Moreover, in the context of increased suspicion and fear of crime, and preoccupation with social decay, residents show no tolerance for people from different social groups or interest in finding common solutions to their urban problems. Rather, they engage in increasingly sophisticated techniques of social separation and the creation of distance. Thus, the fortified enclaves—apartment high-rises, closed condominiums, peripheral office complexes, and shopping centers—constitute the core of a new way of organizing segregation, social discrimination, and economic restructuring in São Paulo. Different social classes live closer to each other in some areas but are kept apart by physical barriers and systems of identification and control.

Contemporary São Paulo is a metropolis in which there are more favelas and *cortiços*, but in which many working-class neighborhoods in the periphery have improved considerably; in which old inner-city areas have been transformed by both gentrification and decay; in which rich people live in the central and well-equipped areas but also in new enclosed enclaves in precarious and distant regions, close to the very poor, either in the capital or outside it; in which the tertiary jobs are moving to nonurbanized areas; and in which an opposition between west (richer) and east (poorer) is becoming more visible. It is also a metropolitan area in which the physical distances that used to separate different social groups may have shrunk, but the walls around properties are higher and the systems of surveillance more obvious. It is a city of walls in which the quality of public space is changing immensely,

and in ways opposite from what would be expected in a society that was able to consolidate a political democracy. In fact, the segregation and the model of obvious separation put in place in recent decades may be seen as a reaction to the expansion of this very process of democratization, since it functions to stigmatize, control, and exclude those who had just forced their recognition as citizens, with full rights to engage in shaping the city's future and its environment.

CHAPTER 7

Fortified Enclaves

Building Up Walls and Creating a New Private Order

The guard in the fortified pillbox is new on the job and so is obligated to stop me in the condominium. He asks my name and destination, observing my shoes. He calls house 16 on the intercom and says that there is a gentleman saying he is the brother of the house's mistress. House 16 answers something the guard does not like, and he says, "Hum." The gate of green iron bars and big golden rings opens in a shuttered motion, as if reluctant to let me pass. The guard watches me going up the hill, notices the soles of my shoes, and believes that I am the first pedestrian authorized to cross that gate. House 16, at the end of the condominium, has another intercom, another electronic gate, and two armed guards. The dogs bark in a chorus and then stop barking suddenly. A young man with a flannel in his hands opens a little lateral door and makes me enter the garden with a gesture of the flannel. . . .

The servant does not know which door I deserve, because I am neither delivering something nor have the aspect of a visitor. He stops, twists the flannel to drain the doubt, and opts for the garage door, which is neither here nor there. Obeying convulsive flannel signs, I skirt the automobiles in the transparent garage, climb a circular staircase, and get to a kind of living room with an uncommonly high ceiling, granite floor, inclined glass wall, other walls white and nude, a lot of echo, a living room where I have never seen someone sitting. On the left of this room runs a big staircase that comes from the second floor. At the bottom of the big staircase there is a small room that they call a winter garden, attached to the patio where the ficus used to live. There is my sister in a robe having her breakfast on an oval table.

Chico Buarque, *Estorvo*

Estorvo means hindrance, obstruction, inconvenience. In his 1991 novel, Chico Buarque—the poet and singer of urban passions and everyday life, of the 1970s resistance to the military, and of the early 1980s hopes for political change—captures the feelings of the new life amid barriers in contemporary Brazilian cities.[1] The novel is set in Rio but could equally well

be set in São Paulo or any other city of walls. In these cities and especially for their elite, an everyday act such as a visit to a sister involves dealing with private guards, identification, classification, iron gates, intercoms, domestic servants, electronic gates, dogs—and a lot of suspicion. The man approaching the gate of the closed condominium warrants suspicion because he gives the wrong signs: he walks instead of driving a car and thus reveals himself as someone who uses urban public space in a way that the residents of the condominiums reject. Closed condominiums, the new type of fortified elite housing, are not places people walk to or even simply pass by. They are meant to be distant, to be approached only by car and then only by their residents, a few visitors, and of course the servants, who must be kept under control and are usually directed to a special entrance. As a consequence, a marginal member of the elite who insists on walking can only elicit doubts and ambiguous interactions with the condominium's employees. Unable to classify the pedestrian, the house servant decides to bring him in through an entrance that is neither the "social" nor the "service" door—the traditional division in middle- and upper-class houses and apartments.

Closed condominiums constitute the most desirable type of housing for the upper classes in contemporary São Paulo. In this chapter, I analyze this new residential type from a series of interconnected perspectives. I first define the closed condominiums and their relationship both with previous housing arrangements and with other enclaves producing the same segregational effects. Closed condominiums are not an isolated phenomenon but the residential version of a new urban form that creates segregation in contemporary cities. Second, I analyze the elements that transform São Paulo's residential high-rises, and especially the closed condominiums, into prestigious residences: security, facilities, services, and location. Third, I discuss problematic aspects of life inside the condominium walls: the difficulty of arriving at consensual regulations and of enforcing rules, the most dramatic expression of which is the rate of adolescent crime, especially vandalism and car accidents caused by teenagers driving without a license. Fourth, I analyze the ambiguities, contradictions, and rejections that this new model generates as residents of the city contrast it to other spaces, housing options, and lifestyles in the city. Although the new model has not eliminated all other possibilities, it provides the main paradigm of distinction for São Paulo's residents. In the city today, a widespread aesthetic of security shaped by the new model simultaneously guides transformations of all types of housing and determines what confers the most prestige.

PRIVATE WORLDS FOR THE ELITE

Closed condominiums are the residential version of a broader category of new urban developments that I call fortified enclaves. The latter are changing considerably the way in which middle- and upper-class people live, consume, work, and spend their leisure time. They are changing the city's landscape, its pattern of spatial segregation, and the character of public space and of public interclass interactions. Fortified enclaves include office complexes shopping centers, and, increasingly, other spaces that have been adapted to conform to this model: schools, hospitals, entertainment centers, and theme parks. All fortified enclaves share some basic characteristics. They are private property for collective use, and they emphasize the value of what is private and restricted at the same time that they devalue what is public and open in the city. They are physically demarcated and isolated by walls, fences, empty spaces, and design devices. They are turned inward, away from the street, whose public life they explicitly reject. They are controlled by armed guards and security systems, which enforce rules of inclusion and exclusion. They are flexible: because of their size, the new technologies of communication, the new organization of work, and security systems, they constitute autonomous spaces, independent of their surroundings, that can be situated almost anywhere. In other words, in contrast to previous forms of commercial and residential developments, they belong not to their immediate surroundings but to largely invisible networks (Cenzatti and Crawford 1998).[2] As a consequence, although they tend to be spaces for the upper classes, they may be sited in rural areas or on the old periphery, beside favelas or autoconstructed houses. Finally, the enclaves tend to be socially homogeneous environments. People who choose to inhabit these spaces value living among selected people (considered to be of the same social group) and away from the undesired interactions, movement, heterogeneity, danger, and the unpredictability of open streets. The fortified and private enclaves cultivate a relationship of rupture and denial with the rest of the city and with what can be called a modern style of public space open to free circulation. They are transforming the nature of the public space and the quality of public interactions in the city, which are becoming increasingly marked by suspicion and restriction.

Fortified enclaves confer status. The construction of status symbols is a process that elaborates social differences and creates means for the assertion of social distance and inequality. Fortified enclaves are quite literal in their creation of separation. They are well demarcated by all kinds of physical barriers and distancing devices, and their presence in the city space presents a clear statement of social differentiation. They offer a new way of establishing boundaries between social groups and establishing new hierarchies among them, and therefore of explicitly organizing difference as inequality. The use of literal means of separation is complemented by a symbolic elaboration that transforms enclosure, isolation, restriction, and surveillance into status symbols. This elaboration is evident from the real estate advertisements.

The transformation of fortified enclaves into prestigious spaces has required changes in the values held by the elite. First, collective residences have come to be preferred to individual houses. Collective housing, including apartment high-rises, has for a long time been devalued in São Paulo because of its association with *cortiços*. Until recently, detached, single-family houses were the paradigm of dignified residence and evidence of moral and social status. The values of privacy, individual freedom, and the nuclear family embedded in the detached house have supported both the war on *cortiços* and the promotion of home ownership among the working classes. Second, isolated, nonurbanized, and distant areas have been transformed into more valuable spaces than the traditional central and well-equipped neighborhoods. This shift has required a reversal of the values that prevailed from the 1940s to the 1980s, when the city center was unequivocally associated with the rich and the periphery with the poor. For the first time, something like the American suburb became popular among the elite, and distance from the center was resignified in order to confer status instead of stigma.

FROM *CORTIÇOS* TO LUXURY ENCLAVES

To live in multifamily residences, sharing both the use and the ownership of common areas, is not a new experience for the Brazilian middle classes. Condominiums have existed in São Paulo since 1928. Although it took a long time for them to lose the *cortiço* stigma and become popular among the middle classes, they became more common from the 1970s on because of changes in financing and the resulting construction boom. Several elements, however, differentiate the 1970s apartments from the closed condominiums of the 1980s and 1990s. Although the old type of apartment continues to be built and has expanded its market even to the working classes, the most sophisticated and expensive developments are of the new type. One difference is location: whereas in the 1970s apartment buildings were still concentrated in central neighborhoods, the closed condominiums of the 1990s tend to be in distant areas. Whereas earlier apartments were integrated into the urban network, recent condominiums tend to ignore it. Sec-

ond, closed condominiums are by definition walled, whereas the high-rises of the 1970s tended to be open to the streets, although most of them have been recently fenced in. Third, the new type of closed condominium tends to have large (sometimes very large) areas and facilities for common use, whereas in the previous generation, common spaces were generally limited to garages, corridors and lobbies, small playgrounds, and maybe a room for parties.[3]

Whereas in the 1970s condominiums were basically apartment buildings, in the 1990s they may be of two types, vertical or horizontal. The former is frequently a series of high-rises in large areas with common amenities, and this is the predominant type in São Paulo. The latter consists of detached single-family houses, as in Chico Buarque's novel, and sometimes townhouses; this type predominates in the other municipalities of the metropolitan region. The detached houses are usually built by the individual owners, not by the developers, as is the case in the United States. As a consequence, they are not uniformly designed, although some developers include in the property deeds regulations regarding setbacks, open areas, walls and fences, house size, and use (residential only). They are still condominiums, since the property and use of common areas and amenities is shared and residents have to conform to collective rules and regulations.

Brazilian closed condominiums are obviously not an original invention but share various characteristics with American common-interest developments (CIDs) and suburbs. However, they demonstrate some revealing differences.[4] First, Brazilian closed condominiums are invariably walled and gated, whereas in the United States, gated communities constitute only about 20 percent of all CIDs.[5] Second, the most common types of closed condominiums in São Paulo are still apartment buildings, and although they may be marketed as an escape from the city and its dangers, they are still more urban than suburban. The first developments built according to the enclosed model are a good example. Ilha do Sul (Island of the South), built in 1973, is a middle-class complex of six high-rises, each with eighty three-bedroom apartments, located in the western zone of the city (Alto de Pinheiros). Its main innovations were its club-like amenities, occupying over 10,000 square meters and including sports facilities, a restaurant, and a theater, and its security: it is walled and access is controlled by security employees. At that time crime was not a central concern in the city, and the practice of controlling circulation was in fact feared by various groups: at the peak of the military dictatorship, many people regarded any investigation of identity as threatening. This fact indicates that enclosure was a marketing strategy, one that became dominant in the next decades: today, security procedures

are a required feature in any building intended as prestigious. During the late 1970s and the 1980s, most closed condominiums constructed in São Paulo were vertical and were built in Morumbi, following the example of Portal do Morumbi.

Horizontal condominiums started to be built in the late 1970s, especially in the adjacent western municipalities of the metropolitan region. They feature some interesting differences from their American counterparts. Although social homogeneity is obviously valued, uniformity of design is not: houses with the same plan and façade are devalued and almost nonexistent. Traditionally in São Paulo, patterned houses were built for the working classes, and they are devalued not only by the population in general but also by the people who have no option but to live in them. Residents make strenuous efforts to transform their houses and to give them what they call "personality," that is, an individualized appearance.[6]

The high value attached to house "personality," shared by all social classes, probably explains why patterned houses are not common among the elite. It is also probably responsible for the fact that apartment buildings also have to show "personality"; Morumbi's buildings display a considerable amount of variation and attempts at individual distinction. Most important, however, this rejection of homogeneity, even among people who are social peers, may be related to the fact that in the ideological justification of closed condominiums in São Paulo, there is no positive reference to idea of a community, a feature always invoked in American developments. Condominiums are never called "communities," and they are never advertised as a type of housing that could enhance the value of doing things together. In fact, residents seem to resent deeply this idea of community. Another interesting point of comparison with the United States is the use of restrictive deeds and covenants. Although Brazilian condominiums necessarily have covenants, and although they are also segregative, historically they have not been considered an instrument of the real estate industry, as is the case in the United States, according to McKenzie (1994, especially chapter 2). It is only with the last generation of very large condominiums that developers have begun to include their own restrictions. In the old apartment buildings, these were confined to preservation of the architecture and façade, which is a different matter in high-rises. For working-class patterned houses, restrictions have never existed, or have never been enforced, and constant modifications are the rule.

The horizontal condominiums of the 1980s and 1990s represent São Paulo's process of suburbanization. This process is still in its incipient stages compared to the United States.[7] Before the 1980s, if real estate developers

acted as private urban planners, their efforts have been more evident in the expansion of the poorer periphery than in the creation of wealthy suburbs. Until very recently, the most famous cases of planned neighborhoods for the elite were those designed at the beginning of the twentieth century, including Higienópolis, Avenida Paulista, and the famous Garden Cities of the 1920s.[8] These areas, however, have always been central. No property was held in common, and the houses were individually built. Moreover, although these developments had restrictions regarding design, some of their regulations were incorporated into the city construction code of 1929. Today they are regulated by the city's zoning codes, not by the determinations of the original deeds.

Developments for the elite away from the city center became significant only in the late 1970s. At that time, a few developers also began building something akin to American new towns or edge cities, that is, suburban areas that combine residential developments with office space and commercial centers. Some of the most famous and most aggressively advertised of these developments were Alphaville, Aldeia da Serra, and Tamboré, in the municipalities of Santana do Parnaíba and Barueri, the new area of middle- and upper-class development. Alphaville started in the 1970s, constructed by the same developers who had built Ilha do Sul and who are now building other horizontal condominiums nearby. Built on an area of 26 square kilometers that extends over two municipalities (Barueri and Santana do Parnaíba), Alphaville is divided into various walled residential areas (Residenciais), each enclosed by 3.5-meter-high walls and accessible by one controlled entrance; an office-building complex (Centro Empresarial); and a commercial center encompassing a shopping center (Centro Comercial). The first parts to be built, in the mid-70s, were the office center and two of the residential areas. In the early 1990s, Alphaville covered an urbanized area of 13 square kilometers and had a fixed population of around twenty thousand inhabitants. Its office center housed 360 enterprises, and the commercial area had 600 enterprises. On average, 75,000 nonresidents passed through it daily.[9] In 1989, 55.4 percent of the tax revenues of the city of Barueri came from Alphaville (Leme and Meyer 1997:20). Security is one of the main elements in its advertising and an obsession of all involved with it. Its private security forces have more than eight hundred guards and eighty vehicles. Each residential area, office center, and commercial center hires its own security force to maintain internal order, and there is a common security force to take care of the public spaces (the avenues and even the highway connecting to São Paulo).

Closed condominiums and new suburban quasi-towns are an invention

of the real estate industry. Their transformation into elite housing is obviously associated with the construction of their image in advertising over the last two decades. It is interesting to follow this construction, the ways it is reproduced, and the ways it helps to shape people's fear of crime and sense of insecurity.

A TOTAL WAY OF LIFE: ADVERTISING RESIDENTIAL ENCLAVES FOR THE RICH

Advertisements aim to seduce. They rely on a repertoire of images and values that speak to different people's sensibilities and fantasies and thereby address their desires. As Augé tells us in his analysis of advertisements of French châteaus and domaines, their effect lies "in the unveiling or sudden revelation to a very precise individual of a place where, he imagines, life will be possible for him" (1989:28–29).[10] To achieve this effect, advertisements and the people to whom they appeal must share a common repertoire. If the ads fail to articulate images people can understand and recognize as their own, they fail to seduce. Therefore, real estate advertisements constitute a good source of information about the lifestyles and values of the people whose desires they elaborate and help to shape. I analyze advertisements of high-rises and closed condominiums published in the newspaper *O Estado de S. Paulo* from 1975 to 1996.[11] During this period, the collective and enclosed residence was elaborated as the most prestigious and desirable housing for São Paulo's upper and middle classes. The analysis reveals the elements of current patterns of social differentiation and distinction, and shows how the upper classes construct their own place in society and their vision of the kind of home where "life would be possible."

Across the most disparate cultures and in various social classes, the home crystallizes important symbolic systems and shapes individual sensibilities.[12] Residence and social status are obviously associated, and the home is a means by which people publicly signify themselves. As a consequence, the construction or acquisition of a home is one of the most important projects people undertake. The home makes both public and personal statements as it relates the public and the domestic. In creating a home, people both discover and create their own social position and shape their intimate world.

For the Paulista working classes, their autoconstructed houses are clearly their most important projects and may consume most of their energies and resources for many years. These houses embody statements about belonging to society and being modern, and through the houses their residents de-

velop a discourse about society and about themselves. For the Paulista urban poor, the process entails not the purchase of a ready-made dwelling but a whole process of construction, both material and symbolic. They do not buy a home but literally build it themselves. There are no newspaper advertisements for working-class houses in São Paulo. In working-class neighborhoods, the real estate market relies almost exclusively on small local offices, interpersonal communication, and the distribution of pamphlets at busy traffic intersections. Newspaper ads appear only for middle- and upper-class homes, especially apartment buildings.

For the upper and middle classes, the construction of a home occurs through the mediation of advertisements and the real estate and construction industries. In the last twenty years, these ads have elaborated what they call "a new concept of housing" *(um novo conceito de moradia)* and transformed it into the most desirable type of housing.[13] This "new concept of housing" articulates five basic elements: security, seclusion, social homogeneity, amenities, and services. The image that confers the highest status (and is the most seductive) is that of an enclosed, fortified, and isolated residence, a secure environment in which one can use various facilities and services while living exclusively among equals. The advertisements present the image of islands to which one can return every day to escape the city and encounter an exclusive world of pleasure among peers. The enclaves are, therefore, opposed to the city, which is represented as a deteriorated world not only of pollution and noise, but, more important, of confusion and mixture, that is, social heterogeneity.

Closed condominiums correspond to the ideal version of this new concept of housing, an ideal in relation to which the other, less complete forms are always measured. Closed condominiums are supposed to be separate worlds. Their advertisements propose a "total way of life" superior to that of the city, even when they are built pretty much inside it. Portal do Morumbi was one of the first closed condominiums in São Paulo. On September 4, 1975, the complex was announced in a full-page advertisement. A series of small illustrations showed what the life of its residents would be like, hour by hour, from 7 A.M. to 11 P.M. People are shown in the swimming pool, the exercise room, the sauna, the playground, and the gardens. The main text reads: "Here every day is Sunday. Alfredo Mathias Developer. Playground, sports courts, medical center. Enjoying the outdoors at any time of the day and night can again be a pleasure completely possible and totally secure in Portal do Morumbi. Guards on duty 24 hours a day. Perfect security amidst the increasing insecurity of the city" (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 4 September 1975).

The ad suggests a world clearly distinguishable from the surrounding city: a life of total and secure leisure. At least ten years before violent crime increased and became one of the main concerns of São Paulo's residents, the insecurity of the city was already being constructed in real estate images to justify a new type of urban development and investment. This practice has persisted to the present day.

> Granja Julieta. Go there and live happily. Three bedrooms, two bathrooms, 1,000 m² of gardens, swimming pools, playground, ballroom, all with garage. . . . You do not have high[-rise] neighbors; far from environmental and visual pollution. Complete sunshine, pure air and a lot of silence. All the complex is surrounded by high protective fences. The garage gate ensures control. . . . Status, comfort. All the advantages of a closed residential complex with the charm of a sophisticated club. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 11 January 1976)

Making appeals to ecology, health, order, leisure, and, of course, security, the ads present the closed condominiums as the antithesis to the chaos, dirt, and danger the city. These images are shared by those who decide to leave the city center to inhabit the new complexes, even though the new complexes are sited in areas with precarious infrastructure that entail long commutes.

7.1

> I left Avenue Paulista because of the noise. . . . During weekends it was the movement around those restaurants, all of that. So, it started to become impossible to live there. . . . And the circulation of people all day long in front of the place I lived in, it was as if it were downtown: there were office boys, that permanent movement, permanent.
>
> *Housewife, fifty-two, lives in Morumbi with her husband, an executive at a multinational corporation, and their two children*

Seclusion and distance from the center of the city and its intense urban life are touted as promising a better lifestyle. Ads refer to the natural setting of the development, with green areas, parks, and lakes, and use phrases with ecological appeal. The condominiums are also frequently represented as islands set in the middle of noble surroundings.

> Who said that apartments do not go with nature? Here is the counterproof. . . . A perfect apartment where you and your family will feel in total harmony with nature. Two bedrooms, living room with two sitting

areas, spacious kitchen and service area. Sophisticated finishing, condominium enclosed by walls and iron fences, guardhouse with guards on duty 24 hours a day, intercom, garage. Permanent tranquility: the green around you will be permanent, an external view to rest the eyes and the spirit. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 12 October 1986)

Wake up the free man who exists inside you. Move to Chácara Flora. Here you will be able to be human the whole week and not only on Saturday and Sunday. Here you will live surrounded by green, breathing pure air. . . . Here you will change your life without leaving São Paulo. . . . Total security with fences and guardhouse with intercom. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 22 January 1989)

The right to not be bothered. We are offering you a totally new and revolutionary housing concept. Townhouses with two bedrooms. Total security for you and tranquility for your children. The residences form a complex totally protected by walls. Access allowed exclusively to residents. The reception controls everything. But you will never be isolated. 5,000 m² of gardens and leisure area, with two swimming pools. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 January 1980)

Only with "total security" is the new concept of housing complete. Security means fences and walls, twenty-four-hour guards, and an array of facilities and technologies—guardhouses with bathrooms and telephones, double sets of doors in the garage, and video monitoring. Security and control are the conditions for keeping the others out, for assuring not only seclusion but also "happiness," "harmony," and even "freedom." To relate security exclusively to crime is to overlook its other meanings. The new systems of security not only provide protection from crime but also create segregated spaces in which exclusion is carefully and rigorously practiced. They assure "the right to not be bothered," probably an allusion to life in the city and the encounters with people of other social groups, beggars, and homeless people in its streets.

In addition to being distant, secluded, and secure, closed condominiums are supposed to be self-contained worlds. Residents should be provided with almost everything they need so that they can avoid public life in the city. In keeping with this view, shared amenities transform the condominiums into sophisticated clubs.

Verteville 4—in Alphaville—real solutions for current problems. . . . View of two lakes and parks. Breathe deeply! Reduced population density. Sociability without inconvenience: complete and hyper-charming common room. It's worth getting to know it: four swimming pools (the big one, the heated one, the one for children, and the jacuzzi). Water

bar. . . . saunas. Room for ballet, fencing, and exercise. Massage and tanning room. Complete dressing room. Mini *drugstore* with books, magazines, tobacco, etc.[14] . . . Daily program of guided activities for children, sports, library, vegetable garden, breeding and care of small animals, etc. An independent administration: totally different from the conventional, creating new, amazing, and fundamental services such as: special assistance to children . . . optional cleaning service, optional supply service: you will have someone to do your grocery shopping. Car wash service. Transportation to other São Paulo neighborhoods. Absolute security, including electronic security. Three suites plus office and three garages, 420 m² of total area. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 4 October 1987)

Despite this determined marketing of the numerous shared facilities, in all high-rises and condominiums where I did research, their use is very low, with the exception of the playgrounds. Maybe this reflects the residents' uneasiness with the idea of sharing residential space, something the ads try to counteract by suggesting that sociability is possible without inconvenience, and that population density is low. The low use of the common areas might also indicate that the presence of all these amenities—some of them quite luxurious—is more a sign of social status and distinction than a necessary condition for a satisfying everyday life. In other words, these facilities are more ostentation than a sign of new patterns of sociability among neighbors or of new conceptions of private life. Only children seem to develop sociability in the condominiums, but even this seems not to survive after they engage in other relationships in their private schools or in clubs, which the families continue to join.

In addition to common amenities, São Paulo's closed condominiums offer a wide range of services: psychologists and gymnastics teachers for children, classes of all sorts for all ages, organized sports, libraries, gardening, pet care, physicians, message centers, frozen food preparation,[15] housekeeping, cooks, cleaners, drivers, car washing, transportation, and servants to do the grocery shopping. If the list does not meet your dreams, do not worry, "everything you might demand" can be made available.

It is not only in large condominiums that services rule. One of the types of housing that is becoming increasingly popular among the middle classes are labeled "flats." These are small apartments (one or two bedrooms) in buildings that offer all the services of a hotel. Because of their popularity, the price per square meter of these one-bedroom apartments has been higher than that of four-bedroom apartments in recent years (Embraesp 1994:4).

Nor is the expansion of domestic service exclusive to Brazil. As Sassen

shows (1991: chapters 1 and 8), in global cities, high-income gentrification requires an increase in low-wage jobs: yuppies and poor migrant workers depend on each other. Any analysis of Los Angeles's West Side reveals the presence of innumerable immigrant maids, nannies, and gardeners working to maintain the luxury lifestyle of the houses protected, as signs warn, by "Armed Response" (see, for example, Rieff 1991). In São Paulo, however, domestic service in the closed condominiums is a modification of an old pattern. Services are an obsession among the Brazilian middle and upper classes. One of the most common reasons people give for moving into apartment buildings is the impossibility of finding "good services"; that is, the impossibility of having live-in maids who take care of the house and children. Elaborating on this theme, an ad for an apartment in Ibirapuera was illustrated with a picture of a fat, smiling black woman—the stereotype of a nice maid, alluding to the image of a slave—wearing a uniform and holding a feather duster. It read: "An apartment where there is no lack of good services for your family to live calmly. The first apartment to come with services" (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 12 October 1986).

While the services offered by the condominiums emphasize the tradition of domestic servants, they introduce important changes. An arrangement in which "independent and different administrations" offer many different services is a long way away from the old, personalistic relations of domestic labor. The tasks are provided under multiple, temporary agreements, instead of by one or a few people employed on a permanent basis and living in the household: for example, a person who prepares frozen food once a month instead of a cook, or a cleaning person who comes once a week instead of a live-in maid. The services are managed by the administration of the condominium (including hiring personnel, negotiating payments and contracts, and controlling the employees), instead of through a personal relationship between the servant and the family (usually the housewife). Both changes render the provision of services more formal and impersonal, without necessarily affecting the nature of the tasks the middle and upper classes pay others to perform for them.[16]

As changes have evolved in traditional services, new ones have been created, the most obvious being private security (see chapter 5).[17] In the condominiums, this service combines new and old patterns. Although recently the industry of private security has increased considerably, in most of the condominiums to which I had access, these services take the form of "organic security": guards are hired directly by the condominium, often under other categories of services (for example, cleaning) or without a legal labor contract. Many of the condominium guards do not have formal training for the job and are working under illegal conditions (many are policemen performing private services in their off-duty time, using police weapons). Even so, the existence of an official market of security services—shaped by federal law, training courses, and labor obligations—frames the labor relationship in quite different terms from the traditional market of domestic services, and these differences introduce new problems and concerns. The dubious character of the labor arrangements is also becoming a source of high anxiety in some circumstances: residents have trouble firing guards with whom they have only verbal agreements but who learned a great deal about their habits and could use this knowledge against them by working with criminals or blackmailing their former bosses.

The new types of services have not eliminated traditional maids or personally negotiated labor contracts, but the framing of these relationships has also changed. In many middle-class residences the space for maids has diminished, and families can no longer afford live-in maids (much less two or three maids, common among the middle classes a generation ago). On the other hand, domestic service is now legally regulated. The 1988 Brazilian constitution extends to domestic servants the benefits of the labor law (paid time off, annual gratuity—the so-called thirteenth salary—social security, an eight-hour workday, and payment of overtime). As expected, resistance to this law was intense, and one of the ways to bypass it is to contract for multiple temporary services instead of one permanent employee. In general, maids under permanent arrangements now refuse to work without a contract and are learning to use the labor justice system, which is probably the only branch of the judiciary system in Brazil that may benefit the working classes. However, the limit on working hours continues to be disregarded, especially in the case of live-in maids, and contracts are not extended to casual workers (weekly cleaners, for example). Domestic employees hired by the administration of the condominium are more likely to have formal contracts and to be employed in conformity with the labor regulations.

Providing space for servants and services in the home has always been a problematic concerns the circulation areas of apartment buildings. Despite many recent changes, the tradition of separate "social" and "service" entrances to buildings and individual units seems to be inviolate: different classes are not supposed to mix or interact in the public areas of the buildings, even though this separation is now illegal.[18] The middle classes may give up their single-family houses, they may abandon central areas of the city, they may move to smaller spaces than they were used to, and they may

have less permanent types of domestic help, but they do not give up the separation between their families and the people providing services. Sometimes the distinction seems ridiculous, because the two elevators or doors are often placed side by side. As spaces shrink, apartments that have totally separate areas of circulation capitalize on that fact by advertising "social hall independent from service hall" (for example, *O Estado de S. Paulo*, 24 January 1988). The idea is an old one: physical separation is a form of class distinction.

The so-called service area, traditional in Brazilian homes, has also changed. In apartments, the service area is usually adjacent to the kitchen; it includes the maid's room and bathroom, laundry facilities, and storage space. Apartments and houses also have a space called a *copa*, a kind of intermediary, informal area between the domestic and formal spaces of the apartment, where the family has breakfast and the children and the maids eat. All these areas have shrunk considerably in recent developments because of their high costs (they are usually tiled and feature lots of plumbing), and solutions like a shared laundry in the basement and a locker room for maids who do not live with the family are starting to appear in the newer developments. (The separate maid's bathroom in each apartment, however, is still included in even the smallest plans.) In upper-class developments, the existence of two or three maids' rooms is advertised as a luxury. What is remarkable is that whereas situations similar to these in other Western countries resulted in the reduction of domestic servants, development of labor-saving machines for household tasks, and increased involvement of all family members in domestic tasks, in Brazil ingenious solutions have been developed so that the traditional concept of domestic service—not to mention the gender division of domestic tasks—remains unchanged.[19]

As the number of workers per condominium increases, as domestic jobs change their character, and as services proliferate for the middle and upper classes who cannot do without them, so the mechanisms of control diversify. When the "creative administrations" of the new enclaves take care of labor management, they can impose forms of control that, if adopted in the more personal interaction between domestic servants and the families who employ them, would create impossible daily relationships. This more "professional" control may be advertised as a new service.

> The *avant-garde* style in a *top class* investment. Ritz Flat. *Top class* project. . . . *Top class* apartments. . . . *Top class* design. . . . *Top class* leisure and social life. . . . *Top class* location. . . . *Top class* equipment: internal sound system, collective TV and FM antenna, garage control, electronic gates, central video, service entrance isolated from the social part, with specific controls. *Top class* administration and services. . . . *Top class* rentability. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 11 January 1987)

In this example, the servants are absolutely central to the whole "top class" business (the expression is given in English), since the development advertised is a flat. The method of "special controls" involves empowering some workers to control the others. In various condominiums, including at least two in which I did fieldwork, both employees of the condominium and maids and cleaning workers employed in individual apartments (even those who live there) are required to show identification to enter and exit the condominium. Often they and their personal belongings are searched when they leave work. These arrangements usually involve men exercising power over women.

The middle and upper classes are creating their dream of independence and freedom—both from the city and its mixture of classes and from everyday domestic tasks—by relying on services performed by working-class people. They give guns to poorly paid working-class guards to control their own movements in and out of their condominiums. They ask their poorly paid "office boys" to solve all their bureaucratic problems, from paying bills and standing in line to transporting astronomical sums of money. They also ask their poorly paid maids—who often live in the favelas outside the condominium wall—to wash and iron their clothes, make their beds, buy and prepare their food, and frequently care for their children all day long. The upper classes fear contact and contamination by the poor, but they continue to depend on their lower-class servants. They can only be anguished about finding the right way to control these people, with whom they have such ambiguous relationships of dependency and avoidance, intimacy and distrust.

In fact, the meaning of control extends beyond the management of servants. Since total security is essential for this type of residence, control is exercised continuously not only over servants but over all visitors, even one's own family. Although property owners may resist or bypass this control, visitors, and especially people from the working classes, usually must submit to it. Once in place, this control is in fact class control, which helps to maintain the condominiums as a separate and homogeneous world. Control completes the new concept of housing, that is, the image of the secluded, disciplined, fortified, homogeneous, and self-sufficient world of the condominiums that seems to synthesize the notion of an alternative lifestyle embodying what the Paulista elite of the 1990s call freedom.

These total and autonomous universes seem to be able to fulfill the

strangest fantasies. One of these is the desire to bring back the past, in a postmodern retro fashion. For example, the horizontal closed condominium Aldeia da Serra has been totally conceived of as a revival of the past. It was built by the same developers who built Alphaville: it seems that they can play equally well with the construction of fictions of the past and of the future. Put on the market in 1980, Aldeia da Serra is a residential theme park meant for people "who miss 'the old days.'" It tries to imitate a colonial village *(aldeia)* by putting in its central square a bandstand and a colonial chapel, furnished with Baroque paintings and sculptures bought in antique stores or copied from Ouro Preto's churches. Antique farm equipment is distributed throughout the residential districts *(moradas)*, the same districts that are protected by fences, armed guards, and security systems. The simulacrum of a historical village protected by armed guards constitutes a truly postmodern undertaking.

Aldeia da Serra, together with Alphaville and Tamboré, is among the most aggressive examples of real estate investment combining closed condominiums, shopping centers, and office complexes on the model of the new American suburbs.[20] In October 1993, an extensive advertisement campaign in São Paulo elaborated on the similarities of this area with enclaves in the United States. It was a campaign to sell the idea of an "edge city" (using the English expression) as a way of increasing the appeal and price of specific enclaves. One of the main proponents of the campaign was Joel Garreau, an American journalist and the author of the book *Edge City: Life on the New Frontier*. His photograph appeared in full-page ads in national magazines and newspapers, he came to São Paulo to talk to a select group of realtors, and he was one of the main participants in a thirty-minute television program marketing the new developments as if they were a piece of the first world that had been dropped into metropolitan São Paulo.

As chapter 6 shows, the western zone in which these developments are located is the part of the metropolitan region most dramatically transformed by socioeconomic changes in the last two decades. Since the 1970s, real estate developers have invested heavily in this area, benefiting from the low price of land and advantages offered by local administrations, and attracting rich residents and important tertiary activities to their developments. The 1993 campaign relied on many already old images of closed condominiums, but added a touch of novelty with the name "edge city"—a name that failed to capture the attention of Paulistanos, who continue to refer to the area by the name of the oldest development, Alphaville.[21]

The advertising program broadcast in São Paulo by Rede Manchete on Saturday, 16 October, 1993, explicitly illustrates the connections with the

U.S. model as well as local peculiarities. The program combined scenes from U.S. edge cities (Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland)[22] and the three developments being advertised in São Paulo. Garreau—speaking in English with Portuguese subtitles—described edge cities as the predominant form of contemporary urban growth and used Los Angeles and its multicentered form as an example. There were interesting differences in the way the program presented Brazilian, as opposed to U.S., edge cities. Residents from enclaves in both countries were interviewed in front of swimming pools, lakes, and green areas, emphasizing the luxurious and antiurban character of the developments. However, where the U.S. edge cities have external walls and controls at their entrance gates, these are not shown, and neither are their security personnel. In the Paulista developments, however, security is emphasized. In one scene, shot from a helicopter, the private security guards of a Brazilian condominium intercept a "suspect car" (a popular vehicle, a Volkswagen bus) outside the walls; they physically search the occupants, who are forced to put their hands up against the car. Although it is completely illegal for a private security service to perform this kind of action on a public street, this, together with scenes of visitors submitting identification documents at the entrance gates, reassures the rich residents (and spectators) that "suspect" (poor) people will be kept away. Another revealing scene is an interview in English with a resident of a U.S. edge city. He cites as one of his reasons for moving there the fact that he wanted to live in a racially integrated community. This observation is suppressed in the Portuguese subtitles, which say instead that his community has "many interesting people." In São Paulo, the idea of a racially integrated community would jeopardize the whole development.

To import first world models and to use them to sell all sorts of commodities is obviously a common practice in third world countries. The parallel between the Brazilian and the American examples suggests that although the degree of segregation varies, it uses similar devices in both cases. Put side by side with the U.S. cases, the Brazilian methods of segregation (high walls, armed guards everywhere, ostensible private policing of the poor) appear obvious and exaggerated. Nevertheless, they reveal in caricature some of the features of the original U.S. model. The issue of racial segregation also offers an interesting contrast. Pointing out racial integration as an advantage in an American common-interest development is anomalous, given the long history of restrictive covenants and racial segregation in this form of housing in America (cf. McKenzie 1994, especially chapter 2). In Brazil, it would be unthinkable given the traditional etiquette of racial relations, in which the issue is never mentioned. As in everyday

life, the advertisement simply silenced the reference to race; and under the pretense that it is not an issue, blacks continue to be harassed and sent to the service entrance.

KEEPING ORDER INSIDE THE WALLS

The ideal of the closed condominium is the creation of a private order in which residents can avoid the city's problems and enjoy an alternative lifestyle with people from the same social group. The advertisement of a luxury development in Morumbi makes this concept unmistakably clear. Called Place des Vosges, it is a replica of the famous Parisian square. Its largest apartments have four bedrooms and 268 square meters (plus four garages and external areas of up to 539 square meters per unit), and they sell for U.S. $476,000. In 1993, when construction began, it was announced with the phrase "Condominium Place des Vosges. Another like it only in Paris" (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 17 October 1993). The development's ads focused on the similarities between the two until 1996, when they started to highlight differences. The new ad shows a photograph of the Parisian square and a drawing of the Morumbi enclave and states: "Place de Vosges. The only difference is that the one in Paris is public and yours is private" (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 15 March 1996).

Although the new enclaves valorize a private universe and reject the city, to organize a common life inside the walls of these collective residential areas has proved complicated. Many people I interviewed in the condominiums agree that they have solved most problems associated with the outside world, but they are continuously struggling with internal conflicts. The condominiums are indeed secure, if by this one means that they are able to prevent crime and to control external interference. However, life among equals seems to be far from the harmonious ideal that some advertisements construct.

Social equality and a commonality of interests do not automatically constitute the basis for a public life. Agreeing on rules appears to be one of the most difficult aspects of life in the collective residences. Moreover, even if rules are agreed on, enforcing them can be hard, especially in dealing with children and teenagers. The central problem of the condominiums and high-rises seems to be how to function as a society with some type of public life. Many residents seem to treat the entire complex like a private home in which they can do whatever they like. They interpret freedom to mean an absence of rules and responsibilities toward their neighbors.

It is again revealing to make some comparisons with American enclaves. In the United States, "community" is a common designation of condominiums of various types. In São Paulo, developers do not think of themselves as "community builders," and ads do not present closed condominiums as a new type of communitarian life, but only as a place of residence for homogeneous social groups. In other words, the ads do not insist on a community of shared values and interests, do not try to create any special sense of belonging to a community, and do not appeal to the importance of a space that can facilitate face-to-face interaction. For Brazilian developers and their clients, the advantages of social homogeneity do not imply the desirability of a local sociability. Although Blakely and Snyder's study of gated communities in the United States (1997, especially chapter 6) reveals that residents have little interest in engaging in local sociability and collective activities, and although the level of participation in homeowners' associations is low, the reference to community is both a rhetorical device to sell planned developments and an ideological criterion for evaluating life inside the walls.[23] In what follows, I criticize common life inside the walls, though not for failing to create a "sense of community." Rather, I criticize it for failing to create a public life ruled by democratic principles, public responsibility, and civility.

A second important difference between Brazilian and American condominiums, and one that also reveals the problems with building a public and democratic life within the São Paulo enclaves, lies in the internal rules and the ways in which they are applied. All Paulista condominiums have covenants, some drafted by the developers, some by the residents. They are a frequent subject of discussion in condominium meetings and are constantly being rewritten. Enforcing these rules, however, is a big problem, and the justice system is not routinely used to solve it. All disputes tend to be treated as private matters among residents. It is only in extreme cases that a dispute reaches the justice system (usually cases of nonpayment or forcing a resident to repair damages in his or her unit that affect other residents). In other words, although in both Brazil and the United States disputes among condominium residents are quite common (McKenzie 1994:12–23), in São Paulo they tend to be dealt with privately and not as matters of public interest or public law.

Residential meetings are the main arenas of conflict, although arguments between neighbors are quite common as well. My observation of various meetings in different condominiums and high-rises revealed that conflicts and aggression were inevitable in the process of arriving at any decisions that would affect everyday routines. People could be nasty and disrespect-

ful if they failed to impose their will. Residents would stand up and shout at each other, pound on tables, verbally threaten their neighbors, and use what sounded to me like a good amount of derogatory language and insults. Although in all condominiums decisions are supposed to be made by vote, discussions could last for four or five hours before a vote was called. Instead of voting, people preferred trying to convince each other and enforce their own views. Disagreements at these meetings could generate long-standing bitterness.

Discomfort with democratic procedures, such as voting and respect for the person disagreeing, are not found only among the Brazilian elite. It has been observed, for example, in the meetings of working-class social movements (Caldeira 1987 and 1988). In these situations, discomfort with disagreement was expressed in an ideological preference for consensus (whose origins can be traced to Marxist organizations) and in a valorization of the notion of community that is rare in Brazilian political life. Various movements, especially those organized by the Catholic Church under the form of Christian Base Communities (CEBs), have relied on the idea that they represent a local community of people supposed to be equal; if differences emerged, they had to be leveled to maintain the strength of the political community (Durham 1984). The meetings of social movements could also be endless as they tried to build consensus. Although this process was frequently passionate, it did not seem to involve the same level of aggressiveness and disrespect among the participants as the condominium meetings. In any event, São Paulo residents, especially the elite, have a hard time accepting democratic procedures, respecting other people's views, and accepting differences and disagreements as a normal part of social interaction. The authoritarian desire of imposing one's will without recognizing other possibilities seems strong indeed.

One of the main issues that reveals the difficulty in creating and respecting common rules is the behavior of adolescents, especially adolescent boys. The resident in charge of security at one of the condominiums in Alto de Pinheiros (a mid-level executive with a wife and two children) began his interview by saying: "What affects us the most is internal security, our own children. The problem of external security was solved a long time ago." In fact, the association of the central problems of the condominiums with "our own children" expresses a kind of commonsense knowledge. It was repeated to me by two people in charge of organizing security, several residents, and one administrator. The offenses of the children vary, running from small thefts or the vandalizing of collective equipment (such as fire extinguishers) to the consumption of drugs and driving without a license.

One of the most common problems, and probably that with the most serious consequences, is the increasing number of car accidents caused by unlicensed teenage drivers (on both public and private streets). The legal driving age in Brazil is eighteen, but the number of elite children driving before that age has increased considerably in the last decade, frequently with the compliance of their parents. For the Brazilian elite, it is easy to break the law and it can even be fashionable. No one is prosecuted for driving without a license, even if they are involved in an accident. According to the law, parents are responsible for the behavior of their minor children, but enforcement of the law is lax, even in relation to accidents and deaths.[24]

Inside the condominiums, disrespect of the law is almost a rule. People feel freer to break the law because they are in private spaces from which the police are kept out, and because they perceive the complex's streets as extensions of their own backyards. In fact, when people have weak notions of public interest, public responsibility, and respect for other people's rights to start with, it is unlikely that they will acquire these notions inside the condominium walls. Rather, life inside the private worlds only further weakens their notions of public responsibility. If traffic in general is marked by a disregard of regulations, the situation inside the condominiums brings it to absurd levels. The case of Alphaville, for which I obtained statistics, clearly exemplifies this. Between March 1989 and January 1991, the police registered 646 car accidents, 925 injuries, and 6 deaths in Alphaville. Eighty percent of the accidents occurred inside the residential areas, that is, inside the walls and on the private streets to which only residents and their visitors have access. The majority of the accidents were caused by teenagers, and the majority of the victims were either children or teenagers playing in the streets (only one of the people who died was over eighteen).[25] The accident rate has been impossible to control. The difficulty is associated with the permissiveness of some parents, who continue to give cars to their children, and with the fact that residents prefer to keep the police out; thus, those in charge of enforcing internal order are private security guards. The elite teenagers regard these people as their servants and refuse to obey them: they threaten the working-class security guards with dismissal by their parents if the guards insist on enforcing regulations about driving and drugs. Although statistics are not available, in various interviews residents remarked that drugs are common inside the condominiums. (The same is true in elite private schools.)[26]

Problems such as adolescents' breaking the law are controversial inside the condominiums. Some residents fear that making such problems public will decrease the value of their property. Moreover, they see such issues as a matter of private order, to be dealt with internally: a matter of discipline,

not of the law. Secrets are kept, especially in the case of condominiums such as Alphaville, famous for its internal security, where property values have risen spectacularly over the last decade. Sometimes, however, residents brave this risk, and the disapproval of their neighbors, to offer information to the press. One resident of Alphaville spoke to *Folha de S. Paulo* in 1990, and his comments capture the essence of the problems of a community that considers itself separate from the rest of society. He said that the police do not enter Alphaville because they are kept out by the residents. "They inhibit the police. They use the old phrase 'Do you know who you're talking to?' Everything here is covered up. There is a law for the mortal people, but not for Alphaville residents" ("Alphaville, o 'Condomínio-Paraíso' de São Paulo, agora Teme os Assaltos," *Folha de S. Paulo*, 20 April 1990).[27]

Reactions are quite different when an "external" security problem changes the life of the condominium, and reports throw light on some of the problems of the enclosed worlds. Such an "external" problem brought Alphaville to the crime pages of all newspapers in February 1991. An eighteen-year-old girl who had grown up there was kidnapped in the parking lot of the condominium's tennis club, raped, and killed. The unfolding of the events reveals paradoxical aspects not only of the maintenance of order inside an elite place like Alphaville but also of Brazilian society as a whole. Immediately after the case was made public, the crime was blamed on construction workers who had access to the condominium. Because the victim was an upper-class girl, the police acted quickly, and the media presented every aspect of the investigations, along with photographs of the girl and her family. Three men (who were not construction workers) were eventually accused of the crime and jailed. The following day, newspapers published their photographs: they had clearly been beaten, and their eyebrows and mustaches had been shaved off. The newspapers and magazines informed the population that this was a sign they had been raped by other prisoners, and that this was a "common treatment" for people accused of rape. Nothing has been done, either to investigate how these abuses happened or to punish the people responsible, nor were any measures taken to prevent them; everything was reported as routine. The paper *O Estado de S. Paulo*, with a readership that includes the elite, commented that "an old code of honor shared by the prisoners was applied during the weekend to two of the people involved in the death of the student. Joanilson, the Big, and Antonio Carlos, the 'Cota,' were beaten and raped (sodomized) by their cellmates in Jandira's prison. Among the prisoners the rapist is rejected and should be punished by the crime he committed" (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 26 February 1991).

Folha da Tarde, whose readers are primarily from the lower middle and working classes and which gives special attention to crime, informed readers about the fate of the third suspect:

> Edgar, in the same way as his companions, did not go unpunished: through the law of the prison, the rapist becomes the woman of the other prisoners. When asked if he had been raped, "Baianinho" answered with a nod of the head. "Baianinho" was not beaten as hard as his companion Joanilson de Lima, "the Big," because he did not resist the rape, according to a prison guard. Despite this, his face and arm were covered in blue marks. "They beat me only a little," said "Baianinho." . . .
>
> A cardinal of the Civil Police—director of a department—who did not want to identify himself, said the day before yesterday that any perpetrators of rape and murder will not remain alive more than two days inside an institution such as the Casa de Detenção. "They will get him during daytime or at night," he said. (*Folha da Tarde*, 27 February 1991).[28]

"Terror as usual," as Michael Taussig would put it (1992: chapter 2). Torture, rape, beating of prisoners, sexism, and disregard for the law and for human rights are treated as trivial by the press. The trivialization of these facts makes them seem so natural that their reporting generates no further response.

Since beating and rape are not routine for the upper classes, the event shook the security of Alphaville. It seems that the girl's murder and the subsequent events showed those who had decided to live above the law that they had problems to face. A few days after the murder, a group of residents from all parts of the complex went to the public security secretary of the state of São Paulo, asking for his help in solving the problem of internal crime that had been downplayed until that moment. They created Conseg (Conselho de Segurança), a security council formed by representatives of the community and the civil and military police. The residents simultaneously created the Associação de Mães de Alphaville (Association of Alphaville Mothers) which promoted conferences and discussions among the residents. All those I talked to, or whose opinions appeared in the press, seemed to blame the problems on the disintegration of the family. From the developers' representatives to the mothers' association and the police, all agreed that the origin of adolescent misbehavior is a "lack of love and attention." The main solution proposed is more love and attention, stronger families, and

more control, that is, a solution in accordance with commonsense beliefs about preventing the spread of evil (see chapter 2). To discuss the question in terms of public order or public responsibility is unheard-of. Judge Mariano Cassavia Neto, addressing the residents at a meeting just after the events of February put things this way: "I don't want to transform this into a Gestapo, but you should follow the everyday life of your children. In the drug dealer's mind, they are the consumption market. Let's try to protect our children. Spend more time with them. Prevention starts inside the home. . . . Do you know who they go around with? When was the last time you kissed them?" ("Alphaville Vive 'Dia de Twin Peaks' em Debate sobre Drogas e Violência," *Folha de S. Paulo*, 10 April 1991).

In other words, the problems are domestic and must be solved privately. Internal (domestic, private) control should be enforced, and thus society's general law does not have to intervene. This notion is so strong that no one thinks of the police enforcing public order inside the condominium: their job is only to keep drug dealers, rapists, and murderers away. The representatives of public order finally came, called in by the mothers, but only to advise. The judge, however, seemed to be conscious of the paradoxes of the situation. In the same speech, he said:

> It seems that there are other laws around here. I started saying that I would put into jail parents of young defaulters [law-breakers], and the telephones did not stop ringing. One wanted amnesty because he was a judge as well, the other was a cousin of a judge, another was a mayor, another said he was the cousin of a judge of the Court of Appeals—the only thing missing was to say that they were brothers of Romeu Tuma and of Minister Zélia Cardoso de Mello.[29]

He was applauded. Nevertheless, the episode only exemplifies the status quo in Brazil: the creation of private rules; the private manipulation of the public order by the elite; and the nonenforcement of the law: in fact, the judge only threatened parents with the idea that he would enforce the law!

This case also reveals the complexities of the relationships between public and private domains in Brazilian society, which is marked by vast social inequality and a tendency to explicitly devalue the public sphere. This happens not only because private enclaves have proliferated but also because spaces that used to be public, and in which a certain respect for collective interest was previously enforced, are being privatized. As public parks are fenced, streets closed by chains and controlled by private guards, and as neighborhoods are transformed into closed enclaves with the help of city officials, the possibility of fair treatment in the public sphere shrinks. Although Brazil has always been an unequal society, the privatization of the public sphere that I have been describing is something new, and the tendency to create private islands of privilege seems to have grown stronger.

Residents of City Boaçava, an area in the western part of town with its own private security service, are trying to achieve a consensus to apply to Emurb (the city agency in charge of urban problems, which authorizes the enclosures of neighborhoods) for construction of barriers on the streets leading to their neighborhood. In this case crime is not the main reason, for they consider their private security system to be efficient. The problem is that a new city park is being constructed nearby, and they want to prevent its visitors from parking their cars on Boaçava's streets. According to the president of the neighborhood association, the enclosure is the only way to relieve residents of this "problem."[30] Until now, streets have still been considered public space, even by the elite. For example, one of the richest neighborhoods in central São Paulo, Pacaembu, developed in the 1930s under the inspiration of the Garden City model, contains the municipal soccer stadium. To this day, inhabitants of the luxury residences have never thought of closing the streets to the tens of thousands people attending games and other events (from rock concerts to religious gatherings). Neither have the residents of the mansions of Morumbi, who live around the biggest soccer stadium in the city. Maybe they will try to in the future, and maybe the city administration will help them out, as the PT administration did in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the fact that this has not been an issue before indicates the extent of the transformations.

All these tendencies toward privatization and rejection of the public order became especially visible in Brazil during the period of consolidation of democratic rule. This change embodied attempts to create a more egalitarian public sphere and in fact expanded the political citizenship of the working classes, who, through their social movements, were for the first time participating effectively in political life. It is therefore possible to interpret the elite's retreat to private enclaves as a form of resistance to democratization.[31] However, similar, widespread processes of privatization happening in other parts of the world, such as those in the United States, where there is a consolidated democracy, should caution us about the limits of a political interpretation. The comparison suggests, however, that even if the issue is not democratization per se, it may be the inclusion of people previously excluded or marginalized, both politically and socially. In the United States, for example, the white flight to the suburbs in the 1960s and 1970s and to gated communities in the 1990s may be related to the expansion of citizenship rights of the black population and to the incorporation into American soci-

ety of an increased number of immigrants. In Europe, the increase of racism and of new patterns of segregation seem to be similarly associated with the expansion of citizenship rights to immigrants.[32]

Although the tendencies toward privatization and secession by the rich are clear, especially in new areas and developments, São Paulo is not yet ruled by them. These ideas and practices are powerful, in part because they are associated with the elite, but they also generate ambiguities and resistance, especially as other social groups engage them.

RESISTING THE ENCLAVES

The enclosed condominium is the most prestigious type of residence in contemporary São Paulo. References to its elements appear in all types of developments. Security, enclosure, seclusion, amenities, and services integrate a code of distinction that residents of the city from all social classes understand and use to elaborate, transform, and signify their spaces. However, the ways of using and interpreting the elements of the code vary across the city. They reveal situations in which this code is resisted or adapted to coexist with opposing values, generating ambiguous and contradictory results. The rejections and ambiguities occur especially in relation to opinions about collective housing, as opposed to detached houses; about central and well-urbanized areas of the city, in contrast to distant areas; and about closed versus open residences. The different evaluations frequently combine and reveal different class perspectives on housing arrangements.

Selling Collective Housing

The upper and middle classes constitute the majority of residents of apartments and closed condominiums. They are already used to collective housing and are continuously moving to such enclaves for security, financial, and status reasons. The idea that apartments are more secure than houses is so prevalent in contemporary São Paulo that many advertisements for detached houses use phrases like "Exquisite residence with the security of an apartment" (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 16 January 1983). Nevertheless, negative perceptions of apartments persist and can be noticed even in advertisements for middle-class high-rises.

> Maison Adriana. Between Santo Amaro Avenue and Ibirapuera Park. Around you will always be the mansions of a strictly residential area, without the inconvenience of another high-rise. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 6 February 1977)

> The first two-bedroom apartments without neighbors . . . Moema. . . . . It distinguishes itself by its advanced architectural design in the form of a cross, which allows each apartment on the floor to remain isolated. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 2 September 1979)

> Morumbi Kings Ville. Definitely the most incredible development in Morumbi. . . . A new concept of housing has just appeared: the system *double stair side-by-side* which allows the construction of two-story apartments (duplex) side by side, with private entrances, both social and service. Thus we have one apartment per floor, because the social accesses alternate: even-numbered apartments on the first floor, odd-numbered on the second, utilizing in this way a single social elevator. (*O Estado de S. Paulo* 12 October 1986)

Indeed, it requires great creativity and verbal dexterity—if necessary with resort to foreign languages—to reconcile apartments, with multiple units on the same floor, with the image of detached houses. Proximity is a sensitive issue among Paulistanos, even the proximity of people who are supposedly social equals. This attitude is strongly sustained by the Morumbi residents of detached houses I interviewed. Their houses are small fortresses. All of them have dogs and electronic alarm systems (in one of them, the pads of the alarm were put at 20-centimeter intervals over the entire external wall); one house has immense bars over all the windows, making them look like prison windows, and an iron door separating the bedrooms from the rest of the house, which is locked every night. Residents of these individual fortresses prefer their paraphernalia of security to living close to other people in closed condominiums or apartments: only in their detached homes do they feel sufficiently isolated and in control, especially of their children's encounters. The residents of detached houses outside closed condominiums seem to have a deeper need for isolation and control—what they call freedom—and a strong fear of strangers, even children and neighbors from the same social class. They take further than condominium residents the perception that fortresses can protect them from crime and from undesirable social interactions and contacts.

In Moóca, where the obsession with the *cortiços* and with differentiating oneself from them is strong, the view of apartment buildings is still more negative and widespread. When people move from a house into an apartment, they feel that their quality of life has deteriorated, and in some cases (see chapter 1) they perceive the move as a social decline. They feel that they are losing independence and control over their own lives, as well as the status they associate with owning a single-family house. Moóca is

still a neighborhood of houses. In 1990, 63.2 percent of the constructed residential area consisted of houses, but the area of vertical constructions almost doubled between 1986 and 1990 (São Paulo—Sempla 1992:148–49 and Seade 1990:42).

Thus, in spite of their objections, Moóca's residents are increasingly moving into apartment buildings, some of them closed condominiums (less luxurious ones than those of Morumbi). These new buildings exemplify the gentrification that began in the 1970s and is associated with the opening of subway lines and major improvements in infrastructure. This process, which is mirrored elsewhere in northern and eastern parts of town that used to be lower middle-class neighborhoods, is changing the local real estate market and bringing places like Moóca, Santana, and Tatuapé to the newspaper pages as "fashionable" locales. The new high-rises bring simultaneously the meanings of imprisonment and security, decline and prestige.

In the poor periphery there are few apartment buildings, and most residents live in autoconstructed houses. In the entire São Miguel Paulista old district, for example, only 2.76 percent of the constructed residential area consisted of apartments in 1990 (São Paulo—Sempla 1992:148–49).[33] Apartments for the working classes are usually built by a state agency in charge of affordable housing such as Cohab (Companhia Metropolitana Habitacional); they are extremely devalued and are associated with high criminality and drug use. According to the 1991 census, these apartments represent 3 percent of the total number of households, and the majority of them (66.5 percent) are located in districts on the eastern and poorest periphery.[34] In Jardim das Camélias, also on the eastern periphery, there are no apartments, and all residents live in houses. They value their space and consider moving to something like a Cohab apartment as a very undesirable option. In addition to the stigma of criminality and the fear of proximity to "bad influences," Camélias' residents value being able to design their own houses according to their taste and personality, and resent the idea of having to submit to a patterned, ready-made design. Not only that which is collective, but also that which is uniform, is considered bad and ugly—a perception once shared by the middle classes living in houses. In these negative evaluations of apartment buildings, aesthetic judgments intertwine with views of social mobility and a moral discourse about the dangers of proximity, the necessity of self-control, and the value of individuality. This confluence of discourses and meanings is shared by people in Jardim das Camélias, Moóca, and Morumbi. It is the reason that patterned houses for the elite are rare, even inside condominiums, and that developers of middle- and upper-class apartments strongly emphasize originality of design in their

advertisements. Nowadays, however, the majority of property owners of detached houses outside condominiums are from either the working classes or the lower middle classes, and they are the ones who explicitly sustain the discourse about the moral values embedded in the ownership of a detached house, frequently turning against the upper classes the same kind of judgments and prejudices that the elite once elaborated to stigmatize the poor and their collective dwellings.

When the City Is Still Desirable

The second issue over which there is much ambiguity and disagreement is the opposition to "the city" and the abandonment of the well-equipped and central areas of town. Not everybody is willing to abandon the city to derive status from the negation of urban life. Some, in fact, are struggling to remain in their neighborhoods, both traditional, central, middle- and upper-class areas where luxury apartment buildings have been common for a long time, and the intermediary and even peripheral neighborhoods where traditionally the lower middle classes or the working classes have lived, and which are undergoing gentrification. In both cases, there is an appeal to the old style of life offered by the city and to tradition rather than transformation.

Ads for new high-rises in old, valorized middle- and upper-class areas like Jardins, Higienópolis, or Pinheiros praise exactly the urban qualities opposed by the closed condominiums, reinforcing the view of these neighborhoods as "noble" and sophisticated:

> Mansão de Itu [in Jardins] . . . In a time in which one saves even with locks, we present the best in every detail. In a place absolutely inside civilization. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 11 January 1976)

> Ed. Villa Velasquez. Jardins are today the pole of maximum attraction in São Paulo. . . . . The *beautiful people* circulate there. . . . Live where things happen. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 8 September 1985)

> The good times are back. You can already live as in the past. In a high-quality apartment in one of the noblest neighborhoods of São Paulo: Higienópolis. A neighborhood which has not lost its character. Nowadays Higienópolis combines an aristocratic neighborhood with an all-modern infrastructure. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 28 October 1990)

> Live in a Madrid Villa in the middle of Pinheiros. For those who do not want to escape. Everything in Mansões de Pinheiros helps you surpass the obsession with roads. They are apartments that bring back the pleasure of staying at home. (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 2 September 1979)

To be in the heart of the city still seems to be attractive to some, especially if the place can be—in the same way as some condominiums—valorized by its proximity to the rich, their mansions, aristocratic style, and civilization (whatever that means), or simply their beauty. However, the ads reveal the power of the "new concept of housing" by including negative references to escape and distance.

Since the closed condominiums embody prestige, it is not surprising that ads for other high-rises make references to them. In advertisements for apartment buildings in traditional lower-middle-class or even working-class neighborhoods it is impossible to claim Morumbi's luxury, but some gestures toward its model are there.

> Two and three bedrooms. . . . Assure your place in this intelligent project. 72 m² of private area. Living room for two sitting areas. Children's swimming pool. Adult swimming pool. Sauna. Dressing room. Squash court. Jogging track. Playground. Ballroom. Children's room. Barbecue. Kiosk. Exercise room. Gardens and squares. Underground garage. Collective laundry. Maid's WC. Central video. Individual storage. Message service. The Residencial Ilhas Gregas (Greek Islands) is located in an excellent part of Tatuapé. It is 200 m from the subway, and in addition to various green areas nearby has a panoramic view of the municipal park. (*O Estado de S. Paulo,* 28 October 1990).

Even when the area of each apartment is only 72 square meters, all the possible requirements of the "new concept of housing" have to be squeezed into the development, from two swimming pools to a separate maid's bathroom in each apartment. However, to appeal to the lower middle classes and working classes, the ads have to change some of their emphasis. For example, they frequently refer to the existence of public transportation—a valuable asset for people who may not have a car—and to public services and urban infrastructure: the view of the public park replaces the area of the private condominium.

Advertisements for apartments in neighborhoods such as Moóca have to address the ambivalence among the lower middle classes about collective housing and about abandoning the center of town and its style of public space. Some of them attempt to make the new housing blend with traditional local values, looking more like a continuation of than a rupture with the past. These ads appeal not to outsiders moving in—as Morumbi's ads do—but to upwardly mobile local residents. The properties are frequently presented as a new step in the tradition of the neighborhood.

> Piazza de Capri—the new way of living in the traditional Moóca. . . . Swimming pool, solarium and lawn bowling green. Reception 24 hours a day, complete laundry service. Playground and gardens. Space for your kids to be truly children. Ballroom, playroom, and an exclusive movie theater for your family. Nursery: you go out and leave your baby in security. Piazza de Capri, the most comfortable and secure way to live in Moóca. . . . Moóca: history and tradition. Piazza de Capri: the most complete infrastructure of services and leisure. (*O Estado de S. Paulo,* 24 January 1982)[35]

> Set your family free in Jardim Tropical. Vila Carrão, the neighborhood which brings people together. It makes them create roots. Because here, fortunately, people still cultivate friendships, the family, traditions. For all that, it is natural that those who live in V. Carrão do not want to change their neighborhood. . . . For your security, the development is totally walled, with a single entrance and guard. (*O Estado de S. Paulo,* 2 September 1984)

> Alto de Santana . . . four bedrooms, two suites, two spaces in the garage. Ed. Piazza Navona. . . . To live in Santana is a privilege. Who has it does not exchange it for anything. This is a neighborhood complete in terms of commerce, services, schools, restaurants, etc., with the typical tranquility of tree-lined streets and easy access to all parts of town. (*O Estado de S. Paulo,* 12 October 1986)

We can read in these ads a dislike for the central part of town and for some ideas associated with city life but an appreciation of other aspects of public and urban life and of local sociability. These ads attempt to capitalize on urban and public infrastructure, services, and proximity to the city center (exactly the qualities Morumbi lacks). These urban qualities come together with old values (which central neighborhoods presumably lack): tranquility and local, traditional, and family values that can compensate for the supposed absence of these values in the rest of the city. Even "friendships" may be presented as an advantage, suggesting that proximity is good if it is of the traditional type. The ads imply that people should not move to new areas of town to show off their status, but should stay where their roots are. This appeal is particularly meaningful in neighborhoods such as Moóca and Santana, which suffered an exodus of the younger generation during the 1970s. Now that these neighborhoods are being gentrified and can offer the same type of developments as Morumbi, it may be advantageous again to live there, and tradition becomes fashionable.

A development in São Miguel Paulista, one of the poorest working-class areas of São Paulo, was advertised as follows:

> The two-bedroom apartment with the highest standard in São Miguel Paulista . . . . The finishings were taken care of in the smallest details: aluminum window frames, decorated tiles, carpet in the color of your choice. In addition, the Jardim Independência is totally closed, guaranteeing your family's security, including the children playing in the playground. There even your car has the protection of a garage. *(O Estado de S. Paulo,* 3 October 1982)

"Independence Garden" is the name of this development. For people used to living in extremely small spaces and not having cars, the protection of the car is really "something special." In another ad, also for a working-class neighborhood in the eastern zone, where people usually dislike collective housing, the reason for the "independence" becomes more explicit:

> Take advantage of the new plan for home ownership. . . . Get to know the new conditions: smaller installments. . . . More accessible family income requirements. Use your FGTS to further diminish the monthly payment. Financed by the *Nossa Caixa.* We, the residents of the Conjunto Residencial Jardim Centenário, are preparing a wonderful party to welcome you and your family. Everybody living here is already free from the torment of rent. Here everything is nice, everyone is a friend. . . . Security: you will live in a closed condominium, totally surrounded by walls and with a centralized guardhouse. . . . Leisure . . . Comfort: here you will be close to everything: . . . bakery, supermarket, pharmacy, bus stop. . . . The best of Sapopemba is here. (*O Estado de S. Paulo,* 24 January 1988)

To be free from rent is the general dream that was made more difficult after the end of BNH financing and the economic recession. The emphasis on financing is typical for both working-class and upper-class ads of the period. What is atypical is the image of a community welcome, which would probably be considered in bad taste, even frightening, in Morumbi. It was only in ads for the working classes and for the lower strata of the middle classes that I found positive references to sociability inside the condominium. This is the closest the ads came to the idea of community that is widespread in the American context. In Brazil this idea is manipulated by developers as a value of the "others," not of the elite.

The above ad includes another element that would probably not appear if it were meant for the upper classes: the proximity to the local bakery, pharmacy, and bus station, things that appeal to working-class people without a car and which until a decade ago were not common in any peripheral neighborhood. The not-so-rich are not ready to leave the city and its public facilities; they are eager to become even more urbanized, both by becoming property owners and by joining more fully in the consumer lifestyle it offers. Paulistanos of the lower middle and working classes want to be part of society, not to escape it. When they feel that they cannot enjoy the city space and its public life as they want, they feel restricted and imprisoned. To withdraw from the city's public life and from the use of its public spaces is seen as a privilege only by those whose participation in it is taken for granted and who can dream of creating better and more exclusive universes.

Closed Doors

Enclosure of residences is the third issue generating contradictory and ambivalent feelings among São Paulo's residents. Whether they are detached family houses or collective apartment buildings and condominiums, all types of housing in contemporary São Paulo have gone through processes of enclosure largely in response to the fear of crime. The necessity of enclosing has affected poor and rich residents alike and transformed the way they live and the quality of public interactions in the city. Nevertheless, feelings about these enclosures seem to differ considerably.

Neither the residents of Morumbi's detached houses nor those of collective residences seem to evaluate their enclosures negatively. Upper-class occupants of closed condominiums and high-rises felt that to live inside of one of these fortresses conveyed feelings of freedom and protection, not to mention a high quality of life. People living in detached houses express the same feelings about their individual fortresses; and they cannot imagine that condominiums could offer the same. In neither case, however, do residents show much regret or nostalgia for a more open type of housing or for a more diversified public sociability. To live in isolation is considered best; they are doing what they want, and thus they have a feeling of freedom. Interestingly, the people I interviewed in Morumbi never use arguments of privacy, individuality, or intimacy to justify their preferences. Morumbi residents seem to fear the spread of evil more than they value individualism.[36]

Whereas residents of closed condominiums think of their fortified enclaves as spaces of freedom, and see their moves and house transformations as positive achievements, people who continue to live in houses in Jardim das Camélias and especially in Moóca feel that their houses have been turned into prisons. They tend to evaluate transformation in a negative way, expressing a sense of loss.

7.2

Do you live in a house?

I do, but it is a prison. There are bars everywhere, and given the way things are now one cannot leave the door open, not even to wash the sidewalk in front of the house.

Housewife, late forties, lives in Moóca; married to a bar owner

One of the most common images used to describe feelings of insecurity and ways of dealing with them was that of closed doors.[37] This image conveys not only people's fears but also the reality of restrictions caused either by the economic crisis or by the fear of crime. Residents in all neighborhoods think that they need fences, walls, bars on the windows, special lights, and intercoms, but many do not appreciate their more secure houses in the same way that they enjoyed the open ones and the social space they created. In many cases the façades are now hidden; to approach a neighbor means to go through locked doors and intercoms, even in the poorest areas of town. In older neighborhoods—that is, those at least fifteen years old—the signs of transformation are obvious: the fences and walls offend the original design of the houses and apartments. Many houses are less comfortable and cozy than before.

7.3

There is always a first time, the burglaries, the thefts. . . . Those iron bars did not exist. The wall was normal, as in any house, one and a half meters, more or less; there was a parking space for one car—today it is for two cars—and I used to leave one car on the street, covered, well locked. . . . It was on a Wednesday, twelve years ago. I had two new cars, one Maverick and one pickup. I used to leave the pickup that I used for work in the garage because the ownership papers weren't ready. At that time the living room was bigger: I've diminished the living room in order to fit in the cars, to enlarge the garage. It was on a Wednesday. . . . They took the new car. . . . From that day on I started to enclose the house. . . . I started to do things . . . the iron bars which you see in the door. . . . We started to close the house: we would build a piece and then another . . . and as I was building, I was building it more secure. Iron, aluminum, concrete. A matter of security. But, thank God, it is not too frightening yet. We keep holding on, right?

Owner of a small foundry, late fifties, lives in Moóca with his wife and two children

Once again the narrative is divided into times before and after a crime that, in this case, initiated a process of house transformation. Inventories of changes to make a house more secure, and many narratives describing the change of residence from houses to apartments, are accompanied by the expression of feelings of imprisonment that jeopardize the sense of pleasures that a house of one's own should offer. How is it possible to enjoy in the same way a house whose living room had to be made smaller to accommodate a garage to protect one's cars? Or in which the light of the bedroom is completely blocked by the new wall? Or in which the view from all the windows is framed by bars? How is it possible to enjoy in the same way one's backyard and the common areas of an apartment building? The transformation of the house into a prison adds to the feelings of restriction and loss associated with the economic crisis and anguish about social decay. The closed door is a strong metaphor.

Although various groups of Paulistanos resist and resent such transformations, the "new concept of housing" dominates the city. In addition to being universally understood, it influences people's decisions and options and shapes the transformations they make in their homes and their lifestyles. It has become a model of the most appropriate, most prestigious, and for many the most desirable style of residence. Among all the characteristics of this model, the most conspicuous is security. To live behind walls and fences is the everyday experience of Paulistanos, and the elements associated with security constitute a language through which people of every class express not only fear and the need for protection but also social mobility, distinction, and taste. While this language has many class dialects, it also has some general features that cut across all social classes. For all social groups today, security is an element through which they think of their place in society and materially create their social space.

AN AESTHETIC OF SECURITY

Fences, bars, and walls are essential in the city today not only for security and segregation, but also for aesthetic and status reasons. All the elements associated with security become part of a new code for the expression of dis-



PHOTO 9. High-security façade in Morumbi, 1994. The opening in the wall, covered with bullet-proof glass, indicates the presence of private guards. Photo by Teresa Caldeira.

tinction, a code I call the "aesthetics of security." This code encapsulates elements of security in a discourse of taste and transforms it into a symbol of status. In contemporary São Paulo, fences and bars become elements of decoration and of the expression of personality and invention. They are elements of a new aesthetic code. These elements have to be sophisticated not only to protect inhabitants from crime but also to express the social status of the residents: sophisticated cameras, intercoms, and electronic gate openers, not to mention defensive design and architecture, become statements about social class. They are investments in public appearance and must allow comparison between neighbors, to show who is doing better and who has more sophisticated tastes.

A couple of years ago, residents of middle- and upper-class areas saw security as something imposed on the architecture in an artificial way. This is still the feeling of residents of Moóca and Jardim das Camélias. When added to a design conceived without it, security may still look and feel strange. But now that security features are part of the building design, residents view them differently. In 1980, there were still debates in São Paulo's newspapers about the rights of apartment owners to add fences and walls to their



PHOTO 10. Autoconstructed houses in Jardim das Camélias, 1994. Residents carefully choose the style of the fence and try to avoid replicating their neighbors'. Photo by Teresa Caldeira and James Holston.

buildings, sometimes changing the original design.[38] This debate seems to have died. Very few high-rises or houses lack fences, and no one would advertise a building without fences and security devices! By the early 1990s, the new "architecture of security" was making its way into newspaper articles.[39] This architecture creates explicit means of keeping away undesirables, especially the homeless.[40] After twenty years of elaboration and of experiments in a new mode of segregation, the language of social distancing and isolation is becoming increasingly explicit and spread across the city (see photos 9 and 10).

House transformations that increase security represent significant investment in a time of hardship. But although the investment may represent a burden for a family of modest income, it is considered absolutely necessary. The man who makes fences and window bars for the residents of Jardim das Camélias, in a small workshop in front of his house, showed me the long list of his clients in the neighborhood, explained to me how expensive the fences are for his poor clients, and told me how he works out installment plans and ways of playing with inflation to make his services more affordable. He also proudly showed me the portfolio with his designs





PHOTOS 11, 12, AND 13. In Moóca (1989) one finds at least three generations of façades. Photo 11 shows old working-class row houses built right to the sidewalk. In the next generation, houses usually had a front yard open to the street. Photos 12 and 13 show examples of these second-generation houses next to others modified according to the new security requirements. The older and more open houses are now dwarfed by the new style that mandates that the front yard be enclosed. Photos by Teresa Caldeira.



of fences and gates and talked about his efforts to decorate them and to transform the simplest fence into something attractive. This is his contribution "to make the neighborhood more beautiful," he told me. He knows his business indeed, and he is conscious that fences are not only about security but also about aesthetics and distinction.

At its most basic level, a well-enclosed house with an aura of place definitively marks the distance between a house and a *cortiço* or a favela. However, more extensive comparisons are possible because residents of São Paulo of all social classes are now literate in the new code of distinction. Of course variations are enormous between rich and poor neighborhoods, but, in all of them, the more ostensibly secure and enclosed the property, the higher its status. It seems that the residents of São Paulo are learning to transform restriction, limitation, uncertainty, and fear to advantage by manipulating the aesthetic of security: they are making their houses into prisons, but their prisons make statements about their social position.

Looking at neighboring houses or apartments in any neighborhood of São Paulo demonstrates clearly how fences and walls talk of distinction and constitute styles of design. In rich areas such as Morumbi, the individual architecture of each building and competition for the most original detail to single out a development try to create feelings of distinction. Neighborhoods constructed in earlier periods, such as Moóca and Jardim das Camélias,

display the changes in fashion in every street. Older façades with more discreet fences and an open design are dwarfed by the new style of security architecture (see photos 11, 12, and 13).

Walls, fences, and bars speak of taste, style, and distinction, but their aesthetic intentions cannot distract us from their main message of fear, suspicion, and segregation. These elements, together with the valorization of isolation and enclosure and the new practices of classification and exclusion, are creating a city in which separateness comes to the forefront and in which the quality of public space and the possibility of social encounters have already changed considerably.

CHAPTER 8
The Implosion of Modern Public Life

São Paulo is today a city of walls. City residents will not risk living in a house without fences and bars on the windows. Physical barriers enclose both public and private spaces: houses, apartment buildings, parks, squares, office complexes, shopping areas, and schools. As the elites retreat to their enclaves and abandon public spaces to the homeless and the poor, the number of spaces for public encounters between different social groups shrinks considerably. The everyday routines of those who inhabit segregated spaces—guarded by walls, surveillance systems, and restricted access—are quite different from their previous routines in more open and mixed environments.

Residents from all social groups argue that they build walls and change their habits to protect themselves from crime. However, the effects of these security strategies go far beyond self-protection. By transforming the urban landscape, citizens' strategies of security also affect patterns of circulation, habits, and gestures related to the use of streets, public transportation, parks, and all public spaces. How could the experience of walking on the streets not be transformed if one's environment consists of high fences, armed guards, closed streets, and video cameras instead of gardens and yards, neighbors talking, and the possibility of glancing at some family scene through the windows? The idea of going for a walk, of naturally passing among strangers, the act of strolling through the crowd that symbolizes the modern experience of the city, are all compromised in a city of walls. People feel restricted in their movements, afraid, and controlled; they go out less at night, walk less on the street, and avoid the "forbidden zones" that loom larger and larger in every resident's mental map of the city, especially among the elite. Encounters in public space become increasingly tense, even violent, because they are framed by people's fears and stereotypes. Tension, separation, discrimination, and suspicion are the new hallmarks of public life.

This chapter analyzes the changes in public space and in the quality of public life that result from expanded strategies of security: segregation, social distance and exclusion, and the implosion of the experience of public life in the modern city. First, I discuss the modern notion of the public, framed by ideals of openness and accessibility both in the city space and in the polity. I analyze two critiques of industrial cities that remain committed to modern values: modernism and the Garden City. Both have influenced the fortified enclaves. Next, I compare the spaces of the new enclaves with those of modernist city planning, showing that the former use modernist conventions with the intention of creating what the latter produced unintentionally: segregation and fragmentation. Third, relying on ethnographic data and on my own experiences in São Paulo, I discuss the relationship between changes in the built environment and changes in the everyday life in the city, showing how the latter is increasingly shaped by incivility and enforcement of social distance. A comparison with Los Angeles shows that São Paulo's pattern of segregation is in fact not unique. In both cities the new urban experience is structured not by the modern values of openness and tolerance to heterogeneity but rather by separation and the control of boundaries. Finally, I address some of the political consequences of these spatial changes in terms of the expansion and restriction of democracy itself.

Of course, the public spaces of cities and the types of relationships that exist there represent only one aspect of public life. Pervading the discussions in this chapter is one of the most challenging questions in urban analysis: how to conceive of the relationships between urban form, politics, and everyday life. These relationships are very complex and usually disjunctive: simultaneous processes with opposite meanings may take place in the same public sphere. São Paulo offers a compelling example of disjunction: its walling process has coincided with the organization of urban social movements, the expansion of citizenship rights for the working classes, and political democratization. By emphasizing this type of disjunction, I differ strongly from environment determinists who would see in the walls and the pattern of segregation crystallized in the urban environment the determinant origin of political processes.

Nevertheless, the built environment is not a neutral stage for the unfolding of social relations. The quality of the built environment inevitably influences the quality of the social interactions that take place there. It does not determine them completely; there is always room for diverse and sometimes subversive appropriations of spaces and for the organization of social actions that counter those shaped by spatial practices. However, the material spaces that constitute the stage for public life influence the types of social relations possible on it. Against a backdrop of walls and technologies of surveillance, life on the sidewalks is quite different from what Jane Jacobs described in her famous defense of urban public space (1961:50–54). The "metaphorical" cities people construct in their everyday practices of space (de Certeau 1984:93) are inevitably different in an open modern city and in a city of walls. Usually it takes organized political action to resist walls or to dismantle patterns of segregation. In everyday life, it is a difficult matter to contest walls and rituals of suspicion and humiliation, as the residents of São Paulo know so well.

THE MODERN IDEAL OF PUBLIC SPACE AND CITY LIFE

Streets open to the free circulation of crowds and vehicles represent one of the most vivid images of modern cities. Although there are various and sometimes contradictory accounts of modernity in Western cities, the modern experience of urban public life is widely held to include the primacy and openness of streets; free circulation; the impersonal and anonymous encounters of pedestrians; spontaneous public enjoyment and congregation in streets and squares; and the presence of people from different social backgrounds strolling and gazing at others, looking at store windows, shopping, sitting in cafes, joining political demonstrations, appropriating the streets for their festivals and celebrations, and using spaces especially designed for the entertainment of the masses (promenades, parks, stadiums, exhibition spaces).[1] These are elements associated with modern life in capitalist cities at least since the remodeling of Paris by Baron Haüssmann in the second half of the nineteenth century. Haussmann's state-promoted transformation of Paris was strongly criticized and opposed by citizens and analysts alike, but no one denied that the new boulevards were readily appropriated by huge numbers of people eager to enjoy both the street life, protected by anonymity, and the consumer possibilities that came with it. The flaneur described by Baudelaire and the consumer of the new department stores became symbols of the modern use of urban public space, as Paris became a prototype of the modern city.

At the core of this concept of urban public life are two related notions: city space is open space to be used and enjoyed by everyone, and the consumer society it houses is accessible to all. As Young puts it, in the ideal of modern city life "borders are open and undecidable" (1990:239). Of course, this has never been entirely the case in Paris or anywhere else. Modern cities have always been marked by social inequalities and spatial segregation, and

their spaces are appropriated in quite different ways by diverse social groups, depending on their social position and power. Paris itself demonstrates the perpetuation of inequality: the remodeling of the city under the Second Empire was in fact a transformation in the mode of spatial segregation and of the organization of class differences, as Engels (1872) noted early on (see also Harvey 1985). As a result, the literature on modern cities has often emphasized their negative aspects, from crime and violence to the danger of the mob, anomie, excessive individualism, congestion, and disease. However, in spite of persisting inequalities and social injustices, Western cities inspired by this model have always maintained signs of openness in circulation and consumption, signs that sustained the positive value attached to an open public space. Moreover, the sometimes violent appropriations of public spaces by different categories of excluded people—the most obvious example being the barricades erected during workers' rebellions—also constituted the modern public and simultaneously contributed to its expansion. Contestation is an inherent component of the modern city.

Some analysts of modern city life have been especially compelling in enumerating the positive values of the city and in defending modern public space. In general, they neglect the fact that the contemporary notion of the public is, in fact, a type of space and an experience of city life that was constituted only in the process of nineteenth-century industrial urbanization. The historical specificity of this notion of the public is essential in understanding its current transformation.

Jane Jacobs is one of the most famous advocates of the values of modern public life in cities. Her analysis of the use of sidewalks emphasizes not only openness and accessibility but also the etiquette and the conditions that make interactions among strangers possible and secure. These conditions include the complex and voluntary control exercised by city dwellers that she labels the "eyes upon the street" (Jacobs 1961:35); density; continuous use; a wide diversity of uses; and a clear demarcation between public and private space. When these conditions disappear, she argues, the freedom of the city and its civilization are threatened. This happens, for example, when the "institution of the Turf" (1961:47–50) orients urban constructions and people build barriers that enclose some areas and fence the others out. It also happens when the separation between public and private is confused. Privacy, Jacobs argues, is "indispensable" in cities (1961:58). "Civilized public life" is maintained on the basis of dignified, formalized, and reserved relationships—what we can call civility—kept separate from people's private lives. Where no vivid sidewalks and public spaces exist, and when relationships in public start to

extend into private life and require close sharing among neighbors, then city freedom is threatened; people tend to enforce common standards, creating a sense of homogeneity that leads to insularity and separation. When public life is absent, the alternative to sharing too much may be sharing nothing, and suspicion and fear of neighbors are the expected outcomes. For Jacobs, both the drawing of lines and boundaries in city space and the extension of the private into the public threaten the values of a good urban public life.[2]

Iris Marion Young (1990) starts from Jacobs's analysis to construct a "normative ideal of city life," which she conceives as an alternative to existing cities and as one way of redressing their many social injustices. Young creates her model as an ideal and therefore does not elaborate on its historic and specific modern character. However, her arguments and criticisms of some Enlightenment views reveal its modern character. Young defines city life as "the being together of strangers," whose ideal is "an openness to unassimilated otherness." "As a normative ideal," she argues, "city life instantiates social relations of difference without exclusion" (Young 1990: 237, 227). By principle these ideals are incompatible with any kind of hierarchical order (such as the medieval, status-based order) and can be conceived only under the assumption of a universal equality of citizens that constitutes modern Western societies.

Young conceives her model of city life as an instrument to criticize communitarianism, that is, the ideal of the fusion of subjects with one another and of the primacy of face-to-face relations as a primary model of democratic politics. This is exactly the model used to justify building fortified enclaves and retreating to suburban life. Using arguments that parallel those of Jacobs, Young argues that the ideal of community "denies the difference between subjects" and "often operates to exclude or oppress those experienced as different. Commitment to an ideal of community tends to value and to enforce homogeneity" and therefore has exclusionary consequences (Young 1990:234–35). She claims that her normative ideal is an elaboration of the virtues and unrealized possibilities of the contemporary experience of cities. The main virtues are four: (1) social differentiation without exclusion; (2) multi-use differentiation of social space; (3) eroticism, understood broadly as "an attraction to the other, the pleasure and excitement of being drawn out of one's secure routine to encounter the novel, strange, and surprising"; and (4) publicity, which refers to public space as being by definition a place open and accessible to anyone and where one always risks encountering those who are different (Young 1990:238–41). "In public life the differences remain unassimilated. . . . The public is heterogeneous, plural,

and playful" (Young 1990:241). Although social reality in any contemporary city is full of inequalities and injustices, the ideal allows us to consider, criticize, and formulate alternatives to them.

Modern ideals of the public do not refer only to city life but are always coupled with conceptions of politics. The promise of incorporation into modern society includes not only the city and consumption but also the polity. Images of the modern city are in many ways analogous to those of the liberal polity, consolidated on the basis of a social contract among equal and free people. The ideal of the social contract based on a principle of universality is quite radical—like that of the open city—and it helped destroy the feudal social order that preceded it. But, clearly, it is only through struggle that the definition of "free and equal" has been expanded. As with the open city, the polity that truly incorporates all citizens equally has never existed. Yet its founding ideals and its promise of continuous incorporation have retained their power for at least two centuries, shaping people's experience of citizenship and city life and legitimating the actions of various excluded groups in their claims for incorporation.[3]

In contemporary politics, the unfulfilled liberal promises of universal citizenship and, simultaneously, the reaffirmation of some of these promises have been articulated best through social movements. These have taken various forms, either affirming the rights of specific groups (such as blacks, indigenous populations, gays, and women) or trying to expand the rights of excluded social groups (as in the case of São Paulo's movements of poor residents of the peripheries demanding their "rights to the city"). In general, especially in their liberal incarnations, social movements have mounted what one might call a positive attack on modern liberal ideals: their aim is still to expand rights, freedom, justice, and equality, and they search for models that include the excluded and, therefore, achieve those goals in a more effective way. In other words, their attack maintains and reinforces basic liberal values, especially those of universality and equality. What distinguishes these liberal social movements from a second type is the treatment of difference.[4] In the liberal version, which Charles Taylor calls a "politics of universalism," social movements mark differences in order to expose injustice. For social movements that emphasize "the equal dignity of all citizens," to call attention to difference means to struggle for the expansion of rights and "the equalization of rights and entitlements" (Taylor 1992:37). Ultimately, their goal is the erasure of difference by the incorporation of the groups discriminated against into full citizenship. These movements aim at a public life and a polity in which equal respect for everybody's rights would eliminate the need to stress differences and inequalities. Because of their emphasis on universal principles, they do not view difference as something to be maintained and valorized.

A second type of social movement has brought to the forefront the question of difference. In this second category, which Taylor calls a "politics of difference," minority groups, especially feminists, argue that liberal notions of universalism have always been constituted on the basis of the exclusion of some. They insist that the rights of minority groups can be addressed only if approached from the perspective of difference rather than that of sameness.[5] Although they still refer to a principle of universal equality, they demand recognition of the unique identity of each group and its distinctiveness from all others (Taylor 1992:38–39). Iris Young's understanding of a politics of difference and of city life as the realm of social relations of "difference without exclusion" represents one version of this criticism (Young 1990). In her model, differences should remain unassimilated; they should not disappear under any fiction of a universal belonging. Although the break with liberalism in this view is explicit, it still constitutes an attack based on the principles of rights, freedom, justice, and equality and, therefore, within the parameters of modernity.

Other theorists of democracy such as Claude Lefort, Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau, and Étienne Balibar offer similar analyses. What they have in common, in addition to an emphasis on the nonassimilation of differences, is an insistence on a democratic polity and on a public space founded on uncertainty and openness and marked by the negotiation of meaning. As Lefort puts it, democracy is instituted and sustained by "the dissolution of the markers of certainty" (Lefort 1988:19). In a democracy, the basis of power, law, knowledge, and social interactions is indeterminate, and the public space is the locus for negotiation about the meaning of the social and the legitimate.

These ideals of the democratic polity—openness, indeterminacy, fluidity, and coexisting, unassimilated difference—have found some of their best expressions in the public spaces of modern cities.[6] Such spaces promote interactions among people who are forced to confront each other's anonymity on the basis of citizenship and therefore to acknowledge and respect each other's equal rights. Of course, there are many ways of subverting that equality and invoking status and hierarchy. Nevertheless, the modern city space, more than any other, forces their confrontation and therefore has the potential to challenge and level those hierarchies. In the space of the modern city, different citizens negotiate the terms of their interactions and socialize despite their differences and inequalities. This ideal of the open city, tolerant to social differences and their negotiation in anonymous encounters, crystallizes what I call the modern and democratic public space.

Cities such as contemporary São Paulo and Los Angeles display a strikingly different type of public urban space. The difference is not of the kind expressed by the demands of social movements (of either type) or by criticisms of the numerous dysfunctions of modern cities, which aim to improve the modern public space and make it live up to its promises. Rather, the public spaces being created in these cities negate the main characteristics of the modern democratic ideal of urban public space. They represent a type of public space that makes no gestures toward openness, indeterminacy, accommodation of difference, or equality, but rather takes inequality and separation as organizing values. It contradicts the principles of modern city space and brings into existence some of Jacobs's and Young's worst scenarios of incivility, inequality, and privatization of public space. Cities of walls and fortified enclaves are cities of fixed boundaries and spaces of restricted and controlled access.

GARDEN CITY AND MODERNISM: THE LINEAGE OF THE FORTIFIED ENCLAVE

The fortified enclaves and the type of public space being created in São Paulo and Los Angeles are the result of complex and heterogeneous influences. Some of them can be traced to a number of critiques of inequalities, segregation, and social injustices that have plagued industrial cities. Two of these views especially influenced the new segregation of enclaves: the notion of the Garden City, and modernism. This analysis will help us to understand how what once constituted a critique of the problems of industrial cities became the source of the destruction of its democratic ideals.

The Garden City model was first articulated by Ebenezer Howard in nineteenth-century England.[7] Considering the problems of large industrial cities insoluble, he proposed replacing them with small towns. Residents, especially the poor, would live close to nature, on a basis of mutuality and collective ownership of land. Howard imagined the Garden Cities as self-reliant and therefore different from traditional suburbs where workers go only to sleep. In fact, the cities he imagined, with their combination of office and industry jobs and residences, are closer to the idea of the new suburbs.[8] Howard envisioned his towns as round, encircled by a greenbelt (like those adopted by many British cities), and connected to other small towns to form another circle (as in the concept of satellite cities). Economic activities, residence, and administration were to be separated by green areas. At the center, public buildings would be clustered to create the "civic spirit." The town was to be planned as a totality—according to a concept that became the synonym for planning itself—and would be controlled by the public authority to prevent speculation and irrationality in its use. Garden Cities were to be governed by a democratically controlled, corporate technocracy, and its main members were to be elected by the renter-residents.

The Garden City model has been extremely influential, generating numerous "new towns" both in England and in the United States since the early twentieth century (Fishman 1988: chapter 1). Contemporary Paulista closed condominiums and American common interest developments (CIDs) exemplify the influence of the Garden City model and also the extent to which it has been modified. The enclosing walls and the private character of today's developments, the absence of a preoccupation with urban order, and the exclusive and exclusionary lifestyle directly contradict the original ideals. However, the Garden City imagery is still significant. In the United States, this model has been frequently associated with communitarian political ideals, although these were not necessarily a part of Howard's vision.[9] It is not difficult to trace to this concept the origins of the CID, administered by a homeowner's association, which is becoming the main type of middle-class residence in the outer cities of the United States.[10] Similarly, as my analysis of advertising shows, Brazilian closed condominiums were inspired by the Garden City model. In contrast with American CIDs, however, Brazilian condominiums do not emphasize the values of community. In São Paulo, communitarianism is not an important ideology, and the Garden City inspiration is expressed in a cruder way. Without the (presumably positive) discourse on the values of local community, its discriminatory intentions are the only ones to stand out.

Le Corbusier and modernist city planning represent another critique of the industrial city and its modern public space that has been appropriated and transformed by the new enclaves. In spite of many differences, Le Corbusier's Radiant City had some links with the Garden City model. In fact, he himself described it as a "vertical garden city" (Jacobs 1961:22).[11] His ideas about density were the opposite of Howard's, and he introduced the skyscraper into his plans; he also brought in the automobile and considerations about the rapid flow of traffic. Nevertheless, his plans reveal a dislike of the street and destruction of its unity; spatial segmentation of functions; emphasis on the city as a park and on the existence of green areas intercalated among built ones; and the need of a total plan that is continuously controlled by public authorities.

Modernist planning and design were influential everywhere in the world, but especially so in both modern Brazil and Los Angeles. As Holston shows (1989), the construction of modernist Brasília in the late 1950s crystallized

an international modernism in its transformation of public space and communicated it to the rest of the country.[12] Modernism has been the dominant idiom of Brazilian architecture and planning to this day. As such, it is associated with prestige and has been helping to create elite spaces and sell residences for the Brazilian elite since the 1950s.[13] In the closed condominiums, however, modernist architecture becomes not only a status symbol for the bourgeoisie, for whom this architecture is still fashionable, but also a principal device of segregation. To achieve their goals of isolating, distancing, and selecting, the fortified enclaves use instruments of design drawn from modernist city planning and architecture. One striking characteristic of both modernist city planning (and the Garden City) and the fortified enclaves is the attack on streets as a form of public space. In Brasília, as Holston shows (1989: chapter 4), as in new parts of São Paulo and Los Angeles, modernist conventions of architectural and urban design eliminate pedestrians and anonymous interactions from the streets, which become dedicated to the circulation of motor transport. The street as a central element of modern public life in the city is thus eliminated. However, even if the results tend to be the same, the original projects of modernism and current enclosures are radically different. It is worth investigating how such different projects have ended up using similar strategies and producing similar effects.

Modernist architecture and city planning arise from a criticism of industrial cities and societies, which they intend to transform through the radical remodeling of space. Their ambition is clear: the erasure of social difference and the creation of equality in the rational city of the future, designed by the avant-garde architect. In this scheme the corridor street is perceived as a source of disease and an impediment to progress because it fails to accommodate the needs of the new machine age. Moreover, modernist architecture attacks the street because it opposes the architectural organization of the public and private embedded in the corridor street (Holston 1989:103)and its related system of public spaces, including sidewalks and squares: a solid mass of contiguous private buildings frames and contains the void of public streets. Modernist planning and architecture invert these solid-void/figure-ground relationships. In the modernist city, "streets appear as continuous voids and buildings as sculptural figures" (Holston 1989:125). By subverting the existing code of urban order, modernist planning aims at and succeeds in blurring the representational distinction between public and private. The result is the subversion of modern public space.

Modernist city planning aspired to transform the city into a single, homogeneous, state-sponsored public domain, to eliminate differences in order and create a universal, rationalist city divided into sectors by functions:

residential, employment, recreational, transportation, administrative, and civic. Brasília is the most complete embodiment of this new type of city.[14] The result, however, has turned out to be the opposite of the planner's intentions. Brasília is today not Brazil's most egalitarian city but its most segregated (Holston 1989: chapter 8; Telles 1995a). In destroying the street as the space for public life, modernist city planning has also undermined urban diversity and the possibility of the coexistence of differences. The type of space it creates promotes not equality, as was intended, but only a more explicit inequality.

Ironically, then, the instruments of modernist planning, with little adaptation, are well suited to producing inequality. Streets designed for vehicles only, the absence of sidewalks, enclosure and internalization of shopping areas, and spatial voids isolating sculptural buildings and wealthy residential areas effectively generate and maintain social separation. These modernist creations radically transform public life. In the new fortified enclaves, they are used not to destroy private spaces and produce a total, unified public, but explicitly to destroy public spaces. Their objective is to enlarge some private domains so that they will fulfill public functions, but in a segregated way.

Contemporary fortified enclaves use essentially modernist instruments of design, with some notable adaptations. The treatment of circulation and commerce is quite similar: pedestrian circulation is discouraged, vehicular traffic is emphasized, sidewalks are absent, and shopping areas are kept away from the streets, discouraging meaningful public interaction. The large spaces separating sculptural buildings are another common feature. The surrounding walls are the clearest departure from the modernist idiom, but their effects are not strange to the modernist city. In modernist planning, as in Brasília, residential, commercial, and administrative areas were to have no fences or walls but were to be delimited by green areas and expressways, as in the Garden City model and in various contemporary American suburbs. In São Paulo, walls are considered essential to demarcate all types of buildings, especially the new enclaves. However, this demarcation of private property does not create the same type of (nonmodernist) public space that characterizes the industrial city. Because in contemporary enclaves the private universes are kept apart by the voids of open spaces (as in modernist design), they break the street line and no longer generate street corridors. Moreover, when there is a street line created by walls and enhanced by sophisticated technologies of security, the residual public space it produces is at odds with modern public life.

A significant difference between modernist design and the fortified enclaves occurs in the use of materials and forms of individual buildings. The

plain modernist façades might be eliminated in favor of ornaments, irregularities, and ostentatious materials that display the individuality and status of their owners. The technologies of security can also help assure the exclusivity of the already isolated buildings. The architecture of these buildings is also at odds with modernist notions of transparency and disclosure of private life, expressed in its use of glass façades. In other words, contrary to modernist publicness, the enclaves enhance internalization, privacy, and individuality, but they are disconnected from its modern counterpart, the formal public sociability, as the building façades no longer constitute a solid frame for meaningful public life in the streets.

The surviving elements of modernist architecture and city planning in the new urban form are those that destroy modern public space and social life: dead streets transformed into highways, sculptural buildings separated by voids and disregarding street alignments, walls and technologies of security framing public space as residual, enclaves turned inward, separation of functions, and destruction of heterogeneous and diverse spaces). The devices that have been abandoned are those intended to create equality, transparency, and a new public sphere (glass façades, uniformity of design, absence of material delimitations such as walls and fences). Instead of creating a space in which the distinctions between public and private disappear—making all the space public, as the modernists intended—the enclaves use modernist conventions to create spaces in which the private quality is enhanced beyond any doubt and in which the public, a shapeless void treated as residual, is deemed irrelevant. This was exactly the fate of modernist architecture and its "all public space" in Brasília and in all cities that have used modernist urban planning to make and remake themselves (Holston 1989). However, while in Brasília the result was a perversion of initial premises and intentions, in the closed condominiums and fortified enclaves it represents a deliberate choice. In the enclaves, the aim is to segregate and change the character of public life by transferring activities previously enacted in heterogeneous public spaces to private spaces that have been constructed as socially homogeneous environments, and by destroying the potential of streets to provide spaces for anonymous and tolerant interactions.

Today, in the new spaces in cities such as São Paulo or Los Angeles, we tend to find no gestures toward openness and freedom of circulation, regardless of differences, nor a technocratic universalism that aims to erase differences. In São Paulo, the old modern urban design has been fragmented by the insertion of independent and well-delineated private enclaves (of modernist design) that are focused entirely inward. The fortified fragments are not meant to be subordinated to a public order kept together by ideologies of openness, accessibility, tolerance for differences, or promises of incorporation. Heterogeneity is now to be taken more seriously: fragments express irreconcilable inequalities, not simple differences. Public space expresses the new intolerance. The modernist conventions of design used by the enclaves help to ensure that different social worlds meet as infrequently as possible in city space: that is, they belong to different spaces.

In a city of walls and enclaves such as São Paulo, public space has undergone a deep transformation. Experienced as dangerous, framed by fences and walls, fractured by the new voids and enclaves, privatized with chains closing off streets, armed guards, and guardhouses, public space is increasingly abandoned by the well-to-do. As the spaces for the rich are enclosed and turned inward, the remaining space is left to those who cannot afford to go in. Because the enlarged, private worlds of the better-off are organized on the principles of homogeneity and exclusion of others, they are by principle the opposite of the modern public space. Yet neither can the leftover public spaces, territories of fear, aspire to modern ideals. Everyday life in the city of walls reinforces exactly the opposite values: incivility, intolerance, and discrimination.

In the ideal modern city life, "borders are open and undecidable," suggests Young (1990:239). Fixed boundaries create nonmodern spaces, an undemocratic public space. However, the relationships between urban form and politics are complicated, as are the effects of a nonpublic space on civil life. My reflections on these complexities are all framed by the fact that the consolidation of the city of walls in São Paulo has coincided with the process of political democratization. It was exactly at the moment when social movements were booming in the periphery, when trade unions were paralyzing factories and filling stadiums for their meetings, when people were voting for their leaders for the first time in twenty years, that city residents started building up walls and moving into fortified enclaves. While the political system opened up, the streets were closed, and the fear of crime became the talk of the city.

STREET LIFE: INCIVILITY AND AGGRESSION

In São Paulo, as in any city, the urban environment is heterogeneous and shows the signs of different layers of construction, uses, and interventions. The current process of building up walls affects all types of spaces in the city but transforms them, and the experiences of public life, in different ways. I describe different types of material transformation caused by the walling process and discuss how they affect the quality of public life. Although the

changes are of different types and have diverse effects, they all reinforce boundaries and discourage heterogeneous encounters. They all create policed borders and consequently leave less space for indeterminacy in public encounters. They all promote intolerance, suspicion, and fear.

As people move around the city, they use the space in individual and creative ways and, as de Certeau reminds us, make fragmented trajectories that elude legibility (1984: chapter 7). Therefore, any account of these spatial practices can be only fragmentary and particular. I draw here on what people have told me and on what I have read and seen, but I rely mostly on my own observations, experiences, and memories of the city. I want to indicate changes and suggest different experiences in the use of the city, but I have no pretension to being exhaustive.

In contemporary São Paulo, the public space is emptiest and the use of streets, sidewalks, and squares rarest exactly where there are the most fortified enclaves, especially residential ones. In neighborhoods like Morumbi, streets are leftover spaces, and the material quality of public spaces is simply bad. Because of the inward orientation of the fortified enclaves, many streets have unpaved sidewalks or none at all, and several streets behind the condominiums are unpaved (photo 6). The distances between buildings are large. Walls are high, out of proportion to the human body, and most of them are topped by electric wires. Streets are for cars, and pedestrian circulation becomes an unpleasant experience. The spaces are intentionally constructed to produce this effect. To walk in Morumbi is a stigma: the pedestrian is poor and suspicious. People on foot may be workers who live in nearby favelas and who are treated by their richer neighbors with distance and disdain—and, evidently, with fear. Since middle- and upper-class people circulate in private cars while others walk or use public transportation, there is little contact in public among people from different social classes. No common spaces bring them together.

The paths inside the favelas are spaces for walking, but the favelas too end up being treated as private enclaves: only residents and acquaintances venture in, and all that is seen from the public streets are a few entrances. The favelas can be seen in their entirety only from the windows of the exclusive apartments above them. When both rich and poor residents live in enclaves, passing within the walls is obviously a carefully policed activity, in which class signs are interpreted in order to determine levels of suspicion and harassment. Empty streets of fixed boundaries and scrutinized differences are spaces of suspicion and not of tolerance, inattention to differences, or wandering around. They are not enjoyable urban spaces.

Various strictly residential neighborhoods for the upper classes (older parts of Morumbi, Alto de Pinheiros, and Jardim Europa, for example) tend to have empty streets as well, but older neighborhoods, some of them designed as garden cities, have good streets and sidewalks. In these areas, however, other devices restrict circulation. Residents have privatized public streets and closed them off with gates, chains or, less ostensibly, with gardens, vases, and plants. In the United States, the same practice is becoming common; the spaces thus produced are called "security zone communities" by Blakely and Snyder (1997). Because the street is still considered open space, its privatization still generates opposition. A few years ago, when this trend started in São Paulo, the city government reacted and removed the chains. However, as support for the practice grew, the city incorporated enclosure into its policies: in 1990, the city government of the PT started offering the services of its architects and construction workers to middle-class neighborhoods interested in the enclosures.[15]

Although these neighborhoods still have nice streets full of trees and sidewalks, a form of entertainment enjoyed by my family when I was a child has now become impossible: to go around the streets of Jardim Europa admiring the mansions of the rich. They are no longer visible; the houses have been concealed behind walls and protected by electric wires and other security equipment. To walk in the area has become unpleasant, as the streets are now dominated by private guards installed in guardhouses, trained dogs barking at passers-by, and devices blocking circulation. The few people walking become suspects. I tried it, with my camera, and drew many guards aggressively in my direction, in spite of my middle-class appearance. The sense of being under surveillance is unavoidable, because the guards position themselves on the sidewalks (instead of inside the buildings, as in Morumbi); they observe everyone passing by, and directly address anyone they find suspect. Well, they are paid to suspect and to keep away strangers. This private army is there to privatize what used to be reasonable public spaces.

I spent my childhood in the late 1950s and early 1960s in a new middle-class neighborhood, Sumaré, which since the late sixties has been completely urbanized and is today a central neighborhood. When we moved there, the streets were unpaved; there was no sewage system and no telephone. We were just two blocks away from the headquarters of the city's department of trash collection, that is, the stable for the horses that pulled the collection carriages through our street every morning, to the great amusement of the children. Sometimes when it rained, my father's beautiful blue '54 Chevrolet, directly imported from the United States and designed for other roads, got stuck in the mud, and he had to walk the one kilometer from our house to the School of Medicine of the University of São Paulo, where he was a professor. There

weren't many houses on our street; some resembled little *chácaras* (country houses), with their vegetable gardens and chickens. Although it was a middle-class neighborhood, in the late 1950s it was still in the process of becoming, like Jardim das Camélias, on the periphery, when I first went there in the late 1970s. The city grew so rapidly, and Sumaré is today so urban, that it is strange to remember that not too long ago it was so undeveloped.

For many years my family's house was separated from the street by a low fence. The gate was only closed at night. In the 1970s, when the neighborhood was built up, the sidewalks became full of people, and traffic increased considerably, my parents built a wall and started to close the gate during the day. They were bothered by passers-by looking into their living room. But we always walked around freely and without fear, even at night. In the early 1980s, my father's house was robbed, and after that the gate was kept locked. Today my father has a private guard inside the walls during the night, and the gate is locked twenty-four hours a day. He asks us to call him in advance when we visit at night so that the guard can be prepared to open the gate promptly and we do not have to wait outside. All the surrounding houses and apartment buildings have been remodeled and have added gates and walls. There are several other private guards on the block. The street, which today combines residences, offices, and commerce, is intensively used during the day (in fact, parking has become a problem), but I would feel uneasy walking around after dark.

A working-class neighborhood such as Jardim das Camélias still has an intense street life, although it has changed in many ways since the late 1970s. On the one hand, the neighborhood has expanded, the houses have improved, the trees have grown, and the streets have been paved, illuminated, and equipped with sidewalks (see photos 3 and 4). But as the neighborhood was urbanized and its material quality improved, fences went up as well, and people became more scared and suspicious. Crime increased in the late 1980s, from thefts to homicides, some of these involving boys who had grown up together playing on the streets. Nevertheless, everyday life is still marked by a public sociability among neighbors, the kind of formal and polite interchange on the sidewalks that gives life to a neighborhood and makes public space meaningful.[16] Traffic is light, and the streets are still constantly used by groups of children and adolescents playing, people who stop for a little chat and maybe sit down on the sidewalks to watch those passing by, people taking care of their cars or building something, people who stop at a little shop to catch up on the local news or, if they are men, to play *sinuca* or have a drink on their way home. The houses are enclosed, but by fences that allow visibility and interaction, not by high walls. This is the kind of

neighborhood kept safe by intense use, mixed functions, and the "eyes upon the street" (Jacobs 1961: chapter 2). In other words, safety is maintained by engagement, not by isolation.

In spite of the continuing local sociability, people do not feel the neighborhood is as safe as it used to be.[17] They have fortified their houses, are more suspicious, talk to strangers on the street from behind their bars, more carefully choose the people they relate to, and control their children. Many children are now prohibited from playing outside the fences of their houses, and adolescents are restricted from going out. As everywhere else, people focus their concerns on the poorest areas; they are especially afraid of the favela nearby and another area recently invaded by participants in the Movimento dos Sem Terra. Suspicion toward people seen as "other" or as "inferior" is not exclusive to the upper classes, as chapter 2 makes clear. The frequency of public parties and celebrations sponsored by the local associations has decreased, and the activities of social movements have slowed down. Collective life and political activities have weakened in the last decade, but the public space of the streets still sustains local interactions and public interchanges.[18]

Most central neighborhoods of São Paulo, those with good urban infrastructure that the elite have maintained for themselves, have traditionally had mixed functions and maintain a relatively intensive and heterogeneous use of public space. Some of these neighborhoods are quite sophisticated, with luxury shops and restaurants (especially Jardins, but also Higienópolis and Itaim-Bibi). In these areas the streets are still used by people of various social backgrounds, and the rich rub elbows with the poor. Now, however, the streets are policed by an army of private guards and video cameras (each building has at least one), and interclass relationships have become nastier. Moreover, in this kind of neighborhood, as well as downtown, property owners have been creative in installing devices to keep undesired people away. In entranceways and *marquises*, sprinklers come on at odd times to discourage the homeless from lingering; chains are placed across patios, entryways, and sidewalks, and public parks are fenced off. The main target of these techniques is the increasing number of homeless people inhabiting the streets. Nevertheless, because the streets are generally crowded, the effects of the constant suspicion are not as severe as in emptier areas.

In these areas of intensive mixed use, the material obstacles at street level are complemented by a series of less visible practices of surveillance that reinforce social differences. The residents and users of these areas are not interested in indeterminacy. Their tools include video cameras, electronic pass systems at the entrances of any major office building, metal detectors at bank doors, and guards who demand identification of anyone entering

office buildings and, increasingly, residential condominiums.[19] Systems of identification, screening, and control of circulation are considered central to good business management and feed the rapidly growing industry of private security services. These systems are a matter not only of security but also of discipline and social discrimination.[20] The image of the suspect is made up of stereotypes, and therefore systems of screening discriminate especially against poor and black people. The entrance guards do not bother people with the right class signs, but they give a hard time to everyone else.

Thus for many people everyday life in the city is becoming a daily management of barriers and suspicion, marked by a succession of little rituals of identification and humiliation. These including forcing office boys, who are invariably stopped by metal detectors in bank entrances, to open their backpacks in front of a long line of people waiting to get in; sending workers to the "service" doors; and physically searching maids when they leave their jobs at the condominiums. It is true that rich people also have to identify themselves and that they too are under surveillance, but the differences in the levels of control exercised over different people are obvious. Managers do not wear the same kind of ID tags, and upper-class people know how to use their class signs (including arrogance and disrespect) to avoid interrogation and go quickly past the guards, who respond with deference instead of the disdain they reserve for poorer people. In a city in which systems of identification and strategies of security are spreading everywhere, the experience of urban life becomes one of social differences, separations, exclusions, and reminders of the limitations of one's possibilities in the public space. It is, in reality, a city of walls, the opposite of the boundless public space of the modern ideal of city life.

São Paulo's streets may still be full of people, especially in central neighborhoods of commerce and service and in regional centers,[21] but the experience of the crowd and the quality of anonymous interactions have changed. People are afraid of being robbed, and their fear of *trombadinhas* (muggers) is taken for granted. Nobody wears jewelry or valuable watches; people carry limited cash and if possible only photocopies of documents, for their replacement requires hours of dealing with various bureaucracies. Women carry their purses tied in front of their bodies, and people embrace their backpacks on their chests. People in cars drive with closed windows and locked doors. They are especially afraid of stopping at traffic lights, for the news is filled with tales of muggers who use knives or pieces of glass as weapons to rob drivers, especially women. It is hard to distinguish these muggers from the increasing number of beggars and street vendors disputing the same street corners.

Not only are the attitudes in the crowd changing, but so is the crowd itself. The middle and upper classes try to avoid the crowded streets and sidewalks, preferring to shop at enclosed shopping centers and hypermarkets.[22] As the middle and upper classes circulate by car, the use of public transportation is becoming a lower-class experience. Still, it remains a mass experience, since the elite constitutes hardly 5 percent of the population of the metropolitan region.

The centers of public transportation—subway and train stations and the hubs of bus lines—have a culture of their own. They are mostly working-class spaces, filled with the sounds of popular music and the smell of fruits and all kinds of food. Every day, masses of people pass through these stations and spend a considerable amount of time commuting on public transportation.[23] These always packed areas are great spaces to sell anything, from religions to food, from cures to electronic gadgets, from herbal medicines to lingerie. This intense informal commerce of the *marreteiros* or *ambulantes*—as the street sellers are called—takes up most of the sidewalk space downtown, filling it with small stands. The experience of taking a bus, a train, or the subway at rush hour (something the middle and upper classes have stopped doing) entails fighting for space in crowded cars and being squashed against others. This is nothing new; if anything, the quality of public transportation in São Paulo has improved, especially as far as the subway is concerned. Nevertheless, frequent users of public transportation, such as the residents of Jardim das Camélias, feel that things today are more tense and unpleasant than in the past: there is little courtesy and a lot of aggression. And there is certainly more prejudice, as the middle classes teach their children that buses are dangerous and hire private drivers for them.

Traffic is by consensus considered to be one of the worst aspects of public life in São Paulo. Disregard of rules and of other people's rights is the norm.[24] There is no civility, as a significant part of the population seems to consider traffic regulations merely as obstacles to the free movement of individuals. The media has investigated and reported frequently on behavior in traffic. The findings are amazing, not only because of the extent of the disrespect they reveal, but also because they have become routine and lost the capacity to provoke any reaction. DataFolha, the *Folha de S. Paulo* research agency, found in April 1989 that 99 percent of São Paulo's drivers consider its traffic dangerous and that one in every four drivers had been involved in at least one accident the year before.[25] Another survey from DataFolha, in April 1986, found that city residents saw the main cause of car accidents as "the lack of responsibility and imprudence of drivers."[26] In October 1989, the research department of *O Estado de S. Paulo* interviewed

a sample of drivers and discovered that 85 percent of them agreed that São Paulo's drivers do not respect pedestrian crosswalks and frequently make prohibited turns. Moreover, eight in ten people interviewed thought that drivers park in prohibited areas, double park, go through red lights, and ignore speed limits.[27] In 1991, DataFolha decided to observe an important intersection of the city (Avenue Paulista and Brigadeiro Luís Antonio). There were an average of thirteen prohibited left turns per hour, in spite of physical obstacles on the road, and most of the drivers never got a ticket because most of the time no policemen were there. They also found that one car ran one red light in every five, that 41 percent of the cars that stopped for a red light disregarded the pedestrian crosswalk, and that only 3 percent of the drivers used seat belts.[28] An additional problem is that of teenagers driving before they legally qualify for a license. Until the 1970s, middle-class adolescents like myself used public transportation to go to school and run their errands around the city. Today this is considered too dangerous or too uncomfortable for the kids, and they are transported exclusively by car, driven by private drivers or their parents—or else they are simply allowed to drive themselves.

São Paulo's traffic reveals that people use the public streets according to their private convenience and do not seem to be willing to conform to general rules or respect other people's rights. There is little respect for others or for the public good. There is also some sense of omnipotence in this behavior, for people do not seem to fear being injured by the same kind of transgressions they commit.[29] The results are dramatic: during the 1980s, more than two thousand people died in car accidents every year in the municipality of São Paulo. Between 1992 and 1994, the numbers decreased, but not significantly. In addition, more than fifty thousand people are injured in car accidents annually in the metropolitan region of São Paulo. In 1996, there were 195,378 reported car accidents in the MSP, which means an average of 535 accidents per day. Of these, 13.16 percent resulted in injuries. According to one source, the total number of accident victims was 59,679, and of these 1,113 were fatalities.[30] Very few people responsible for accidents are prosecuted.

Traffic is a strong indicator of the quality of public life. In Brazil, traffic behavior constitutes only the most obvious example of the routine disrespect for the law and the difficulties in enforcing it. Traffic policemen disregard some violations simply because they have become the norm. When they issue tickets, traffic enforcers usually hide in places where they cannot be seen by drivers. They try to avoid confronting upper-class people, who do not hesitate to challenge their authority. This is done on the basis of manipulation of class signs, but sometimes, when the signs are ignored or misunderstood, drivers resort to violence. The most violent attacks seem to be made against parking wardens, usually women, who control the restricted parking areas called the *zona azul* (blue zone). Some have been beaten by men when they refuse to void tickets, and one ended up in the hospital after an enraged motorist ran his car over her. These behaviors indicate how violent people can become when they are asked to conform to the law and cannot use their class position as a source of privilege, that is, to evade the law. Since the working classes usually cannot avoid the law, these behaviors reveal once more how class differences not only rule public interactions but also are reproduced by the elements that shape the public space.

Traffic is obviously not exclusively São Paulo's problem, but it is a national problem. In 1996, around twenty-seven thousand people died in car accidents in Brazil. The situation has acquired such dramatic dimensions that the federal government decided to revise the national traffic code *(código nacional de trânsito)*. After six years of debate in Congress, the new code took effect in January 1998. It establishes high fines and serious penalties and a system of demerit points that may lead to suspension of one's license. All violations, from not carrying the car registration to drunk driving, earn points and entail a fine (from R$40 to R$800). A more severe code is expected to increase civility in traffic. But it remains unclear whether the authorities can enforce these regulations, especially in a context in which public civility is deteriorating, not improving.

EXPERIENCING THE PUBLIC

Different social groups experience the transformed public spaces of the city in contradictory ways. The young middle-class and upper-class children who are coming of age in the city of walls do not seem unhappy with their experience of public spaces. Nor should they, perhaps, with private drivers on hand and no need to fight their way in crowded public buses. Moreover, they seem to love the secure spaces of shopping malls and fast food stores, of discotheques and video-game arcades. These are for them "cool" spaces in which to display their knowledge of a global youth culture of style labels and fashion trends. They connect to "global youth" but not to the youth of their own periphery. The Paulista working-class youth does not have the privilege of avoiding public transportation or the congested streets on which they commute and where some of them work. They do, however, share with rich kids some of the signs of a global youth culture, especially in clothes: sneakers, blue jeans, T-shirts. Nevertheless, they gather not in the upper-class malls

but in spaces on the periphery itself (including malls), and they favor some subcultures (punk, skinhead) and some styles of music and dance (especially funk) not shared by the middle classes. Moreover, they experience violence and harassment in their use of the city and in their neighborhoods. In their musical gatherings themes such as police abuse, murders, and disrespect are constant.[31] For working-class kids, the experience of the city is one of injustice, not of privilege.

In contrast to the experience of these younger groups, older people, who grew up in São Paulo when progress was the goal and the use of streets and parks was more open, are nostalgic in their discussions of public space. Their descriptions of the city in the past have a quality similar to those recalling the period before the trauma of a crime. The old city is remembered as better, more beautiful, and more civilized than it is now. I spoke to two sisters about changing habits, specifically going to the movies.

8.1

People don't go to the movies anymore?

L: They don't. Now, after the video, they won't really go.

W: And it is too difficult! It all starts with parking: there is no place to park: parking is as expensive as the movie. If you leave the car on the street, either it is stolen or there are the "owners of the street" to take care of it.[32] So it is a problem to go out with the car, we cannot relax. You go to a shopping mall; sometimes we go to the movie in a shopping center.

L: We park the car inside. When we go to movie theaters, it is in the Lar Center, Center Norte, because it is more convenient.

W: Thirty, forty years ago we could go out. We used to dress well to go out, with gloves, all beautifully arranged, to go to the city, the downtown. Ipiranga, Metro. . . . Metro was the greatest . . . [33]

L: Lido, at the Lido a man could not enter without a tie. Would not enter.

When was this?

W: Like forty years ago.

L: I think it was thirty years ago. We would only go to the movies downtown. We used to go to the movies, and then go out, look at some shop windows—Barão de Itapetininga was a good street, with good stores. You would have a snack . . . would have dinner out. Nowadays you cannot go downtown on a Sunday, on weekends, it is impossible because there are the homosexuals, the transvestites . . . the little stalls *(barraquinhas)*. Well, downtown is horrible now with all those street vendors *(marreteiros)*.

L and W are both widowed and in their fifties. They spent their lives in Moóca and now live together to allow W's son to live with his family in her house without paying rent.

Older people recall with nostalgia the formality involved in the enjoyment of the public space, the gloves and the ties they wore, the distinctiveness of the old movie theaters, and the "good" streets of old downtown in which one walked among elegant people—"It was so chic!" said the woman whose narrative I analyze in chapter 1. These are signs of distinction and rules of class separation that have been lost. In today's downtown, the "chic" population has been replaced by "marginals," nothing guarantees distinction, and the feeling that remains is uneasiness with the proximity of the poor. Many years ago, when the downtown area was used by the upper classes, joining the crowd (through the use of the right clothes and accessories, for example) was a matter of identification with social superiors, a sign of distinction for the working-class residents of Moóca. Today, however, the same people feel the need to promote distance rather than identification with the downtown crowd, for it is now made up of poor and marginalized people—vendors, street children, transvestites, prostitutes.

The expansion of mass consumption makes matters of distinction more complicated. Easy symbols of superiority, such as gloves and ties, have disappeared, and frequently the middle and upper classes feel irritated by poor people's consumption of goods considered to carry some form of status but which are no longer exclusive (see chapter 2). It is more difficult for the elite to impose their own code of behavior—including rules of deference—onto the city. Moreover, with democratization, the poor forced the recognition of their citizenship, and they occupied spaces—physical and political—previously reserved for the elite. With fewer obvious signs of differentiation at hand and with more difficulty in asserting their privileges and codes of behavior in the public space, the upper classes turn instead to systems of identification. Thus, spaces of controlled circulation (such as shopping centers) come to assure that distinction and separation are still possible in public. Signs of social distance are replaced with material walls.

The transformations in the various spaces in the city all seem to lead to

more rigid and policed boundaries, and consequently less indeterminacy and fewer spaces for contact between people from different backgrounds. These experiences engender fear and intolerance rather than expectation and excitement. Experiences in public space seem to run counter to a modern and democratic public life. However, the politics of urban public spaces in São Paulo are still more complex, and two uses of public space contradict the dominant tendency of boundaries and segregation.

The few major parks in the city are intensively used in quite a democratic way. When a park is located on the periphery, such as Parque do Carmo, its users are mostly from the working classes, but the parks of Ibirapuera and Morumbi, both in rich neighborhoods, are used by people from all social classes. Although most of them are fenced, they are large, and they are the few green areas remaining in the city. In the last few years, the parks have been appropriated by thousands of people who go there, especially on weekends, to jog, bicycle, roller-skate, play ball, or simply be outside. These oases of intensive and mixed use are very few in São Paulo, and it is interesting that they are usually spaces used for the leisure of the masses. If what happens in other areas of the world is any indication, spaces for leisure and entertainment continue to have a mixed massive use—as in American waterfront areas, rebuilt historical districts, and theme parks, for example—even when all other public spaces deteriorate.

The second example is Praça da Sé, São Paulo's central square. Praça da Sé is the powerful symbol of the center of the city, whence all roads and streets are imagined to radiate.[34] Today, the landmarks of this big square are the Catholic cathedral, the central subway station, and the "zero mark" of the city, indicated by a stone erected on top of a compass engraved on the ground. The square is mainly a working-class space. Every day, a mass of commuters crosses Praça da Sé. Many people work there: vendors of every type of popular product, preachers of different religions, musicians, and policemen—the same types of people who fill any major hub of public transportation. The square has many residents, too: a contingent of street children and homeless people. Men dressed in suits and carrying briefcases, usually lawyers who have to reach the Central Forum next door, are frequently seen in the square, but they no longer give the place its identity. Praça da Sé is fundamentally a space for poorer residents, both in its everyday uses and in its symbolism. Residents of Jardim das Camélias I interviewed in the late 1970s considered going to Praça da Sé a special activity for the holidays, such as New Year's Day: it was their way of enjoying the city and feeling that they belonged in it. Today, they feel that the square has become a dangerous space, and although they still use it, for leisure they instead go somewhere like a shopping mall. As the working classes rule the square with their sounds and smells, the wealthy avoid it as a dangerous and unpleasant space.

But Praça da Sé has a second layer of symbolism: for both rich and poor Paulistanos it is the main political space of the city, a meaning that has been fixed by various events in the process of democratization. During the military years, the few political demonstrations that took place were held in Praça da Sé mainly because of the presence of the cathedral. The Catholic Church was at that time the only institution able to offer a relatively safe space for protests against the abuses and human rights violations practiced by the military regime. For the same reason, Praça da Sé became the site of numerous demonstrations by social movements during the *abertura* process, most visibly the huge gatherings of the Movimento do Custo de Vida in the second half of the 1970s. When the movement for free elections was organized in the early 1980s, it was only natural that mass demonstrations be held in the square. On 25 January 1984, the day of the city's anniversary, around three hundred thousand congregated in Praça da Sé to demand free elections. Middle- and upper-class people who had not been downtown for years (the main economic activities and all luxury commerce had moved southwest) found out how to take the subway and emerged in the middle of the square to demand democracy. Demonstrations were moved to Vale do Anhangabaú on only two occasions, when the square was too small for the expected crowd of one million: the last rally for direct elections in April 1984, and the demonstration for the impeachment of President Collor in September 1992.[35]

On the one hand, Praça da Sé symbolizes the political reappropriation of public space by the citizens in the transition to democracy. On the other hand, it represents the deterioration of public space, danger, crime, anxieties about downward mobility, and the impoverishment of the workers who continue to use it for commuting, working in the informal market, and consuming its cheap products. It symbolizes both the strength and the deterioration of public space and, therefore, the disjunctive character of Brazilian democracy (Holston and Caldeira 1998).

The example of Praça da Sé is another indication that political democratization is not contradictory to the deterioration of public spaces. In fact, democratization may have helped to accelerate the building of walls and the deterioration of public space. This does not, however, occur in the simplistic way some right-wing politicians want us to believe it does: that democracy creates disorder and crime and therefore generates the need for walls. If democracy gave rise to walls, it was because the democratization process

was unexpectedly deep. Until the end of the military regime, politics had been the exclusive realm of the elite. With the *abertura*, however, the poor residents of the periphery became important political players, taking Praça da Sé to present their demands and assert their rights to the city. Their trade-union movements and social movements surprised everybody; and they were able to claim a political space that was being opened, but not necessarily for them. In the imagination of those who prefer to abandon the city, the fear of crime intertwines in complex ways with other anxieties provoked by change, as I showed in chapter 2. It intertwines with the fear of electoral results (especially the fear that the PT might win elections, as it did); the fear that one might decline socially because of inflation and economic crisis; the fear that certain goods no longer serve to create social distance or confer status; and the fear that the poor can no longer be kept in their places.

The coincidence of democratization with the deterioration of public space and more obvious processes of social segregation, as well as the ambiguous symbolism of Praça da Sé, precludes any easy associations between the material public spaces of cities and forms of polity. São Paulo shows that the polity and the public space of the city can develop in opposite directions. This disjunction between the political process and urban form is meaningful. On the one hand, because recent urban transformations are mostly not the result of imposed state policies but rather of the way in which the citizens engage with their city, they can be seen as the result of a democratic intervention. Although this engagement may be seen as a form of democratic action, it has produced mainly undemocratic results. The perversity of this engagement of the citizenry is that it leads to segregation rather than to tolerance.[36] On the other hand, as citizens build all types of walls and controls in the city space, they create limits to democratization. Through the creation of walls, residents re-create hierarchies, privileges, exclusive spaces, and rituals of segregation where they have just been removed from the political sphere. A city of walls is not a democratic space. In fact, it counters democratic possibilities. Fortunately, however, this process is not monolithic, and there is always the possibility that spaces such as Praça da Sé will fill again with people from all classes, as it did when they gathered to overthrow the military regime.

THE NEO-INTERNATIONAL STYLE: SÃO PAULO AND LOS ANGELES

In contemporary São Paulo, disjunctive processes do not diminish the fact that rigid and policed boundaries and the increasing segregation of social

groups create a type of urban environment that impairs openness and freedom of circulation and jeopardizes anonymous and impersonal interactions of people from different social backgrounds. These and similar transformations may be detected in many other cities around the world, although not always with the same intensity or obviousness. From Johannesburg to Budapest, from Cairo to Mexico City, from Buenos Aires to Los Angeles, similar processes occur: the erection of walls, the secession of the upper classes, the privatization of public spaces, and the proliferation of surveillance technologies are fragmenting the city space, separating social groups, and changing the character of public life in ways that contradict the modern ideals of city life.[37] In the same way that these ideals have shaped cities all around the world, transformations of that ideal, similar to those occurring in São Paulo, are now affecting the character of urban space and public life. Thus it is important to broaden the discussion and include some comparison.

Los Angeles is an interesting case for this comparison for two reasons. First, several of the new instruments used to enforce segregation in cities around the world seem to have been first developed in Los Angeles and its metropolitan region. Some of these instruments are even considered to give the region its distinctive character. Consequently such devices are more evident in L.A. than in other places and may help us to understand the process that is still evolving in cities such as São Paulo. Second, Los Angeles's nonmodern public space is less explicitly uncivil than São Paulo's, and some of its practices of segregation may not be immediately readable. In this regard, São Paulo offers the clearer form and may guide the perception of L.A.'s characteristics. The juxtaposition of the two cases therefore illuminates both and suggests more general trends in the transformations of public space.[38]

Until the second half of the nineteenth century, Los Angeles and São Paulo were insignificant towns. Industrialization and migration from the turn of the century onward made them into large metropolitan regions. Spatially, however, they were laid out in completely different ways. São Paulo grew according to a center-oriented urban model of European lineage that has been modified only recently. Los Angeles, in contrast, has always been dispersed and decentralized, favoring the suburbs. It has always been what Fogelson (1967) calls a fragmented metropolis. Los Angeles epitomizes American antiurban sentiment, the valorization of nature, and a preference for small-scale communities, even within a global metropolis (Banham 1971; Weinstein 1996).[39] The metropolitan region expanded under the form of a fragmented "patchwork quilt of low-density suburban communities stretching over an extraordinarily irregular terrain of mountains, valleys, beaches, and deserts. Both tying the fabric together and giving it its unusual elastic-

ity was first a remarkable network of interurban electric railways and then an even more remarkable freeway system" (Soja 1996a: 433–34).[40]

Although the city has always had a center, which grew around the original eighteenth-century pueblo and continues to accommodate the main administrative structures and a dynamic financial district, the center's relationship to the rest of the city is not that of a traditional downtown. The Los Angeles metropolitan region does not have a single center but rather a network of dynamic nuclei. The renovated downtown is only one of the region's economic and financial centers.[41] Everything in the metropolitan region, from housing to industry, has always been dispersed, and it decentralized further as the city grew. As a result, contemporary Los Angeles is "polynucleated and decentralized" (Soja 1989:194). This pattern, which is not new but is certainly not common for industrial cities, has sometimes been evoked to characterize its urbanism as postmodern (Dear 1996:85; Soja 1989 and 1996a). As a similar formula of urban expansion and urban structuring appears in other metropolitan regions, it becomes a model. This is suggested, for example, by Garreau's assertion that "every single American city that *is* growing, is growing in the fashion of Los Angeles, with multiple urban cores" (Garreau 1991:3; emphasis in original).

Although Los Angeles's urbanism has never been dense and concentrated, until the 1940s the expansion of residence and manufacture was essentially contained within the limits of the county. Between 1940 and 1970, the population of Los Angeles's metropolitan region tripled to almost ten million. This growth, however, occurred in the form of mass suburbanization, as is attested by the boom in the incorporation of cities, some of them already gated and walled in the 1960s (Soja and Scott 1996:8–9). Much of this expansion was sustained by the growth of the military-industrial complex. After 1970, although the rates of population growth were not as high, they were still the highest of all American metropolitan regions. Moreover, they were much higher in the outer counties, especially Orange County, than in L.A. (Soja and Scott 1996:11). Characterized by Soja as a "peripheral urbanization," this expansion created a multicentered region on the basis of high-tech, post-Fordist industrialization, luxury residential enclaves, huge regional shopping centers, programmed environments for leisure (such as Disneyland), links to major universities and the Department of Defense, and various enclaves of cheap labor, mostly immigrants (Soja 1989: chapters 8 and 9). Development during the last three decades in Los Angeles's metropolitan region is a departure from the pattern of residential suburbanization with dependency on downtown jobs. It exemplifies a new "exopolis" in which not only residences but also employment, production, and consumption expanded on the periphery and created relatively independent nuclei. The same type of development started to be detected in São Paulo's metropolitan region in the 1980s, although on a rather smaller scale.

The urban restructuring of Los Angeles accompanied an accelerated economic restructuring during the 1970s and 1980s, which transformed it into the largest industrial center in the United States. While the rest of the country was deindustrializing, L.A.'s industrial sector continued to expand. This expansion, however, involved a "shift in industrial organization and technology from the Fordist-Keynesian practices of mass production and mass consumption . . . to what is increasingly described today as a post-Fordist system of flexible production and corporate development" (Soja 1996a:438). In other words, the region went through a complex process of simultaneous deindustrialization and reindustrialization. Moreover, this happened concomitantly with a pronounced expansion in the service sector. From 1969 to 1989, "the service sector increased its dominance, from 45 percent to 58 percent of all jobs, making Los Angeles a more service-oriented economy than the nation as a whole" (Ong and Blumemberg 1996:318). This shift toward service indicates both a transformation in the region's economic structure and the new international role of Los Angeles, which became the site of massive foreign investment, the major urban center on the Pacific Rim, and the second largest banking center in the United States. These transformations occurred as the region also received a massive influx of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, which transformed the region's ethnic and racial composition. The population of Los Angeles County "shifted from 70 percent Anglo to 60 percent non-Anglo between 1960 and 1990, mostly living in ethnic enclaves" (Soja and Scott 1996:14). By 1980, L.A. was the most racially segregated of all American cities (Soja and Scott 1996:10).

As in many other global cities (Sassen 1991), Los Angeles's economic restructuring accentuated a bifurcation in the labor market between a growing high-wage, high-skill group of workers and a mass of low-wage, low-skill workers, often undocumented. It is not surprising, then, that economic disparity, always a characteristic of the city, deepened. Although the same happened throughout the country, reversing the social gains of previous decades, it was accentuated in Los Angeles. Ong and Blumemberg (1996) show that between 1969 and 1989 both the per capita income and the median family income increased in the city and were higher than the national averages. However, in Los Angeles the income distribution was more unequal. The GINI coefficient for Los Angeles increased from .368 in 1969 to .401 in 1979 and .444 in 1989, whereas the national rates were, respectively,

.349, .365, and .396 (Ong and Blumemberg 1996:319). At the same time, the income ratio—that is, the percent of income going to the poorest fifth of all families as a percentage of the income going to the richest fifth—dropped from 11.8 percent in 1969 to 9.7 percent in 1979 and to 7.8 percent in 1989).[42] The poverty rate increased, jumping from 2.8 percent of the population in 1969 to more than 15 percent in 1989 and an estimated 23 percent in 1993 (Ong and Blumemberg 1996:318–19, 322, 328). Homelessness became a feature of the region as jobs were lost in the economic restructuring process, the welfare state was dismantled, and the cost of housing escalated (Wolch and Dear 1993; Wolch 1996). Given the ethnic and racial makeup of the contemporary city, it is no surprise to verify that the economic disparity "coincide[s] with racial and ethnic divisions, leaving African-American, Latinos, and Asians disproportionately represented at the bottom of the economic ladder" (Ong and Blumemberg 1996:312). Although Los Angeles's indicators of inequality are still lower than São Paulo's, disparities and inequalities in both metropolitan regions increased as the regions went through economic crises and economic restructuring. We can only wonder if Los Angeles's pattern coincides with that of São Paulo, where the most severe rates of inequality are exactly in those areas where economic performance and restructuring have been most successful and where the wealthiest are moving into fortified enclaves.

After the 1980s, it was clear that another type of urbanization was happening in L.A.'s metropolitan region, one that differed markedly both from previous centered urban forms and from the traditional residential suburbanization. Various expressions have been coined to describe the new phenomenon: "peripheral urbanization," "outer cities," "exopolis," "edge cities," "postsuburban," and so on. For Edward Soja, who uses the first three expressions, the decentralization of Los Angeles surpasses the region itself and becomes "globalized" (1996a: 435). He argues that the new urban dynamics require completely new analytical perspectives. They should, for example, be able to make sense of L.A.'s role as "the world's most productive and influential center for the manufacturing and marketing of hyperreality" (1996a: 453). This specialized role of the region would translate into comprehensive theme-parking and "scamscape."[43]

Among the many characteristics of L.A.'s peripheral urbanization that separate it from traditional industrial urbanism, particularly notable is the absence of a densely built urban environment. Even in the central districts of L.A., which are largely laid out according to modernist design, there is no dense urban fabric whose solids would generate spaces able to frame the public and promote a meaningful pedestrian street life. Streets are wide and

empty, and cars circulate rapidly. Walking is discouraged, and urban crowds do not congregate. Circulation in the public space is always mediated by the automobile—usually individual and private, since public transportation is limited and is certainly not a realistic alternative for the majority of the population. The primacy of the automobile constructs streets as the modernist, machine-oriented space of circulation and, therefore, as spaces for drivers, not for pedestrians. The typical streets in the Los Angeles region are obviously not corridor streets: they are usually wide, may have high speed limits, are truncated by large, empty spaces and gardens, and have empty or sometimes nonexistent sidewalks. These are the kinds of streets created by modernist devices, in which what is public is what is left over. As a result, "the city is experienced as a passage through space, with constraints established by speed and motion, rather than the static condition of solids, of buildings that define the pedestrian experience of traditional cities. The resulting detachment further privatizes experience, devalues the public realm, and, by force of the time spent in travel, contributes to isolation" (Weinstein 1996:35).

Even where corridor streets do provide a frame, as in the downtown area, street life is limited: people's activities are contained in the corporate buildings and their under- and overpass connections to shops, restaurants, and hotels. In other words, many functions of the street have been transferred to more sanitized, controlled, and privatized spaces, and the separation between the universe of wealth and business and that of poverty and homelessness becomes vast.[44]

Obviously, Los Angeles still has open and nonprivatized areas of relatively intense public use, in which something like a crowd can congregate. However, these areas seem to be mainly of two nonmodern types. One is the increasingly segregated and socially homogenized space in which people of only one social group circulate (Latino parks and Beverly Hills luxury shopping areas, for example). Such spaces do not favor heterogeneous, anonymous encounters. The other is specialized spaces mainly for leisure and consumption that have been transformed into a kind of theme park, like the Promenade in Santa Monica or the Venice boardwalk. These constitute the most significant category of spaces that still allow anonymous and heterogeneous encounters, and so one can only wonder what happens to the urban experience of encountering the other when it becomes something extraordinary—that is, something done only on weekends and in special spaces—and not a matter of routine.

Most of L.A.'s public life takes place in segregated, specialized, and enclosed environments such as malls, gated communities, entertainment centers, and theme parks of all sorts, whose creation Los Angeles pioneered.[45]

They are all privatized spaces, administered by enterprises or homeowners' associations whose interests are at odds with public administrations. Moreover, as Davis shows (1990: chapter 3), these private administrations may engage in various NIMBY ("not in my backyard") strategies to "protect their investment," passing all sorts of segregationist legislation to guarantee the exclusivity of their enclaves. These enclaves, usually for the better-off, exist in relation to the spaces left for the impoverished population—the parks and streets occupied by the homeless, the poor and ethnically diverse inner-city neighborhoods, the gang territories, the migrant camps and shantytowns.[46] In other words, the wealthy, the poor, and those from different ethnic groups do not encounter each other in proximate spaces in contemporary Los Angeles.

Los Angeles exemplifies the new urban form in a much more explicit way than São Paulo, where the old center-oriented urbanism still provides a stage for anonymous and heterogeneous encounters. In L.A., streets are emptier, and the new types of decentered spaces produce apartheid zones for different social groups. Postsuburbia as a type of urban form is not about "open and undecidable" borders; it is not about the creation of spaces for the vitality of the heterogeneous public. Postsuburban spaces are about clear delimitations and separations, rigid boundaries, and predictable, policed encounters. Los Angeles is not only fragmented but enclaved. Its postsuburban pattern has created a metropolitan region that is more unequal and more segregated than most American cities. Separation is guaranteed more by modernist design devices than by walls, but although these are more subtle than São Paulo's, they generate what Soja calls the "carceral city" and Davis labels "fortress L.A." (Soja 1996a: 448–50; Davis 1990: chapter 4).

Compared to that of São Paulo, however, Los Angeles's fortification is mild. Where rich neighborhoods like Morumbi use high walls, iron fences, and armed guards, the West Side of L.A. uses mostly electronic alarms and small signs announcing "Armed Response." While São Paulo's elite clearly appropriate public spaces—closing public streets with chains and other physical obstacles and installing private armed guards to control circulation—L.A.'s elite still show some respect for public streets. However, walled communities that appropriate public streets are proliferating, and one wonders if Los Angeles's more discreet pattern of separation and surveillance is not in part related to the fact that the poor already live far from the West Side, whereas in Morumbi they live right across the street. Moreover, the Los Angeles Police Department—although considered one of the most biased and violent police forces the United States—still seems effective and nonviolent compared to São Paulo's police.

Two analysts of Los Angeles have captured the transformations in the character of its built environment and public life in quite opposed and significant ways. Charles Jencks defends the new urbanism and the need to segregate spaces. In contrast, Mike Davis reads in the new configuration "the end of public space." I disagree with both while supporting many aspects of Davis's analysis.

Charles Jencks analyzes recent trends in Los Angeles's architecture in relation to a diagnosis of the city's social configuration. In his view, L.A.'s main problem is its heterogeneity, which inevitably generates chronic ethnic strife and explains episodes such as the 1992 uprising (1993:88). Since he considers this heterogeneity as constitutive of L.A.'s reality, and since his diagnosis of the economic situation is pessimistic, he predicts that ethnic tension will increase, the environment will become more defensive, and people will resort to increasingly diverse and mean-spirited measures of protection. Jencks sees the adoption of security devices as inevitable and as a matter of realism. Moreover, he discusses how this necessity is being transformed into art by styles that metamorphose hard-edged material needed for security into "ambiguous signs of inventive beauty and 'keep out'" (1993:89), and which design façades with their backs to the street to camouflage the contents of the houses. For him, the response to ethnic strife is a gimmicky stylistic slogan: "Defensible architecture and riot realism" (1993:89); this realism lies in architects' looking at "the dark side of division, conflict, and decay, and represent[ing] some unwelcome truths" (1993:91). Among these "truths" is the assertion that heterogeneity and strife are here to stay, that the promises of the melting pot can no longer be fulfilled. In this context, boundaries must be both clearer and more heavily defended. "Architecturally it [Los Angeles] will have to learn the lessons of Gehry's aesthetic and en-formality: how to turn unpleasant necessities such as chain-link fences into amusing and ambiguous signs of welcome/keep out, beauty/defensive space. . . . Defensible architecture, however regrettable as a social tactic, also protects the rights of individuals and threatened groups" (Jencks 1993:93).

Jencks identifies ethnic heterogeneity as the reason for Los Angeles's social conflicts and sees separation as a solution. His arguments resemble a form of reasoning that Balibar, following P. A. Taguieff, calls differentialist racism. It is a type of argument that naturalizes not racial belonging, but culture and racist conduct. It assumes that since cultural or ethnic differences are insurmountable, the attempt to abolish them would generate interethnic conflict and aggression. As a result, the argument goes, to avoid conflict people must "respect the 'tolerance thresholds', maintain 'cultural

distances' or, in other words, in accordance with the postulate that individuals are the exclusive heirs and bearers of a single culture, segregate collectivities" (Balibar 1991:22–23). What Jencks proposes and admires in the intervention of some architects and planners in L.A.'s urban environment is the development of an aesthetic of separation and of a built environment that precludes unprogrammed and heterogeneous encounters. He is obviously not interested in fostering any of the ideals of the modern public, but exactly their opposite.

But Los Angeles's defensible architecture also has critics, and the most famous of these is Mike Davis. For Davis (1990, 1991, 1993), social inequality and spatial segregation are central characteristics of Los Angeles, and his expression "Fortress L.A." refers to the type of space presently being created in the city.

> Welcome to post-liberal Los Angeles, where the defense of luxury lifestyles is translated into a proliferation of new repressions in space and movement, undergirded by the ubiquitous "armed response." This obsession with physical security systems, and, collaterally, with the architectural policing of social boundaries, has become a zeitgeist of urban restructuring, a master narrative in the emerging built environment of the 1990s. . . . We live in "fortress cities" brutally divided between "fortified cells"' of affluent society and "places of terror"' where the police battle the criminalized poor. (Davis 1990:223–24)

Davis ascribes the increasingly segregated and privatized Los Angeles to a master plan of the postliberal (i.e., Reagan-Bush Republican) elite, a theme he reiterates in his analysis of the 1992 riots (Davis 1993). To Davis, contemporary Los Angeles represents a new "class war at the level of the built environment" and demonstrates that "urban form is indeed following a repressive function in the political furrows of the Reagan-Bush era. Los Angeles, in its prefigurative mode, offers an especially disquieting catalogue of the emergent liaisons between architecture and the American police state" (Davis 1990:228).

Davis's writing is marked by an indignation fully supported by a wealth of evidence. Nevertheless, he sometimes collapses complex social processes into a simplified scenario of warfare, which his own rich description defies. Moreover, the coincidence of São Paulo's current segregation with political democratization advises skepticism in affirming direct correspondences between political intentions and urban transformations. In spite of this limitation, Davis elaborates a remarkable critique of social and spatial segregation and associates the emerging urban configuration with the crucial themes of social inequality and political options. For him, there is nothing

inevitable about "fortress architecture," and it has deep consequences for the way in which public space and public interactions are shaped.

In both São Paulo and Los Angeles the public space created by enclaves and devices of the "defensible" style fosters the reproduction of inequalities, isolation, and fragmentation.[47] As urban orders based on enclosure and on the policing of boundaries, these cities deny the modern ideal. Realizing how Los Angeles's contemporary urban environment is at odds with the modern public, Davis treats it as the "destruction of public space" (Davis 1990: chapter 4). Yet this unqualified phrase evades many questions. Are we dealing with the destruction of public space in general or with the creation of another type of public space, one that is undemocratic, does not tolerate indeterminacy, and negates the modern ideals of openness, heterogeneity, and equality? After all, the soviet type of monumental, modernist space in Moscow or Warsaw and the modernist type of Brasília are still public.[48] In the same way that the industrial city did not invent public space but only its modern version, today's destruction of modern public space is leading not to the end of public space altogether but to the creation of another kind. Privatization, enclosure, and distancing devices offer means not only of withdrawing from and undermining a certain public space (modern) but also of creating another public sphere: one that is fragmented, articulated, and secured by separation and high-tech devices, and in which equality, openness, and accessibility are not organizing values. The new spaces structure public life in terms of real inequalities: differences are not to be dismissed, taken as irrelevant, left unattended, or disguised in order to sustain ideologies of universal equality or myths of peaceful cultural pluralism. The new urban environment enforces inequalities and separations. It is an undemocratic and nonmodern public space.

Of course, many of those who have analyzed the new features of Los Angeles urbanism, such as Edward Soja (1996a and b) and Michael Dear (1996), would simply call it postmodern. However, they thereby emphasize certain aspects of L.A. life, such as flexibility, cultural syncretism, "social heterodoxy," and borderlessness, that directly contradict the aspects I have been emphasizing. Although these aspects are also part of L.A.'s public life, they are not the main features by which the built environment is organized. The notion of the postmodern is usually associated with experiences of fluidity and borderlessness; L.A.'s present urban environment is marked by opposite characteristics.[49]

São Paulo and Los Angeles probably have as many differences as similarities. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of the two cases is especially suggestive. Their similarities suggest that patterns of segregation and urban re-

structuring cannot be understood only as local responses to local processes. Different cities constitute their particular built environment and public spaces in a broad dialogue, using instruments that are part of a common repertoire. The Garden City model, modernist design and city planning, and now the fortified enclaves, "outer cities," and theme parks are part of the repertoire from which different cities around the world are now drawing. At earlier times, there have been other elements in this repertoire, such as the Laws of the Indies, the corridor street, and Haussmann-style boulevards. The use of forms from the contemporary repertoire articulates a strong separation of social groups in a process that transcends the built environment. The fear of crime and the production of stereotypes of dangerous others (the poor and the migrant, for example) are other dimensions of the same process. Paulistanos' intense fear of crime and the city's high rates of violence and its high walls might tell us about similar, as yet less extreme tendencies in Los Angeles. In São Paulo tensions are higher than in L.A. because the ghetto is not as enclosed, inequalities are more pronounced, violence is greater, and the old urban model still keeps crowds on the streets.

The differences between the two cities, however, point up the specific histories and choices of each society. While Los Angeles is a metropolitan region that seems always to have favored dispersion, suburbanization, and privatization, São Paulo developed according to an European model that valued the center, where the main economic activities and the residences of the elites were concentrated. When the city expanded, the poor were sent further out, but the elite remained in the center. Although the center's importance has been an organizing principle in the city since its origins as the colonial village, São Paulo's urban environment is composed of various layers of experiments. It has expanded quickly and without much concern for historical preservation. For example, during this century Avenida Paulista has had two incarnations: as a street of mansions for the coffee producers and as an agglomeration of modernist buildings for corporations. The cityscape bears various inscriptions: an old downtown framed by neoclassical plans and architecture; the Garden City plan of upper-class neighborhoods; the Haussmann-inspired avenues; the vernacular architecture of the autoconstructed houses; the improvisation of the slums; and the postmodern-inspired design of the contemporary fortified enclaves. Some of these elements left a stronger mark on the built environment, as they were able to dictate its restructuring. The most important effect of the fortified enclaves seems to be exactly this: they alter the principle of centrality that has always organized the city space. After the radical opening toward the periphery in the 1940s (inspired by Haussmann), the present investment in "outer cities" and enclaves is probably the most radical change to the built environment, one that inaugurates a new pattern of segregation. The juxtaposition with Los Angeles indicates that the instruments causing this new pattern in São Paulo are not exclusively local but are part of a broader repertoire. It also suggests that we are dealing not only with a change in design styles but with a change in the character of public space. The new urban form challenges the modern and democratic public space.

Although political projects may not always be read directly into the urban environment, especially given its multilayered quality, the instruments available in the urban environment are related to different political projects. To use them, however, may not necessarily fulfill the intended goal. In fact, the authoritarian Haussmann created democratic spaces in Paris (Clark 1984), and the socialist modernists created undemocratic, empty spaces in Brasília and many other places around the world (Holston 1989). In what ways do urban form and political processes coincide in cities such as São Paulo and Los Angeles, and in what ways do they diverge? What democratic processes might be counteracting urban transformations and vice versa? If social inequalities seem to organize the urban environment instead of being put aside by a tolerance for differences and undecidable borders, what kind of model can we adopt for the public realm? Is democracy still possible in the new city of walls? What kind of polity will correspond to the new, fragmented public sphere in which interests are privately expressed—by homeowner associations, for example—and in which it becomes difficult to defend the common good?

CONTRADICTORY PUBLIC SPACE

In spite of their specificities, São Paulo and Los Angeles are today more socially unequal and more dispersed than they used to be, and many of the changes to the urban environment are causing separation between social groups, which are increasingly confined to homogeneous enclaves. Privatization and rigid boundaries (either material or symbolic) continuously fragment what used to be more open spaces and serve to keep groups apart. Nevertheless, the experience of the urban environment is not the only experience of the residents of theses cities, and it is certainly not their only experience either of social difference or of democracy. One of the qualities of Los Angeles repeatedly emphasized by its analysts is its multiculturalism, the presence of expressive numbers of different ethnic groups changing the makeup of a once predominantly Anglo city. These are the characteristics highlighted by those who, like Soja and Dear, look at its postmodern urbanism from a

positive perspective instead of emphasizing its bleaker side, as Davis tends to do. Soja, for example, talks about a new cultural syncretism (Latino, Asian American), cross-cultural fusion, and coalition building (1996a). There is also talk about hybridity and border cultures. Some mention the importance of the mass media and new forms of electronic communication and their role in blurring boundaries and bridging distances, not just in L.A. but everywhere. In São Paulo, opposition to the segregationist and antidemocratic impulses of the built environment comes partly from the media but mainly from other sources: the democratization process, the proliferation of social movements, and the expansion of citizenship rights of the working classes and of various minorities.

In both São Paulo and Los Angeles, therefore, we can detect opposing social processes, some promoting tolerance of difference and the melting of boundaries, and some promoting segregation, inequality, and the policing of boundaries. In fact, we have in these cities political democracy with urban walls; democratic procedures used to promote segregation, as in the NIMBY movements; and multiculturalism and syncretic formations with apartheid zones, promoted by segregated enclaves. These opposing processes are not unrelated but rather tensely connected. They express the contradictory tendencies that characterize both societies. Both are going through significant transformations. Both have been unsettled by the opening and blurring of boundaries (migration and economic restructuring in Los Angeles, and democratization and economic crisis and restructuring in São Paulo). If we look for a moment at other cities around the world where enclaves are increasing, we see that some are going through similar processes of deep transformation and democratization: Johannesburg and Buenos Aires, for example. The unsettling of social boundaries is upsetting, especially for the elite. Their movement to build walls is thus understandable. The problem is that the consequences of fragmentation, privatization, and walling are severe. Once walls are built, they alter public life. The changes we are seeing in the urban environment are fundamentally undemocratic. What is being reproduced at the level of the built environment is segregation and intolerance. The space of these cities is the main arena in which these antidemocratic tendencies are articulated.

Among the conditions necessary for democracy is that people acknowledge those from different social groups to be co-citizens, having similar rights despite their differences. However, cities segregated by walls and enclaves foster the sense that different groups belong to separate universes and have irreconcilable claims. Cities of walls do not strengthen citizenship but rather contribute to its corrosion. Moreover, this effect does not depend

directly on either the type of political regime or on the intentions of those in power, since the design of the enclaves and walls itself entails a certain social logic. The new urban morphologies of fear give new forms to inequality, keep groups apart, and inscribe a new sociability that runs against the ideals of the modern public and its democratic freedoms. When some people are denied access to certain areas and when different groups do not interact in public space, then references to ideals of openness, equality, and freedom as organizing principles for social life are no longer possible, even as fiction. The consequences of the new separateness and restriction of public life are serious: contrary to what Jencks (1993) thinks, defensible architecture and planning may promote conflict instead of preventing it, by making explicit the social inequalities and the lack of common ground. In fact, we may argue that the Los Angeles uprising was caused by social segregation rather than by the lack of separation and defenses.[50]

If the experiences of separateness expressed in the urban environment become dominant in their societies, people will distance themselves from democracy. However, given the disjuncture between different types of experiences in cities such as Los Angeles and São Paulo, there is also hope that the reverse could happen: that the experiences of the blurring of boundaries and of democratization will one day extend into the built environment.